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AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2277 
ADELAIDE M. HAYES, IN HER OWN RIGHT AND AS 
EXECUTRIX OF THE LAST WILL .AND TESTA-
MENT OF WILLIAM R. HAYES, DECEASED, ET 
AL., Appellant, 
versus 
WILLIAM L. PARKER, Appellee. 
~:"' ADELAIDE l\L HAYES, EXECUTRIX UNDER THE 
' LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF WILLIAM R. 
____ HAYES, DECEASED, Appellant, 
versi1,s 
. WILLIAM L. PARKER, Appellee .. 
CONSOLIDATED CAUSES. 
PETITION FOR APPEAL. 
1STATEMENT. 
This is a petition for an appeal by Adelaide M. Hayes, in 
her own right and as Executrix of the last will and testament 
of William R. Hayes, deceased, from a decree of the Circuit 
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Court of Norfolk City (Judge Spindle sitting) entered in the 
above consolidated cause on December 5, 1939 (R., p. 854), 
2~ awarding William *L. Parker an attorney's fee of $21,-
262.00 (twenty-five per cent of $85,048.00 found to be 
the value of the estate of William R. Hayes) for services per-_ 
formed in connection with settlement of that estate. 
Commissioner- ·Pilcher to whom this matter was referred 
had, after finding the net value to be $89,394.00, recommended 
an allowance of approximately twenty-five per cent of that 
sum or $22,500.00. Except for the reduction made in these 
:figures the decree confirmed the Commissioner's report (R., 
p. 80), and overruled petitioner's exceptions thereto (R., p. 
838). 
Before this controversy arose petitioner had· made pay-
ments to Mr. Parker amounting to $9,850.00 ($10,020.03 less 
$170.03 for printing), Exhibits 38, 38-A, from which his dis-
bursements amounting to $1,144.27, Exhibit 55, were deducted, 
leaving a net credit of' $8,705.73, Com. Report (R., p. 122). 
Subsequently, due to the fact that most of the estate securi-
ties had been transferred to the name of Mr. Parker for rea-
sons which need not be gone into here, estate dividend and 
interest checks were used by Mr. Par.ker and applied on,his ac-
count. At the time the decree was entered such collections__/' 
totaled $2,096.87, Decree (R., p. 856). The balance due was, · 
therefore, $10,459.40 for which judgment was given in the- , 
decree (R., p. 856). 
The decree also awarded to Mr. Parker the costs of. the 
reference amounting to $1,676.00 (R., p. 856). -
*Certain additional Court costs in Virginia and fees 3* 
and 'Couct costs in litig·ation in New York, which will be 
referred to later, amounting- to $3,115.71, had been paid by 
Mrs. Hayes, and she still owes premiums for two years 
amounting- to $217.34 on her bond as Executrix. (Exhibit 37, 
R., p. 495). 
If the dooree is allowed to stand the total cost of settling 
the estate, exclusive o'f our charges for services in contesting 
Mr. Parker's claim and preparing and filing an account with 
the Commissioner of Accounts, will be $27,415.32, or some-
thing more than thirty-two per cent of the sum found to be 
the net value of the estate's assets : 
Mr. Parker's fee 
Mr. Parker's disbursements 
Additional fe·es and Court costs paid by Mrs. Ha.yes 
or due · 
Costs of reference 
$21,262.00 
1,144.27 
3,333.05 
1,676.00 
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The estate's assets consisted entirely of personal property 
to the total value of $72,291.71-stocks and bonds appraised 
at $61,085.00, life insurance payable to the estate amount-
ing to $10,214.22, a bank deposit of $992.49. Exhibits 20, 21. 
About six months prior to his death Mr. Hayes conveyed 
certain real estate in Orange County, 'New York, to Mrs. 
Hayes. As suit was brought to set the deed aside, this prop-
erty, valued at $15,000.00, was treated as a part of the estate 
in so far. as it had any bearing on the value of Mr. Parker's 
services. 
4* *Soon after the death of Mr. Hayes, on April 27, 1934, 
Mr. Parker was employed. The matter of compensation 
was discussed and Mr. Parker was asked whether he would 
accept the employment on a contingent basis. He declined, 
saying he did not work that way; that he preferred to have 
payments from time to time. Mrs. Hayes testified (R., p. 
494): 
''Q. Now, on this first occasion, or subsequently, did you 
have any arrangement with Mr. Parker in reg·ard to fees t 
"\Vas there anything said about fees? 
''.A. Yes. I asked Mr. Parker if he wanted a retainer. He 
said No. I asked l1im if the transaction would be on a con-
tingent basis. He said, No, he did not work that way, that 
he would prefer to have payments from time to time. I asked 
him about what the litigation would cost, and he said he could 
not tell, it depended on what work he would have to do." 
The will was executed in .Newburgh, New York, on July 
15, 1932. It left all the property of Mr. Hayes to Adelaide 
M. Grady (now Mrs. Hayes) and named her as Executrix. 
The following· September Mr. Hayes and Miss Grady were 
married in Elizabeth City, North Carolina. They spent the 
winters of 1932, 1933 and 1934 at Virginia Beach, and in the ~ 
early spring of the latter year they decided to build a home 
there and make it their permanent residence. Mr. Hayes had 
for a great many years made his home in Newburgh, OrangE'. 
-County, New York, and one of the first questions that came 
up was whether domicile was there or in Virginia at the time 
of his death. It was thoug·ht there might be a contest and 
the question was carefully considered because, under our 
laws, Mrs. Hayes, as J\fr. Hayes' widow, was entitled to 
5* t_he entire *estate without the will, while in New York 
State she vtould, as his wife, take only $10,000.00 plus 
half the residue. After an investigation· Mr. Parker con-
cluded Mr. Hayes was domiciled in Princess Anne County, 
Virginia, at the time of his death. The will was accordingly 
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probated there on May 28 before the Clerk of the Circuit 
Court and Mrs. Hayes was appointed Executrix. The Na-
tional Surety Company went on her bond as surety in the 
required amount of $51,000.00 under an arrangement between 
the Surety Company, National Bank of Commerce, Mrs. 
Hayes and Mr. Parker whereby it was agreed that all checks 
against estate funds would be countersig11ed by the latter 
and the estate securities would be held in a safe deposit box 
in the joint names of Mrs. Hayes and l\ir. Parker. 
A few days after the will was probated, Mary Hayes Guil-
foil, sister of Mr. Hayes, appealed from the order of pro-
bate. The appeal was withdrawn on July 19, 1934. The next 
step taken by Mrs. Guilfoil was to apply for letters of ad-
, ministration in Orange County, New York. The application 
was not opposed and letters were issued on September 11, 
1934. In October, 1934, Mrs. Guilfoil, as Administratrix, filed 
a bill in equity ag·ainst l\Irs. Hayes in the District Court of 
the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia asking 
for an accounting and a decree directing delivery to her of 
the estate's assets. A motion to dismiss was argued and 
overruled. This case was not brought on for trial on the 
merits. Later Mrs. Guilfoil .brought a further suit in the 
same District, the purpose of which was to contest the 
6""' validity *of the will. The Court dismissed the bill for 
lack of jurisdiction and its decision ,vas affirmed by the 
Circuit Court of Appeals. An application for a writ of cer-
tiorari was denied. About a year later Mrs. Guilfoil brought 
suit in the Circuit Court of Princess Anne County. for an 
issue devisavit vel non. There the parties went to trial on 
the sole issue of domicile. It was held to be in Virginia and 
the lower Court "s decision was affirmed by this Court in the 
case of Mary Hayes Gitilfoil v . .Adelaide 1.11.. Hayes, 169 Va. 
548. There was, too, the suit in New York, previously men-
tioned, to set aside the deed to the ;Newburgh real estate. 
This cause was not tried. In pursuance of a stipulation by 
means of which a continuance was obtained by contestant, it 
was dismissed on the merits after the decision of this Court 
in the Princess Anne County case. Mr. Parker was also, of 
course, called upon to attend to many administrative mat-
ters. 
In pursuance of the arrangement made at the outset, Mr. 
Parker was paid $3,750.00 in 1934, $1,500.00 in 1935, .$2,500.00 
in 1936, $2,170.03 (less $170.03 for printing) in 1937 and 
$100.00 in 1938, Exhibit 38. 
In June, 1938, Mr. Parker presented an account, Exhibit 
1, in which his charges were summarized as follows: 
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1. Probate of Will 
2. Duties of Executrix 
3. Controversy with surety on bond of Executrix 
4. Estate securities and investments 
5. Virginia Beach house 
6. Newburgh real estate 
7. Straus & Company mortgage bonds 
8. First will contest ( Circuit Court of Princess 
Anne County) 
9. Snit in State of New York to set aside deed con-
veying ,Newburgh real estate 
7ts *10 Applica.tion of Mary Hayes Guilfoil for 
letters of administration in Orange Coun-
ty, New York 
11. Snit of Mary Hayes Guilfoil, Administratrix, 
in United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Virginia, to recover assets in 
hands of Adelaide M. Hayes 
12. Second will contest (United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia) 
13. Third will contest (Circuit Court of Princess 
Anne County) 
14. Tax matters 
15. Snit of Samuel C. Johnson 
16. Miscellaneous 
Total fees 
Disbursements 
I j 
Total fees and disbursements 
$ 500.00 
3,750.00 
· 2,000.00 
1,500.00 
500.00 
350.00 
2,500.00 
3,000.00 
1,500.00 
1,590.00 
1,750.00 
5,000.00 
4,500.00 
500.00 
250.00 
750.00 
29,850.00 
1,144.27 
$30,994.27 
A summary of the services claimed to have been performed 
is attached marked '' Schedule A''. There we have dealt with 
the services under two general headings, namely, Litigated 
Matters and Miscellaneous Estate Matters. While Items 1 
and 10 were, of course, not litigated matters, it seemed to us 
they could be more appropriately considered under the 
former, rather than under the latter, heading. "Schedule 
A'' will, we think, give the Court a fairly comprehensive un-
derstanding of the nature, character and extent of Mr. Park-
er's services. 
Payment of the account was declined and in the latter part 
of July, 1938, Mr. Parker brought snit (R., p. 3), claiming an 
attorney's lien on the estate securities and asking for an ac .. 
counting- and a judgment for the amount found to be due him. 
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It appeared from the bill that estate interest and divi-
8* dend checks which *had come in to Mr. Parker after the 
account was rendered were being used and applied on 
his account and there was every reason to suppose this prac-
tice woul~ be. continued. Upon the refusal of Mr. Parker 
to transfer· the estate securities to Mrs. Hayes, as Execu-
trix, upon the .making of satisfactory a1~rangements with the 
Surety for the transfer and the giving of a bond to secure 
his claim (letters, R., pp. 31, 32), an indep~ndent bill (R., p. 
20) was filed on behalf of Mrs. Hayes asking· that Mr. Parker 
be enjoined from using estate funds and required to turn 
over to her, as Executrix, its securities and funds. Mr. 
Parker then filed a cross-bill (R., p. 33), and asked that the 
two suits be consolidated which was done over petitioner's 
objection. Demurrers were :filed by petitioner setting up that 
l\:fr. Parker's action was one for the collection of a debt, a 
matter over which a Court of Law alone had jurisdiction,. 
but they, as well as a motion made later on for an issue out 
of chancery or a hearing ore tenus, were overruled, and all 
other issues raised by the pleadings were referred to Com-
missioner Pilcher for determination and report (R., p. 76). 
The Commissioner found (Report, R., p. 80) that many 
of the items of service were of necessity interrelated and 
overlapping· and did not attempt to pass on the reasonable-
ness of the individual charges made by Mr. Parker. He held 
that '' for all practical purposes the remuneration of Parker 
· was contingent upon a successful termination of the litiga-
tion involved'', and recommended, as stated above, the 
9* allowance of twenty-five per cent of *the amount found 
to be the net value of the estate, or $22,500.00. We con-
tended that only half the estate, after first deducting $10,-
000.00, was at stake in the litigation-what Mrs. Guilfoil 
would have received had domicile been found to be in New 
York State ·and the will invalidated; that a quantum meruit 
was the measure of Mr. Parker's compensation, but the Com-
missioner and later the Court held against us on both points. 
There were also Court costs and· fees paid to New York at ... 
torneys to which no consideration was given in ass~ssing the 
award on a contingent fee .basis. 
The Commissioner also found that Mr. Parker had an at-
torney's lien on the estate securities. Neither the Commis-
sioner nor the Court passed upon his rig·ht to use estate in-
come. The securities were put in his name for a specific pur-
. pose, namely, to prevent them from being seized by Mrs. Guil-
foil by legal process (R., pp. 164, 168), and were admittedly 
held in trust (R., p. 15) and the income therefrom prior to 
this controversy had been deposited in the estate's account 
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(R., p. 241). This practice should have been continued and 
Mr. Parker ought not to have taken advantage of his trust 
position. Moreover, he had no legal right to apply estate 
funds ( trust money) to the payment of his claim against 
Mrs. Hayes (7 C. J. S. 1096; Tomlinson v. Flanagan, 190 N. 
E. 785, 287 .Mass. 38). The Commissioner was wrong in hold-
ing he had an attorney's lien, because what control he had 
was for a specific purpose (1Vatts v. Newberry, 107 Va. 233), 
the element of possession in the sense required was lack-
10• ing and the securities belonged to the •estate while his 
claim was against Mrs. Hayes individually. However, 
we are not insisting on these points here bee.a use the matters 
in controversy will be disposed of by the decision of this 
Court and determination of such questions will then be a 
matter of no practical importance. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
- Numerous exceptions were filed to the Commissioner's re-
port, but petitioner rests her appeal upon errors committed 
by the lower Court only in the following particulars : 
1. In failing to hold that only one-half the estate, after first 
deducting $10,000.00, was a.t stake. 
2. In holding Mr. Parker's remuneration was contingent 
upon a successful termination of the litigation, in allowing 
him a contingent fee of a per cent of the amount at risk, or 
as much as $21,262.00 on any theory, and in failing to hold 
the services were performed on a quantitm meruit and fix 
. his compensation on that basis. 
3. In failing ( on a contingent fee basis) to deduct from the 
$85,048.00 found to be the value of the estate, disbursements 
amounting to $3,077.32 for Court costs and expenses before 
giving :Mr. Parker a percentage, and from :Mr .. Parker's per-
centage allowance, fees paid to iN ew York counsel, $1,400.00, 
for services in connection with the -litigation. 
4. In charging petitioner with the costs of the reference. 
5. In failing to g-rant an issue out of chancery. 
ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE ESTATE, AFTER FIRST 
DEDUCTING $10,000.00, WAS AT STAKE. 
As heretofore pointed out, Mrs. Hayes was, under the laws 
of Virginia, either as wife or beneficiary, entitled to the 
11 • *whole estate, but in New York State, if domicile had 
been found to be there, she would, as his widow, take 
only $10,000.00 plus one-half of the residue, and the ha.lance 
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would go to Mrs. Guilfoil. It was this remaining sum onlv, 
we contend, that l\frs. Guilfoil was seeking in the various suits 
broug·ht in her behalf. If the marriage could not be attacked 
after the death of Mr. Hayes then that sum was bound to 
represent the amount at risk. Mr. Parker satisfied himself 
it could not be for he said in his account (Exhibit 1, Item 13): 
'' A search was made for all the decisions of the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina interpreting this statute and the 
conclusion was reached that the validity of such a marriage 
could not be attacked after the death of one of the contract-
ing parties.'' 
On the argument Mr. Parker's attorney took the opposite 
position. The Commissioner found the question an open one 
(R., p. 118), and the lower Court concurred in .his holding. 
The answer turns on whether the marriage was "void" or 
''voidable" under the North Carolina statute. The in-
validity of a "void" marriage can be maintained in any pro-
ceeding· in which the fact of marriag·e may be material, di-
rect or. collateral, but a marriage that is "voidable" only 
may only be attacked during the lifetime of the parties. 18 
R. C. L., pp. 446,447: 
'' Collateral Attack.-Under ordinary circumstances, the 
effect of a void marriap;e, so far as concerns the conferring 
of legal rights upon the parties, is as t.houg·h no marriage 
had ever taken place. And therefore being good for no 
legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any 
12* *proC'ee.ding in which the fact of marriage may be ma-
terial, either direct or collateral, in any civil court be-
tween any parties at any time, whether before or after the 
death of either or both the husband and wife, a.nd upon mere 
proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be 
disregarded or treated as non-existent by the court. But a 
voidable marriag·e is valid for all purposes until a.voided 
or annulled, and it cannot be attacked collaterally, but only 
in a direct proceeding during the lifetime of the parties. 
Hence on the death of either, the marriage cannot be im-
peached, and is made good ab in-itio." 
'l111e N ortb Carolina statute, Sec. 2495 North Carolina Code, 
is set forth in the Commissioner's report (R., pp. 108, 109). 
We rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina in the case of TT' afters v. 1TVatters (1915), 84 S. E. 
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703, in which it was held that a marriage between persons, one 
of whom was incompetent, was made voidable only by the 
statute. The Court said, p. 704: ~ 
"It will be seen from this that the only marriages that 
are absolutely void are those in the proviso. As to the others, 
they are not void, ipso facto, but must be declared so; that 
is, they are voidable." 
The marriages mentioned in the proviso referred to were 
those between a white person and a negro or an Indian and 
bigamous marriages. . 
Counsel for Mr. Parker says that in declaring that the 
word "void" meant "voidable", as to all marria,ges other 
than those mentioned in the proviso, the Court went beyond 
the issues and was indulging in a dictum. In the Watters 
case there was birth of issue as well as cohabitation which 
brought the case squarely within the proviso. But the Court 
held the complaining husband had ratified and confirmed 
13* the marriage, even if the wife was *mentally incompetent 
a.t the time thereof. If such a marriage had been abso-
lutely void from the hegfoning, there would ha.ve been noth-
ing to confirm. Thus it appears that the Court's decision 
was based on the voidable. character of the marriage and that 
the Court's interpretation of the word ''void'' was not mere 
c]iP.tum. Mr. Robert M:. Hug·hes, Jr., reached the same con-
~lusion (R., p. 767). As all the authorities are dealt with by 
Mr. Hughes (R.., pp. 765-771), a further discussion of the 
subject here would seem unnecessary. 
But., in our view of this case, l\frs. Guilfoil never intenderl 
contesting· the marriage and we do not get to that question. 
It is true the issue was raised in the pleadings either di-
rectly or indirectly. It was raised on the appeal from the 
Clerk's order of probate in Princess Anne .County but in-
stead of trying the issue contestant took a non-suit. It was 
au issue in the first suit in the Federal Court in Virginia but 
contestant did notl1ing- to bring that case on for trial. The 
issue was again raised in the pleadings in the New York suit 
to set aside· the deed to the N ewbun.rh real property but. that 
case was nevei· tried. ... 
Corning· down to the Princess Anne County case, the validity 
of the marriage was squarely put in issue there by a special 
plea that Mrs. Guilfoil was not a party interested. The bill 
of complaint was predicated on the assumption there was no 
marriage and contestant was the sole heir and distributee of 
Mr. Hayes. In the answer filed on belialf of Mrs. Hayes, it 
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was averred _that on the 12th day of September, 1932, 
14• she and Mr. -Hayes •were lawfully married and con-
tinued' so until the latter's death. It also appears on 
page 55 of the printed record, Exhibit 9, that the marriag·e 
was proved by the .introduction of a marriag·e certificate as 
well as by the testimony of Mrs. Hayes. Mr. Parker said 
in his brief on behalf of Mrs. Hayes, Exhibit 4: 
"It is not disputed that prior to the death of the decedent, 
he and the appellant (appellee) were lawfully married and 
so continued until his death.'' 
In the petition for appeal, Exhibit 9, pp. 3, 13, it was 
stated: · 
-" At the ·hearing it appeared ·that the testator had been 
married in Elizabeth City • • *. So that it appears that the 
only question, upon this appeal, is as to the sufficiency of all 
the evidence to show that an es.tablished domicile had, shortly 
before the testator"s death, been changed from New York 
to this State. ~ >I: * We l1a.ve simply these two facts-mar-
riage and the building of a house at the Beach, to support 
the theory of a change of domicile. =9il ~ • The defendant, het-
self, admits that the alleged cl1ange of domicile was not de-
cided upon until long after tlle marriage. It is obvious from 
this that neither she nor the testator contemplated a r.hange 
of domicile as necessary on account of the marriage. • * *'' 
This Court found tl1at tbe legality of the marriage had been 
agreed to. This was the effect of what was said and done, 
but there was apparently no formal stipulation. 
It seems tons that wl1en the plaintiff in that case allowed 
the averments in the answer and plea and also the proofs 
to go unchallenged, the marriage was thereby established and 
that the issue then became res ad,iindicata. 15 R. C. L. 976, 
977, 980,981; 34 C. J. 818, 913; Oklahoma v. Texas, 256 U. S. 
70; Perry v. McLendon, 62 Ga. 598. Why did contestant 
15• not take advantag·e of "'this opportunity of attacking the 
marriage, if she had ever intended doing so? She hacl 
the right to do so if the marriage was ''void'' and! if success-
ful, she would immediately J1ave become an interested party 
and entitled to contest the will. The answer is, we think, 
inescapable-counsel for Mrs. Guilfoil never intended con-
testin~ the marriage, knew there was no chance of success-
fully doing so .either on the fncts or the law. 
It is claimed that: if contestant had been successful on the 
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domicile question she would then have pressed the marriage 
issue in New York State and for this reason t.he whole estate · 
was at risk. But this was simply an assumption on the part 
of counsel _for Mr. Parker. There was no basis for it. It is 
inconceivable that contestant would in the Princess Anne 
County case have let the allegations and proof go unchal-
lenged and dealt with the marriage issue so lightly, and with-
out res~rvation, if she ever had intended to contest it The 
fact is there was no reason for Mrs. ;Hayes to go to New York 
and she would not have done so. The estate's assets were 
Jtll in Virgini_a and, ~ven if domicile had been found to be in 
New York, she would still_ have administered on the estate 
h~re which she had the right to do. So there was no chance 
of. cont~stant ever getting in a different or more favorable. 
tribunal. The alleg·ations in the pleadings proved to be 
nothing more than threats. Mr. Parker's statement_ that the 
marriage could not~ attacked after the death of Mr. Hayes 
shows he never took them seriouslv and contestant's 
16* *f~ilure to act on them in the Princess Anne. County case 
shows conclusively she never intended doing so. 
We do not think it could be f nirlv and reasonablv said that. 
that part of the (}state which Mrs. ·Haves was entitled to un-
der tiie laws of New York State. as the wiclow of Mr. Haves • 
. was at stake i:p. the sense thtlt Mr. Pari{er was entitled to ~. 
percentage of it .. Of c;ourse, he i~ entitled to be compens.atecl 
9.n a quantit1n ·meruit for l1i~ services in making the investig·a:-
tion whicb le<J to the eon~lusion that the marriage was not 
. contestable after the death of Mr. Hayes. 
THE COURT ERR.ED IN ALLOWING A CONTINGENT 
FEE OF A PERCENTAGE OF THE AMOUNT AT 
RISK. A. QU.ANTTJ.M MERDIT WAS TEE PRQPEU 
MEASURE. THE AJiLOvVING WAS M ... t\.NIFESTLY 
EXCESSIVE ON .A.NY GROUND. 
it. wiil be seen from '' Sehednle A" that the factual issues 
tendered by the pie~dings i_n the yariQus suits. were the same 
~nd _that preparati_o!is made by 1\fr. Parker for the trial of 
the :fir$t will contest nec~ssijrily prepared him for the trial 
of all the other cases blithe facts; that only one factual issue, 
that of domicile, was ever tried; that only two of the five suits 
instituted were tried, namely, the :.;econd suit in the Federal 
Court on the legal quest.ion of the jurisdiction of that Court 
to hear and determine a will contest and the suit in Princes~ 
, Anne County on the factual issue of domicile; that the litiga-
tion was not nearly as extensive as a casual examination of 
the record would indicate. 
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17* *It will also appear that_ the administrative work was 
relat~vely simple. As a whole it might appropriately 
be characterized as run-of-mine work, such as- a lawyer might 
expect in the handling· of an estate. Much of it might have 
beeri. done without making a charg·e as an incident to the liti-
g·ation, and some of it was necessarily incidental thereto. The 
estate's assets were liquid, there was but one beneficiary, 
very few debts ( only one being contested), no intricate legal 
questions to be solved. There were, concededly, many details 
to be attended to. 
The aggregate of his charges for the litigation is $17,750.00. 
By segregating his services for purely administrative work, 
he succeeded in building up a total charge of $12,100.00. His 
charges for services completed in the first four months of hii) 
employment are noteworthy. The will was probated on May 
28, 1934---Item 1, charge $500.00; the non-suit in the first will 
contest was taken on July 19, 1934-Item 8, charge $3,000.00; 
the Virginia Beach house was completed in July or August, 
1934-Item 5, charg·e $500.00; letters of administration were 
granted to Mrs. Guilfoil on September 11, 1934--Item 10, 
charge $1,500.00-total up to the latter date $5,500.00. In 
addition at least seventy-five per cent of the services enu-
merated under Items 2, 3 and 4, aggregating $7,250.00, was 
completed prior to October 1, 1934, and work had been begun 
on some of the other matters prior to that date. To recapitu--
late, Mr. Parker's charges for the ft;rst four months are at 
least $11,000.00. 
18* #His charges of $2,000.00 for services in connection 
with the controvery with the Surety Company, of 
$1,500.00 for ad;;rising the purchase of nine lot~ of stock and 
keeping in touch with conditions that might affect their value, 
of $2,500.00 for studying data of the Bondholders' Commit-
tees of the Strauss bonds and writing· nine letters in connec 4 
tion therewith are so outrageously high that no comment is 
necessary. They are fairly representative and illustrate, we 
think, the unreasonableness of all the charges. It would ap-
pear to us that all of the administrative work could appro- · 
priately be included in Item 1---Duties of Exccutrix--and that 
an allowance of $3,000.00 as sug·gested by Mr. Hug·hes (R., 
p. 719). (a statement for the Commissioner of Accounts is 
still to be prepared and filed) would afford reasonable com-
pensation for this work. The usual commission (5%) on an 
estate of $72,000.00 would be $3,600.00, and Mr. Parker could 
hardly expect a la rg:er share than $3,000.00, even if· the ad-
ministrative work had been completed. 
The error which Mr. Parker fClll into in making up his 
account was, we think, in treating each item as separate and 
Adelaide · IYI. Hayes, et al., v. William L. Parker. 13 
distinct from all the others instead of a step toward the ac-
complishment of the desired end. Hence the inordinate re-
sult. It often happens that many more issues of fact and 
law must be met in one suit than were raised in the various 
suits here. In such a ca.se, clearly, a charg·e for successfully 
meeting each contention could not be made just as if it was 
unrelated to the whole. No more could it properly be done 
here. The same issues of fact were present in all of the cases. 
In the Federal Court case, in which contestant went so far as 
to apply for a writ of certiorari, there was, after all, 
19* but one bare issue of law, *namely, whether that Court 
had jurisdiction. Even if solution of that issue. was as 
difficult as Mr. Parker claims, the work of presenting it 
could not, we submit, possibly justify a separate charge ol! 
anything like $5,000.00. 
The Commissioner very properly dealt with the services 
as a whole but, as will be pointed out later, we 'think that 
many of his conclusions were not justified by the evidence 
and that his allowance of a eontingcnt fee of a percentage 
of the amount at risk was clearly wrong. l\fr. Parker could 
not have done better had there been a contingent arrange-
ment in the beg-inning, for it is inconceivable that in a case 
of this kind he would have asked for a great.er share than 
twenty-five per cent. 
Reference to the expert evidence offered on behalf of Mr. 
Parker (R.., pp. 262-455), would seem unnecessary other than 
to say it was based on assumptions that an estate of around 
$115,000 was at risk and that Mr. Parker was entitled to a 
contingent fee of a percentage of that value. 
There was nothing in writing; no agreement of any kind 
to pay a percentag·e of all or any part of the estate. That 
the arrangement between Mr. Parker and Mrs. Hayes was 
not as stated by her (R., p. 494) (this petition, p. 4) was not 
claimed. The Commissioner apparently accepted her state-
ment for he says (R., p. 83) : 
'' There was no contract entered into between Parker and 
Mrs. Ha.yes * * *. l\frf-1. Hayes (p. 370, Exhibit 2) testified 
that the fee was not. upon a contingent basis, but that Parker 
stated that he wished to be paid from time to time, and that 
she offered him a retainer, which he declined." 
20* *He might and should have added that Mr. Parker 
declinP.d to work on n contingent basis ( see quotation 
this petition. p. 4). ....i\.ll l\f r. Parker claimed wa8 tliat .from 
conversations had with Mrs. Haves later on lie wa.s led to 
believe she bad nothing and that he would have to look 
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_ to the estate for his compensation.: The Commissioner found 
(R., p. 83): 
' 
'' • • • but it is certain that if the litigation had been iost, 
Mrs. Hayes would not have been able to compensate her at.: 
torney; and in the sense that his fee depended upon the SU~ 
eessful ternµ..n_ation of the litigation; his remuneration was 
contingent upon that event. * * * It is certain that she had 
to borrow money to pay for the probate of the will and the 
expense of her counsel immediately after the probate for a 
trip to New York, and while it is quite possible that she had 
'individual possessions of some $10,000.00 to $13,000.00 which 
were not derived from her husband's estate, yet the record 
<;lisclose·s that she was unwilling to jeopardize these in lit.iga.:. 
tion over her husband's will. She evid-entlv left Parker un.; 
der th~ i~pressio~ that she could pot raise any money ouf-
~ide of wliat would come to her through her husb~nd; and 
.that that would be· his only source of remuricraticm.:'' 
The holding that if f4e litig·atiori had been lost Mrs. Hayes 
would not have be~n able to compensate her attorney is, of 
course, iiot .reconcilabl~. with h~s finding that she inay hav~ 
lad possesstons wprth from $10,000.QO to $13,-000.00 ( a list of 
thein was o:ff ered in evidence, Exhibit 4~) ~nd,, the bor,rowing 
. of money .is, of course; uo inclicatiol) .of lack of. funds for this 
is often done rather tlJan liquidate securities. . 
21* *Certainly Mr. Parker_ never' agreed to :r~lease Mrs~ 
. Hayes from her pers.onal obligation. to pay him, and it 
is undoubtedly true .th~t if the litigation had been unsuccess-= 
~ul Mrs. Hayes could have been made to respond to the ex~ 
tent of her ability to pay. . . . 
.. As we have se~n, Mr. Parker refused tp W(?rk on a con..: 
~ingent basis and ac¢epted payments. during the course of 
the litigation amounti.ng to $9,859~00 in accordance with the 
ar'rangeinent originally made. . lie npw. says, however, he 
would have had to refund them if the litigation had not been 
successful. That i~ not correct be~ause Mrs. ;H~yes pe.rsonally 
was lia.bl~. to Wm for: t}le reasonable value of his services and., 
~f any refunding had become nee~ssary, she would have beeri 
the one th~J would have been called upQn to jnake. the pay-= 
inents good, and J_\lr. P&rkcr could }mly have be~n looked t<>; 
under his indemnity to the Surety Compa.ny, to the extent she 
was unable to do so. The possibjlity of having to account t,d 
the._estate was not mentioned at the time payme:nti;, ,vere made 
~iid it is inconceivable J\fr~. Hayes would J1ave J:>e~n ,villing: 
to pay out such substantial suins, or that 1\Ir._ Parke1· would 
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have asked her to do so, if there had been the remotest pos-
sibility they might have to be accounted for to the estate. The 
funds paid out were undoubtedly considered by each of them 
as actual payments on account. It seems to us these circum-
stances alone negative any possibility of contingency. 
22• *Then, too, Mrs. Hayes was bound to get $10,000.00 
plus one-half of 1fhe remainder of the estate unless the 
marriage contract was invalidated. Since Mr. Parker satis-
fied himself (see quotation, petition, p. 11) tha.t the ;marriage 
could not be attacked after thG death of Mr. Hayes, it follows 
that he really never considered his fee in jeopardv and that 
the contingency theory was an afterthought. · 
But there is still another reason why ].\fr. Parker's com-
pensation was not conting·ent. It is, we think, fairly well 
settled, at least in Virginia, that an Executor who acts in 
g·ood faith is entitled to allowances from the estate for at-
torney's fees even when there is an unsuccessful attempt to 
probate. Butt v. 1Jf11rden, 154 Ya. 10. _ 
In view of the circumstances mentioned, we do not think 
there was any chance of Mr. Parker going without compensa-
tion. If he had been only partially successful there would 
have been ample funds to take care of his fee. If he had 
whol}y failed, if sur.l1 a result could possibly be imagined, he 
would have been entitled to an allowance from the estate as 
the attorney for the proponent of the will and, to the extent 
that such allowance was inadequate, he could_lrnve withheld 
from the payments already made, for wl1ich Mrs. Hayes was 
personally responsible to the C1state, what was needed to make 
up the deficiency, or he could have looked to her directly 
for payment. Such compensation as he would in such. an 
event have been entitled to could undoubtedly have been col-
lected in this wav. 
23* *"Whether a fee is absolute or contingent is, in - a 
proper case, one of the many circumstances to be con-
sidered in determining the compensation to be recovered 
(County of Campbell v. Howard, 133 Va. 19), but a contingent 
fee of a percentae;e of the amount at stake is never permitted 
i.n the absence of an express contract fixing the amount. In 
every instance, so far as we have been ,able to ascertain, where 
there has been an attempt to recover without an express con-
tract a. contingent fee, or a percentage of the amount at stake, 
the right has been denied. 
O'Neill v. 0-rane (N. Y., 1901), 65 App. Div. 358, 72 N. Y . 
. Supp. 812, 814: 
'' On the record before us, the question presented for de-
termination was what wa.s the fair and reasonable value of 
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the services actually rendered, in. view of the nature and im-
portance of the litigation, the standing of the attorney in 
his profession 'for learning·, skill, and proficiency,' and of 
the iruporbmce to the client of the result; and such value 
could not be augmented by the fact that plaintiff's services 
were to be performed gratuitously in the event that the ac-
tion was not successful. Randall v. Packa,rd, 142 N. Y. 47, 
56, 36 N. E. 823; Harland v. Lilienthal, 53 N. Y. 438; Wal-
bridge v. Barrett, 118 :Mich. 433, 76 N. vV. 973; Robbins v. 
Harvev, 5 Conn. 335; Middleton v. Telegraph Co. (C. C.), 32 
Fed. 524. It therefore follows that the court erred in not 
excluding· from the hypothetical question the contingent ele-
ment of the employment, and it is manifest from the nature 
of the answers given by the witnesses that the error was 
prejudicial to the appellant.'' 
Shackleford v. Arkansas Baptist College (Ark., 1930), 26 
s. w. (2d) 124,125: 
"This case was tried on the theory that appellant was en-
titled to a contingent fee. He contended for a contingent 
24* fee of 35 per cent of the amount coming *to the Arkansas 
Baptist College under the will. Two reputable attor-
neys testified that 33-1/3 per cent would be a reasonable fee. 
We think there is no basis for a contingent fee, and that 
his recovery must be limited to the reasonable value of his 
services. The general rule is as stated in 2 R. C. L., p. 1048: 
'In the absence of an express contract of employment between 
an attorney and his client fixing the amount of the attorney's 
compensation, it is genernlly held that the attorney is entitled 
to what his services are reasonably worth, or ,vhat has usually 
been paid to others for similar. services.' " 
The rule is stated thus in 7 C. J. S., p. 1063 ~ 
'' An attorney is not entitled to a percentage of the amount 
recovered by his client in the absence of an express contract 
to that effect; and the payment of conting·ent fees cannot bP 
provided for by the Court, no matter how great and peculiar 
thr-ir merit'may be.'' 
This Court laicl down the same rule in Co-1.,nty of Campbell 
v. Howard (1922), 133 Va. 19, 51: 
'' Accordingly, we find that the settled rule, laid down by· 
the authorities, almost if not quite unanimously, is that the 
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measure of compensation which attorneys at law are entitled 
to recover for ser·vices rendered under an employment 1which 
contains no provision fixing a de finite compensation! is the 
reasonable value of the services rendered, not in benefit to 
the client, but, in themselves, on. a qiiantitm meruit; * * * The 
result secured by the services of the attorney 1nay l-ikewise 
be considered; but merely as bearing 11,pon the consideration, 
-0/ the efficiency with which they were rendered, and, in that 
way, upon the-ir value on a quantiirn, mern-it, not from the 
standpoint of their value to the client ... , 
Elsewhere in t~e opinion (p. 51) the circumstances to be 
considered in determining the amount to be awarded are 
listed and among them is the element of contingency-
"wheth~r or not the fee is absolute or contingent'', but 
25* the Court was very careful to point *out in that connec-
tion that the result obtained could only be considered 
as an element bearing on the efficiency of the services, '' and, 
in that way, upon their value on a qttantum merit.it, not from 
the standpoint of their value to the client'' which could only 
mean that the allowance of a percentage of the amount saved 
would not be proper without an express ag·reement. In Ar-
ticle 12 of the '' Rules for the Integration of the Virginia 
.State Bar'' contingency or uncertainty of compensation and 
five other elements are set forth as proper to be considered 
in determining the value of an attorney's services. But the 
rule goes on to say tl1at "No one of these considerations in 
itself is controlling. They are mere guides in ascertaining 
the real value of the service~'. The principal vice of the 
holding of the lower Court lies in its failure to follow this 
rule. 
In Crmnlish's Ad11ir. v. Bhenandoa.Ji Val. R. Co. (1895), 
22 S. E. 90, the Supreme Court of .Appeals of West Virginia 
held: 
'' The payment of large contingent fees cannot be provided 
for by the court. no matter how ~reat and peculiar their 
merit may be. That, as far as lawful, must be left as a mat-
ter of express contract between client and attorney.'' 
In the fairly recent case of O'Neal v. Spivey (1928), 145 
S. E. 71, the Supreme Court of Georgia said: 
"Without agreement, attorney is entitled to compensation 
quantu·m, meruit. '' 
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26• *Two years earlier the same subject was dealt witI1 
by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Fleming v. Phinizy, 
134 S. ~- 814, where it was said: 
"Where an attorney renders in behalf of his client serv-
ices of the nature indicated above, without any agreement 
whatever as:- to the amount or te1·ms of bis compensation, he 
is not 'acting. un~~r a eon tract f Qr a contingent fee in a divorce 
case or in an alimony case, and no question arises as to 
whether employment upon such a contingent basis would be 
illegal or contrary to public policy, or whether an attorney . 
who has rendered services under a contract illegal or con-
trary to public policy could nevertheless recover on quantum 
meruit.'' 
The Supreme Court of Nebraska in the cas_e of Thurston 
v., Travelers lflB"l·rmice Compan.v, 258 N. W. 66, 68, held: 
"It is not to be forgotten that. an attorney is not entitled 
to a percentage of the amount recovered by his· client in the 
absence of an e~press contract to that effect; the burden of 
proving which rests on the attorney asserting it. 6 C. J. 741:, 
758; Crumlish's A.dm'r. v. Shenandoah Valley R. Co., 40 W. 
Va. 627, 22 S. E. 90." 
On a contingent fee basis, even if it could be said that the 
entire value of the estate was at risk, the award was grossly 
excessive. Certainly the lower Court in awarding a per-
centa.ge put too much emphasis on the result or benefit to 
client and by so doing erred in applying the quanfo,m meruit 
rule as laid down in County of 'Campbell v. Howard, supra. 
Measured by this rule the awa.rd is, we respectfully submit, 
shocking. As will be· seen from a reading of the evidence or 
the experts, all of them, including those who testified 
27* for Mrs. Hayes, wanted to be, and were *just as liberal 
as their consciences would permit in appraising the 
value of his services. Their natural sympathies and preju-
dices would be in favor of Mr. Parker. The fact is that afte·r 
talking to a great many Norfolk lawyers only one, Mr. Robert 
M. Hughes, Jr., could be found who was willing to testify 
against Mr. Parker and he did so with much reluctance. See 
statement,. p. '7.16. In view of the nature of the employment 
and the other circumstances mentioned, it would seem to us 
that the services as outlined in Schedule A do not justify 
a oharge .in excess of the payments already made, namely, 
$10,802.60. In this connection it must be. remembered that 
Adelaide 11. Hayes, et al., ~- William L. Parker. 19 
the under lying facts -in each case were the same; that the 
Princess Anne County case was tried on the single factual 
issue of domicile; that the second suit in the Federal Court 
was disposed of on· jurisdictional grounds; that there was , 
.nothing done in the first suit in the Federal Court beyond 
arguing a motion to dismiss which was overruled and that the 
New York case and the appeal from the order of probate 
were never tried. 
In re N cw York Investors, 79 Fed. ( 2d) 182, 185, the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit said this with 
respect to compensation of attorneys engaged in the admin-
istration of estates: 
'' The Supreme Court has g·iven notice on more than one 
occasion that receivers and attorneys engaged in the admin-
. istration of estates in the courts of the United States and in 
litigations affecting property within the jurisdiction of those 
courts should be awarded only moderate compensation, and 
that many of the allowances heretofore awarded have beeu 
too high.'' 
In numerous instances this Court has reviewed and re-
vers.ed, or reduced, fees aUowed by the lower Courts. The 
facts in most of them are different from those in this case, 
·but reference to a few may be worthwhile. 
28* •1n Belmont v. McAllister (1914), 116 Va. 285, .Judge 
·Cardwell reduced the award of the lower Court from 
$11,928.32 to $600.00 and charged the attorneys with the costs. 
In Bmne'.~ Ex'x. v. Bibb's Ex'x. (1921), 129 Va. 45, the al-
lowance of the lower Court was reduc.ed from $5,000.00 to 
$2.500.00. .Judge Prentis, speaking for the Court, said p. 50: 
'' All dealings between the attorney and client must be char-
acterized by the utmoRt fairness and good faith, and transM-
tions between them are closely scrutinized.'' 
Some other cases are Thomas v. T1tnier's Admrs., 87 Va. 
l; Cullop v. Leonard. 97 Va. 256; Union Central lnsuranc~ 
CMn17an71 v. 1Vilson, 157 Va. 454. 
The contingency theory is based entirely on impressions 
, which l\fr. Parker got from conversations with l\frs. Haves 
from which he SaVR 'lie was led to llelieve she had nothing and 
that lie would have to look to the estate for his compensation. 
Such convP.rsations were admittedly had long after :M:r. Par-
ker refused to work on a c.ontingent basis and asked, instead, 
for payments from time to time. Mr. Parker. was, we tl1ink, 
clearly bound by the original arrangement. However, any 
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doubts as to what was said and what the real situation was 
should be resolved in favor of Mrs. Haves. In Stiers v. Hall 
(1938), 170 Va. 569, this Court in dealing with contracts be-
tween attorney and client quoted with approval from 5 Am. 
Jur. Sec. 160, as follows, p. 576: 
29*' *'' '* * * It is well settled, also, that contracts be-
tween attorney and client made after the relation has 
been established are construed most strongly against the at-
torney and are regarded with suspicion and jealously and 
closely scrutinized by the courts. In many instances they 
have declared to be voidable, even though they would be 
deemed unobjectionable between other parties. In fact, there 
is a presumption of unfairness and invalidity.' " 
And at page 577 it quoted from Thomas v. Turn.er' s Adinrs,. 
siipra, as follows : 
'' According to that rule all dealings between attorney and 
client for the benefit of the former, are not only regarded 
with jealousy and closely sc.rutinized, but they are presump-
tively invalid, on the ground of constructive fraud; and that 
presumption can be overcome only by the clearest and most 
satisfactory evidence. The rule is founded in public policy, 
and operates independently of any ingTedient of actual fraud, 
or of the age or capacity of the, client, being intended as a 
p'rotection to the client against the strong influence to which 
th~ confidential relation naturally gives rise.'' 
COSTS AND EXPENSES--FEES OF NE·w YORK 
COUNSEL. 
Mrs. Hayes' disbursements for Court costs and expenses 
and fees to New York counsel were $3,115.71, Exhibit 37; 
$1,144.27 Mr. Parker's disbursements, Exhibit 55, a total of 
$4,259.98. She still owes $217 .34 for premiums on her bond 
( R. p. 495). Of this total of $4,472.32, $1,400.00 was paid 
to New York counsel as fees (R., p. 647). The balance. 
$3,077.32, represents the total of her payments for costs and 
expenses. 
30* *The Commissioner and the Court completely ignored 
these items in their calculations. Our position with re-
spect to them is that, if the allowance of a percent.age was 
proper ( we confidently say it was not), then the costs of the 
litigation, $3,077.32, should have been deducted from the 
amount found to be at risk and the percentage reckoned on 
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the balance; that the fees paid to New York counsel, $1,400.00, 
should be deducted from the percentage allowance made to 
Mr. Parker. To do otherwise would be contrary to logic and 
common sense principles. Mr. Parker was certainly not en-
titled to a percentage of something he did not recover for 
Mrs. Ha.yes, and the percentage that was allowed him should 
have included fees to his New York associates. The rule in 
respect of contingent fees is stated thus in 7 C. J. S. 1090: 
'' The percentage coming to an attorney is usually reckoned 
on the amount actually recovered by the client, and not on 
the amount of the judgment, unless the lang·uage of the con-
tract is such as to justify such an interpretation. The amount 
actually received within the meaning of the rule, is the net 
amount recovered, that is the amount allowed by the judg-
ment less the amount of any claim, expense, or offset that 
may properly be deducted therefrom.'' 
In Kerzee v. Ault,man (Texas, 1927), 291 S. W. 293, there 
was a. contract providing that the attorneys should receive 
one-third of client's net recovery. The Court said, p. 294 :_ 
31 * ,x,,' As we construe the contract, we think the only 
equitable construction that can be placed thereon is that, 
after all the legitimate expenses incurred by the attorneys 
have been settled, the remainder of the amount collected by 
appellees would be the net amount which appellant recovered. 
• * * "\Ve do not think it would be a fair construction to put 
on the contract to say that appellees were to receive one-third 
of the total amount they recovered, when a portion thereof 
was used by them to pay tl1e necessary expenses of the litiga-
tion. * * * .As we view the contract, the amount to be divided 
between appellees and appellant was the amount left after 
the payment of all ]eg·itimate expens<?s and costs that have 
been incurred in the litigation." 
; I I . I 
And in Whitlo·w's Adm-r. v. 1Vhitlow's Admr. (Ky., 1901), 
60 S. "\V. 182, it was held that a fee pnicl to assiRtant counsel 
employed by principal counsel who was under contract for a 
eonting-ent fee was not a. necessary expense; that it should 
be paid by principal counsel out of hiR contingent fee. 
COSTS OF THE REFER~lNCE-F AILURE OF COURT 
TO GR.A.NT AN ISSUE OUT OF CHANCERY. 
These subjects can appropriately be dealt with tog·ether. 
The lower Court's award of $21,262.00 was $8,588.00 less 
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than the fee demanded bv Mr. Parker. In the "Rules for 
the Integration. of the Virginia State Bar,'' Article 12, it is 
said: · 
"In fixing fees, lawyers should avoid charges which over-
estimate their advic() and services, as well as those which 
under-value them.'' · 
The rule that the party substantially prevailing is entitlecl 
to costs should not be strictly applied as between attorney 
and client because the former occupies a dominant posi-
32~ tion and is much better *able to judge the value of hi~ 
services than the client. To do so would often cause 
clients to pay unjust. claims rather than incm~ the risks inci-
dent to litigation. A client should, in a propeF case, be en-
. couraged in contesting an attorney's- charge and where) as 
here, the attorney has made a charge that is about thirty 
per cent greater than the lower Court felt he was entitled to., 
even on a theory which is obviously wrong, it should not be 
considered that the attorney has substantially prevailed. 
When an attorney misses the mark of reasonableness by such 
a wide margin he, and not the client, ought to be charged with 
the costs of any litigation gTowing out of his excessive charge .. 
But there are other circumstances which it seems to us 
are entitled to consideration in this connection. It was natural 
that Mr. Parker should want security for his claim, but the 
extent to which he went., especially in refusing to accept a. 
bond in the place of estate securities (letters, R., pp. 31, 32) 
and thereafter using estate income, instead of depositing it 
in the estate's account in the National Bank of Commerce 
. where it could only be withdrawn on his counter-signature, 
was, we think, an abuse of the position of trust and confidence 
which Mrs. Hayes had reposed in l1im as her attorney. His 
unreasonableness compelled her to file an independent bill 
to recover the securities and restrain him from using es-
tate funds. This made it possible for him to proceed on 
his claim by way of a cross-bill. His original bill stated 
matter proper for the exercise of the potential jurisdiction -
of a Court of Chancery, but the proofs sho'Y"ed there was no 
reason for an acconntinµ:, or for any equitable relief and 
33* the alleged "grounds therefor were, apparently, ei11-
ployed as a mere pretext for bringing into a Court of 
Chancery a cause of action for the collection of a debt. But 
for t.he bill of Mrs. Hayes jurisdicHon would not, in our 
_ opinion, have been maintained. Thus Mrs. Hayes was not 
only denied a trial by jury of tbn h~sue as to the amount to 
\ 
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which Mr. Parker was entitled, but a situation was brought 
about r~sulting in her being charged with the very substan-
tial costs of the reference. It was something we tried to 
avoid for Mrs. Hayes from the beginning because we knew 
the costs would be heavy and some one would have them to 
pay-demurrers were filed, an ore tenus hearing or an issue 
out of chancery was asked for-but at every stage of the 
proceedings counsel for Mr. Parker insisted on a reference 
and ~ally persuaded t.he Court to give him one (R., p. 77). 
There ,vas no need for an accounting and Mrs. Hayes was, 
at least, entitled to a jury trial on the issue as to the value of 
Mr. Parker's services. Shrewsberu v. Meadows (W~ Va., 
1934), 174 S. E. 688; Stiers v. Hall (1938), 170 Va. 569. If~ 
an ore tenits hearing, or an issue out of chancery, had been 
granted, the heavy costs of the reference would, of course, 
have been avoided. It was therefore, we respectfully submit, 
an abuse of discretion to charge Mrs. Hayes with the costs 
of the reference. 
In the recent case of Stiers v. Hall, supra,, Mrs. Hall soug·ht, 
to have cancelled her note given to Mr. Stiers for profes-
sional services. The trial Court rejected an answer tendered 
more than ninety days after the filing of the bill and 
34* entered up *judg1nent for complainant. This Court 
, found that the note was executed under pressure and 
could not, therefore, be enforced, but that ]\fr. Stiers must 
be paid for his work. On remanding the cause the Court 
directed that there be an issue out of chancery to determine 
the amount of compensation due Mr. Stiers. The Court said, 
p. 579: 
'' This ca.use Rhould be remanded. There should be an is-
sue out of chancery to determine, under all the circumstances, 
what is a fair, just and reasonable compensation for services 
rendered by ]\fr. Stiers as disc]osed hy the record. Thomas 
v. T1.wner's .illhn'-1., s1.tpr(l,; 011,llop v. Leonard, s1Ppra, and 
Bruce's Ex'x. v. Bibb's Ex'x., sitpra.'" 
For the foreµ;oing reasons your petitioner prays that she 
may be allowed an appeal from, and a sitpersedeas to, the 
said decree of December 5, 1939, and that this Court will re-
view and reverse said decree and charge the costs of the 
reference to Mr. Parker and hold that the payments already 
made, amounting to $10,802.60, fairly and reasonably com-
pensate him for his services and enter up judgm~nt accord-
ingly. If an appeal is g-ranted this petition wi1l be adopted 
as appellant's opening brief. ~ince the protection of the 
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estate of a decedent is involved, all the estate securities 
are held in a safe deposit box subject to th_e joint control 
of Mr. Parker and Mrs. Hayes and petitioner has heretofore 
given bond in the sum of $51,000.00 (R., p. 132), for the 
35* faithful *performance of the duties of her office, prose-
cutio11 of this appeal should be permitted without the 
giving of an appeal bond. Sec.· 6351 Virginia Code; Mc-
Cauley's Adni'r. v. Griffin's Ex'r., 4 Gratt. 9, 10. 
An opportunity for the presentation of oral argument is 
requested. A copy of this petition was delivered to opposing 
counsel on February 10, 1940 .. This petition is to be filed 
with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
for delivery by him to a Judge of the Court. 
February 10, 1940. 
ADELAIDE M. HAYES in her 
own right and as Executrix of 
the last will and testament of 
William R. Hayes, deceased, 
By BAIRD, -WHITE & LANNING, 
Her Attorneys. 
BAIRD, WHITE & LANNING, 
Attorneys for Petitioner. 
I, George M. Lanning, of 1119 National Bank of Commerce 
Building, Norfolk, an attorney practicing in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, do c.ertify that, in my op_inion 
the decree complained of in the foregoing petition ought to 
be reviewed and reversed. 
GEORGE M. LANNING. 
Received February 12, 1940. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk 
February 27, 1940. Appeal and supersedeas awarded by 
the court. Bond $2,000. 
M. B. W. 
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SCHEDULE "A". 
Liti.qnJed M atter.c;. 
1. Probate of 11'Vill 0,nd First Will Contest (Items 1 and 
8): After an investigation Mr. Parker concluded domicile 
was in Virginia and the will was, therefore, probated on May 
28, 1934, before the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Princess 
Anne County. A few days later Mrs. Guilfoil appealed from 
the order of probate. The grounds of contest were mental 
incapacity of Mr. Hayes, undue influence by Mrs. Hayes and 
lack of jurisdiction because of decedent's domicile in New 
York. ·preparation for the trial of these issues involved an 
examination of the law, investig·ations here and in New York, 
taking depositions, drawing up instructions, etc. When this 
case came on for hearing on July 19, 1934, contestant was 
permitted to withdraw the appeal. Charge $3,500.00. 
2 . .Application of Mary Hayes Gitilfoil for Letters of Ad-
ministration in Orange C oitnty, New York (Item 10) : On 
July 21, 1934, Mrs. Guilfoil applied to the Surrogate Court 
of Orange County, New York, for letters of administration. 
To avoid any possibility of submitting Mrs. Hayes to the 
jurisdiction of the New York Court, Mr. Parker determined, 
after examination of the authorities and consultation with 
Newburgh counsel, not to oppose the application. Charge 
$1,500.00. 
2«· *3. Suit in New York to set aside deed to N ewbu,rgh 
Real Estate (Item 9) : .A.bout six months prior to his 
death Mr. Hayes lrnd conveyed to Mrs. Hayes certain real 
estate in Newburgh, New York, consisting of a lot and a 
dwelling house which had been converted into a three family 
apartment. The deed to the property was not admitted to 
record until July 21, 1934. On July 2, 1934, l\frs. Guilfoil 
brought suit in the Supreme Court of Orange County, New 
York, to set the deed aside. J\fr. Parker drafted removal 
papers to remove the cause to the District Court of tl1e United 
States for the Southern District of New York and an answer .. 
After removal was effected the New York firm of Hunt, Hill 
& Betts was employed. Depositions were taken and the case 
otherwise prepared for trial. The bill charged mental in-
capacity and undue influence-issues set up in the first will 
contest. A short time before the case was called a con-
tinuance was granted on a stipulation in which contestant 
agreed to dismiss the New York case if the decision in the 
P·rincess Anne County case was favorable to Mrs. Hayes. A. 
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clause suggested by Mr. Parker was added giving Mrs. Hayes 
the right to contest the New York litigation if the Virginia 
decision was unfavorable. After the decision of this Court 
in Guilfoil v. Hayes, S'ltlJrn, in favor of ~rs. Hayes, ~r. 
Parker drafted a final order to be entered in the New .York 
litigation d~sinissing that cause on the merits. Charge 
$1,500.00. . 
3$ *4. First Suit in the District Court {Item 11): On 
October 29, 1934, Mrs. Guilfoil, as Adl!}inistratrix of 
the estate of William R. Hayes, filed a bill in equity in the Dis- · 
trict Court of the United States for the Eastern District of 
Virginia. It prayed for an accounting and for a decree di-
recting the delivery of the estate to her. Mr. Parker filed 
an answer to the bill. He also moved to dismiss on the ground 
that plaintiff was not qualified in Virginia and therefore had 
no legal right to maintain an action as Administratrix and 
on the further ground that she had no right, in her individual 
capacity, to recover as distributee. A memorandum of au-
thorities in support .of the motion was filed. In the latter 
part of February, 1935, the motion was argued and over-
ruled. The case was never tried on the merits and was finally 
dismissed, after the decision of this Court in .January, 1938. 
Mr. Parker claims that because of dilatory tactics employed 
in connection with this litigation counsel for contestant was 
forced to institute the equity suit in Princess A.nne County, 
but the record does not show that anything was done other 
than await some action on the part of contestant which never 
came. Under the Virginia statute a bill in equity fo1· au 
issue devisavit vel non had to be brought within two years 
after the probate of the will, and the bill in Princess Anne 
County was filed a day or so before the expiration of the two 
year period. Why the first suit in the District Court was not 
broug·ht on for trial between February, 1935, when the mo-
tion to dismiss was heard and decided, and May, 1936, only 
counsel for contestant can explain. He undoubtedly could 
4• have had a trial during "9that period had it been desired. 
We find nothing in the record justifying an extra allow-
ance to Mr. Parker because of dilatory tactics. Charge 
$1,750.00. 
5. Second TVill Conte.c;t (Item 12): On May 23, 1935, Mrs. 
Guilfoil instituted a second suit in the District -Court of the 
United Stafa~s for the Ea8tern District of Virginia, the pur-
pose of which was to contest the validity of the will in the 
Federal Court. The grounds of contest were the same as on 
the a.ppea1 from the order of probate. l\fr. Parker filed a mo-
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tion to dismiss and also an answer to the bill. The question 
on the motion was whether the proceeding was a suit between 
parties or· a probate proceeding under Sec. 5259· of the Vir-
ginia Code. Briefs were prepared and submitted and the 
motion argued before. Judge Way. After having the matter 
under consideration for about five months Judge Way ren-
dered an opinion holding that the suit was a continuance of 
the probate proceeding and fhat the Federal Court was with . 
. out jurisdtction. An appeal was taken from his decision to 
the Circuit Court. of Appeals, briefs were filed and the case 
argued. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Way; 
Thereupon contestant applied for a writ of certiorari and 
M:r. Parker filed a brief in opposition thereto. A writ was 
denied. Charge $5,000. · 
6. Third Will Contest (Item l3) : In May, 1936, while the 
- suits in the Federal Court were Rtill pending, a further suit 
was instituted in the Circuit Court of Princess .A.'nne County. 
There the issue was devisavit 'liel non. The issues raised 
5* in the bill •were exactlv the same as those tendered in 
the appeal from the orclcr of probate, namely, domicile~ 
of the testator, his capacity to make a will and undue influ-
ence of !Jrs. Hayes. Mr. Parker filed two special pleas to-
gether with an answer, ,one a plea. to the jurisdiction of the 
«Court based upon the statute of limitations and the other 
that contestant was not a pa.rty in interest as contemplated by 
Sec. 5259 of the Code of Virginia. The former was rejected. 
The latter was allowed and the ease went to trial, in August, 
1936, on the issue of domicile. Testimony was taken, and 
depositions in related cases were by stipulation read into the 
record, contestant claiming that the testator died domiciled 
in the State of New York and that nnde,r the laws of that. 
Sta.te, if the testator died intestate, she had an interest in 
the estate. The Court held that the testator died domiciled 
'in the State of Virginia and that contestant was, therefore, 
not a party in interest. Tho bill was thereupon dismissed. An 
appeal was applied for and granted. It was argued in Octo-
ber, 19·35, after the filing· of briefs. The decision of the lower 
Court was sustained,. Guilfoil v. llayes, 169 Va. 548. Charg,.\ 
$4,500.00. 
Mi.~cellaneous Estate Matters. 
1. Duties of Exec11trix (Item 2): Enumerated under this 
heading- are ( a.) services performed and responsibility as-
sumed in exercising joint control with Mrs. Hayes-a usual 
and customary practice involving no risk because Mrs. Hayes 
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had access to the estate securities only in the presence 
6* of Mr. Parker and all checks *had to be sign.eel by him, 
(b) services in i.nvestig·ating the law and reaching the 
conclusion that Mrs. Haves could lawfullv use estate funds 
to complete the building" of a house at Virginia Beach, the 
construction of which had been contracted for prior to the 
death of Mr. Hayes, (c) sei·vices in furnishing transfer agents 
with required data to effect a sale of ten blocks of stock found 
in the estate, ( d) services in collecting $10,214.22 on a policy 
of life insurance involving the furnishing of a death cer-· 
tifi.cate, ( e) services in performing· other details such a~ 
settling undisputed debts of the estate, inventorying contents 
of decedent's safe deposit box and transferring same to a. 
box in the name of the Executrix, preparing and filing in-
ventory and appraisement, endorsing a note for the Executrix 
in the sum of $500.00 to enable her to make a payment to Mr. 
Parker. Charge $3,750.00. 
2. Controversy with Surety on Bond of Executrix (Item 
3): Soon after the bond was given the Surety Company 
threatened, because of certain representations, to cancel its 
obligation. All Mr. Parker claims to have done was to inform 
representatives of the Smety Company of the situation and 
try to satisfy them that the information was untrue. He 
attended several conferences called by the Surety Company 
and kept it advised from time to time. He was under the 
impression tha.t he had entered into an indemnity agreement 
under which he '' assumed personal responsibility for all deal-
ings with the estate, including changes in investments and 
expenditures'' in consideration of the ag;reement of the 
7* Surety *Company to remain on the bond but that was 
not the case. The indemnity agreement to which Mr. 
Parker ref erred was executed at the time the bond was given, 
long before the controversy arose, and was in the form regu-
larly required of an attorney who is given joint control. Un-
der that agreement nothing could be done without his consent 
and no real risk was, therefore, assumed. Mr. Parker seemed 
to think that both the estate and Mrs. Hayes derived great 
benefits from his services in this connection and that on this 
account, too, he was entitled to the amount charged. We do 
not think Sec. 5417 of the Code g·ave the Surety ·Company the 
1·ig·ht to cancel, but Pven if it did. the services which Mr. Par-
ker performed did not call for the application of any par-
ticular professional skill or experience, only the imparting 
to the Surety Company of the knowledge he had gained as 
attorney, a duty which he was obliged to perform, and if, ag 
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an incident thereto, the estate and Mrs. Hayes happened to 
be benefited, that fact, if true, should not materially increase 
the value of the service. Charge $2,000.00. 
. ' 
3. Estate Securities and Investments (Item.4): This item 
covers services in purchasing with estate funds in 1934, first 
· in street names and later in Mr. Parker's name, 100 shares of 
American Telephone and Telegraph Company, 100 shares of 
United Gas and Improvement, 100 shares of General Electric, 
50 shares of Consolidated Gas, 50 shares of United States 
Steel and 25 shares of Norfolk & ,v estcrn, and in 1937, in the 
name of Mrs. Hayes, as Executrix, 25 shares of Con-
8* tinental Can, 25 shares of American *Tobacco B. and 50 
shares of National Dairy Products, and in keeping in 
touch with conditions which might affect the value of such 
securities. ·what was done here called for no professional 
legal skill or experience. They were all stocks of nationally 
known companies and free data in respect of them was avail-
able a.t any Broker's office. Many of the purchases were in 
fact made at the suggestion of Mrs. Hayes. Charge $1,500.00. 
4. Virginia. Beach House (Item 5): This covers routine 
services-visiting- the house during· the course of construc-
·tion and conferences with the builder in respect to contro-
versial issues, etc. Charge $500.00. 
5. N ewbiirgh Real Estate (Item 6) : What was done here 
was also routine. "\Vhile in Newburgh in connection with 
litigated matters complainant visited the property and inter-
viewed the agent, and from time to time thereafter wrote the 
agent from Norfolk about minor matters. No lega] servicP 
was called for. Charge $350.00. 
6. Strauss & Co. Mort,ga,qe Bonds (Item 7): The appraised 
value of these bonds was $16,420.00, par value $88,500.00. 
There were thirteen issues and some were in default prior 
to the death of Mr. Hayes. Twenty-five pages of I\fr. Parker's 
account are devoted to this item, mostly in ~;iving the history . 
and status of securities taken from literature sent out by 
Bondholders' Committees, very little in enumerating services 
performed by Mr. Parker. It is not contended the estate de-
rived any pecuniary bern'.)fits. Mr. Parker claims to have 
sought information from available sourc.es but apparently 
· the principal, if not the only, source was the data 
9* *mailed out from time to time by the Committees, which 
was usuaHy brought to him by Mrs. Hayes. He did not 
30 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
think well of the personnel of some of the Committees and ad-
vised against allowing them to act for estate bonds, but in 
most instances the Committ~es were acceptable. He attended 
no Committee meetings; submitted no suggestion for a change 
in .Committees,. plans for reo1~ganization. The only work 
that he appears to have done was to study the data sent out 
by the Bondholders' Committees and write nine letters, copies 
of which are parts of Exhibit 52. Charge $2,500.00. 
7. Tax Matters (Item 14}: Estate tax return was prepared, 
following which there was a controversy with the Tax Au-
thorities resulting in a settlement. ln response to the de~ 
mand of the Collector of Internal Revenue, New York, tax 
retur~s were drawn up and :filed for Mr. Hayes for the years 
1932 and 1933 showing no taxable income. Federal tax r~-
turns for the estate for the years 1934, 1935, 1936 and 1937 
and also State returns ( tangible and intangible personal prop-
erty and income) for the years 1935, 1936, 1~37 and 1938 were 
prepared and filed. A State Inheritance tax return was made 
up and filed by our firm after Mr. Parker's employment was 
terminated. Charge $500.00. 
8. Suit of Samuel C. rTohflson (Item 15): :Mr. Parker hacl 
some correspondence with Dr. Johnson and suit on thi~ claim 
for $2,000.00 was :finally broug·ht in March, 1938. Interroga-
tories addressed to plaintiff were prepared and depositions 
taken in New York. Settlement was made for $1,500.00 be-
fore the case was reached for trial. Charge $250.00, expe'JliSC"s 
$50.00 .. 
10• *9. Miscellaneous (Itfm 16}: Enumerated under this 
heading are (a) advice given Mrs. Hayes with respect 
to liabilitJr of newspapers for publications regarded as libel-
ous, liability of Paul H. Guilfoil for statements made by him 
to the Surety ,Company and liability of opposing co:unsel ~or 
false statements made in argument on the trials, (b) services 
in investigating tl1e rights of Mrs. Hayes under a lease of a 
safe deposit box by l\fr. Hayes which gave her as survivor 
access to, and control over, the contents and under a power 
of attorney given he1~ by Mr. Hayes g·iving her the right to 
draw checks against bis Bank balance, ( c) services in investi-
gating the· facts with respect to the execution of an earlie1-
wi11, ( d) services in investigating the question of the right 
of the Court to appoint a conservator pending contest of tl1e 
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will, in negotiating a temporary loan for $1,500.00 on Mr. 
Parker's endorsement to enable Mrs. Hayes to make a pay-
ment to him and in attempting unsuccessfully to collect $500.00 
due Mr. Hayes from a former parish, (e) services in investi-
gating the facts relative to a statement made by John W. 
Walsh to Mr. Benn~t in 1934 and a proceeding by ·Holland 
Brewing Company under Sec. 77-B of the Bankruptcy Act in 
which proof of claim was filed. Charge $750.00. . 
RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Circuit Court of the City of .Norfolk, at 
the Courthouse thereof, on the 5th day of December, in the 
year 1939. 
Be it remembered, that on the 14th day of December, in the 
year 1939, came both counsel for the complainants and the 
defendants in certain consolidated chancery causes pending 
in this court, wherein William L. Parker is complainant, and 
Adelaide M. Hayes in her own right and as .Executrix of 
the last will and testament of' William R. Hayes, deeeased, is 
defendant; and wherein Adelaide l\L Hayes, Executrix un-
der the last will and testament of William R. Hayes, deceased, 
is complainant, and William L. Parker is defendant, and filed 
their stipulation as to the manner and form in which the 
record for an appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia should. be made up by the clerk of this court. 
The following is the stipulation referred to in the forego-
ing caption: 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of tlie City of Norfolk. 
William L. Parker, Complainant, 
v. 
Adelaide M. Hayes, in. her own right and as Executrix of the 
last will and testament of William R. Hayes, deceased, et 
al., Respondents. 
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CONSOLIDATED CAUSES. 
Adelaide M. Hayes, Executrix under the last will and testa-
ment of William R. Hayes, deceased, Complainant, 
v. . 
,vmiam L. Parker, Respondent. 
STIPULATION. 
It is stipulated and agreed by and between the undersigned 
that for the purposes of a petition for appeal to the Supreme 
.Court of Appeals by Adelaide M. Hayes in her own right and 
as Executrix of the last will aud testament of ·w"illiam R. 
Hayes, deceased, the written transcript to be prepared by 
the Clerk shall consist of: 
Bill of ·complaint of William L. Parker; bill of complaint 
of Adelaide M. Hayes, Executrix under the last will and tes-
tament of William R. Hayes, deceased; answer and cross-bill 
of William L. Parker (Exhibit A attached thereto need not 
be included) ; demurrers of Adelaide l\.L Hayes, etc., to bill 
of complaint and cross-bill of William L. Parker and decrees 
entered thereon on November 10, 1938; answers of Adelaide 
M. Hayes, etc., to bill of complaint and cross-bill of ·wmiam 
L. Parker; answer of ·wmiam L. Parker to the cross-bill of 
Adelaide l\t Hayes, etc.; decree entered on December 23, 
1938, overruling motion of Adelaide l\L Hayes, etc., for an 
issue out of chancery or a hearing ore teniis and ref erring 
the consolidated cause to George Pilcher, Commissioner; tes-
timony taken before the Commissioner ; report of Commis-
sioner; exceptions of Adelaide M. Hayes, etc., to the Com-
missioner's report; final decree entered on Decem-
pag·e 3 ~ her 5, 1939. 
It is further stipulated (1) that these causes were 
consolidated by orders entered on October 31, 1938, and (2) 
that the exhibits filed with the evidence before the Commis-
sioner need not be copied by the Clerk but may be sent up as 
origfoal exhibits with the written transcript. 
BAIRD, WHITE & LANNING, 
Attorneys for Adelaide M. Hayes, in her own 
rig·ht and as E~ecutrix of the last will and 
testament of William R. Hayes, deceased. 
Wl\f. G. M.AiUPIN, 
.Attomey for William L. Parker. 
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In compliance with the foregoing ,Stipulation, the follow-
ing is the bi11 of complaint of William L. Parker, as filed in 
this court at the Rules holden for it on the first Monday in 
September, 1938: 
To the Hon. Allan R. Haneke!, Judge of the said 'Court: 
The bill of your complainant., "\i\Tilliam L. Park.er, who sues 
as trustee and in his own right, respectfully shows unto the 
court the following case: 
1. Your complainant is an attorney at law., and at all times 
liereinafter mentioned was duly licensed and practicing as 
such in the City of Norfolk, State of Virginia. 
2. On or about May 5, 1934, the def eudant, Adelaide M. 
Hayes, employed your complainant, in his capacity 
page 4 } as attorney, to represent her in matters arising as 
a result of the death of ·william R. Hayes to whom 
she had been married in October, 1932. 
3. At the time of said marriage the decedent, William R. 
Hayes, was a priest of the Roman Catholic Church., and for 
many years prior to said marriage had been pastor of a church 
of that denomination in the City of Newburgh, New York, 
where he was domiciled. 
4. Your complainant was advised by the defendant that 
the decedent had left, in a safe deposit box in the National 
Bank of Commerce of Norfolk, Virginia, a last will and tes-
tament; and upon examining· the contents of said box a paper 
writing purportin~· to be such a will was found, devising and 
bequeathing all lus property to the defendant, Adelaide M. 
Haves. 
5. The will in question had been executed, prior to the 
marriage of the testator, in :Newburgh, New York, and was 
attested by two witnesses, residents of that City. Under the 
laws of the State of New York subsequent marriage did not 
revoke the will, while under the laws of Virginia it did. The 
decedent, a Catholic priest, contrary to the tenets of his re-
ligion, had married. A contest of the will was anticipated 
and the religious issue was an important factor to be con-
sidered in selecting the locality of the contest. Certainly, it 
was desirable, that the forum be other than the vicinity of 
the place where the decedent had officiated for so many years 
as a parish priest. It was accordingly decided that, if le-
gally practicable, the will be probated in Virginia. 
6. Tl1e questions of law and fact presented were investi-
g-ated, and proceedings taken, with the result, that 
page 5 ~ on May 26th, 1934, the will in question was admitted 
to probate, ex parte, by the Clerk of the Circuit 
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Court of Princess Anne County, Virginia. The defendant, 
Adelaide M; Hayes, thereupon qualified as executrix under 
the will. 
7. Shortly after the admission of said will to probate, one 
Mary Hayes Guilfoil, a sister of the decedent, appeared by 
counsel and appealed from the Clerk's order of probate to 
the Circuit Court of Princess Anne County. The object of 
said appeal.was to contest the validity of the will, and the 
validity of th~ marriage, on the ground of mental incapacity 
to execute the one, or enter into the other, and on the ground 
of alleged undue influence exerted by the defendant, Ade-
laide M. Hayes, in each instance. 
8. Complete preparation for trial of the issues raised by 
the appeal was made, and the parties and witnesses were 
present before the Circuit Court of Princess Anne County, 
on July 19, 1934, the date fixed for trial, when the contestant, 
· by counsel, announced that she had concluded that the Vir-
ginia court was without jurisdiction to admit the will to pro-
bate, that New York was the only state having such juris-
diction, and she then moved to be allowed to take a non-suit .. 
This motion was resisted by your complainant but was 
gTanted by the Court. 
9 . .Shortly after the termination of said proceeding in 
the Circuit Com·t of Princess Anne County, said Mary Hayes 
Guilfoil made application before the Surrogate's Court in 
Orange County, 1N ew York, for letters of administration on 
the estate of the decedent, and a citation to appear in said 
proceeding was served on the defendant, Adelaide M. Hayes, 
in Virginia. It was necessary for your complainant 
page 6 ~ to decide whether said proceeding could be safely 
· ignored, and after investigation this course was de-
termined upon. 
10. Among the assets of the decedent's estate were a num-
ber of corporate stocks standing in the name of the decedent; 
- which were listed on the New York Stock Exchange, and which 
had transfer offices located in the City of New York. This 
fact was known to the contestant. It was anticipated that, 
if the contestant was successful in her effort to obtain appoint-
ment as administratrix in the State of New York, an effort 
would be made by her to reduce said stocks to possession. Ac-
cordingly, steps were at once taken to convert said stocks 
into cash, and in due course this was done. 
11. The defendant, Adelaide M. Hayes, was anxious to re-
invest the proceeds of said stocks in other stocks, in order to 
obtain an income- therefrom, and any increment that might 
accrue. It was realized, that if said stocks were taken in the 
name of the defendant, Adelaide M. Hayes, and that fact be-
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came known to the contestant, an effort might be made to 
- attach them in the St.ate of New York. It was accordingly de-
cided to purchase said stocks and bold the same in brokers' 
names. To this end the defendant, Adelaide M. Hayes, paid 
over to your complainant sums of money from time to time, 
from funds held by her, as executrix, and your complainant 
purchased, at the direction of the defendant, Adelaide M. 
Hayes, the following stocks : · 
No. of Shares 
50 
100 
25 
page 7 ~ 50 
100 
100 
Name 
Consolidated Gas Company 
General Electric Company 
Norfolk & Wes tern :Railway Company 
United States ,Steel Corporation 
United Gas & Improvement Company 
American TelegTaph & Telephone Company 
Certificates for said shares of stock were duly received 
and held for a period of time when your complainant was 
advised by brokers who had negotiated the purchases that 
the same would have to be transferred from brokers' names. 
It was ag-reed between eomplainant and defendant, Adelaide 
M. Hayes; that said certificates should be transferred to your 
complainant and this was done. All of said certificates now . 
stand in the name of your complainant, with the exception of 
the 50 shares of Consolidated Gas Company and the. 100 
shares of United- Gas & Improvement Company, these hav-
ing been sold at the direction of the,said Adelaide M. Hayes 
and the proceeds of sale paid over to her. 
12. At the time of qualification of said Adelaide M. Hayes 
as executrix as aforesaid a bond in the sum of $51,000.00 
was required of lier. National Surety Corporation agreed 
to become her surety, but upon condition_ that your complain-
ant would assume joint responsibility with said executrix for 
the administration of said estate, and particularly that all se- · 
curities of said estate be lodged in a safe deposit box ·in the 
joint names of your complainant and said Adelaide M. Hayes, 
and all funds of said estate deposited in a bank account re-
quiring the signature of both your complainant and said Ade-
laide M. Hayes on all checks drawn thereon. Pursuant to 
this agreement a safe deposit box was rented from the de-
fendant, National Bank of Commerce of 'Norfolk, under the 
n11me : '' Estate of "'William R. Hayes, By Adelaide :M:. Hayes, 
Executrix, William L. Parker, Attorney'', and re-
page 8 ~ quiring the presence of both your complainant and 
· said Adelaide M. Hayes for access thereto; and a 
checking- account was opened with said Bank in the name of 
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'' Adelaide M. Hayes, Executrix'' with the requirement that 
all checks drawn thereon, to be valid, should bear the. signa-
ture of said Adelaide M. Hayes and the countersignature of 
your complainant. There is now lodged in said safe deposit 
box tl1e certificates of stock above described, and other stocks 
and bonds, the property of the Estate of said William R. 
Hayes; and there is now on deposit to the credit of said bank 
account a sum in excess of $650.00. 
13. On September 11, 1934, :Mary Hayes Guilfo11, pursuant 
to her application hereinhefore mentioned, was appointed by 
the Surrogate's Court for Orange County, New York, ad-
ministratrix of the estate of said William R. Hayes, and duly 
qualified as such. On October 29, 1934, said administratrix 
instituted a suit in equity against the defendant, Adelaide M. 
Hayes, in the District ·Court of the United States for the 
Eastern District of Virginia. The object of said suit was to 
obtain an accounting and possession of the assets of the estate 
of William R. Hayes. Said suit was defended by your com-
plainant and eventually dismissed. 
14. On ]\fay 23, 1935, and while the suit referred to in para-
graph 13 was still pending, said Mary Hayes Guilfoil insti-
tuted a second suit in the District Court of the United States 
for the Eastern District of Virginia, against the defendant, 
Adelaide M. Hayes. The object of this suit was to test the 
validity of the will of William R. Hayes, in the manner au-
thorized by Section 5259 of the Virginia Code. Your com-
plainant def ended said suit on behalf of said Adelaide l\L 
Hayes and in the course thereof filed a motion to 
page 9 ~ dismiss the same on the ground that the proceeding 
in question was probate in character as to which 
Federal courts had no jurisdiction. 'The motion w·as sus-
tained by the District Court and the plaintiff appealed to 
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit. Your complainant appeared in said last named court 
on behalf of said Adelaide M. Hayes (preparing and filing 
brief and arguing the case), with the result that the decision 
· of the District Court was affirmed. The plaintiff then ap-
plied to the Supreme Court of the TT nited States for a writ 
of certiorari to the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Your complainant prepared and filed a brief in opposition 
with the result that the writ was refused. 
15. On May 23, 1935, and while the suits mentioned in para-
graphs 13 and 14 were still pending·, Mary Hayes Guilfoil 
instituted, in the Circuit Court of Princess Anne County, a 
suit as authorized by ,Section 5259 of the Virginia Code to 
contest the validity of the clecedent 's will. Your complain-
ant defended this suit on behalf of the defendant Adelaide 
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M. Hayes, and succeeded in having the suit dismissed on a 
special plea. The contestant applied to the Supreme Court 
of Appeals for a writ of error. Your complainant filed a brief 
in opposition to the granting of the writ but the same was 
nevertheless granted. Your complainant def ended said case in 
the Supreme Court of Appeals, preparing and filing a hrief 
and arguing the case, with the result that the decision of the 
Circuit Court of Princess Anne County was affirmed. 
16. When the contents of the decedent's safe deposit box 
were examined, there was found a deed from the decedent 
conveying to the said Adelaide l\L Hayes certain valuable 
real estate in the City of Newburgh, New York. Said deed 
has been executed and acknowledged but not re-
page 10 ~ corded. Your complainant caused said deed to be 
recorded and shortly thereafter said Mary Hayes 
Guilfoil instituted suit in a State Court in Orange 
County, New York, the object of which was to cancel the 
deed on the ground that the grantor lacked mental capacity 
to execute the same; that it had ·been procured by the undue 
influence of Adelaide M:. Hayes; that no legal delivery of 
the deed had been made; and tha.t the transfer was without 
consideration. Your complainant caused said suit to be re-
moved to the District Court of the United States for the 
Southern District of New York, with the result that when 
said suit was reached on the calendar the plaintiff, rather 
than try the same before that court, entered into a stipula-
tion to the effect, that in event the pending litigation involv-
ing· the validity of the will was decided in favor of Adelaide 
l\f. Hayes, a decree would be entered in the New York suit 
adjudging the deed valid; while on the other hand, should 
the contrary result follow, it was agreed that the decision 
would be without prejudice to Adelaide lVL Hayes in the New 
York suit. As a result of the successful termination of the 
litigation involving the validity of the will a decree was en-
tered in the New York suit, pursuant to the terms of the 
stipulation referred to, adjudging the deed in question to be 
valid and effective. 
17. As shown in paragraph 12, your complainant, in order 
to obtain surety on the bond of Adelaide M:. Hayes as execu-
trix, assumed joint control with said executrix in the aclmin-
istra tion of said estate, and in so doing assumed personal 
responsibility for its management. When certain assets of 
the estate had been converted into cash, as sl1own in para-
graph 10, the condition of the security market was such as to 
present serious difficulty in obtaining a fair re-
page 11 ~ turn on any investment approved for fiduciaries 
under the provisions of the Virginia Code. It was 
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the judgment of your complainant that the best opportunity 
from the point of view of income and increment in capital 
was offered by good common stocks listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange, and the said Adelaide M. Hayes concurred 
in this view. Your complainant assumed the responsibility 
for, and consented to such investment of the funds as is shown 
in paragraph 11. The result has been a good income and a 
substantial incre~ent. in invested capital. Had a loss re-
sulted, and the 'C&se been lost, your complainant might well 
have been held .accountable to the ultimate beneficiaries of 
the fund. In addition, your complainant performed all duties 
of the executrix, who acted only as directed by him. 
18. Shortly after the institution of the first will contest, 
National Surety Corporation, surety on the boncl of the execu-
trix, by reason of representations made to it on behalf of 
the contestant, took steps seeking to be relieved as such 
surety, as it had a legal right to do. Had this course been 
followed, and the surety relieved, it would not have been 
possible to obtain new surety by reason of the pending con-
test. In.evitably the appointment of a c.nrator would have 
been necessary. The result would have been added expense to 
the estate, a different policy with respect to investments, diffi-
culty in completing the house under construction at Virginia 
Beach (hereinafter to be ref erred to), inability of Adelaide M. 
Hayes to secure funds for her own support and for the con-
duct of the litigation in which she was involved, and other in-
conveniences. As a result of a series of negotiations between 
your complainant and representatives of the Surety Company, 
added to the fact that your complainant had as-
page 12 ~ slimed personal responsibility in the management 
of the estate, the surety was induced to abandon 
its proposed course of action, and the matter wa~ allowed to 
stand as it was. · 
19. In connection with the management of the estate in-
vestments, your complainant made detailed studies and in-
. vestigations to determine their suitability, kept himself ad-
vised of market prices and conditions, studied the financial 
reports of the several corporations involved, collected divi-
dends and remitted to the said Adelaide M. Hayes, sold cer-
tain securities and invested in others, and in other ways con-
ducted the management of such securities to the best of his 
ability. 
20 ... Shortly prior to the death of the decedent he had pur-
chased a lot at Virginia Beach, title to which was taken in 
the name of Adelaide M. Hayes, and had contracted for the 
erection of an expensive dwelling house thereon. At the time 
of his death substantial progress had been made on the con-
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struction but the house was far from completed. It was neces-
sary to determine whether it was wise to complete the house 
and whether the cost constituted a proper charge against the 
estate. These matters were considered and investigated by 
your complainant, title to the property examined and the 
decision made to complete the house. Your complainant su-
pervised the construction, adjusted differences with the con-
tractor and performed numerous other services incidental 
thereto. 
21. The litigation involving the real estate situated in New-
burgh and referred to in paragraph 16, was pending for nearly 
four years. The property had been remodeled as an apart-
ment house designed for three families. During 
pag·e 13 ~ that period your complainant supervised the man-
agement of said property, seeing to the payment 
of carrying charges, the making of repairs and improvements, 
controversies and contracts with tenants, and other incidental 
matters. 
22. Among the assets ·of the estate were mortgage bonds 
issued by S. 1V. Straus & Co., to the aggregate par value of 
approximately $90,000. They consisted of parts of thirteen 
separate issues, and in each instance the issues were in a 
large amount. Your complainant had the management and 
care of these securities over a period of four years, during 
which time, in almost all cases, reorganization of the proper-
ties securing· the issues was accomplished. Your complain-
ant informed himself of the details of these proceedings and 
was prepared to protect the interests of the estate in event of 
irregularities. The details· of exchanging the old securities 
for new, coll~cting distributions, and other incident_al mat-
ters were attended to by your complainant. 
23. For a period of four years your complainant prepared 
and filed Federal and State tax returns for the estate. In-
cluded were Federal Estate Tax return, Federal and State 
Income tax returns, State tangible and intangible tax returns, 
and City and County real estate tax matters. In addition 
your complainant had prepared all data and was ready to 
file the State Inheritance tax retum when the controversy 
hereinafter referred to between your complainant, and the de-
fendant, Adelaide l\tI. Hayes, arose, and your complainant was 
directe{l by said defendant to do nothing further with re-
spect to her affairs. 
24. Shortly after the qualification of the execu-
page 14 ~ trix. one Dr . .Samuel C. Johnson filed a claim 
against the estate for $2,000, for an operation per-
formed by him on the decedent shortly prior to his death. 
The executrix refused to pay any part of said claim, and in 
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March, 1938, suit was instituted by the claimant against the 
executrix. This suit was def ended by your complainant and 
shortly before the date set for trial was compromised on the 
instructions of said executrix for $1,500. 
25. In the preceding paragraphs your complainant has 
stated, in bare outline, the principal services rendered the 
defendant, Adelaide M. Hayes, all at her instance and request. 
In addition to the services referred to your complainant, dur-
ing· the period of four years over which his services extended, 
rendered numerous other services to the said defendant. A 
statement in more detail of all of said services was dulv ren-
dered said defendant. .. 
26. Your complainant alleg·es that all of said services were 
rendered by your. complainant to said defendant, Adelaide 
M. Hayes, in her own right and as executrix of the estate of 
William R. Hayes, deceased, as an attorney at law; that the 
fair value of said services is the sum of $29,850.00; that from 
time to time said defendant paid to your complainant, on ac-
count of said services and for expenses incurred sums of 
money aggregating· the sum of $9,850.00; that of the sum so 
paid your complainant disbursed and expended for the ac-
count of said defendant the aggregate sum of $894.27, leav-
ing· a balance clue your complainant of $20,894.27. In addi-
tion to actual disbursements made, your complainant, with 
the approval and consent of said defendant, incurred an in-
debtedness of $200 to one ],. E. Kellam, for legal 
page 15 ~ services rendered, and $50 to one Dr. Frank H. 
Redwood for expert medical opinion and advice. 
A statement of receipts and disbursements, and indebtedness 
incurred was duly rendered said defendant by your com-
plainant. 
27. Your complainant avers, that with respect to the cer-
tificates of stock standing in his name and ref erred to in para-
graph 11, he holds the same as trustee, but that the same 
came into his custody, possession and control by virtue of his 
employment by said defendant, Adelaide M. Hayes, as her 
attorney; that by virtue of this fact your complainant has a 
lien on said securities for the compensation due him and 
above set forth. 
28. From the time said stocks were purchased by your com-
plainant, until July, 1938, your complainant collected the 
dividends from said stocks and forthwith remitted the same 
to the said Adelaide M. Hayes, but since the oecurrences here-
inafter mentioned, in ,July, 1938, your complainant has col-
lected and applied to said account, dividends and interest paid 
to him on securities registered in his name, the sum of $423.12, 
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which said swn should be credited on the balance due your 
complainant and above stated. 
29. In July, 1938, and after your complainant had ren-
dered to the defendant Adelaide :M. Hayes the statements of 
services rendered and expenditures made as above set forth, 
your complainant received a written demand fi;om the said 
.Adelaide M. Hayes for delivery to her of the securities above 
mentioned and held by your complainant, coupled with a de-
nial by said defendant that she was indebted to your com~ 
plainant in any amount whatsoever. 
30. In addition to the securities registered in the name of 
your complainant, there are other securities in -the 
page 16 ~ possession and control of your complainant, and 
lodged in the safe deposit box leased in the joint 
names of your complainant and the defendant Adelaide M. 
Hayes., from the defendant National Bank of Commerce of 
Norfolk. Said securiti~s likewise came into the possession 
and control of your complainant by virtue of his employment 
by said defendant as her attorney, and your complainant 
likewise has a lien upon said securities for his said compen-
sation. Demand has also been made upon your complainant, 
by said defendant, Adelaide M. Hayes, for the delivery of 
said last named securities to her. 
31. Your complainant further alleges that all of the debts 
of the estate of William R.. Hayes have been paid with the 
exception of the debt due your complainant, and that the said 
.Adelaide M. Hayes is entitled, by virtue of the will of said 
W~illiam R. Hayes, to all of said property, and all other re-
maining assets of said estate, after payment of what is due 
your complainant. 
32. Inasmuch as your complainant and said defendant, 
Adelaid~ M. Hayes, with respect to the securities standing 
in the name of your complainant and above set forth, occupy 
the relationship of trustee and cestiti qite trnstent and dis-
putes and differences have arisen between them as to their 
respective interests in the subject matter of said trust; and es-
pecially with respect to your complainant "s right to a lien 
thereon; and inasmuch as your complainant is under a duty 
to render an accounting to the defendant Adelaide M. Hayes 
of his transactions as such trustee, your complainant feels it 
to be his rig-ht and duty to ask the c.ourt for advice and direc-
tion with respect to his rig·hts and duties under 
pag-e 17 ~ said trust and to examine into his administration 
of said trust from the commencement thereof with 
respect to sales and purchases, investments and re-invest-
ments as respects the principal of said trust fund, and his 
receipts, charges and disbursements on account of the income 
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thereof, and to pass upon the propriety and correctness of 
said doings and accounts, and to make a complete settlement 
of all matters between him and said defendant Adelaide M .. 
Hayes. 
33. In addition your complainant is advised that by reason 
of the matters and things hereinbefore stated he is entitled 
to a lien for his services as attorney upon all of said securi-
ties in his custody or under his control, which said lien will 
be protected aµd enforced by-a coul't of equity. 
34. Your ·coiµplainant is further advised that this court _ 
can require tthe defendant, National Bank of Commerce of 
Norfolk, in whose vaults said secmities are lodged, to deliver 
said securities to this court, or to such other person as the 
court may hereafter determine, and to pay over in like man-
ner the balance to the credit of the bank account hereinabove 
mentioned. 
Being without remedy, save in a court of equity, where 
matters of this sort are alone cognizable, your complainant 
prays that the said Adelaide M. Hayes, in her own right and 
as executrix of the last will and testament of William R. 
Hayes, deceased, and National Bank of Commerce of -Norfolk,. 
be made parties defendant to this bill, and be required to an-
swer the same, but not under oath, answer under oath being 
hereby expressly waived; tha.t this cause be referred to a 
Commissioner in Chancery of this court with directions to 
take, state and settle an account showing the dealing-s of 
your complainant as trustee with the trust estate 
page 18 ~ from the commencement thereof to the time of 
· such examination, including all sales and pur-
chases, investments and re-investments as respects the prin-
cipal of said trust fund, and all other receipts, charges and 
dis-bursements on account of the income thereof; and the rea-
sonable value of the services rendered the defendant, Ade-
laide M. Hayes, in her own rig·ht and as executrix of the es-
tate of William R. Hayes, deceased, by your complainant; 
that this court "~ill pass upon the propriety and correctness 
of the said doings and accounts and make a complete settle-
ment up to date of all matters as between the complainant 
and said defendant, Adelaide M. Hayes; that the defendant, 
National Bank of Commerce of Norfolk, be required to de-
liver and pay over to this court, or to such person as may be 
designated by it, the securities above described and lodged 
with it and the balance to the credit of said bank account 
with it; that this court will enter a decree in favor of your. 
complainant, against said defendant, for the amount found 
due your complainant for his services aforesaid; that this 
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court will adjudge that your complainant has a lien upon the 
securities aforesaid for the amount f ormd to be due him; and 
that this court will enforce the lien of your complainant by 
sale or otherwise; and that your complainant may have such 
other and further relief, both general and special, as to equity 
may seem meet and the nature of the case may require. 
And your complainant will eyer pray, etc. 
WILLIAM L. PARKER. 
WM. G. MAUPIN, 
Counsel for Complainant. 
page 19 ~ Also in c.ompliance with the foregoing stipula-
tion, the following is the bill of complaint filed at 
the Rules holden for this Court on the third Monday in Sep-
tember, 1938, by Adelaide M. Hayes,. Executrix under the 
last will and testament of William R. Hayes, deceased, com-
plainant, v. William L. Parker, respondent: 
·page 20 } Virginia : 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk. 
Adelaide M. Hayes, Executrix under the last will and testa-
ment of William R. Hayes, deceased, Complainan~ 
'V. 
William L. Parker, Respondent. 
BILL OF 001\:IPLAI,NT. 
To Hon. Allan R. Hanek el, Judge of the Court afore said: 
Humbly complaining, showeth unto your Honor, your ora-
trix Adelaide M. Haves Executrix under the last will and tes..: 
~ tament of William R. Hayes, deceased, the following· case: 
1. Adelaide l\L Hayes was the wife, and is now the widow, 
of William R. Hayes who departed this life on April 27, 
1934. They then resided at Virginia Beach in Princess Anne 
County, Virginia, where she now resides. She has qualified 
in said County as Executrix under his last will and testa-
ment. 
page 21 ~ - 2. William L. Parker is a duly licensed and prac-
ticing attorney at law who resides and has his 
place of business in Norfolk, Virginia. 
3. Complainant employed respondent as her attorney to 
perform necessary services in connection with the adminis-
tration of the estate of ·wmiam R. Hayes, and he accepted 
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said employment. From time to time she paid him, at his in-
stance and request, sums ag·gregating $10,020.03 as fees for 
services rendered to Adelaide M. Rayes both as E..xecutrix 
and in her own right, and expenses incurred in connec.tion 
with said services. When demands for said sums were made 
she objected to them as unreasonable, but respondent in-
sisted on their payment, and the circumstances were such 
that she felt constrained to pay them. She believes said pay-
ments were sufficient, and probably much more than suffi-
cient, compensation for such services and reimbursement for 
such expenf,es:- Respondent now, however, demands further 
sums aggTegating $21,144.27 on account of said fees and such 
expenses which she has refused to pay because she does not 
owe it. 
4. Respondent informed complainant that, as attorney for 
the estate, he arrang·ed with National Surety Company to exe-
cute the bond required of her, and later ag-reed with it that 
all funds belonging to the estate should be deposited in the 
National Bank of Commerce at .Norfolk subject to the joint 
check of himself and herself, and that all securi-
page 22 ~ ties belonging to the estate should be deposited· in 
a box in said Bank subject to the joint order of him-
self and herself. ·This, he said, was necessary to prevent the 
company from cancelling the bond it had given on account 
of misrepresentations which had been made to it respecting 
the management of the estate. Complainant consented to 
the arrang·emcnt solely for the reasons stated and it was 
made. 
5. Respondent advised complainant that certificates for 
. certain shares of stock purchased by the estate should be made 
out in his name and delivered to him because he said they 
mig·ht otherwise be proceeded against by Mrs. Mary Hayes 
Guilfoil who had qualified in New York as Administratrix 
of William R. Hayes claiming he was a resident of that State. 
Complainant consented to this arrangement solely for the 
reasons stated and it was made. She does not know the num-
bers of these certipcates, but the names of the companies 
which issued them, the numbers of shares, and their approxi-
niate values are: 
Name of Company 
A.mer. TPl. & Tel. Co. 
General Electric 
U. S. Steel 
Norfolk & "\Vestern Railway 
No. of Shares 
100 
100 
50 
25 
Value 
$14,400.00 
4,000.00 
2,800.00 
4,250.00 
$25,450.00 
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Respondent received checks for dividends on the afore-
mentioned shares, and endorsed some of them to complain-
ant's order, and will receive other checks for like dividends. 
He now refuses to endorse to complainant's order any checks 
he has received and has not yet endorsed, and any he may 
hereafter receive, and says he has kept and 
page 23 } credited, and will keep· and credit, them on the sums 
he claims to be due him. He also refuses to en-
dorse to complainant's order said certificates of stock for 
the reason, he says, that he has a lien on them, and a right 
to keep them until what he claims is paid. · . 
6. The estate owned other securities, bonds and evidences 
of debt, some of which were in default, and respondent ad-
vised complainant to accept checks and new securities in ex-
change for those in default, and agree that such checks, and 
checks for interest on such bonds, should be sent him be-
cause, he said, that would be the most convenient method .. 
Complainant consented to the arrang·ement solely for the rea-
sons stated and it ,,ms made. Respondent now refuses to en-
dorse to complainant any of the checks he has received and 
not already endorsed, or any he may hereafter receive, or 
to account to complainant therefor, for the reason, he says, 
that he has a lien on them and a right to keep and credit them 
on the balance due him which he is doing and intends to con-
thme doing. 
7. In connection with his employment, respondent came 
into possession of many books, papers, writings and docu-
ments belonging to the estate which he said it was necessary 
that he have for proper administration of the estate, and 
complainant consented to his having· them solely for the rea-
son stated. He now refuses to surrender them for the rea-
son, he says, that he has a lien on them for the balance which 
lie claims to be due him. 
Complainant is unable to specify the books, papers and 
writings in respondent's possession. 
page 24 ~ 8. TJ1e names of the companies by which the cer-
tificates in the box in the Bank were issued, the 
number of shares, and the approximate present values of 
them are: 
Name of Company 
Amer. Tel. & Tel. Co. 
General Electric Co. 
U. S. Steel 
Norfolk & Western Railway 
American Tobacco B 
No. of Shares 
100 
100 
50 
25 
25 
Value 
$14,300.00 
4,100.00 
2,900.00 
3,750.00 
2,150.00 
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Continental Can. Co. 
National Dairy Products 
25 
50 
1,000.00 
650.00 
$28,850.00 
9. The nam~s of the companies by which the bonds in the 
box in the. Bank were made, the number of bonds> and the ag-
gregate face yalues of them are : 
Name of Company 
Bear Mt. Bridge 
Republic of Chile 
Number of Bonds 
1 
Chanin Bldg. 
Cerana Apt. 
Lombardy Apt. 
Lombardy Apt. 
Broadway and 41st Street 
Court and Remsen St. 
Court and Remsen St. 
Kashak Realty· Co. 
59th.Street and Madison Ave. 
Majestic Apt. 
521 Fifth A venue Corp. 
I I 
Book Tower & .Addition Bldg. 
Book Tower & Addition Bldg. 
3 
10 
5 
4 
2 
10 
5 
1 
5 
10 
5 
10 
2 
8 
Value 
$ 1,000.00 
3,000.00 
5,000.00 
5,000.00 
4,000.00 
1,000.00 
10,000.00 
5,000.00 
500.00 
5,000.00 
. 10,000.00 
5,000.00 
10,000.00 
2,000.00 
4,000.00 
$70,500.00 
The approximate present aggregate value of said bonds is 
$15,000.00. 
page 25 }. 10. The funds of the estate on ·deposit in the 
Bank aggreg·ate $656.67. 
11. Upon complainant's refusal to pay respondent the sums 
demanded by him he, as stated, refused and still ref uses: 
(a) To sign checks on the funds in the Bank 
(b) To permit complainant to have access to the securities 
in the box in the Bank. 
( c) To turn over to complainant any cheeks which have, 
or may hereafter, come to him. 
( d) To account for the funds he has received, or may re-
ceive. 
( e) To surrender the books, papers, writings and docu-
ments in his possession. 
Respondent takes these positions for the reasons, he says, 
that a balance is due him and he has a lien on the securities, 
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papers and documents therefor, and a right to appropriate 
all funds and credit them on said balance, and· is bound, by 
his arrangement with the Surety Company, to control the 
funds on deposit and the securities in the -box. All this com-
plainant specifically and emphatically denies. 
12. The circumstances under which respondent was em-
ployed and which led complainant to impose great confidence 
in him are that when the said William R. Hayes came from 
~New York to Norfolk in 1932, he opened an account in the 
National Bauk of Commerce, and later asked it for the name 
of a lawyer who would properly perform desired 
page 26 ~ legal services. The Bank gave him the name and 
address of :M:r. Hugh W. Davis, and he went to 
his office in the Bank Buildin&' but did not find him. Respond-
ent, associated with Mr. Davis, was there and was employed 
in his place and stead. Upon the death of complainant's hus-
band she continued respondent's employment, and in consent-
ing to each of the arrangements hereinbefore mentioned she 
relied upon his suggestions and was guided ·by his advice. She 
had no thought that he had any intention, as a result of them, 
of obtaining a lien on the property of the estate or putting 
himself, in a position to insist upon demands against it. 
13. By reason of respondent's acts; 
(a) He has possession of the aforementioned and ref erred 
to stock certificates and funds belonging to the estate to which 
complainant is entitled and possession of which she has been, 
is, and wm be, unable to obtain. 
(b) He has deprived complainant of access to the estate's 
box in the Bank wherein are its securities, and control over, 
and the power to check on, the estate''s funds on deposit in 
the Bank. 
( c) Settlement of the estate has been tied up. 
( d) Claims for taxes, penalties and bond premiums have 
accrued. 
( e) Papers, documents and writings necessary for the ad-
ministration of the estate are not available. 
14. To avoid the difficulties, inconveniences and losses oc-
casioned complainant as aforesaid she arranged with Na-
tional Surety Company for a release of respondent from any 
liability in connection with administration of the 
page 27 ~ estate, and also arranged to give him a bond for 
the payment of anything found to be due him, and 
offered him such a release, and such a bond, on condition 
that he turn over to her all proper~y and funds belonging 
to the estate in his possession or under his control, release 
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his control over the funds on deposit, and over the box in · 
the Bank. This proposition he summarily declined. Copies 
of the offer and its rejection are attached as parts hereof. 
15. Even if complainant owed respondent anything which 
is denied, she believes and alleges that he has no right to 
the securities in his name, no lien on the funds he has, or 
may hereafter have, and no right to appropriate them to his 
own use, and no lien on the papers in his possession, and no 
rig·ht to interfere with complainant's control o-~·er the funds . 
on deposit or over the box in the Bank. If, however, it is 
determined by this Court that respondent. has the rig·hts afore-
said, complainant is willing and able, and now offers, to pro-
vide and deliver respondent a release as aforesaid, and to 
provide and deliver to him a bond as aforesaid on the before-
mentioned terms. 
16. Respondent has instituted in this Court two suits 
ag·ainst complainant and others to recover the aforesaid sum 
of $21,144.27. The object of those suits is entirely different 
from the purpose of this, and complainant will interpose de-
fenses therein, and institutes this suit to obtain possession 
of the funds and securities mentioned without prejudice to 
all such defenses, the benefits thereof being expressly re-
served. 
page 28 ~ IN TENDER CONSIDERATI10N WHEREOF, 
and for as much as she is remediless save in a 
Court of Equity where matters of this kind are alone prop-
erly cog11izable and relievable, complainant 1Jrays that Wil-
liam L. Parker: 
(a) Be made a party defendant herein, and required to 
answer this bill, but not under oath, an answer under oath 
being expressly waived. 
(b) Be adjudged to have no lien on, or right to retain, ap-
propriate, or dispose of, any funds and/or securities belong-
ing· to the estate of William R. Hayes. 
( c) Be enjoined and restrained from collecting·, retaining,. 
appropriating or disposing of any funds and/or sec.urities 
belonging· to the estate of Wil1iam R. Hayes. 
( d) Be required to account for all funds and securities be-
longing to the estate of William R. Hayes now in, or which 
may hereafter come into, his possession by reason of his 
former position as counsel for the estate. 
( e) Be required to revoke all directions given by him re-
specting· funds or securities belonging to the estate whereby 
they, or a.ny of them, have, or may l1ereafter, come into his 
possession, or under his control. _ 
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(f) Be required to endorse and deliver to complainant all 
certificates for shares of stoek belonging to said estate which 
are in his name or under his control, and all checks for divi-
dends thereon. 
page 29 } (g-) Be required to turn over and deliver to com-
. plainant all books, papers, documents and writings 
belonging to the estate in his possession. 
(h) Be required to give all notices and sign or endorse all 
releases, assignments, orders, and checks necessary to give 
complainant complete control over all ·books, papers, securi~ 
ties and funds belonging to said estate, and over the funds 
on deposit, and the box in the National Bank of Commerce, 
and to do all and every thing necessary, requisite or con-
venient for that purpose. 
Complainant also prays that she may have a decree against 
the said William L. Parker for all loss, cost and damage oc-
-casioned her as afore said, and all other decrees necessary to 
give her the relief herein prayed for, and any other relief 
to which she is entitled, and she will, as in duty bound, ever 
pray. 
JORN G. POORE, 
ADELAIDE M. HAYES, 
Executrix of Wm. R. Hayes, Deceased. 
BAIRD, ,vHITE & LANNING, 
p. q. 
State of Virgfoia, _ 
Corporation of the City of Norfolk, to-wit: 
This day personally appeared before me, Edw. R. Baird, 
Jr., a Notary Public for the Corporation aforesaid in the 
State of Virginia. whose commission expires on Aug. 19, 1942, 
in my Corporation and State a.foresaid, Adelaide M. Hayes. 
who being by me :first duly sworn made oath that 
pag·e 30 } she is Executrix of the last will and testament of 
William R. Hayes deceased and as such complain-
ant in the above-entitled cause, and that she is familiar with 
the matters and things in the foregoing bill and they are true, 
so far as stated of her own knowledge, and, so far as stated 
on information derived from others, she believes them to be 
true. 
ADELAIDE J\f. HAYES. ii 
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Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7th day of Sep-
tember, 1938. 
EDW. R. BAIRD, JR., 
Notary Public. 
page 31 ~ August 2~ 1938 
W. G. Maupin, Esq.,. 
National Bank of Conunerce Bldg.,. 
Norfolk, Virginia. 
Parker v. Hayes 
Dear M:r. Maupin: 
We have been associated with Mr. John G. Poore of New 
York as counsel for Mrs. Hayes and will appreciate dupli-
cate copies of your pleadings-one for Mr. Poore and one 
for ourselves, and we will, of course,. send you duplicate copies 
of ours-one for yourself and one for Mr. Parker. Mrs .. 
Hayes wants control of the funds belonging to the estate and 
can arrang·e satisfactorily with the surety company in that 
regard. She also wants the securities Mr. Parker has and 
to that end will give a bond to secure the payment of what-
ever is found due him. It seems to us this is reasonable and 
a desirable arrangement as it will eliminate from the contro-
versy everything :but the question of the value of the services .. 
Please let us know if you will cooperate in the foregoing .. 
Very truly yours, 
ERB/b 
(;(J-J ohn G. Poore, Esq .. 
Mrs. Haves 
page 32 ~ WM. G. MAUPIN 
Norfolk, Virginia 
Messrs. Baird, White & Lanning, 
Attorneys-at-Law, 
August 3rd, 1938 .. 
National Bank of Commerce Building, 
Norfolk, Virginia. 
Re: Park.er v. Hayes. 
Dear Sirs: 
I am in receipt of your letter of August 2nd. 
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When the bill is drawn I shall be glad to accede to your 
request for duplicate copies. 
With reference to your request that the funds and securi-
ties belonging to the estate be turned over to your client, l 
regret that I am unable to accede to your wishes. Mr. Parker 
has a lien on these funds and securities and I am unwilling 
to do anything which might affect or possibly prejudice his 
position in that respect. I do not care to substitute a surety 
bond for the present status . 
.Very truly yours, 
WGM/M (Signed) ,vl\L G. MAUPIN. 
page 33 ~ And in compliance with said stipulation, the fol-
lowing is the answ·er and cross-bill of William L. 
Parker, filed in this Court at the Rules holden for it on the 
first Monday in October, 1938; 
The answer and cross-bill of William L. Parker to a bill 
of complaint filed against him in the Circuit ,Court of the City 
of Norfolk, by Adelaide M. Hayes, Executrix under the last 
will and testament of William R.. Haye-s, deceased. 
This respondent for answer to said bill, or to so much 
thereof as he is advised that it is material that he should an-
swer, answering says: 
(1) The allegations of paragraph one (1) are admitted. 
(2) The .alleg·ations of parag·raph two (2) are admitted. 
(3) With respect to the allegations of paragraph three 
(3), it is true that Adelaide M. Hayes employed this respond-
ent as her attorney to perform legal services, and that this 
respondent accepted such employment. It is true that the 
said Adelaide M. Hayes paid to respondent. certain sums of 
money on account of fees for services rendered, and for ex-
penses incurred in connection with said services. The amount 
paid to respondent, however, w·as not the sum of Ten Thou-
sand and Twenty Dolla1·s and Three Cents ($10,020.03), as 
set forth in said paragraph three (3), but the sum of Nine 
Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($9,850.00). This 
respondent denies that Adelaide M. Hayes at any time ob-
jected to the amounts requested by this respondent as un-
reasonable. On the contrary, he alleges that, from 
page 34 ~ time to time, the said Adelaide M. Hayes requested 
this respondent to inform her of the amount which 
he would ultimately charge for his services. In each instance 
this respondent informed the said Adelaide M. Hayes that 
52 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
his charge would depend upon the services he was called 
upon to perform and his success or failure in defending the 
litigation in which she was then, or might later be involved. 
During· the course of four years over which the services in 
question extended, matters arose and suits were instituted 
·which could not have been anticipated, and this respondent 
advised the said Adelaide M. Hayes from time to time that 
it was impossible to forecast in advance what additional liti-
gation would be instituted, or the result thereof. This re-
spondent admits that he has demanded sums aggregating 
Twenty-one Thousand One Hundred ]forty-four Dollars and 
Twenty-seven Cents ($21,144~27) in addition to the amount 
previously paid to him. Two Hundred and Fifty Dollars 
($250.00) of said amount represents indebtedness incurred 
for the account, of said Adelaide M. Hayes, which has not 
been paid. 
( 4) With respect to the alleg·ations contained in paragraph 
four ( ~) of the bill, this respo1ident alleges that he negotiated 
with National Surety Corporation to become surety on the 
bond of said Adelaide l\L Hayes as Executrix. As a condi-
tion to executing the said bond, said National Surety Cor-
poration demanded joint control with the Executrix of ·the 
funds and securities belonging to the Estate. Had this been 
done, serious inconvenience to the complainant would have re-
sulted. The complainant was advised of this demand by the 
surety, and of the consequences of acceding thereto. The 
surety subsequently agreed to waive such require-
page 35 ~ ment upon condition that this respondent assume 
joint responsibility for the management of said 
Estate with the said Adelaide M. Hayes, as Executrix, and 
with her knowledg·e and consent, this respondent did assume 
such joint responsibility. This respondent admits that it 
was agreed that all funds belonging to the Estate should be 
deposited in the National Bank of Cominerce/of Norfolk, sub-
ject to the joint check of himself and said Adelaide l\L Hayes, 
and that all securities belonging to the Estate should be de-
posited in a box in said Bank subject to the joint order of 
himself and herself. He denies that he stated that such was 
necessary to prevent the Company from cancelling the bond, 
and denies that the complainant consented to the arrange-
ment for the reasons stated. 
(5) .. With respect to the allegations c.ontained in paragraph 
five ( 5) of t11e bill, this respondent says that Adelaide l\L 
'Hayes, as Executrix of William R. Hayes, deceased, had on 
deposit in the bank account above referred to, subject to the 
joint control of herself and this respondent, a large amount 
of cash, the proceeds of certain securities owned by William 
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R. Hayes, and sold by said Adelaide M. Hayes as his E:Xoou-
trix. The said Adelaide :ht Hayes desired to reinvest said 
funds in certain stocks. In the meantime, Mary Hayes Guil-
foil, a sister of the decedent, who had previously instituted 
proceedings in the Circuit Court of Princess Anne County, · 
Virginia·, to contest the validity of the will of William R. 
Hayes, had dismissed said proceedings, and had applied to 
the appropriate Court in .Orange County, .New York, for a 
grant of letters of administration on the Estate of said Wil-
liam R. Hayes, proceeding on the theory that that Court alone 
had jurisdiction to entertain administration pro-
pag·e 36 } ceedings. -This respondent, acceding to the request 
of said Adelaide M. Hayes, to reinvest the cash 
funds above ref erred to, purchased certain stocks, and re~ 
ceived certificates therefor in brokers' names. Said certifi-
cates were deposited in the safe deposit box above referred 
to. Subsequently, this respondent was advised by the broker 
who negotiated the purchase that it would be necessary to 
transfer said stocks from brokers' names to some other ·name. 
This respondent· had reason to believe that if said stocks 
were held in the name of the said Adelaide M. Hayes, an at-
tempt would be made to subject them to the claims of the per-
sonal representative appointed in the State of New York, and 
that, by reason of the fact that t11e transfer offices for the 
corporations in which said stock was held were located in 
the State of New York, attachments or othe·r process for the 
sequestration of said stocks might be resorted to, with the 
result that additional litigation and serious inconvenience 
would follow. .Said Adelaide M. Hayes, having· been ac-
quainted with these facts, asked the -advice of this respondent 
with respect to .the best course to be pursued by her under 
ihe circumstances. This respondent agreed to take title to 
said stocks in his name and this was done. The names of 
the companies issuing the stocks in question, and the number 
-0f shares in each, are as stated in paragraph five (5) of the 
bill. This respondent admits that from time to time he has 
received dividends from the shares above mentioned and en-
dorsed the checks the ref or to complainant's order as set forth 
in said paragraph five (5). He admits that he now_ refuses 
fo endorse to complainant's order any future checks re-
ceived by him, and admits that he has kept .and 
·page 37 ~ and credited on the indebtedness due him by the 
complain'.ant certain dividends received on said 
stock. He further admits that he refuses to endorse to com-
plainant's order said certificates of stock. His reason for so 
doing is that he claims a rig·ht to keep them until his charges 
are paid in full. 
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( 6) With·_resp.ect to the allegations contained in paragraph 
six ( 6) of the bill, this respondent says that he has received 
and credited . to the balance due and owing him from said 
Adelaide M:. Hayes, the sum of Four Hm1dred Eighty-five 
Dollars and Sixty-two Cents ($485.62), representing divi-
dends and interest on securities registered in his name. This 
respondent has rec.eived no checks payable to the order of 
said Adelaide M. Hayes, except certain checks heretofore re-
ceived which wete delivered to her. 
(7) The allegations of paragraph seven (7) of the bill are 
. admitted. 
(8) The allegations of paragraph eig·ht (8) of the bill are 
admitted. 
(9) With respect to the allegations contained in parag-raph 
nine (9) of the bill, this respondent says that he has made no 
inventory of the contents of the safe deposit box referred 
to, but believes the allegations with respect to the contents 
of said box to be substantially true. He denies, however, 
that the approximate value of said securities is Fifteen Thou-
sand Dollars ($15,000.) as alleged in said paragraph nine (9), 
and alleges that the value theteof is greatly in excess of the 
amount stated. 
(10) The allegation contained in paragraph ten (10) of the 
bill is admitted. 
page 38 ~ · (11) ·with respect to the allegations contained in 
paragraph eleven (11) of this bill, this respondent 
admits: 
(a) That he refuses to sign checks on the f uncls in bank ; 
(b) That he refuses to surrender control over the safe de-
posit box referred to and the securities therein contained; 
( c) That he refuses to turn over to the complainant any 
checks that may come to him. 
( d) This respondent denies that he has refused to aooount 
for the funds he has received, or may receive, for the account 
of the complainant, as alleged in sub-paragraph ( d) of para-
graph eleven (11) of the hill. On the contrary, he stands 
ready to render a full accounting· thereof, and prays that the 
same may be done in this proceeding. 
( e) This respondent admits that he refuses to surrender 
any books, papers, writings and documents in his possession 
as alleged in sub-paragraph (e) of paragraph eleven (11) of 
the bill. 
This tespondent asserts, as a11eged in said paragTaph 
eleven (11) that he has a lien upon said bank account, said 
securities, said checks and said books, papers, writings and 
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documents, for the balance· due and owing· him for his E?erv-
ices as aforesaid, by reason of the fact that the relationship 
between this respondent and the complainant was that of at-
torney and client; that the balance due and owing from the 
complainant to this respondent is for services rendered in 
that capacity, and that said bank account, securities, checks, 
books, papers, writing·s and documents came into the custody, 
possession and control of this respondent in the course of 
his employment as such attorney. This respond-
page 39 ~ ent denies that he claims the rights herein as-
serted by reason ?f this agreement with the surety 
on the bond of the Executrix. On the contrary, he asserts 
that the complainant has fully administered the Estate of 
the decedent, except for payment of the amount due this re-
spondent, and that after payment of such amount, said funds 
and securities are the property of said Adelaide M. Hayes, 
as sole beneficiary under the will of the decedent. 
(12) This respondent is unable to see the materiality or 
relevancy of the allegations contained in paragraph twelve 
(12) of the bill, but in order that the record may be complete 
and accurate, says that on a day in the latter part of Oc-
tober, 1933, the decedent, ·wmiam R. Hayes, entered the of-
fice of this respondent, whic.h he shares with Hugh Vi. Davis, 
an attorney practicing in the City of .Norfolk, Virginia, in-
troduced himself, and inquired whether this respondent could 
prepare a deed conveying- certain property owned by him 
to his wife. This respondent undertook to prepare the deed 
and made an engagement for a later day for the decedent 
to return and execute the same. The deed was duly prepared 
and on a later day, the decedent came to the office of this 
respondent, exeeuted the same, and delivered the same to 
the said Adelaide l\[ Hayes, in the presence of this respond-
ent. On the occasion of the second visit, the decedent re-
quested this respondent to obtain certain information for 
]1im relative to certain securities owned by him. This re-
spondent obtained the information desired and saw the de-
cedent for a third, and perhaps a fourth time relative thereto. 
He never saw the decedent again.· In l\fay, 1934, said Ade-
laide M. HayeA, came to the of flee of this respondent, and 
informed him that her husband was dead a.nd dur-
page 40 ~ ing his lifetime had advised her, in the event of 
his death, to place her affairs in the hands of this 
respondent. At no time was this respondent ever advised by 
the decedent, or the complainant, that they had been previ-
ously referred to a.ny other attorney. Wit11 respect to the 
remaining allegations contained in said paragraph twelve 
(12), this respondent says that he insists only on his legal 
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rights, and has never, by word or act, led the complainant 
to believe that he would at any time adopt any other course. 
(13) This respondent admits the allegations of paragraph 
thirteen ( 13) of the bill with respect to his possession and 
control of said funds and securities, and states that in so 
doing, he is acting within his legal rights for the reasons 
above set forth. He denies that the said Adelaide M. Hayes 
is entitled thereto before his charges are paid in full. 
(14) With respect to the allegations contained in para-
graph fourteen (14) of the bill, this respondent is not ad-
vised of any arrangements which the defendant may have had 
with N atioual Surety Corporation. He is advised that there 
is no obligation upon him to accept in lieu of the lien to which 
he is entitled any guaranty of any person, firm, or corpora-
tion. On the contrary, he asserts and insists upon all rights 
accorded him by law, including the right to maintain title, 
custody, possession and control of the funds and securities re-
ferred to until his charges are paid in full. 
(15) With respect to the allegations contained in para-
graph fifteen (15) this respondent repeats that there is a 
large sum of money due him from the c.omplain-
page 41 ~ ant for which he has a lien upon the funds and se-
curities above mentioned; that he has a right to 
appropriate any funds coming into his hands and to apply 
the same upon the inde bted1iess due him. He is further ad-
vised, as set forth in the preceding paragraph, that there is 
no leg·al obligation resting· upon him to accept an1' guaranty 
or other arrangement in lieu of the rights secured to him by 
law. 
(16) With respect to the allegations contained in para-
graph sixteen (16) this respondent alleges that prior to the 
institution of this suit, he instituted in this Court a suit in 
equity against the complainant herein as Executrix and in her 
own right, and in due course, filed his bill of complaint therein. 
Copy of said bill of complaint is herewith filed, marked 
Exhibit "A", and prayed to be read as a part of this bill. 
This respondent denies, as alleg·ed in said paragraph six-
teen (16) of said bill, that the object of said suit k entirely. 
different from the purpose of this. On the contrary, he as-
serts that precisely the same issues ar~ presented in each. 
And ·now, having· fully answered the allegations contained 
in the bill of complaint, this respondent, hy way of cross-bill,. 
alleges and prays as follows: 
(a) That the respondent, having been employed by the 
complainant, Adelaide l\L Hayes, in May, 1934, as her attor-
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ney, at her instance and request, performed, for a period of 
four years sm1dry services of. an onerous and difficult na-
ture, including the admission of the 1'Till of William R. 
Hayes to probate; the appointment and qualification of the 
complainant as Executrix thereunder; the performance of 
duties devolving upon said Executrix under the Will; the 
composing of a controversy with the surety on the bond of 
said Executrix arising after her qualincap.on; the 
page 42 ~ management and administration of the Estate se-
curities and investments; the superintendence of 
the construction,of a residence at Virginia Beach in progress 
at the time of the decedent's death, and the adjustment of 
controversies arising therefrom; the management of certain 
real estate situated in the City of Newburgh, New York, con-
veyed by the decedent to the complainant during his lifetime; 
the performance of services connected with sundry real es-
tate mortgage bonds issued by S. W. Straus & Company; the 
defense of a proceeding brought in the Circuit Court of Prin-
cess Aune County, Virginia, to contest the validity of the 
decedent's Will; the defense of a suit brought in the State of 
New York to .set aside the deed conveying the Newbur~h 
property from the decedent to the complainant; servic.es in 
connection with the application of one Mary Hayes ·Guilfoil.,, 
for letters of administration on the Estate of the decedent 
in Orange County, New .York; the defense of a suit brought 
by said Mary Hayes Guilfoil, as administratrix appointed in 
the State of New York, in the U nitcd States District Court 
for the Eastem District of Virginia, for an accounting and 
the recovery of assets; the defense of a second Will contest 
instituted in the District Court of the United States for the 
:BJastern District of Virginia; ·the defense of a third Will 
contest instituted in the Circuit Court of Princess Anne 
County, Virginia; the preparation and filing of sundry tax 
returns; the defense of a snit brought by Dr. Samuel C. John-
son against Adelaide M. Hayes, Executrix; and sundry mis-
eellaneous services, all set forth more particularly in the 
copy of said bill of complaint filed herewith as Exhibit '' A''. 
(h) This respondent alleges that said services 
page 43 ~ were rendered by him to said complainant, Ade-
laide J\f. Hayes, in her own right and as Execu-
trix of the Estate of William R. Hayes, deceased, as an at-
torney at law; that the fair value of said services is the 
amount of Twenty-nine Thousand Jmght Hundred and Fifty 
Dollars ($29,850); that from time to time, said complain-
ant paid to this respondent, on account of said services and 
for expenses incurred, sums of money aggregating the sum 
of Nine Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty Dollars 
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($9,850.00); that of the sum so paid, this respondent dis-
bursed and expended for the account of said complainant 
the aggregate sum of Eight Hundred Ninety-four Dollars and 
Twenty-seven Cents ($894.27), leaving a balance due this 
respondent of .Twenty Thousand Eight Hundred and Ninety-
four Dollars and-Twenty-seven Cents ($20,894.27). This re-
spondent has coife~ed and credited against said.amount due 
the sum of Four -Hundred and Eighty-five Dollars and· Sixty-
two Cents ($485.62), leaving a balance due of Twenty Thou-
sand Four Hundred and Eight Dollars and Sixty-five Cents 
{$20,408.65). In addition, this respondent incurred an in-
debtedness of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) to one F. E. 
Kellam for legal services rendered, and Fifty Dollars 
($50.00) to Dr. Frank Redwood for expert medical opinion 
and advice, in connection with the affairs of said complain-
ant, and with her lmowledge and consent. A statement of 
receipts and disbursements, tog·ether with indebtedness in-
curred as aforesaid was duly rendered said complainant by 
this respondent. 
( c) As set forth in the bill of complaint herein, and in this 
answer and exhibit filed therewith, in connection with de-
fending the interests of the complainant, both in 
page 44 ~ her O'wn right and as Executrix, and in connection 
with representing· her as such as her attorney at 
law, said funds and securities of the Estate of said William 
R. Hayes, deceased, came into the possession and under the 
control of this respondent. This respondent alleges that he 
has a lien as such attorney upon said funds and securities 
for the payment of the amount due him for services rendered 
and expenses incurred. 
( d) As shown in the bill of complaint herein, and admitted 
in this answer, certain shares of stock in sundry corpora-
tions, purchased with funds belonging- to the Estate of ,;v-n-
Iiam R. Hayes, deceased, were issued in the name of this re-
spondent, by virtue whereof the relationship of trustee and 
beneficiary arose between this respondent and the complain-
ant. This respondent has and claims a lien upon said sl1ares 
of stock for the reason that the same came into his posses-
sion and control by virtue of the relationship of attorney and 
client existing· between him and said complainant. By rea-
son of the controversy existing between this respondent as 
tro.stee, and the complainant as beneficiary, and by reason of 
the necessity for an accounting by this respondent with the 
complainant, it is the right and duty of this respondent to 
apply, as such trustee, to a court of equity for the advice 
and direction of the court with respect to the execution of 
his said trust and for the ascertainment by the court of the 
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rights of this respondent in said securities so held in trust, 
including the determination of the amount due this respond-
ent for services rendered as aforesaid. This respondent is 
further advised that he has the rig·ht to apply to the court to 
determine whether or not he has a lien for his services afore-
said, and if so, in what amount; and if it he de-
page 45 } termined he has such a lien, to have the same en-
forced by a sale or other disposition of the securi-
ties referred to. 
Being· without. remedy, save in a court of equity, where 
matters of this sort are alone cognizable, this, respondent 
prays, by way of cross-bill, that the said Adelaide M. Hayes 
in lier own right and as Executrix of the last will and testa-
ment of William R. Hayes, deceased, be made i:>arty defend-
ant to this cross-bill, and be required to answer the same but 
not under oath, answer under oath being hereby expressly 
waived; that. this cause be referred to a Commissioner in 
Chancery of this court with directions to take, state and settle 
an account showing ( l) the dealings of this respondent as 
trustee with the trust estate from the commencement thereof 
to the time of such examination, including all sales, pur-
chases, investments and re-investments as respects the prin-
cipal of said trust fund, and all receipts, charges, and dis~ 
bursements on account of the income thereof; (2) the reason-
able value of the services rendered the complainant, Adelaide 
M:. Hayes, in her own rig·ht and as Executrix of the Estate of 
William R. Hayes, deceased; by this respondent; that this 
court will pass upon the propriety and correctness of the 
said doing·s and accounts and make a complete settlement 
up to date of all matters as between this respondent and 
said complainant, Adelaide M. Hayes; that this court 
will enter a decree in favor of this respondent, against 
said complainant, for the amount found due him for his 
service aforesaid; that this court will adjudge that this re-
spondent has a lien upnn the securities aforesaid for the 
amount found to be due him, and will enforce said lien as 
it may be advised; and that this respondent have 
page 46 ~ such other and further relief, both general and spe-
cial, as to ~quity may seem meet, and the nature 
of the case may reqmre. 
And he will ever pray, etc. 
WILLIAM L. PARKER. 
vV:M:. G. MAUPIN, 
Counsel for Respondent. 
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Exhibit ''A'' aforementioned, is omitted in compliance with 
the said stipulation. 
And in further compliance with said stipulation, the fol-
lowing is the demurrer of Adelaide :M. Hayes, Executrix, etc., 
to the bill of complaint of William L. Parker, said demurrer 
having· been filed in this court on November 3, 1938: 
pag·e_ 4 7 ~ Virginia: 
In the Circuit Co~rt of the City of Norfolk. 
William L. Parker, Complainant, 
v. 
Adelaide M. Ha.yes in her own right and as Executrix of the 
last will and testament of William R. Hayes, deceased, et 
al., Respondents. 
IN CHANCERY. 
CONSOLIDATED CAUSES. 
Adelaide M. Hayes, Executrix under the last will and testa-
ment of William R. Hayes, deceased, Complainant, 
v. 
William L. Parker, Respondent. 
DEMURRER TO BILL OF COMPLAIN~. 
The demurrer of Adelaide M. Hayes, Executrix of Wil-
liam R. Hayes, deceased, to the bill of complaint of William 
L. Parker herein says it is not sufficient in law, especially 
for the reasons that: 
1. The proceeding is against Adelaide 1I. Hayes both in 
her own rig·ht and as Executrix of ·wmiam R. 
page 48 ~ Hayes, deceased. 
2. The cause of action is one for the collection 
of a debt, a matter of which a Court of Equity has no juris-
diction, one of which a Court of law has exclusive jurisdic-
tion. 
3. The bill is brought by William L. Parker and is on his 
behalf both in his own right and as Trustee. 
WHEREFORE· respondent demands judgment as - to 
whether she shall be compelled to make any further or other 
answer to said bill, or the matters therein contained, and 
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prays to be hence dismissed with her reasonable costs in this 
behalf expended. 
BAIRD, ·wmTE & L.ANNlNG, 
p. d. 
page 49.} The following is the demurrer to the cro;s-bill, 
:filed in this court on November 3, 1938, by Adelaide 
M. Hayes, Executrix, etc.: 
page 50 } Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of the City of 1N orf olk. 
William L. Parker, Complainant, 
'l). 
Adelaide M. Hayes in her own right and as Executrix of the 
last will and testament of William R. Hayes, deceased, et 
al., Respondents. 
IN CHANCERY. . 
CONSOLIDATED CAUSES. 
Adelaide M:. Hayes, Executrh under the last will and testa-
ment of William R. Hayes, deceased, Complainant, 
v. 
·wmiam L. Parker, Respondent. 
DE~fTURRER TO CROS·S-BILL. 
The demurrer of Adelaide :M:. Hayes, Executrix of William 
R. Hayes, deceased, to the cross-ibill of William L. Parker 
herein says it is not sufficient in law, especially for the rea-
sons that: · 
1. The proceeding is against Adelaide 1\f. Hayes both in 
-her own right and as Executrix of William R. Hayes, de-
ceased. 
pag·e 51 } 2. ,The cause . of action is one for the collection 
of a debt, a matter of which a Court of ~uity 
has no jurisdiction, one.of which a -Court of law has exclusive 
jurisdiction. · 
3. The subject matter of the cross-bill is not germane to 
-that of the original bill, and the averments thereof are not 
such that it can be properly filed as a cross-bill in the pro-
ceeding wherein it is filed as such. 
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WHEREFORE respondent demands judgment as to 
whether she shall be compelled to make any further or other 
answer to said cross-bill, or the matters therein contained, 
and prays to'"b~_hence dismissed with her reasonable costs 
in, t4is behalf e~vended. 
BAIRD, WHITE & L.AJ.~NING, 
p. d. 
page 52 ~ The following· is the decree entered in this cause 
on November 10, 1938 : 
This cause came on again this day to be heard upon the 
papers formerly read, the decree entered herein on the 31st 
day of October, 1938, the decree entered herein on the 3rd 
day of November, 1938, granting leav-e to Adelaide M. Hayes, 
Executrix of William R. Hayes, deceased, to file demurrers 
to the bill herein,. and said demurrer of Adelaide M. Hayes, 
Executrix of William R. Hayes, deceased, and was argued 
by counsel. 
Upon consideration whereof the Court is of opinion to and 
doth hereby overrule the said demurrer; to which action of 
the Court the said Adelaide M. Hayes, Executrix of William 
R. Hayes, deceased, by her counsel, duly excepted. 
And this cause is continued. 
And there also follows a second decree entered on N ovem-
ber 10, 1938, in this Court in this cause: 
This cause came on again this day to be heard upon the 
papers formerly read, the decree entered herein on the 31st 
day of October, 1938, and the decree entered herein on the 
3rd day of November, 1938, granting. leave to the said Ade- · 
Iaide M. Hayes, Executrix of William R. Hayes, deceased, to 
file her demurrer to the cross-bill exhibited against 
page 53 ~ her by the said William L. Parker in this case, the 
said demurrer of the said Adelaide M. Hayes, Ex-
ecutrix of William R. Hayes, deceased, and was argued by 
counsel. 
Upon consideration whereof the Court is of opinion to and 
doth hereby overrule the said demurrer of Adelaide M. Hayes, 
Executrix of William R. Hayes,. deceased, to the said oross-
bill, to which action of tho Court the said Adelaide M. Hayes, 
Executrix of ·w'illiam R. Hayes, deceased, throug·h her coun-
-sel, duly excepted. 
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And this cause is c.ontinued. 
And in further compliance with the aforementioned stipu-
lation, there follows the answer of Adelaide M. Hayes, Ex-
ecutrix, etc., to the bill of complaint of William L. Parker, 
filed in thts court on Decem her 3, 1938 : 
page 54 ~ Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk. 11 
William L. Parker, Complainant, 
v. 
Adelaide M. Hayes in her own right and as Executrix of the 
last will and testament of William R. Hayes, deceased, et 
al., Respondents. 
IN CHANCERY. 
.. 
I 
CONSOLIDATED CAUSES. 
Adelaide M. Hayes, Executrix under the last will and testa-
inent of William R. Hayes, deceased, Complainant, 
v. 
"\Villiam L. Parker, Respondent. 
ANSWER OF ADELAIDE i\t. HAYES, lN HER OWN 
RIGHT A:ND AS EXE!CU'11RIX OF THE LAST WILL 
AlND TESTAMENT OF WILLIAM R. HAYES, DE-
CEASED, TO THE BILL OE, COMPLAINT OF WIL-
LIAM L. PARKER HEREIN. 
To Hon. Allan R. Hanckel, .J udg·e of the Court aforesaid: 
The answer of Adelaide M. Hayes, in her own right and 
as Executrix of the last will and testament of William R. 
Hayes deceased, to the bill of complaint exhibited 
page 55 ~ against herself and others herein by William L. 
Parker, for answer to said bill or so much thereof 
as she is advised it is material to answer, says: 
1. The allegations of Articles 1, 3 and 4 are admitted. 
2. In answer to Article 2, respondent says complainant was 
employed as counsel for the estate of William R. Hayes. 
3. Answering Article 5, respondent admits the will of Wil-
liam R. Hayes was executed prior to "his marriage, and that 
under the laws of Virg-inia it was revoked by the marriage 
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while under the laws of New York it was not. :She admits 
William. R. Hayes was a Catholic Priest, and it was deemed 
desirable that his will should be probated in Virginia. 
4. In answer to Article 6, respondent admits the will of 
William R. Hayes was admitted to probate in the Circuit 
Court of Princess Anne County, and that she qualified there-
under. She calls for strict proof of the other allegations in 
said article contained so far as the same are material. 
5.r·Answering Article 7, respondent refers to the record in 
the proceedings mentioned in it for the allegations therein, 
the purposes thereof, and steps taken therein. 
6. In answer to Article 8, respondent admits that a hear-
ing before the Circuit Court of Princess Anne County was 
fixed for July 19, 1934, at which witnesses and counsel were 
present and a non-suit was taken. She is not sufficiently fa-
miliar with the other alleg·ations in said article contained to 
admit or deny them. 
page 56 ~ 7. Answering Article 9, respondent admits Mary 
Hayes Guilfoil made application in New York for 
letters of administration on the estate of William R. Hayes, 
that she was served with a citation therein, and that the ap-
plication was granted. She has not sufficient information re-
specting the other allegations in said article contained to atl-
mit or deny them. 
8. In answer to Article 10, respondent admits there were 
certificates for corporate stocks among. the assets of William 
R. Hayes, in his name at the .time of his death, and that the 
companies issuing said certificates had transfer offices in 
New York. She does not know whether Mary Hayes Guilfoil 
had that knowledge, but supposes she did or could have ob-
tained it and probably would have sought to get such cer-
tificates into her possession as Administr~trix. She has not 
sufficient information respecting· the other allegations in said 
article contained to admit or deny them. 
9. Answering Article 11, respondent admits a. sale of the 
securities mentioned, and reinvestment of a portion .of the 
proceeds of their sale. She says these transactions were at 
the instance and sug·gestion of complainant, and that they 
resulted in serious loss to the estate. She further says advice 
in regard to such sales and reinvestments could and should 
. have been obtained from experienced brokers .without cost 
to the estate. She admits tl1e certific.ates for the 
pag·e 57 ~ shares of stock purchased were taken in complain-
ant's name, but says that also was at his instance 
and suggest.ion. with the understanding that it was for the 
sole purpose of making ineffective any steps taken by Mary 
Hayes Guilfoil to get possession of them, and that they, with 
Adelaide M. Hayes, et al., '!.- William L. Parker. 65, 
all dividends on them, were to J>e returned and. paid to the 
estate. She denies complainant can charge, as a lawyer, for· 
the services mentioned. 
10. In answer to Article 12, respondent says she has no 
knowledge as to what the National Surety Company required 
as a condition to executing the bond except what she was 
told by complainant (substantially as stated by him), and 
calls for strict. proof thereof so far as that is material. She 
admits a safe deposit box was rented in the National Hank of· 
Commerce, but says it was rented for, by, and in the name 
of the estate, although she admits it was subject to the joint .. 
control of complainant and herself. She admits an account 
was opened for the estate in the Bank whioh could be drawn 
upon only by checks signed by complainant and herself. She 
says all these arrangements were at the instance and sug;;. 
g-estion of complainant, or the Surety Company, and were 
made with no intention of giving complainant any right to, 
or lien upon, the money and securities or the interest thereon 
and dividends therefrom. ·Complainant says such is the situa-
tion in Article 11 sub-division ( e) of his answer and cross-
bill in the following- words: 
page 58 ~ '' This respondent denies that he claims the rights 
herein asserted by reason of this agreement with 
the surety on ·the bond of the Executrix.'' 
Respondent admits the securities mentioned, a~d sums 
stated, are in the safe deposit box, and on deposit, in the 
Bank, but denies complainant can charg·e, as a lawyer, for 
the services in said article set forth. 
11. Answering Article 13, respondent admits Mary Hayes 
Guilfoil qualified in New York as Administratrix of William. 
R. Hayes, and instituted suit in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in which respond-
ent ,·vas served with process. · Her information in respect t.o 
said suit came from complainant, and she refers to the record 
for the allegations made in, and purposes of the suit, and 
the steps taken therein, and sl1e says, on information and be-
lief, that said suit was dismissed on a point of law and with-
out the taking of any testimony. 
12. In answer to Article 14, respondent has no knowledge 
respecting the suit in the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Virginia, or the subsequent proceed-
ings therein, except ·what she received from complainant, but 
she admits being served with process in said suit. She re-
fers to the record thereof for the allegations in, and purposes 
of, the proceeding and the steps taken in it. On information 
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and belief, she says the suit was dismissed on a point of law 
and without the taking of any testimony. 
page 59 ~ 13. Answering Article 15, respondent says she 
knows nothing respecting the suit in Princess Anne 
County except what she was told by complainant and admits 
that she was serv.ed with process· therein. She refers to the 
record for the allegations in, and purposes of, the proceeding, 
and the steps taken therein. 
14. In answer to Article 16, respondent admits there was 
in the safe deposit box of ·wmiam R. Hayes, at the time of 
his death, a deed conveying to Adelaide M. Hayes property 
in Newburgh, New York, and that it had ·not then been re-
corded. She admits that, after the death of the said ·William 
R. Hayes, steps were taken to record the deed. She alleges 
that substantially everything done with regard to that mat-
ter, or the property conveyed by said deed, including the 
litigation in respect thereto, was done, and said litigation 
was carried on, by New York counsel employed and paid by 
her. 
15. Answering Article 17, respondent denies complainant 
assumed any personal responsibility to the estate of ,vmiam 
R. Hayes or the company which became surety on respond-
ent's bond, but admits tha~ he agreed with the Surety Com-
pany that all securities and cash belonging to the estate 
should be subject to the joint control of himself and herself 
and should be properly used, as is customary. She denies 
complainant performed the duties 9f Executrix, or any serv-
ices other than such as are usually performed by counsel for 
an estate, or that he can charge, as a lawyer, for 
page 60 ~ any such services. She denies there were any dif-
ficulties respecting the administration of the estate 
other than those specifically mentioned in complainant's bill,. 
cross-bill and answer, and in respondent's bill and answers. 
16. In answer to Article 18, respondent denies the National 
Surety Company could have cancelled the bond it gave and 
thereby brought about the results stated, or that it was in-
duced to abandon doing so in the manner set forth, although 
she admits complainant conferred with the officers of the 
company regarding the situation. She denies that complain-
ant can charge, as a lawyer, for his alleged. services in the 
foregoing respects. 
17. Answering Article 19, respondent denies complainant 
was employed to perform, or was in a position to perform, 
or that he can charge as a lawyer for, the services mentioned 
in said article, or that the same were necessary or proper for, 
or beneficial to, the estate. She calls for strict proof of the 
Adelaide M. Hayes, et al., ~. William L. Parker. 67 
other allegations therein contained in respect of such services 
(if any) so far as the same are material. 
18. In answer to Article 20, respondent admits a house on 
land at Virginia Beach owned by Adelaide M. Hayes was in 
course of construction at the time of William R. Hayes' death, 
pursuant to a contract made by him, but denies that com-
plainant was employed to, or did, supervise its construction, 
or that he was in a position to do so, or to determine the 
proper cost of the structure, or that he can charge, as a law-
yer, for such services. 
page 61 ~ 19. Answering Article 21, respondent denies 
there was any occasion for complainant's manag-
ing, or that he did manage, or was in a position to manage, 
the property at Newburgh, or that he can charge, as a lawyer, 
for such services, and she says that said property was han-
dled by agents who were paid by her for managing it. 
20. In answer to Article 22, respondent says the only thing 
done by complainant with regard to the S. vV. Straus bonds 
was as to the reorganizations of the companies by which they 
were issued. The estate held onlv a small number of bonds 
of each issue, and had no alternati've but to agree to what the 
debtors proposed and the holders of· large majorities of the 
bonds approved and/or was required by Section 77-B of the 
Bankruptcy Act, and that he only carried on some correspond-
ence in regard to such reorganizations and received the cash 
and securities exchanged for the securities held by the estate; 
there was nothing else he could do and his services in the 
premises were of no real value. Respondent denies that com-
plainant is eutitled to compensation for keeping ''himself in-
formed of the resu1ts of these proceedings'' and being '' pre-
pared to protect the interests of the estate in the event of 
irregularities''. 
21. Answering Article 23, respondent says she needed no 
assistance in regard to many of the tax matters; that many 
of t.he other tax matters could have been attended to bv a 
tax accountant without much cost. and that 'the 
page 62 ~ only real difficulty in respect of the tax returns 
was as t.o the State inheritance tax which was 
never. filed during the four years complainant represented 
the estate, although the Federal inc.ome tax was pr~pared 
and filed bv liim. · 
22. In answer to Article 24, respondent was told by com-
plainant the claim of Dr. ,Johnson for $2,000.00 was very ex-
cessive and he was entitled to recover, and probably would 
recover, very little, and she believed this to be the case and 
now· believes that said account could have been settled at the 
outset for much less than was finally paid Dr. Johnson. The 
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settlement by payment of $1,500.00 was negotiated by com-
plainant who gave respondent no explanation of the differ-
ence between what he had anticipated and the results. 
23. Answering Article 25, respondent denies that the bill 
states the services complainant claims to have rendered in 
mere outline, and says, on the contrary, that it recites them 
in great detail, and as if they were necessarily and wholly 
performed by him, and that said recitals cover and include 
everything done by complainant in the premises, directly or 
indirectly, wholly or partially, necess-arily or incidentally. 
She further says many of the matters treated as services 
were merely incidental to others and not such as complain-
ant can or should charge for; many were unnecessary and 
of no benefit to the estate, many of a kind com-
page 63 ~ plainant was not employed to perform, and many 
were not matters for which complainant can 
charge, as a lawyer. She calls for copies of the accounts re-
f erred to as she has no complete copies of them. 
24. In answer to Article 26, respondent denies complain-
ant's services were of the fair value of $29,850.00 and he has 
been paid only $9,850.00, or there is a balance due him of 
$20,894.27. She says, on the contrary, that when demands 
were made upon her by complainant from time to time for 
the various sums paid him she considered them excessive and 
p1·otested against payment of them, but he insisted on pay-
ment and she felt obliged by the circumstances to pay him. 
She repeatedly told him the costs g-reatly exceeded what she 
expected, and thought they should be, and urged him, at al-
most every stage of the proceeding, to say what his charge 
would be, but he always postponed doing· so. She says the 
payments made aggregate $10,020.03, and are more than full 
compensation for all services rendered and full payment of 
all disbursements made. She therefore alleges that she owes 
him nothing. She further says the only questions at issue 
respecting the interests of the estate, or herself as the bene-
ficiary of it, were whether the will was valid, whether the 
deed she bad to the New York real estate was good, and 
whether jurisdiction of the probate proceeding·s 
page 64 ~ was in New York or Virginia ; if the will was valid, 
the estate, irrespective of the deed and place of 
probate, came to her under it; if the will was invalid, there 
came to her, as the widow of "\Villiam R. Hayes, half the es-
tate, under the laws of New York, and a.11 of it, under the laws 
of Virginia. She says New York lawyers were paid to rep-
resent the interests of the estate and herself in regard to 
all New York matters, and complainant is entitled to very 
little on account of that work. The New York real estate 
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was worth about $15,000.00, and the remanider of the estate 
about $65,000.00. Complainant's services related to the lat-
ter, and his charges amount to almost as much as the differ-
ence between what respondent, as beneficiary of the estate, 
would have received if the probate proceedings were in New 
York and what she would have received if they were in Vir-
ginia, even if the will was invalid, and she was frequently a:s-
sured by complainant, and believed, that it was valid. T.he 
alleged indebtedness of $200.00 to F. E. Kellam and $50.00 
to Dr. Frank H. Redwood were incurred in 1934 and respond-
ent understood complainant was to pay, and had paid, them 
out of the sums advanced by her to him. No account was 
presented to the estate by either of them or by the complain-
ant, and the matter was never mentioned to respondent by 
either of, them or by the complainant until it was stated in 
the suit broug·ht by complainant. Respondent further says 
that if complainant has not paid said indebtedness he should 
do so, or account to the estate for anything it has to pay on 
account thereof. 
_ page 65 }- 25. Answering Article 27, respondent says com-
plainant has stated in this litigation the purposes 
for which the certificates mentioned were taken in his name 
and they show that° he ought not to have taken them in his 
name, and that he has no lien on them or right to keep them, 
or the interest on, or dividends from, them, or the sums on de-
posit all of which are the property of the estate. ,She fur-
ther says that by taking said certificates in bis own name and 
refusing· to return them, and by appropriating to his own 
use the interest and dividends thereon, complainant has sub-
jected the estate to much unnecessary expense and inconven-
ie.nce and has brought about much delay in the settlement of 
the estate. 
26. In answer to Article 28, respondent says she has no 
knowledge as to the dividends received by complainant ex-
cept tlmt he turned over to her certain sums prior to July, 
1938, and since the.n has refused to turn over to her other 
sums which he says he has received. She alleges that he 
now owes the estate all sums so collected and not turned over, 
and she calls for strict proof thereof. 
27. Answering Article 29, respondent admits the allega-
tions thereof except that she is not sure that she received the 
accounts therein referred to. 
page 66} 28. In answer to Article 30, respondent says the 
safe deposit box in the Bank was rented by her 
as Executrix, but access to it was t.o be had only by com-
plainant and herself. ,She denies the securities, or the inter-
est thereon and dividends therefrom, came into complainant's 
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possession in the course of his employment, or that he has 
any lien on them, or any right to retain them, or to appropri-
ate to his own use the interest on, and dividends from, said 
securities. She alleges, on the contrary, that said securities, 
interest and dividends came into complainant's possession 
and have been used and retained as in his original bill, and in 
his answer-ap.d.".cross-bill, and in respondent's orig·inal bill 
and herein-:set' forth. She says further that, as a matter of 
law, she, as.Executrix, has the sole right to the possession 
and use of said securities and the interest thereon and divi-
dends therefrom. She denies that she owes complainant any· 
thing to the payment or satisfaction of which he has a right 
to apply said interest and dividends. 
29. Answering Article 31, respondent admits all the debts 
of the estate have been fully paid, and there are no claims 
against it other than that of complainant, and that by the 
will of William R. Hayes all his estate was left to Adelaide 
M. Hayes. 
page 67 r 30. In answer to Article 32, respondent denies 
that any trust relationship has existed, or now 
exists, between complainant and the estate of William R. 
Hayes, or that complainant is under any duty, or has any 
right, to ask the advice and instmctions of the Court in re-
gard to his dealings with said estate as its counsel. 1She fur-
ther says the fact that there is no such duty or right appears 
from the allegations of complainant's answer and cross-bill 
herein, Article 11, subdivision ( e) : 
'' On the contrary, he asserts that co,mplainant has fully 
administered the estate of the decedent, except for the pay-
ment of the amount due this respondent, and that after pay- · 
1nent _ of such amo'lvn.t, said f'und and the secitrities are the 
property of the said Adelaide M. Hayes a.s sole beneficiary 
u/nder the will of the decedent." (Italics ours.) 
31. Answering Article 33, respondent denies, as she has 
heretofore done, that complainant has any lien upon the money 
or securities of the estate, or any right to keep and use the 
interest and dividends on said securities. She says the facts 
in regard thereto, and to complainant's possession and use 
thereof, are as fully set forth in her pleading·s heretofore filed 
in this cause. 
32. In answer to Article 34, respondent denies there is any 
µeed for this Court's making any order respecting payment 
of the sums on deposit with tl1e Bank or the delivery of the 
securities in the safe deposit box. She says, on the contrary, 
that the Bank has no relation to either except as depository 
of the money and owner of the box. 
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page 68 } Respondent further says the real matter in con-
troversy in this cause is whether anything, and if 
so what, is due complainant by the estate of ,villiam R. 
Hayes, and that complainant ~s bill, answer · and cross-bill 
herein show the estate is amply able to pay all complainant 
demands, if he is adjudg·ed entitled thereto, and that his claim 
of a lien on, and control over, the estate "s assets, and his use 
of the interest and dividends on its securities, are unneces-
sarily embarrassing, and have caused and will cause, un-
necessary expense, to the estate. . · 
Respondent prays that this her answer may be taken and 
treated as a cross-bill herein so far as is necessary to re-
quire an accounting by complainant of all dividends and in-
terest belonging to the estate which he has received and 
should, but has not, turned over to the estate, and all sums 
he should have paid out of the sums received, or the estate 
is now liable for, to the said F. E. Kellam and Dr. Frank 
H. Redwood, and that this Court will a ward respondent a 
judgment therefor. 
For a further answer to the bill of complaint respondent 
says that, to simplify and expedite a disposition of the con-
troversy herein, and because these matters do not substan-
tially affect the rights and responsibilities of either party 
and unnecessarily complicate the issues, she will waive all 
the questions heretofore raised for the purpose of simplify-
ing and expediting a disposition of the controversy herein, as 
to whether complianant is or is not a Trustee, has or has not 
a right to joint control, and has or has not a lien, 
page 69 ~ so the question will be whether respondent is in-
debted to complainant and in that event to what 
extent, and whether complainant is indebted to respondent 
and in that event to what extent, if the Court directs an is-
sue out of chancery, or a hearing ore tenu,S, for one or the 
other of which she respectfully prays in the place and stead 
of the reference to a Commissioner for which complainant 
prays. 
And now having fully answered respondent prays to be 
hence dismissed with her reasonable costs in this behalf ex-
pended. 
ADELAIDE M. HA YES, 
Executrix under the Last Will and Testament 
of W"illiam R-. Hayes, deceased. 
JOHN G. POORE, 
BAIRD, WHITE & LAJNNING, 
Counsel for Respondent. 
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page 70 ~ The following is the answer of Adelaide M. 
Hayes, Executrix, etc., to the cross-bill of William 
L. Parker, which was filed in this court on December 3, 1938: 
page 71 ~ Virginia : 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk. 
,vmiam L. Parker, Complainant, 
v. . 
Adelaide M. Hayes in her own right and as Executrix of the 
last will and testament of William R. Hayes, deceased, et 
al., Respondents. 
IN CHANCERY. 
CONSOLIDATED CAUSES. 
Adelaide M. Hayes, Executrix under the last will and testa-
ment of William R. Hayes, deceased, Complainant, 
v. 
William L. Parker, Respondent. 
ANSWER OF ADELAIDE M. HAYES, EXECUTRIX, 
ETC., TO THE CHOSS-BILL OF ·w1LLIAM 
L. PARKER 
To Hon. Allan R. Hanckel, Judge of the Court aforesaid: 
The answer of Adelaide l\L Hayes, Executrix under the 
last will and testament of William R. Hayes, deceased, to the 
cross-bill of ,vmiam L. Parker herein, for answer thereto or 
to so much thereof as she is advised it is material to answer, 
answering says: 
page 72 ~ 1. This is a consolidation of two causes hereto-
fore pending· in this Court under the style of Wil-
liam L. Parker, Complaina~t.t v. Adelaide M. Hayes, et als., 
Defendants, and Adelaide 1v1. Hayes, E,xecutrix, etc., Com-
plainant, v. William L. Parker, Respondent. This ·respond-
ent filed the bill in the second of said causes, and has filed 
an answer in the first, and she refers to them, and adopts the 
allegations of them, as parts of this answer ·because the al-
leg·ations of complainant's bill and those of his answer ancl 
cross-bill are substantially the same, and the allegations of 
respondent's bill and those of her answer are substantially 
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the same as the allegations of a more detailed answer. herein . 
would be, and such an answer would therefore be mere repe- · 
tition. · 
2. For further answer respondent (a) denies William L. 
Parker was employed for all the purposes, and to perform 
all the services, set forth, or that many of his services were 
beneficial to the estate, or that he can charge, as a lawyer, 
for many of them; (b) denies complainant has been paid 
only $9,850.00, and there is a balance due him of $20,894.00, 
says he has been paid $10,020.03, mueh of which was paid 
under protest, and also that she understood F. E. Kellam 
and Dr. Frank H. Redwood were to be paid, and had been. 
paid, out of the sums heretofore paid complainant by her, 
a.nd if that I1as not been done oomplainant is liable to them, 
or is liable to the estate for anything it has to pay 
page 73 ~ them; ( c) denies the funds and securities of t.he es-
tate came into complainant's possession in· the 
course of his employment as attorney for the estate, and al-
leges they came into his possession for the express purposes, 
and with the express understanding set forth in respondent's 
aforesaid bill and answer, denies complainant has any lien 
upon the funds or securities of the estate, or any right to re-
tain them or to control over them, or to appropriate the in-
terest and dividends on and from them; ( d) admits shares of 
stock were purchasd with the estate's funds and certificates 
for them taken in complainant's name, but denies this was 
because of his position as counsel for the estate, and says 
they were so taken at complainant's suggestion, for the ex-
press purposes and on the express understanding in respond-
ent's aforesaid bill and answer set .forth, and oomplainant 
never claimed any lien on, or right to, or to control over, 
them until his employment was terminated; denies any ne-. 
cessity for an accounting and that complainant has any right 
to the advice and instructions of the Court respecting the 
discharge of his duties as attorney for the estate. 
3. For further answer respondent says she is entitled to an 
accounting- of all interest and dividends collected by com-
plainant and any sums he should have paid F. E. Kellam 
and Dr. Frank H. Redwood, or for whieh the estate may be 
liable to them, and she respectfully prays that she may have 
a deeree therefor. She denies that she owes complainant any-
thing whatever. 
pag·e 74 ~ 4. For further answer, respondent denies com-
plainant is entitled to the reference to a Commis-
sioner asked for by him, and repeats all that is said in her 
aforesaid answer respecting a waiver. She also repeats the 
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prayer in said answer contai11ed for an issue out of chancery, 
or a hearing or.e ten.its. 
ADELAIDE M. HAYES, 
Executrix under the Last Will and Testament 
of William R. Hayes, deceased. 
JOIL~ G. POORE, 
BALRD, vVHIT.E & LANNING, 
Counsel for Respondent. 
page 75 ~ In further compliance with the herein contained 
stipulation, the following is the answer of Wil-
liam L. Parker to the cross-bill filed against him by Adelaide 
M. Hayes, Executrix, etc., filed by decree in this court on De-
cember 23, 1938: 
The a.nswer of said Adelaide M. Hayes in her own right 
and as executrix of the last will and testament of William 
R. Hayes, deceased, to the bill of complaint filed by this re-
spondent herein, in parag1.·aph thirty-two, ~n page fifteen of 
said answer, prays that the same may be taken and treated 
as a c.ross-bill so far as is necessary to require the accounting 
by this respondent of all dividends and interests belonging 
to the estate of William R. Hayes, dooeased, which this re-
spondent may have received and has not turned over to said 
estate, and as to all sums said respondent should have paid 
out of the sums so received, or the said estate may be liable 
for, to F. E. Kellam and Dr. Frank H. Redwood. 
In answer to said cross-bill, or to so much thereof as this 
respondent is advised is necessary and material for him to 
answer, he answers and says : 
(1) He denies that he has received any dividends or in-
terest belonging· to the estate of 'William R. Hayes, deceased, 
which he is obligated to pay to said estate and has not paid 
thereto. 
(2) He denies that he has received any sum or sums of 
money from the said Adelaide !L Ha.yes either as an indi-
vidual or executrix of the estate of William R. 
page 76 ~ Hayes, deceased, entrusted to him for the pur-
pose of paying the same or any part thereof to 
F. E. Kellam, or Dr. Frank H. Redwood. 
(3) This respondent desires an accounting of all matters 
between himself and the said Adelaide M. Hayes both as an 
individual and as executrix of the estate of William R. Hayes, 
deceased, and has prayed that such ace-0unting be ordered 
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by the Court in his original bill filed herein, in his cross-bill 
to the bill filed against him by said Adelaide M. Hayes, execu~ 
trix, in this consolidated cause, and in his answer to said 
original bill. ·To avoid prolixity and repetition, this respond~ 
ent prays that the said bill, cross-bill, and answer be read as 
a part of this answer, as though incorporated herein at 
length. 
And now, having fullr answered, he prays that he may be 
hence dismissed with his reasonable costs in this behalf e::g;-
pended. 
And he will ever pray, etc. 
WILLIAM L. PARKER. 
WM. G. MAUPIN, 
Counsel for Respondent. 
The following is the decree entered in this eause on ))e .. 
cember 23, 1938: 
This consolidated cause came on again this day to be heard, 
upon the_ papers formerly read, the decree permitting Ade-
laide M. Hayes in her own right and as executrix of the 
estate of William R. Hayes, deceased, to file her 
page 77 ~ answer to the bill of complaint exhibited against 
her by William L. Parker, entered on the third 
day of December, 1938, the said answer of said Adelaide M. 
Hayes in her own right and as executrix as aforesaid, the an--
swer of said William L. Parker to that part of the answer 
of Adelaide M. Hayes which she prayed to be treated as a 
cross-bill, leave being hereby granted to the said William 
L. Parker to file his said answer, and on the motion of said 
_ Adelaide M. Hayes in her own right and as executrix of 
William R. Hayes, deceased, for an issue out of chancery or 
a hearing ore tenus, a.nd was argued by counsel. 
Upon consideration whereof, the Court is of opinion that 
in order to ascertain and decide the equities and rights of 
the parties hereto, an accounting will be necessary, and the 
Court doth so decide and doth 
Adjudge, order and decree that this consolidated cause be 
referred to George Pilcher, Esquire, one of the Commission-
ers of this Court, with direction that he make the following 
inqui_ries, to-wit: 
(1) What, if any, stocks, bonds, and securities of any na-
ture whatsoever may be now in the hands of the said William 
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L. Parker or under his control which constitut~s a ~art ~f 
the estate of William R. Hayes, deceased; ' · .. :-. . 1 • • .1. 
(2) What bank deposits, if any, and where located, m~y 
be in the name of or under 'the control, joint ()l~ otherwise,. of 
the said William L. Pai·ker, whieli may· constitute· a' part of 
the estate of William R. Hayes·, ·deceased; · · 
·· (3) What legal services,' if any, have 'been rendered by 
~ William L.l Parker to Adelaide M. Hayes, in her. 
p~ge 78 ~ o~n right~ ~nd as e~ecutri~ of the estate of Wil~ 
_t·h f · ha~~-- H~yes? dec~as~~' an~ the r.e~s~:q~ble valu~ 
ereo; 
( 4) ·. What money h~s been paid to s~id Willialll L. ParkEn: 
()Il account of. such. serv.ic~s; ., > I . ' 1 
' (5) Wh¢thef. or ·not the s~d William L. Parker has a lie11 
u~o:q. any securities or monies cqnstitiiting· a~sets of the es-: 
tate of William R. Hayes, dece~se~, \"'hich may be found tq 
be in his possession or under. his co':µtr,ol, and if so, for what 
amount; · · ·• · '-·· 
(6) An account of the trans~QtiQ:qs ~etween said Willia~ 
L. Parker as attorney and truste~, and the said Adelaide M~ 
Hayes in her own right and as exe~utrix Qf William ~- Hayes, 
deceased. · 
(7) What part, if any, of th~ mQnies and securities herein-: 
above mentioned may be in th~ custody of, or deposited with, 
the defendant National Bank of. Commerce of Norfolk; ' 
(8) Any other matter which the said Conunissioner may 
deem pertinent, or as to which he may be requested to report 
by any of the parties hereto, or their. counsel. 
Which said inquiries and accounts the said Commissioner: 
shall proceed to make, take, settle and report, with all rea-
sonable dispatch. 
To which action of the Court in referring this consolidated 
cause to a Commissioner, the said Adelaide M. Hayes in 
her own right and as executrix of William R. Hayes, deceased, 
havi11g previously moved the Court to order an issue out of. . 
chancery or to hear the cause ore ten,us as to all matters of 
law and fact; and to the refusal of the Court so to do, said 
Adelaide M. Hayes, in her own right and as executrix as afore-: 
said also duly excepted. 
And this cause is continued. 
pag·e 79 ~ The following· is the report of the Commissione1: 
in Ch~ncery., filed in this c.ourt q~ September 21, 1939; . . . . . . 
Adelaide M. Hayes, et al., v:. William L~ ~arker. 
page 80 ~ Virginia: 
In the Circ~~ 1C~~!t ~f t,~ Cit:f of N prf ~lk~ 
W. L. Pa!~e~, C?~pla~,n~, 
v. ' . 
77 
'' 
Adelaide M. Haye~ in her own right and as Executrix of th~ 
last will and tes'tament of', William &.· Hayes, deceased, et 
:al., Respondei?-t~: · · · · · " · · · · · · · · · · ' · · · · · · 
IN CHANCERY. 
'- • •.. j \ 
CQNSOLID.A:'FED CAUSES. 
• . ' I .. '- • 
r.ro the Honorable Allan R. Hanekel, Judg~ of t4~ Court afor~· 
. said : 0 • ' - I • 1 0 
By a de~ree ~nt~r~d il) th~ a~ve entitl~d cause ,on the 23rd 
day of Dooember, 1938, the matter was referred to the under: 
~igned, one of the co:rnµli~§ioi;iers qf this · pqurt, to make t.h~ 
'following inqnide.s : · ·' · · · · 
•.• 1_.--. 
(1) What, if any, stqcks, bonds, and securities of any na:-
.ture whatsoever ma·y be })OW in the hands of the said William 
L. 1 •arker or under his eol)trol which constitute a part of th~ 
estate of William R. Hayes, deceased; 
. ' (2) What bank deposits, if any, and where located, may be 
in the nGl,me of or under the control, joint or otherwise, of 
:the said William L. Parker, which may constitute a part of 
the estate of 'William R. Hayes, deceased; 
· (3) What legal services, if any, have been rendered by 
,vmiam L. Parker to Adelaide l\f. Hayes, in her own right, 
and as executrix of the estate of \Villiam R. Hayes, deceased~ 
· and the reasonable value thereof; · 
page 81 ~ ( 4) ·what money has been paid to said William. 
L. Parker on account of such services; 
( 5) Whether or not the said William L. Parker has a lien 
upon any securities or monies constituting assets of the es-
tate of William R. Hayes, deceased, which may be found tQ 
be in his possession or under his control, and if so, for what 
amount; 
( 6) An account of the transactions· between said William 
L. Parker as attorney and trustee, and the said Adelaide M'. 
H_ayes in her own right and as executrix of William R. Hayes, 
deceased; 
< (7) Wh.at p.;~rt, if-~ny, ~f the monies ,n1 secn~~ies her~~n:-
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above mentioned maty be in the custody of,. or deposited with, 
the defendant .,National Bank of Commerce of Norfolk; 
48) .A:oy other matter which the said Commissioner may 
deem pertinent, or as to which he may be requested to report 
by any of the parties hereto, or their counsel 
By agTeement &f counsel,, your C4>mmissioner proceeded 
to execute the decree at his office,. 425 Western Union Build-
ing, Norfolk, Virginia, on the 25th day of Januacy, 1939 .. 
After several adjournments, the hearings were completed and 
your Commissioner lte:rewith returns. his findings together 
_ 'Wit4 the testimony taken in the matter and the exhibits filed .. 
1. SEOURITIES IN THE HAJ\TDS OF WILLIAM L .. 
PARKER OR UNDER HLS CONTBOL .. 
Your Commissioner nnds the following seeurities in the 
hands of William L. Parker: 
100 .American Telephone & Telegraph Company 
100 General Electric · 
50 United States Steel 
25 Norfolk & Western 
25 Consolidated Can 
25 American Tobacco Company 
50 National Dairy Products 
page 82 ~- 2·. BANK DEPOSITS .. 
By letter of C. S. Whitehurst, Vice-President of the Na-
t~onal Bank of Commerce, dated August 31, 1939, there is to 
the credit of Adelaide :M:. Hayes, Executrix, the smn of 
$656.67. ·This fund is under the joint control of William L. 
Parker and the Executrix. · 
8. LEGAL SERVICES PERFORMED BY WILLIAM L. 
PARKER AND A REASONABLE VALUE 
THEREOF. 
The decree specifies the legal services that were rendered 
by William L. Parker to Adelaide M. Hayes in her own right 
and as executrix of the estate of William R. Hayes, deceased. 
and in taking the testimony counsel for Mrs. Hayes took 
the position that your Commissioner should report separately 
his services rendered as counsel in these two capacities. How-
ever, counsel for Mrs. Hayes in her individual capacity and 
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as executrix, on page 17 of their brief filed with the Com-
missioner, have abandoned this request and treated the serv-
ices rendered by Parker in solido, and as Mrs. Hayes is the 
sole beneficiary under the will of her late husband, there is 
no reason why this course should not be pursued in arriving 
at the value of Parker's services, for the reason that Mrs. 
Hayes as Executrix could not make any ag-reement with Par-
ker binding the estate, but became personally liable to Parker, 
with the right of having refunded to her by the Court out 
of the estate of her late husband reasonable compensation 
for his services so rendered.· 
EMPLOYMENT. 
The question has been raised as to the character of Par-
ker's employment-whether it was contingent or not. 
There was no contract entered into between Par-
pag·e 83 } ker and Mrs. Hayes that the fee should be contin-
gent, but it is certain that if the litigation had been 
lost, Mrs. Hayes would not have been able to compensate her 
attorney, and in the sense that his fee depended upon the 
successful termination of the litigation, his remuneration was 
contingent upon that event (Parker, pp. 58 and 112; Smith, p. 
151; Green, pp. 206-208; Lawrence, p. 259; Jenkins, p. 302).· 
Mrs. Hayes (p. 370 Exhibit No. 2) testified tliat the fee was 
not upon a contingent basis, but that Parker stated that hP 
wished to be paid from time to time, and that she offered 
him a. retainer, which l1e declined. It is certain that she had . 
to borrow money to pay for the probate of the will and the 
expenses of her counsel immediately after the probate for 
a trip to New York, and wllile it is quite possible that she 
had individual possessions of some ten to thirteen thousand 
dollars which were not derived from her husband's estafa..,. 
yet the record discloses that she was unwilling· to jeopardize 
these in litig·ation over her husband's will. She evidently 
left Parker under the impression tllat she could not rais·e 
any money outside of what would come to her through her 
husband, and that tliat. would be his only source of remunera-
tion. That was one of the reasons for Parker's attitude to-
ward the surety company and his refusal to permit it to ex-
ercise joint control. (Parker, pp. 701 to 704). It will bP 
noted that counsel for Mrs. Haves did not cross examine 
. . Parker on this statement, nor did l\frs. Hayes 
page 84 ~ make any effort to refute it. 
While Mrs. Haves is not to be criticized for her 
unwillingness to jeopardize her personal holdings in this 
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litigation, yet it would seem to be unfair for her to set -qp 
~t this time her ability to pay counsel, when she did not so 
inform him at the time of his employment. 
Your Commissioner the ref ore holdf) that, for all practical 
purposes, the remuneration of Pa:rker was contingent upon 
the successful termination of the litigation involved. 
Measure of Value of Services ~endered, 
In Campbell County v. Howard, 133 Va. 19, the Court said: 
'' The circumstances to be considered in determining the 
compensation to be recovered are-the amount and character 
of the services rendered; the responsibility imposed; the 
labor, time and trouble involved; the character and impor-
tance of the matter in which the services are rendered; the 
amount of the money or the value of the property to be af-
fected; the professional skill or experience called for; the 
character and st~nding in their profession of the attorneys; 
and whether or not the fee is absolute or contingent, it being 
a recognized rule that an attorney may properly charge a 
much larger fee where it is to be contingent than where it is 
not so. Th~ result secured by the services of the attorney 
may likewise be considered, but merely as bearing· upon the 
consideration of the efficiency with which they were rendered, 
and, in that way, upon their value upon a quantum meruit, 
not from the standpoint of their value to the client." (Italics 
supplied.) 
In re Osofsky, 50 Fed. (2) 925, the Court adopted the fol-
lowing as a guide for determining the compensation of coun-
sel: 
page 85 ~ '' The elements to be considered in determining 
an attorney's fee were once most aptly summarized 
in evidence given on a reference by Honorable William G. 
Choate, formerly a Judge of this court, and David B. Og·den, 
Esq., a well known lawyer of a generation ago. 
They laid down the following elements as being matters 
properly to be considered when the fees of an attorney have 
llOt hem1 agTeed on beforehand, but are to be fixed: (1) The 
time which has fairly and properly to be used in· dealing 
with the case; because this represents the amount of work 
necessary. (2) The quality of skill which the situation facing 
the attorney demanded. (3) The skill employed in meeting 
that sit.uation. ( 4) The amount involved; becau~e that de-
• 
Adelaide Al. Hayes, et al., v:. William L. Parker. 81 
termines the risk of the client and the eoJllJllensurate respon-
sibility of the lawyer. (5) The result of the case, becauae 
that determined the real benefit to tile client. ( 6) · The 
eminence of the lawyer at the bar, or i11 the specialty in which 
he may be practicing. 
Each case, of course, differs to some extent from every 
other ca~e in respect of the importance of the~e several ele-
ments. 
In some cases the time element is dominant; in· others the 
skill used seems specially to stand out; and in others still, 
the amouut which a defendant has been saved, or which a 
plaintiff has recovered, may be the dominating consideration 
in the charge. But if all these elements are considered to-
gether7 and the relative importance of each element is fairly 
weighed by an attorney, it is possible to arrive at a proper 
charge in almost a.ny case witho11t muoh difficulty.'' 
Ref erring to the last mentioned case, the skill whwh the 
situation facing the attorney demanded, the skill employed 
in meeting· that situation, and the eminence of the attorney 
at the bar or in the specialty in which he was practicing are 
COllCeded by all parties to the litig·ation aµd by &11 of those 
who have testified either for or against the amount claimed 
by Parker as reasonable compensation. 
page S6 ~ This leaves for the principal matters for your 
Commissioner to deeide the amount involved, the 
results obtained and the method by which they were obtained. 
Statetnent of Facts Out of Which, the Litigation Arose. 
William R. Hayes, a Roman Oatliolic priest at Newburgh, 
New York, on July 15, 1932, executed a will leaving all of 
his property to Adelaide M. Grady, after making a bequest 
of $1.00 to his sister and a similar bequest to his nephew. 
On September 12, 1932, they were married in Elizabeth City, 
North Carolina. On October 23, 1933. he deeded certain reai 
estate in N ewburg-11 to Mrs. Hayes. In March, 1934, he pur-
chased a lot at Virg'inia Beach, Virginia, taking title thereto 
in the name of Mrs. Hayes, and shortly thereafter he entered 
into a contract for the erection of a home on the said lot. 
After the construction was comm~nced Hayes went to New 
York for an operation and died in New York on April 27, 
1934. 
Immediately after his death his will was probated in Prin .. 
cess Anne County, Virginia and the deed for the Newburgh 
real estate put to record in Newburgh . 
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Immediately::·following the probate oi the will and recorda-
tion of the deed the sister of Hayes, Mrs. Guilfoil, instituted 
a number of suits to set aside the will and the deed, alleging 
lack of testamentary capacity on the part of the testator 
anq. undue influence of Adelaide M. Grady, afterwards Hayes,. 
and asserting that the testator at the time of his death was 
domiciled in New York, that he died intestate and that she 
was his sole heir at law,. and alleging directly or 
page 87 ~ indirectly the invalidity of the marriage between 
the testator and Mrs. Hayes. 
The liiigation over the different matters lasted about four 
years, and .in 01·der to give an acc1u-ate view of the litig·ation 
or litigations, it will be necessary to go somewhat into the 
details of the different suits and contests that were waged, 
together with other matters pertaining to the compensation 
to which her attornev is entitled. 
Parker in rendering his bill (Exhibit No. 1) has gone into 
great detail as to the different items constituting the basis 
of his fee and has itemized his services and stated what he 
considered was a. fair value of each item. These items are 
of necessity interrelated and overlapping, and it is the opinion 
of your Commissioner that a fairer determination of thP 
value of Parker's services ca.n be arrived at by viewing the 
litigation on the principles as laid down in the Campbell 
County ease. This seems to be the view of counsel for Mrs. 
Hayes, as set out on page 8 of his brief fi~ed with your Com-
missioner. 
First Will Contest. 
Mrs. Hayes expected a bitter contest by her husband's rela-
tives as soon as they found out that sbe was the sold bene-
:ficia.ry under the will and testified that her husband had so 
told her. (Hayes, pp. 369, 414 to 416 and 419). 
The first question for counsel to decide was where he would 
bave the wilJ probated-in other words, where was the domi-
cile of the testator when he died-
pag·e 88 ~ The question of domicile was of utmost impor-
tance, owing to the difference between the laws of 
Virginia and New York and the religious issue that might be 
injected into litigation at Newburgh. (Parker, pp. 6, 105 
and t69). . 
.Counsel finally determined to probate the will in Prince8s 
Anne 'County, Virginia, and it was probated on May 28, 1934. 
before the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Princess Anne County .. 
An appeal from the order probating the will was taken 
' 
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_by Mrs. Guilfoil, the sister of Hayes, on June 1, 1934, and 
grounds of contest filed. H set forth that William R. Hayes 
_suffered from ten different chronic diseases, which had so 
impaired him that he was without mental capacity to execute 
any will or make othe:r: disposition of his property, and was 
not capable of understanding the nature of a will or the 
effect thereof; that he was domiciled at the time of his death 
in the State of New York, and that she was his next of kin 
and sole distributee and heir. It further set forth that for 
.several years prior to his death, and particularly through 
the month of September, 1932, and continuously thereafter, 
the testator wa.s so mentally affected as to be incapable of 
entering into a valid marriage; that his mental condition was 
such that he did not understand the na hue and effect of the 
-attempted marriage ceremony which took place between bim 
and the said Adelaide M. Grady on or about September 1, 1932, 
and that therefore the latter is not the widow and never has 
been the wife of the said William R. Hayes. 
page 89 } (See Exhibit No. 11). 
It was necesary for counsel to prepare for this very seri-
·ous contest, which he did, informing himself as to the laws 
both of New York and of Virginia, and making investigation 
both in Virginia and New York as to the mental capaeity 
of the testator, taking depositions and preparing instructions 
for trial. (Parker, pp. 7 and 10, Exhibits 12 and 13). 
On the moming of the trial counsel for Mrs. Guilfoil stated 
that they had come to the conclusion that the testator had 
been domiciled in New York and not in Virgfoia and the 
Court was without jurisdiction, and moved the Court to dis~ 
miss the appeal, which was done and order was entered on 
July 19, 19B4~ o,~er the objection of Parker, dismissing the 
same. (See Exhibit No. 14) . 
.Application for Letters of .Administratio1i in Orange County, 
New York. 
After the dismissal of the appeal in Princess Anne County 
Mrs. Guilfoil made application on July 12, 1934, to the Clerk 
of tlw Snrrop:ate Cuurt of Orange County, New York, for 
letters of administration; (Parker, pp. 11 to 13, 673 and 
674. Exhibit No. 47). 
The allegations in this application were that William R. 
Hayes was a resident of Newburgh, New York. at the time 
of his death, that diligent search had been made for a wil1 
and none had been found except a document which had been 
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filed in the Circuit Court of Princess Anne County, 
page 90 ~ Virginia as a will, but which was void and invalid, 
and that Adelaide M. Grady, residing at Virginia 
Beach, Virginia, claimed to be the widow of the deceased, 
but that the marriag·e between her and the testator was null 
and void and the said Adelaide M. Grady was assuming and 
using the name of Adelaide l\L Hayes. The summons in this 
application was served on Adelaide M. Hayes in Princess 
Anne County. 
It then became necessary for counsel to determine the na-
ture of the proceeding in New York and the New York laws 
relating thereto and whether by the laws of New York the 
proceeding was in rem or in personarn. (Parker, p. 12; 
Smith, p. 193; Green, p. 2B5 ; Jenkins, p. 315). If Parker 
appeared and opposed the motion there was a possibility of 
his submitting· his client to the jurisdiction of the New York 
Court. The funds in Virginia would tllen have been removed 
to New York for administration and Mrs. Haves would not 
have had the benefit or use of the funds under" the joint con 
trol of herself and Parker, with which to pay the expenses 
of defending the will, for reasons given by Parker. pages 
110 et seq. 
No appearance was made in New York and the letters of 
administration were finally g:ranted hy the Surrogate Court 
of Orange County on October 2, 1934. (Exhibit No. 47). On 
October 29, 1934, Mary H. Guilfoil as administratrix insti-
tuted a suit in equity in the District Court of the United 
States for the Eastern District of Virgfoia against Adelaide 
M. Hayes to recover the assets of the estate of 
page 91 ~ William R. Haym,, calling upon Mrs. Hayes for an 
accounting, which brings us to 
The First 81,tit in the United States District Court. 
The bill in this suit alleged the diverse citizenship. of the 
parties, the domicile of William R. Hayes in New York, the 
appointment of the C<?mplainant as administratrix by the 
Surrogate Court of Orange County, New York, the personal 
estate of William R. Hayes, the fact that she was the sole 
heir and distributee of the said Hayes and in her own right 
and as administratrix was entitled to the property, and that 
immediatelv after the death of William R. Haves the defend-
ant, Adelaide M. Grady Hayes took possessio'n of the entire 
estate, converting· the same into cash, but of just what the 
estate consisted and what part had been converted into cash 
the complainant was unable to st.ate. 
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.Counsel filed a. motion to dismiss this bill and an answer, 
and also prepared a memorandum of authorities _in support 
of this motion and answer. (Exhibit No. 15). 
The motion to dismiss was overruled and the· case was set 
down for hearing on the answer, but it seems that dilatory 
tactics were employed (Parker, p. 683) and this case remained 
on the docket until after the case of Mary Hayes Guilfoil v . 
.Adelaide M. Hayes, known as the third will cont~st, was de-
cided by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in the 
early part of 1939, when it was dismissed. (Parker p. 24). 
The reason for the dilatory tactics was to fo1·ce 
page 92 } counsel for Mrs. Guilfoil to institute an equity suit 
in Princ,ess Anne County to litigate the validity 
of the will. The time was running short within which an 
equity suit could be brought for this purpose. In these tactics 
Parker wa-, suecc8sful, and the result was that counsel for 
' Mrs. Guilfoil was forced to bring a suit in which was sought 
an issue devisavit vel non.. (Pp. 682 and 683). As stated 
above, this suit finally went to the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia. 
In the meantime, on May 23, 1935, Mrs. Guilfoil instituted 
another suit against Adelaide :M. Grady Hayes in the United 
States Di:;trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. 
This suit is referred to throughout the testimony in this ease 
ll.8 
The Second Suit in the United States Court. 
The bill alleged that William R. Hayes was intestate, that 
the complainant was his sole heir and distributee, and that 
he died domiciled in the State of New York, where he had 
lived for many years prior to his death. It further set forth 
that a paper writing purporting to be the last will and testa-
ment of William R. Hayes, whereby he devised and bequeathed 
substantially his whole estate to Adelaide M. Grady Hayes, 
had been admitted to probate in Princess Anne County, Vir-
ginia; that at the time the said paper writing· was made the 
testator was not of sound mind and was incapable of under-
standing tbe extent and variety of his property 
page 93 } and the object of his affection, so. as to make his 
devises and bequests eonform to his true intent 
and desire, and that the ~aid paper writing was procured 
by the unlawful and undue influence of the said Adelaide M. 
Grady Hayes operating upon his mind at the time of ibi 
execution. The bill further alleges that the latter is in pos-
session of th~ property, real and personal, of which the in-
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· testate· died :t>.ossessed, and will, unless restrained by the 
court, waste .~~d dissipate and improperly dispose of the 
same if it should be decided that the said paper writing was 
not the last will and testament of the said ~ayes, and prays 
for an issue of devisavit vel 11,on. (Exhibit 10; Parker, pp.· 
16 and 17). 
Counsel for Mrs. Haves filed a motion to dismiss this suit 
and also an answer to "the bill. The question on the motion 
to dismiss was whether the proceeding was a suit inter partes 
or a probate proceeding under Section 5259 of the Code of 
Virginia. (Parker, p. 17; Smith, p. 188; Exhibit 17). If thP 
suit was inter partes, then the United States Court had juris-
diction, but if it was a continuation of the probate proeeed-
ing the United Stat.es District Court was without jurisdic-
tion. 
The matter was argued before Judge Way, briefs were filed 
and, aft.er taking the matter under consideration for some 
five months, Judg·e Way rendered his opinion to the effect 
that the suit was a continuation of the probate proceeding, 
as provided for by the Virginia statute, and that 
page 94 ~ he was without jurisdiction. (Parker, p.18; Green, 
p. 215). 
An appeal was then taken from thi~ action of the District 
Court to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, (Ex-
hibits .5, 6 and 10), before which court the case was argued 
and briefs filed, and in due time the Circuit Court of .Ap-
peals entered its decree upholding the United -States District 
Court. 
Thereupon the complainant applied for a writ of certiorar·i 
and .counsel for Mrs. Hayes filed a brief in opposition thereto 
(Exhibit 7) and a writ of certiorari was denied. 
The question raised on this motion by counsel for Mrs. 
Hayes was quite novel in Virginia practice. It required an 
investigation by counsel of the laws of other states relating 
to whether the proceeding was inter partes or probate, and 
from the briefs filed on this question and pencil memoranda, 
as shown in Exhibit 17, it is evident that a thorough and ex-
haustive investigation was made .by counsel of this novel and 
unusual proceeding. 
While these two suits were pending in the federal courts 
Mrs. Guilfoil, as stated above, instituted her contest in Prin-
cess Anne County, Virginia, lmown as 
P.he Third Will Contest. 
The issue in this case (Parker, pp. 18 and 20) was devisa.vit 
vel non. The alleg·ations in the prayer of the bill are similaJ· 
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- to those that have been heretofore set out as to 
page 95 ~ the domicile, the interest of the complainant and 
the incapacity of the testator, and need not here 
be repeated. 
To this bill two special pleas were filed, together with an 
answer. The plea to the jurisdiction of the court was based 
on the statute of limitations or the time within which a suit 
of this nature could be brought after the probate of the will, 
the General Assembly of Virginia having in the meantime 
reduced the period from two years to one year from the date 
of probate. This plea was rejected. 
The plea that the complai·nant was not a party in interest 
as contemplated by Section 5259 of the Code of Virginia was 
allowed and the complainant's motion to reject the same re-
fused. (Exhibit 9, pp. 29 and 30). The case went to hear-
ing on the plea before the court, without the intervention of 
a jury. Testimony was taken and depositions taken in re-
lated cases by stipulation were read, upon the sole question 
of domicile. (Exhibit 9, p. 34). The complainant maintained 
that the testator died domiciled in the State of New York 
and that under the laws of that state, if the testator died in-
testate but married, she had an interest in the estate. (Ex-
hibit 9, p. 36). 
Upon full hearing and after argum~nt, the Court helrl that 
the testator died domiciled in the State of Virginia, that thP 
complainant was not a party in interest wit11in tlle meaning 
of the statute, and dismissed the bill, to which ruling; of the 
Court the complainant appealed to the Supreme 
page 96 ~ Court of Virginia, which allowed an appeal. (Ex-
hibit 9, pp. 31 and 32). 
This case was argued in the Supreme Court_ of Appeals of 
Virginia a.nd briefs were filed, and the lower court was sus-
tained. 
This left penclin2" only the first case in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. which 
was dismissed after the decision of t.he Supreme Court of 
Appeals, ending the litigation. which l1ad rontinued over a 
period of some four years. (Parker, p. 24). · 
Deed to ReaJ, Estate in New York. 
On October 23, 19~3, about one month after 11is marria.g-e 
to A delaicle l\.L Gradv, Hayes conveyed to her his real estate 
in N ewhurgh, New York, com~isting· of a Jot and a dwe1ling 
house in which he had once Jived, and wllich in the Rummer 
of 1933 he had converted into an apartment house, (Parker, 
pp. 28 and 29; Exhibit 19). Hayes, after consultation with 
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Parker, his attorney, decided not to put the deed to record. 
immediately, but delivered it to his wife, who put it in a look 
box. (Parker, p. 29). This deed was admitted to record on 
July 21, 1934, after the dismissal of the first will contest in 
Princess Anne County, Virginia, on July 19, 1934. 
On Aug-ust 2, 1934, Mrs. Guilfoil brought suit in the Su-
preme Court of Orange County, New York, against Adelaide 
M. Grady, sometimes known as .Adelaide M. Hayes, alleging 
that Hayes was without capacity to make any lawful dis-
position of his property, owing· to the fact that he 
page 97 ~ had a number of chronic. diseases which had so im-
paired his mind tba t .he was incapable of under-
standing the contents and purport of any deed or will or 
other instrument intended to transfer or convey property, 
either real or personal. The bill further set up that the 
defendant unlawfully, fraudulently and without paying any 
adequate consideration therefor, did compel the said Hayes 
to make and execute the deed, that the deed was never lawfully 
delivered by the said Hayes and that the defendant unlawfully 
and fraudulently came into po~session of the said deed and 
caused the same to be recorded in the Clerk's Office of Orange 
County, New York, and that the same constituted a cloud 
upon her title, she being the sole heir at law and next of kili 
of Hayes. (Exllibit 19. Parker, p. 30; Bennett, pp. 524 and 
552.) · 
Owing to the local prejudice and religious feeling of the 
community and being· doubtful that a fair trial could be had 
in Orang·e County, New York, Parker as counsel for Mrs. 
Hayes had the suit removed to the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York. 
An additional reason for the move was that if the litiga-
tion had continued in the state court, the trial would have 
been by a jury, but in the federal court it would be by the 
court without the intervention of a jury. Parker took all 
the necessary steps and prepared all the necessary papers 
and forwarded the same to Bennett to effect this removal. 
(Parker, pp. 30, 71, 122, 677 and 679; Bennett, pp. 489, 499 
· and 52.3). 
page 98 ~ .After the removal of the case to New York the 
firm of Hunt, Hill and Betts wer~ also retained 
as associate counsel, for the reason . that they were better 
equipped to follow the case than Bennett would be some 60 
miles away (Parker, p. 31; Bennett, p. 500) ; but notwithstand-
ing tl1at there were associate coun~el employed. in tl1c case, 
nevertheless, Parker was the final arbiter of what was done and 
passed on about eve1·y paper that was submitted in the case-. 
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This is shown bv the fact that on several occasions Parker 
had to override· contentions of his associates (Parker, pp. 
551 and 690). · He was by no· means merely the forwarding 
attorney that Meagher of the firm of Hunt, Hill and Betts 
considered him. (Meagher, p. 564). Bennett corroborated· the 
fact that Parker was leading counsel at pages 500 and 525. 
· The case was prepared for trial, depositions taken (Par;. 
ker, p. 31) and witnesses interviewed after some delay (Par-
. ker, p. 686). 
Several days before the case was called the complainant 
asRed for a continuance, but counsel for the defendant came 
to the conclusion that he was on pretty safe grounds and 
pressed for trial. As a result there was a stipulation be-
tween the parties. The. original proposed stipulation, which 
was drawn by Hunt, Hill and Betts, provided that the litiga-
tion then p~nding before the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia should be decisive of the New York Ii tig·a tion. This 
stipulation was not acceptable to Parker, and after much 
-communication with associate counsel in New York, Parker's 
views prevailed and .it was stipulated that, if the 
l)age 99} Virginia litigation was favorable to l\frs. Hayes, 
it should control the New York litigation, but if 
the Virginia litigation was unfavorable to Mrs. Hayes, she 
could then contest the New York litigation and assert her 
rights, if any, to the real estate in New York, the Virginia 
decision to l1ave no effect upon ~ueh efforts upon her part. 
For matters relating; to the stipulation see· Parker, pp. 121, 
122, 557 and 688; Meagher, pp. 556 and 559. 
After the decision by tl1e Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia the New York suit was dismissed, according to 
stipulation. 
Issues! Involved. 
It has been suggested by counsel for Mrs. Hayes that the 
litigation in this matter was simple and involved the same 
issues growing· out of a given state of facts. With this con-
tention vour Commissioner is unable to agree. 
It is true t.l1a.t. tl1e cleath of the testator. tlie amount of prop-
erty he left, the disnute as to his domicile. the dispute as to 
his marriag:e~ t.l1e dispute as to his mental testamentary ca-
nacitv and his kinshin to l\f rs. Guilfoil are fundamental facts 
in El 11 cases. N evertl1eless, li.tigants 
'' As sailors with the selfsame gale 
Will several different eours()s sail''. 
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In the first will contest the question oi residence was in-
volved; in the third will contest the question of domicile was 
involved; in the first suit in the United States District Court 
f o:r the Eastern District of Virginia there was a question 
of the right of .a·. foreign administrator to replevy g~ods in 
· tb:~~ands of the Virginia administrator, and the 
page 100 } fe.d~ral proceeding relating thereto; in the sec-
ond suit in the United States District Court 
was a question of whether the suit was inter partes or probate 
and whether that court had jurisdiction or not. In the suit in 
New York relating to the real estate one of the questions 
involved was the right of removal of suits of this nature, 
and as to this the New York counsel first differed with Par-
ker, but the latter's views finally prevailed. For these rea-
sons it can not be said that the litigation was simple and 
that the issues involved in the different suits were the same. 
Miscellaneous Matters. 
In regard to the property in Newburg, New York, questions 
continuously arose calling for legal se1·vices upon · the part 
of counsel for Mrs. Hayes (pp. 108 and 109). The final re-
sponsibility for matters relating to the prope~·ty rested upo11 
Parker. (Bennett, pp. 499, 500 and 523; Exhibit 1, Item 6). 
In re_gard to the Virg'inia Beacb bouse, counsel had first. 
to determine whether the estate could carrv out the contract 
for its construction, which was made by Hayes in his life-
time. From time to time counsel had conferences with the 
contractor, looking a.fter the purchase of an oil burner and 
seeing tha.t tl1e contract was carried out and that the contrac-
tor was not paid amounts not justified by the work that had 
been done. During this time Mrs. Hayes was in New York 
and counsel was the sole representative in Virginia. 
There was litigation over the bills rendered by the physi-
cians for services rendered Hayes in his last ill-
page 101 ~ ness, which finally resulted in a compromise. 
There were tax questions and the servicing of 
the bonds spoken of as the Strauss bonds. 
At the time of his death tlrn testator had different securi-
ties known as tl1e Strauss boncls. Tl1ere were some ten or 
twelve different issues of these bonds on different properties 
in New York. The par value of the bonds was some $88,-
500.00, and nearly all of them went through some form of re-
organization. (Parker, o. 48 et seq.,: 91 et seq., 113 et seq.). 
The different forms of these reorg·anizations are fully set 
· ont in · Section 7 of Exhibit 1. 
· Much has been said .in the testimony as to who was the 
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guiding spirit in these reorganizations, or whether counsel 
performed any services. It cannot be -doubted from reading 
the testimony that counsel gave these different reorganiza-
tions careful consideration and followed them as diligently 
as one could, g~ing over carefully the different plans and 
investigating the committees who were handling the separate 
issues and whether to deposit the bonds with them or not. 
While it may be true that the. value of the new securities was 
not materially increased, if at all, over the appraised value 
of the securities held by the testator at his death, yet one 
can readily understand that it consumed much of counsel's 
time to perform his duties in connection· with these bonds 
and the exercise of good judgment. It was no fault of his 
that thP. original investment did not turn <)ut ad-
page 102 } vantageously to the estate. 
Counsel was criticized for delay in filing state 
inheritance tax returns. (Hayes, p. 376). Final return for 
state inheritance tax could not possibly be filed until t.he es-
tate was wound up and Parker's fee determined for the rea-
son that it was a valid expenRe of the estate and a proper de-
duction for tax purposes. (Parker, pp. 51, 52, 669 and 671). 
Bond of Executrix 
,1 nint Cnntrol and R-i,qht of 8uret.11 tn Reliel Under Section. 
li417 of the Code of Vir.qinia. 
· Shortly after the institution of the will contest the Na: 
tional Surety Company, which was surety on the bond, signi-
fied its intention to take proper steps to be relieved from 
future obli~·ation on tlie _ bond. Representations J1ad been 
made to the head office of the company that the will under 
which Mrs. Hayes had qualified as executrix was invalid, 
that no lnwfnl marriage had occurred between her and the 
testator. that she was wasting the assets of the estate and 
that the contest whfoh Mrs. Guilfoil instituted would· be suc-
cessful, with tl1P. reRult that the surety company wo\dd be 
let in for a he~vy loss. · 
There is i::iome qu~stion as to whether counsel W. L. Par-
ker at that time had only joint control over the estate with 
Mrs. Haves or whPther he had executed a contract with the 
surety company making him personally and individually liable 
on t.he bond. Hi~ recollection is that at that time he had 
o]J.]y joint control. bnt that la.ter. when the threat of the 
surety company was made, he ag·reed to enter 
page 103 } into_ a contract and have it dated back to the day 
of the qualification. (Parker, pp. 36 to 39 and 
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365). However, W. Taylor ,Johnson, agent for the surety 
company, states that }m agreement was made at the time of 
the qualification that Parker would enter into a contra~t 
makin~ himself personally liable for any acts of the execu-
trix. (Johnson, pp. H60 and 362). This contract is found 
in the record as Exhibit 8. 
It is immaterial which view is taken of this matter. The 
surety company would have had a right to ask for relief 
whether Parker wa.s personally liable on the contract or 
whether he merely had joint control, and his services in keep ... 
in~: the surety company on the bond as surety are of the 
same value in either instance. He had manv conferences 
with Mr. Bilbrey, general attorney for the surety company, 
and convinced representatives of the surety company of the 
correctness of his positions and that there was no reason 
for them to attempt to cancel their obligation on the bond. 
The surety company, however, never made a definite com-
mitment that they would not at some future time renew their 
application for relief. In the meantime, counsel kept them 
advised of each and every step that was taken in the litiga-
tion. 
Had counsel's effort been unsuccessful and the surety been 
relieved from ohlfa·ation on the bond. it would have been 
almost impossible for the executrix, Mrs. Hayes, to have 
obtained another surety, and under Section 5417 of the Code 
:Mrs. Hayes as executrix would have lost con-
page 104 ~ trol of the estate; the Court would have removed 
her and appointed a curator or an administrator 
d. b. n. c. t. a. and Mrs. Hayes would have been hampered 
in getting funds from time to time to pay for the litig·ation 
and also for her personal expenses and her interest in the 
estate would have been greatly jeopardized. It was coun-
sel's effort in thiR matter that cttused the surety company 
to remain upon the bond, and for this he is entitled to remm1-
eration proper to the services rendered, (Johnson, p. 364), 
not 80 much for the risk that he ran personally as for the 
benefit rendered the eAtate and the executrix and chief bene-
ficiary under the will . 
.Amom,t of the Estate Involved. 
The consideration of the amount of the estate involved 
in the Ii tig·a tion brings up two questions : The amonn t of 
the estate and whether the total estate was involved in the 
litigation. · 
\v11ile the New York real estate is not a part of the estate 
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of which Mrs. Hayes is executrix., yet as we are treating the 
whole estate, real and personal., as one, reference to the 
estate herein will be taken to inc.lude that real estate. 
The appraised value of the stocks, bonds and cash assets 
of the estate amounted to $72,291.71. (Exhibit 20). Many 
of the stocks held by the testator at his death were highly 
.speculative and of such character that they could not con-
tinue to be held by the executrix without incurring a liability 
under the law. It might be said tha.t if she was 
page 105 ~ the sole beneficiary under the will, she could con-
sent to hold these speculative securities. This, 
however, overlooks the fact that there was a contest of the 
will and one other than herself might have an interest in 
the whole or in a part of the estate. It was therefore neces-
sary that these speculative securities be disposed of and 
the proceeds invested in other securities which were more 
.suitable, which was done. (P. 1.06 et seq., 134 et seq.) 
Fearing that the securities purchased with the proceeds 
of the sales would ho attaehed bv Mrs. Guilfoil with the 
transfer agents in New York, none of the securities were 
taken in the name of Mrs. Hayes as executrix of the estate, 
1H1t in the name of vV. L. Parker in some instances and Mrs. 
Hayes in other instances. From the record it seems that this 
was wise, as counsel for Mrs. Guilfoil was contemplating 
litigation tying· up the estate through the transfer agents in 
New York. (Exhibit 1, item 4). 
From the testimony of Mrs. Hayes nt pages 393 and 394, 
Exhibit 41, these reinvestments of the funds resulted in an 
increase to the estate of $7,951.51. 
The Newburgh real (estate) ha.s been recently sold for 
$15,000.00. 
There was an increase in the value of the Argentine bonds 
and the Republic of Chile bonds and the Bear Mountain 
Ridge bonds of $1,280.00. 
page 106 ~ As to the· Strauss bonds~ from the testimony of 
Bentley, a witness for Mrs. Hayes, there was a 
loss of (1,994.00 from the a.ppraised value of the bonds as of 
the date of the death of Hayes. There is no active market 
for these bonds, the trades in th(lm are sporadic and the price 
set by Bentley was the bid price for the bonds and not the 
offered price of the I10lder. It would seem fair in arriving 
at the compensation of counsel in thiR matter to treat these 
bonds as not 1rnvinp.: been either increased or decreased in 
market value from the price returned in tl1e inventory. 
Bv Exhibit 21 we seP. that the debts of the decedent were 
rep~rted to the United States Government as $4,118.74. How-
ever, this overlooks the faet that the bill of Dr. Johnson for 
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$2,000.00 was. settled for $1,500.00, thus making the debts 
of the estate $3,618.74. 
The bonds sold 'for reinvestment purposes brought, ac-
co1·ding to Parker (p. 133) $3,169.00 less· than the value given 
them in the appraisal of the estate. This, however, did not 
take into consideration the amount of $436.98 paid to brokers 
as commission for making· the sales and purchases of the 
new securities. This adtj.ed to the $3,169.00 makes. $3,605.98 .. 
. With the above explanation the value of thl>. 
page 107 ~ estate as a whole is as follows : 
Appraised value 
Increment on stock invcstmentE; 
·Newbm·gh real estate 
Increase in value of bonds 
Equity in Building· iot at Virginia 
Beach 
Paper loss in sales of securities origi~ 
nally held as compared to the 
amount for which they were a p-
praised, plus expenses of sales 
and purchases 
Debts 
Funeral Expenses 
Net value of estate 
72,290.00 
7,951.00 
15,000.00 
1,280.00 
1,500.00 
3,605.00 
3,618.00 
1,404.00 
$98,021.00 
8,627.00 
89,394.00 
Your Commissioner is not certain tllat the two items of 
debts and funeral expenses should be deducted from the value 
of the estate in detei:mining its value for the purposes either 
of the commisti\ions that mav be dne to the executrix or the 
compensation of counsel for the executrix. It is believed 
that if the beneficiary or beneficiaries were a different per-
son or different persons from the personal representative, ad-
ministrator or executrix, the amount of the estate without 
deductions would be considered the proper basis for allow-
ances for th~ personal representative or counsel, either where 
a will is contested or not contested. · 
The law is well settled that the personal representative 
cannot bind the estate by any contract as to attorney's fees,.. 
but that the personal representative can be reimbursed by 
tl1e court for only reasonable fees which the personal repre-
sentative, has either paid or incurred. It is conceivable that 
where an estate is very larg-e and with many 
page 108 ~ debts, the compensation would depend upon the 
size of the decedent's property wit11out deduct-
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ing the debts and expenses. However, your Commissioner 
deems it fit in this instance to remove all doubt in regard to 
this matter by allowing the debts and funeral expenses to 
be deducted from the total value of the estate of the dece-
dent. 
It ~ow becomes necessary to determine whether the whole 
or only part of this estate was involved. 
Marriage. 
In all of the legal proceeding·s brought by Mrs. Guilfoil 
the marriage of Mrs. Hayes is either directly or indirectly 
by necessary implication questioned. 
The marriage is determined by the laws of North Carolina, 
where it was solemnized. If the ma.rria!!'e is valid under 
the laws of North Carolina, it is of course ·valid everywhere. 
The statutes of North Carolina relating to marriages are 
found in Sections 2495 and 1658 of the North Carolina Code 
(see Exhibit 46) and for the sake of convenience are here 
set out: 
Section 2495: 
'' Want of capacity; void and voidable marriages. All 
marriages between a white person and a. negro or indian, or 
between a white person and a person of negro or indian 
descent to tbe third generation, inclusive, or between a Chero-
kee indian of Robeson county and a negro, or between a 
Cherokee india.n of Robeson county and a person of negro 
descent to the third g·eneration, inclusive, or between any 
two persons nearer of kin than first cousins, or between a 
male person under sixteen years of age and any female, or 
between a female person under fourteen years 
page 109 ~ of age and any ·male, or between persons either 
of whom has a hiu;band or 1i-i.f e living at the time 
of. such marriage, or between persons either of whom is at 
the time physically impotent, or incapable of contracting 
from want of will or understanding-, shall be void; provided. 
double first. cousins ma.y not marry; and provided further. 
tl1at no marriage followed by cohabitation and the birth of 
issue slrnll be declared void after the death of either of the 
parties for ar1,11 of the causes stated in this section~ except for 
that one of the parties was a white person and the other a. 
negro or indian or of negro or indian descent to the third 
generation, inclusive, and for bigamy.'' 
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(Rev., s. 2083; Code, s. 1810; R.. C., c. 68, ss. 7, 8, 9; 1871-2, 
0193, s. 2 ; 1887, c. 245 ; 1911, c. 215, s. 2 ; 1913, ~· 123; 1917 ; 
c. 135). 
Section 1658 : 
''What marriages may be declared void on application oj 
eithet· party. The superior court in torm time, on applica-
tion made as by law provided, by either party to a marriage 
contracted contrary to the prohibitions contained in the chap-
ter entitled Marriage. or declared void by said chapter, may 
declare s1tch marria.Qe void from the be,qinnin_q, subject, never-
theless, to the proviso contained in said chapter.'' (Italics 
supplied.) 
(Rev. S. 1560; Code, s. 1283; 1871-2, c. 193, s. 33). 
While the statute says that certain marriag·es are void, it 
contemplates, certainly where both parties are living, that 
there shall be some judicial determination establishing the 
facts which render the marriage void from the beginning-
bigamous and miscegenetic marriages excepted. 
In discussing a marriage void _for the lack of mental ca-
pacity, Ruffin, .C. J., in the case of Johnson- v. Kincade, 37 
N. C. at page 474, gave the following· as the reason for such 
determination by a court: 
page 110 ~ ''However, that may be, it is obvious that it 
is convenient and fit in respect to the decent or-
der of society, the condition of the parties and the succes-
sion of estates, that the invalidity of such a marriag·e should 
be directly the subject of judicial sentence. Hence,. although 
th~ common law deems it void, it has been the constant course 
in England for the courts, having the cognizance of matri-
monial causes, to entertain suits for declaring its nullity, 
as in other cases of marriages void by reason of a legal iµi-
µediment, as in cases of impotency, duress, incest, .or the 
like." 
In the case of Ga.th-inl}s v. Williams, (N. C.) 44 Am. Dec. 
at pa~e 51, althoup:h it was a bigamous marriage instead of 
mental incapacity, Judge Ruffin used the following lan}~'Uage: 
"But where the marriage is· between persons, one of whom 
l1as no capacity to contract marriage at all. as where there 
is a want of age, or understanding, or a prior marriage still 
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subsisting, the marriage is void absolutely and from the be-
ginning, and may be inquired of in any court. •For, aUhough, 
in such case there may be a proceeding in the ecclesiastical 
court, it i.i, not to dissolve the marriage, but merely for the 
convenience of the parties, to find the fact and declare the 
marriage there,z1,pon to have been void_. ab initio; and no civil 
rights can be acquired wnder such a marriage. It is said to 
be no marriage, but a profooation of marriage, and the factum 
is a nullity." (Italics supplied.) 
See Williamson v. Williams, 56 N. C. 446; Lea v. Lea, (N. 
C.) 17 Am. St. Rep. 692. 
It has also been decided bv the courts of North Carolina 
that an annulment proceeding under these sections, during 
the lifetime of the pal'ties, partakes of the nature of a di-
vorce case. 
In the case of Sawyer, et als.; v. Slack, (N. C.) 146 S. E. 
864, the marriage of a female under the age of 
page 111 ~ sixteen was under consideration. In passing· 
upon this statute Judge ,Connor used the follow-
ing language at page 864: 
"The superior court of this state is authorized by statute 
to declare a marriage void ab initio, and therefore a nullity 
from its inception. Either party to a marriage may main-
tain an action for judgment to this effect, when the marriage 
was contracted contrary to statutory prohibitions, or where 
the marriage is expressly declared void by statute, for rea-
sons set o.ut therein. C. S. Sec. 1658. An action to annul 
a marriage for statutory reasons is in the nature of an a.c-
tion for divorce. After such action is begun in the superior 
court, the procedure therein is tl1e same as in an action for 
divorce.'' 
See Sims v. Sims, 121 N. C. 297, 61 Am. St. Rep. 665; 
Johnson v. K'incade, suvra; 
Willio:nrnon v. Williams, 56 N. C. 446. 
Counsel for 1\frs. Hayes take the position that the mar-
riage was voidable and not void; that therefore, after the 
death of her husband it could not be attacked. Thev relv 
upon the case of ·watters V. }flatters (N. ·c.), 84 s. E. 0703 ... 
An action was instituted in this case to declare void a mar-
riage celebrated between the plaintiff and tl1e defendant, upon 
the ground that at the time of the marriage the defendant, 
Lula vYat.ters, was incapable of making or entering into a con-
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tract of marriage for the want of will or understanding. The 
plaintiff and the defendant had lived together for eight years, 
during which time she bore him :five children. 
In this case the court used language to the effect that the 
husband was estoppe.d by his conduct from as-
page 112 ~ serting that his wife was incapable of entering 
into a marriage contract, and that by bis living 
with her during eight years he had ratified and confirmed 
the marriage with the defendant. They flirt.her contend that 
this holding of the court ne~essarily implies that the marriage 
between the parties was not void but voidable; otherwise the 
court could not, if the marriage was void, have held th~t 
Watters had ratified or confirmed his void aet. 
This contention overlooks the holding of the court in Sims 
v. Sinis, supra, where it is said ( 61 Am. St R.ep. at page 
666): 
'' Indeed, the marriage at the time of a legally declared 
lunacy, being a nullity, could only have been remedied by 
proceeding· to set aside the inquisition of lunacy for fraud 
or other good ground, or by a new marriage if the lunatic is 
since found to be restored. The void marriage on account 
of lunacy could not be cured merely by cohabitation after 
restoration. Marriages entered into by parties under the 
legal age, however, being not void but voidable, can be vali-
dated by cohabitation after arrival at marriageable age; 
State v. Parker, 106 N. C. 71.1; Koonce v. Wallace,-- 52 N. C. 
194.'' (Italics supplied). 
It will be noticed that in t]1e Watters case the jury, upon 
the issue submitted, found that the defendant on the date 
of her marriage had sufficient mental underst~nding to make 
and understand and enter into a marriage contract. 
It would seem from this that the language used by th?. 
court as to estoppel and ratification is obiter or was used 
in answer to a charge given to the jury by the judge to which 
the plaintiff took! exception. 
The Court further held that the only party 
page -113 ~ who could bring an action of this nature was the 
person who had been deceived or entrapped into 
a marriag·e. The court said at page 704: 
'' There a.re cases in which marriages have been set aside 
on the ground that one of the parties ~eeking it was mentally 
incapable of contracting· the marriage. But in all cases the 
action was brought at the instance of the party imposed 
on.'' 
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Certainly if this is the law relating to marriages in North 
Carolina, the plaintiff had no cause of action to begin with. 
The court further commented upon the fact that the plain-
tiff did not allege or testify that the defendant's mental 
capacity was concealed from him or that any fraud or im-
position was practiced upon him, and stated that by his con-
duct he was estopped to assert his cause of action. 
Further, the case is not controlling in the instant litiga-
tion for the reason that there is an exception to the statute 
which reads as follows: 
'' Provided further, that no marriage followed by cohabita-
tion and the birth of issue shall be declared void after death 
of either of the parties, for any of the causes cited in this 
section,'' 
bigamous and miscegenetic marriages excepted. If a mar-
riage could not be declared void ab initio after the death of , 
one of the parties, as claimed by counsel for Mrs. Hayes, 
what was the necessity for the above provision 1 Does it not 
necessarily follow that, after the death of the husband,· no 
· children being born of the marriage, the validity 
page 114 ~ of the marriage can be attacked, the. marriage not 
being within the saving provisions of the proviso? 
Is it not that, only where thllre has been cohabitation and 
children born of the marriag·e, the courts are without power 
to declare void ab initio marriages entered into contrary to 
the provisions of the statute, but that in all other cases that 
have that powed 
Counsel for Mrs. Hayes rely upon the statement in Sims 
v. Sims, sitpra, to the effect that annulment of a marriage 
must be done in a direct proceeding, using the following lan-
guage: 
'' The power of the courts to declare a marriage a nullity 
for incapacity of on~ of the parties, though not an adjudged 
lunatic at the time of the marriage, is also upheld in ti olmson 
v. Kincade, 37 N. C. 470; State v. Setzer• 97 N. C. 252, 1 S. E. 
558: Lea v. Lea, 104 N. C. 303, 10 S. E. 468. This might be 
done even after the death of the parties ( Gatlin.qs v. Wu-
limns, 27 N. C. 487) though issue could not be bastardized: 
but it must be done in a direct proceedings, as in this case,. 
and not incidentally (Willimnson v. Will-imns, 56 N. C. 446)." 
The statement that tl1e annulment of the marriage must 
be in a direct proceeding a.pplies to annulment proceedings 
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if both parties are alive, since such a. proceeding, as we have 
seen, partakes of the nature of a suit for divorce, which of 
course is impossible after the death of either spouse. 
Moreover, to allow a marriage to be the subject of an in-
direct or collateral attach during· the life of the parties mig·ht 
result in the termination of tbe marriage relation between 
the parties at the instance of one not a party to the marriag·e, 
as was attempted in lVilliamson v. TVillianis, supra. This 
condition could not obtain after the death of one of the par-
ties, for the marriage relation would have been 
page 115 ~ terminated by the death. 
It seems, therefore, that where property rights 
are involved, as in the instant case, the courts having juris-
diction of the res affec.ted by the marriage have power to dis-
regard the marriage in determining the rights of litigants 
in the res. This position finds support in the following cases 
which construe the proviso set forth above: 
Baity v. 'Cran/ill, 91 N. C. 298, 49 Arn. Rep. 641; 
:Ward v. Daily, (N. C.) 23 S. E. 926. 
In the Baity case .the statute provided that all marriages 
contracted after the 27th of December, 1852, and all mar-
riages in the future between persons nearer of kin than first 
cousins shall be void (the present statute is double first 
.cousins). It is further provided that. no marriage followed 
by cohabitation and the birth of issue should be declared void 
after the death of either of the parties, for any of the causes 
stated in the statute, except for bigamy or miscegenation. 
The proceeding wa.s instituted by the plaintiff as admiu-
istrator of Lee V. Cranfill, deceased, ag·ainst the defendant 
as heir in order to sell the land for assets. 
In passin,g on the applicability of the proviso relating to 
cohabitation and birth of issue, the court said at page 296: 
page 116 ~ '' These statutory provisio~1s are referred to, 
as indicating, as in our opinion they clearly do, 
an intention to confine the power conferred upon the court 
to declare void, or in a judicial proceeding to treat as vo~d, 
except where the intermarriage is between the specified races 
or involves the offense of bigamy, to cases, whenever the power 
· is exercised, during the lifetime of the parties, or after death, 
only ,when there has been no is.me born to them·. The strnc. 
ture a1id interdependence of these several sections are in hM-
1nony only when such an interpretation is pu,t u,pon the proviso 
.first quoted~ -
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It speak prospectively as to the exercise of the judicial au-
thority bestowed, but it is an authority to be exercised upon 
all subsisting marriages before specified, when the relation 
may have been entered into, as well as such .as may there-
after be formed. The words are 'that no marriage followed 
by cohabitation and the birth of issue shall be declared void 
after the death of either of the parties for any of the causes 
stated in this section, except;' &c., tlms imposing restraint.,;; 
after death, not attaching d~tring life." (Italics supplied.) 
This case is probably dictum for the reason that there were 
children born of the marriage, and in the instant case there 
were no such issue. 
In the case of Ward v. Daily, supra, the action was to re-
cover personal property belong'ing to the estate of the de-
cedent and claimed to be wrongfully held by the defendant 
under the claim that. she was the widow. 
The evidence showed that the defendant was deserted by 
her husband in 1860; that in 1870, having heard nothing from 
him, she married the plaintiff's intestate, with whom she 
lived until his death, and that her husband was seen alive 
after 1870. The court said that the marriage was not only 
voidable, but void. It was contended that the plaintiff's in-
testate being dead, the courts were. prohibited 
page 117 ~ under the proviso from formally declaring .the 
marriage void. The Court said at page 296·: 
'' But, plaintiff's intestate, being now dead, it was con-
tended that the courts now are prohibited, unp.er the proviso, 
from formally declaring the contract null. In order, how-
ever, to bring the case within tho proviso, it is not sufficient 
to show simply tha.t one of the parties to the contract has died, 
but it must appear further that issue was born during the 
cohabitation. The latter requirement is not met by the proof; 
indeed, it is admitted that there was no issue of the bigamous 
marriage.'' 
If the courts of North Carolina arc correct in saying that 
by the st.atute bigamonB marriages are ipso facto void, and 
need not be so adjudged by the courts, then the above is 
dictum. 
It is true that Parker in his account. filed in Exhibit 1, un-
der the heading· "Third Will Contest", Raid "a search was 
made for ::ill the decisions of tlw Supreme Court of North 
Carolina interpreting this statute and the conclusion was 
reached tlUlt the validity of such a marriage could not be at-
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_tacked after the death of one of the contracting parties,'' and 
doubtless he so informed ::M:rs. Hayes on several occasions. 
Certainly counsel for Mrs. Guilfoil had taken a different 
view, otherwise the allegations that Mrs. Guilfoil was the 
sole heir. 9:f. her brother, involving not only the validity of 
the marriage, would not have been ma.de and sw01·n to. Cer-
tainly, so far as the Virginia litigation was concerned, Mrs. 
Guilfoil and her counsel had to establish the in-
page 118 ~ validity of both the marriage and the will, or else 
they we.re attempting a vain thing. If either tlH~ 
will was valid or the marriage was valid, Mrs. Guilfoil had 
no interest in the property so far as the Vfrginia. litigation 
was concerned. 
Your Commissioner's investigation of the North Carolina 
statutes and deeisions leads hini to the conclusion that there 
has been no decision construing the proviso where there has 
been a marriage contrary to the p1·ohibitions of the statute 
followed by cohabitation and the death of one of the spouses, 
no issue surviving. The question is the ref ore an open one,, 
to be deeided by the courts of other states according to their 
respective construction of the statute. 
Counsel for Mrs. Hayes in their brief question whether 
counsel for :Mrs. Guilfoil had any intention of proceeding in 
thH federal court to recover the assets of the estate. They 
.also state that counsel for Mrs. Guilfoil knew the marriage 
was voidable only under the laws of North Carolina and 
could not the ref ore be successfully attacked after the death 
of Hayes, for they allowed the marriage to be proved without 
any contest and went to trial in the third will contest in 
.Princess Anne County solely on the issue of domicile, and that 
on appeal they admitted the validity of the marriage. 
It is obvious that counsel for :Mrs. Guilfoil were anxious 
to conduct the litigation in some jurisdiction other 
page 119 ~ than the Circuit Court of Princess Anne County 
and preferably in .New York, but it is submitted 
that counsel for Mrs. Hayes are in error in concluding that 
counsel for Mrs. Guilfoil knew the marriage could not be suc-
cessfully attacked after the death of Hayes, because they 
went to trial solely on the issue of domicile or admitted the 
validity of the marriage on appeal. 
The case went to trial on th~ plea that the complainant was 
not a person interested (Exhibit 9. page 30) and not upon 
~the answer. The plea negatived the interest of the complain-
ant and every person other than the defendant, Mrs. Hayes, 
and alleged the. domicile of Hayes at the time of his death 
·to be in the State of Virginia. It was not necessary to de-
feat this plea to attack it on all issues presented. It was 
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. necessary to attack it upon only one of the issues presented, 
and if this was successful the whole plea fell. 
Counsel for Mrs. Guilfoil confined the issue to the question 
of domicile of the testator. That was the sole issue before 
the court. (Exhibit 9, page 34.) . 
On the appeal counsel for Mrs. Guilfoil made. the follow-
ing statement in their petition: 
'' So that it appears that the only question upon this ap-
peal is as to the sufficiency of the evidence to show that an 
established domicile had shortly before the testator's death 
been changed from New York ~to this ,State.'' (Exhibit 9, 
page 3.) 
It is contended that this is a concessu.m that there were 
no other issues inyolved, and the validity of the marriage 
was conceded. 
page 120 ~ In this view your Commissioner is unable to 
concur. It cou~d as easily be a reservation of 
other questions in the case which would be the subject of fu-
ture litigation in the event that the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia overruled the Circuit Court of Princess 
Anne County, and held that the domic~le of the testator at 
the time of his death was in New York, where it is quite evi-
dent Mrs. Guilfoil and her counsel were trying to remove the 
litigation. 
Former Adji1tdication. 
Counsel for Mrs. Hayes in their brief filed, entitled '' Memo-
randum on Former Adjudication'', states: 
"As Mr. Parker said in his account., 'The plea put in issue 
the validity of the defendant's marriage to the decedent'. It 
not only put it in issue; but thrust the question so forcibly 
under Mr. Heath's nose that J1e could not have failed to 
recognize the consequences of neglecting to meet the issue, 
unless he preserved his rights in some way.'' 
l\fore accurately speaking·, the plea offered in issue the 
validity of defendant's marriage to the decedent, but as we 
have seen, counsel for Mrs. Guilfoil declined that part of 
the issue, but went to trial on the question of domicile. 
Had counsel for Mrs. Guilfoil prevailed on this question, 
the decree entered by the court would have been entirely dif-
ferent from the one that was entered. It would have held 
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that the domicile of the testator was in New York. 
page 121 ~ \Vhat proceedings would then have taken place 
become a matter of speculation; not necessary for 
your Commissioner to decide other thai1 to say that there are 
no North Carolina decisions construing the statute which 
would prevent the iN ew York courts from holding the mar- · 
riage void ab initio, as was doue in Jaques v. P·ublic Adminis-
trator, 1 Bradford 499, where in a similar case it was held 
that a marriage of one mentally incompetent could be at-
tacked after the death of the other spouse; and that a suit 
was already pendii1g in New York for the cancellation of 
the deed to the real estate. 
For the reasons stated above, your ·Commissioner holds 
that the entire estate was in issue. 
A niount of C ompensatid1i~ 
Many attorneys testified in this case as to the compensa-
tion to be allowed counsel for Mrs. Hayes. The witnesses 
for Parker testified as follows: 
J. Sidney Smith $26,100.00, based on the value of the es.:. 
tate at $110,000.00, ot practically 25%. 
N. T. Green $30,000.00, based on an estate estimated at 
$117,000.00-about 25%. 
Henry Bowden, that the fee charg·ed by Parker of $29,850.00 
was reasonable and fair on an estate of $100,000, or about 
30%. 
Juli.an S. Lawrence considered the fig11re reasonable, based 
on an estate of $114,000.00 to $115,000.00-something over 
26%. 
The result of John B. Jenkins' testimony was $25,850 on 
the basi_s of an estate valued at $110,000.QO;_about 23.5%. 
page 122 ~ Counsel for :Mrs. Hayes gaYe the following re-
sults: 
Bennett, on the supposition that the fee was a contingent 
fee, considered from 25% to 33-1/S% reasonable. (P. 590.) 
Based upon the fee's not being contingent, and that tl1e estate 
was involved only to the amount of $36,000.00, he testified 
$10,000.00 was a reasonable fee, or about 28%. 
W. H. !feag·her testified that a fee of $10,500 was reason-
able. This was based on the theory that the amount in liti-
gation was only $33;750.00, and is about 31 %. However, he 
stated (p. 586) that on a contingent basis a 1/3 contingent 
fee was fair. 
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R. M. Hughes did not regard the fee as a contingent one, 
regarded no fee as contingent unless so stipulated in ad-
vance, and that there could not be a contingent fee on quantum 
meruit. (Pp. 595, 633.) He considered the estate in con.:. 
troversy to be $36,500.00 and thought a fee of $9,125.00 was . 
reasonable~ This was about 25%. (P. 597.) He said if the 
estate was larg·er he would not allow as mtieh as 25%. (Pp. 
630 and 631.) 
Your Commissioner the ref ore recommends a fee of approxi-
mately 25% of the amount found to be the value of the whole 
estate, or a fee of $22,500.00. 
4. MONEY PAID TO vV. L. PARKER ON ACCOUNT OF 
SERVICES. 
Counsel has received the sum of $8,705.73 on account of 
services, ivhich should be deducted from the amount recom-
mended by your Commissioner. 
page 123 ~ 5. LIEN OF W. L. PARKER ON THE SEOURI-
TIE1S FOR HIS FEE. 
Counsel for Mrs. Hayes on page 27 of their brief contend 
that counsel has no lien on securities in the lock box and 
moneys deposited iil the bank for his fee and cites the case 
of Watts v. Newberry, 107 Va. 233. 
In this case a fee was denied counsel for several reasons. 
Counsel had given advice to his client prior to the litigatio~ 
which enabled the elient to conceal his property from his 
creditors, and further, the securities placed irt his hands were 
for a specific purpose, which was inconsistent with the claim 
of a lien. . 
Such condition does not exist in the present case. The se-
curities were placed in Parker's name during the litigation 
and for the benefit of the litigation, to the end that they mig·ht 
not be reached in a foreign jurisdiction by a suit against the 
transfer agent and the litigation regarding the e~tate could 
not be transferred to a foreign State. 5 Am. Jur., pages 
388 and 389. 
6. ACCOUNT OF TRANSACTIONS BE·TWEEN PARKER 
AND ADELAIDE .:M .. HAYES, ADMIN-
ISTRATRIX, ETC. 
Since July 13, 1938, when relationship between Parker as 
counsel and Mrs. Hayes ceased, he has eolleeted on securities 
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standing in .his name belonging· to the estate the sum of 
$1,474.37. This sum should be deducted from the fee allowed 
Parker as. counsel In addition, he holds checks amounting 
to $503.74 payable to Mrs. Hayes. These checks should be 
turned over to Mrs. Hayes when the remainder 
page 124 ~ of the fee due Parker under the fourth item of 
the dooree is paid him. (See Exhibit 55 filed by 
consent before your Commissioner.) 
7. WHAT PART OF MONEYS OR SECUR:1TIES IN CUS-
TODY OF OR DEPOSITED WITH ·NATIONAL 
BANK OF OOM:MERCE OF NORFOLK. 
All of the secnrities and moneys other than those mentioned 
in the last preceding inquiry are either in the custody of . or 
deposited with the National Bank of Commerce of Norfolk, 
Virginia, the money being on deposit and the securities be-
ing in . the look box under the joint control of Mrs. Hayes 
·and W. L. Parker. 
Before filing this report your Commissioner gave notice 
in writing of the filin&· to counsel of record of all parties who 
have appeared in this cause by mailing the same to their 
last known post office address, and furnished each of them 
a copy of this report. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEO. PILCHER, Commissioner. 
Commissioner's fee $1,250.00. 
Stenographer's bill $426.00. 
page 125 ~ Virginia: 
In the ·Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk .. 
William L. Parker, Complainant, 
v. 
Adelaide M. Hayes, etc., et al., Defendant, 
In Chancery .. 
and 
0 onsolidatet·oauses. 
Adelaide M. Hayes, Executrix, Complainant, 
v. 
)Villiam L. Parker, Defendant .. 
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William L. Parker. 
TESTIMONY BEFURE. ·OOl\fMISSIONER IN 
CHAiNCERY. 
The testimony of witnesses, taken pursuant to decree of 
reference in the above-entitled cause, before George Pilcher, 
Esquire, Commissioner, by agreement of counsel as to the 
time and place, at the offices of the Commissioner, Western 
Union Building, Norfolk, Virginia, eommencing on the 25th 
day of January, 1939, to be read as evidence in said causes, 
pending in the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, Virginia . 
.Appearances: Mr. Wm. G. Maupin, Counsel for William 
L. Parker. Messrs. Baird, W·hite & Lanning, by George M. 
Lanning, and Mr. John G. Poore, Counsel for .Adelaide M. 
Hayes. 
page 126 ~ "WILLIAM L. PARKER, 
having been :first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
Examined. by Mr. Maupin: 
Q. State your name and occupation, please t 
A. William L. Parker; .Attorney at Law. 
Q. You are the plaintiff in this case T 
A. I am. 
Q. You practice law where? 
A. In the City of Norfolk. 
Q. How long- have you been practicing law? 
A. Since 1915. 
Q. In the City of Norfolk? 
A. One year in the City of Portsmouth and the remainder 
of the time in the City of Norfolk with the exception of two 
years during the war period. . 
Q. Do you know Mrs. Adelaide M:. Ha.yes? 
A. I do. 
Q. The Executrix of William R. Hayes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you know her husband¥ 
A. Yes, I knew bim beginning about October, 1933. 
Q. Did you ever perform any special service for him? 
A. I prepared a deed for him and got some information 
with respect to some securities which he owned,-perhaps two 
or three or four times. 
page 127 ~ Q. When, or approximately when, did the Rev. 
'William R. Hayes die? 
108 .Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
William L. Parker. 
A. April 27, 1934. 
Q. After his death were you consulted and retained by 
·his widow Mrs. Adelaide M. Hayes? 
A. In the early part of May, 1934, I was retained by Mrs. 
Hayes to represent her in connootion with matters arising 
by reason of the death of William R. Hayes, her husband. 
Q. Did William R. Hayes die testate or intestate Y 
A. He left a will. 
Q. Did she have a will with her at the time she consulted 
you or did she present it to you shortly thereafter? 
A. When Mrs. Hayes obtained access to the safety deposit 
box, with my assistance, reg·istered in the name of William 
R. Hayes and herself, in the National Bank of Commerce, 
that will was found among his papers in the box. 
Q. And you say you were retained to represent her gen-
erally and particularly with regard to the property men-
. tioned in that will? 
A. I was. 
Q. Did you probate the wilH 
A. Afte1· considering the matter of the approprJate place 
of probate-that is, whether or not the probate could be had 
in the State of Virginia or whether it was neces-
page 128 ~ sary to apply in the .State of New York, I decided 
and did apply to the Clerk of the Circuit Court 
of .Princess Anne County, Virginia, for probate of the will 
there. 
Q. Where was the testator living· at the time of his death f 
Let me amplify that question somewhat: To get it straip;ht 
in the record, please state where he had lived, what his oc-
cupation was, what his circumstances were that made you 
somewhat doubtful in the beginning as to the proper place 
of probate? · . 
A. Well, the will in question had been executed by the de-
cedent in July, 1932; at that time he was Pastor of a Catholic 
Church in the City of Newburgh, New York, and was un-
married; unde1· the provisions o~ the will, his entire estate 
was left to Adelaide M. Grady, who was appointed executrix 
of the will; it was several months later, in September, 1932, 
I think, the decedent and Adelaide M. Grady were married. 
Q. Where? 
A. They were married in Elizabeth City, North Carolina~ 
Immediately after the marriage, they went to Virginia Beach, 
staved at the Cavalier Hotel for some period of time, I don't 
remember how long·, and rented a furnished cottage,. where 
they lived until the spring of 1933. 
• 
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At that time the decedent returned to Newburgh, got his 
affairs in order, attended to various business transactions, 
arranged to transfer his securities to the City 
page 129 } of Norfolk, and in the fall of 1933 returned to 
Virginia Beach, where he rented another fur-
nished cottage-not the one that he had had before. 
At that time there were various indications that it was 
his intention to change his domicile from New York, where 
it had been previously, to Virginia Beach, in the State of 
Virginia. However, the presumption was that his original 
domicile in New York continued, and it was necessary to de-
cide whether or not the evidence was sufficient to establish 
whether there had been an aetual change. 
In the early part of 1934 he purchased a lot, the title to 
which was taken in the name of his wife, and contracted for 
the erection of a dwelling; house. .Shortly after this contract 
had been executed, he returned to New York for the purpose 
of having an operation performed on his mouth. The · op-
eration was perform.eel, and inside of several weeks he died 
as the result of a hemorrhage which subsequently developed. 
Q. He died in New York? 
A. He died in the State of New York. A number of ques-
tions were presented in connection with the question of domi-
cile. 
Under the law of New York a subsequent marriage did 
not revoke a will like it does under the law of Virginia. The 
question of whether or not the will was revoked 
page 130 ~ was very complicated in yiew of some of the au-
thorities on the question of conflict of law~. The 
domicile at the time of the marriage determines whether or 
not the marriage operates to revoke a. will, according to some 
authorities, and according to others that question is deter-
mined by the domicile at the time of death. 
There was an extremely important fact for consideration 
to be determined. There was reason to think at that time 
that a contest would perhaps result from the will being of-
fered for probate and if the contest occurred at Newburgh, 
the former domicile of the ~ceased, there was every reason 
to think that the religious issue would play an important part 
in any decision by reason of the fact that he had been Pastor 
for some 25 years of a large congregation in that city. 
Q. Now, was there any difference also between the laws 
of the State of New York and the laws of the State of Vir-
ginia with regard to the distribution of the personal estate 
of the testator who was childless and married? , 
• 
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A. That w~ also a very important consideration. Under 
those circlW).stances, in Virginia the widow would inherit all 
the personal property while in New York she would only 
take one-half. 
Q. Then I take it you decided to apply for the probate of 
this will in Prinooss Anne County, Virginia t 
page 131 ~ A. I did. 
. Q. On the theory that the testator was domiciled 
in that County and State at the time of his death t 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where was the will executed 1 
A. The will had been exec.uted in .Newburgh, New York. 
Q. I take it that it was necessary to prove the execution 
of it by witnesses in the State of New York? 
A. The two attesting witnesses were residents of New-
burgh, one Mr. A. W. Bennett, an attorney of Newburgh. 
I ace.ordingly offered the will to the Clerk of the Circuit 
Court of Princess .Anne County, and it was necessary to re-
move the will, take it to Newburgh, take the deposition of 
Mr. Bennett for formal proof of the will, and have the depo-
sitions together with the will returned to the ·Clerk of the 
Court. · 
I mig·ht state on the oooasion of that visit, at Mrs. Hayes' 
instructions, I sounded out the counsel who had already been 
retained there by the contestants with a yiew to determining· 
whether or not it was possible to compromise the controversy. 
By reason of the exorbitant demands of the contestants, I 
found this was not practical. 
I spent some three or four days in Newburgh and in New 
York investigating all facts in connection with the past his-
tory of the decedent, and then returned to Nor-
page 132 ~ folk. 
Q. !Now, Mr. Parker, when that will was ad-
mitted to probate by the 01erk of Princess Anne County, had 
contest proceedings been instituted, and, if so, who instituted 
them, and what counsel represented the contestants? 
A. The will was admitted to probate on May 28th; on June 
2nd Mary Hayes Guilfoil and 'a son of hers, Paul Guilfoil, 
appealed from the Clerk's ex parte hearing admitting the 
will to probate. I executed the bond and perfected the ap-
peal. 
The representatives of the contestants at that time were 
Smith Brittingham, Jr., and Mr. C. S. Roth, attorney. 
Q. Who was named as executrix in that will 1 
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A . .Adelaide M. Grady, who subsequently became the wife 
of the decedent. 
Q. Then the will made tht~ wife, Adelaide l\f. Grady, the 
sole beneficiary and executrix 1 
.A.. Yes; and they made an arrangement with me to obtain 
a ~ond for her with the National Surety Company, the bond 
bemg for $51,000. The bond was duly executed and the ex-
ecutrix qualified. 
Q. Beginning· in the spring of 1934, when your employment 
was made, did you represent Mrs. Hayes with regard to her 
husband's estate thenceforward, and, if so, for how long? 
A. I represented Mrs. Hayes in most of her 
page 133 ~ husband's estate from that time until July 23, 
1938, when I -received a letter from her discharg-
ing me from any further employment. 
Q. That was a period of approximately four years and two 
months! 
.A.. That is rig·ht. 
Q. Have you represented her throughout that period in 
those matters? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, were your duties in connection with that, Mr. 
Parker, a formality and sporadic, or were they continuous Y 
A. Practically continuous during that period. 
Q. Now, you have stated that the contest arose before the 
Circuit Court of Princess Anne County on appeal from the 
Clerk's probate of the will of ·wmiam R. Hayes; state what 
the outcome of that contest was, and whether or not the coun-
sel you named continued as sole counsel in the case or 
whether they were supplemented or supplanted by other coun-
sel? · 
.A.. Shortly after the institution of the contest, these gen-
tlemen associated with them ]\fr. James E. Heath, an attor-
ney of the City of Norfolk, and the three together continued 
that contest. 
· In the grounds of contest wllich the Court re-
page 134 ~ quired them to file, the principal contentions were 
that the testator was of unsound mind; that his 
act in executing the will had been subject to undue influence; 
that he had not been lawfully married for the reason that he 
was of unsound mind at the time· of the marriage, and, in 
addition to that, there were listed a number of alleged physical 
ailments from which he was suffering. 
Q. There was an attack, the ref ore, I take it, from your 
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answer, both on the validity of the will and on the validity 
of the marriage i 
A.. There was. 
Q. What was the outcome of that? 
A.. Preparations were made ior the trial of this contest. 
I again went to Newburgh to attend the taking of deposi-
tions on behalf of the contestants. These depositions were 
dulv taken. 
I°' took occasion also at that time to make a thorough in-
vestig·ation of the facts in connection with the decedent's past 
history. 
At a later date I attended the taking of depositions of 
some physicians in the City of New York who had from time 
to time attended the decedent during his lifetime. I might 
say their testimony was to the effect that the decedent was 
at all times, or most of the time, when under their care, irra-
tional. 
page 135 ~ Q. I take it then that the case was prepared 
for trial both in its factual al.ld legal aspects quite 
thoroughly Y 
A. All the instructions to the jury were prepared,. the ques-
tions of law investigated and authorities collected, and on 
July 19th, after having subpoenaed a number of witnesses 
and having arrang·ed for the attendance of Mr. Bennett, who 
had prepared the will, I went to Princess Anne County for 
the purpose of trying the case. At· the outset, Mr. Heath 
arose and stated that upon investigation they had come to the 
conclusion that the· decedent had died domiciled in the State 
of New York; that the Circuit Court of Princess Anne County 
was without jurisdiction to entertain the contest, and they, 
therefore, asked leave to take a non-suit. 
I resisted that motion on the ground that in a matter of 
this kind a non-suit could not be taken, but was overruled by 
the Judge of that court, who allowed the non-suit. The re-
sult of tha.t was the Clerk's original order of probate stood. 
Q. All right. From the aspect of the legal proceeding in 
connection with this, what was the next step that was taken 
by .the contestants 1 · 
A. The contestant Mary Hayes Guilfoil then made appli-
cation to the Surrogate of Orange County, in the State of 
New York, for letters of administration on the estate of 
William R. Hayes. In this application it was alleged that 
the decedent died domiciled in the State of New 
page 136 ~ y ork; that he left 110 will, but that a paper writ-
ing alleged to be his . will had been filed, as the 
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appliootion stated, with the Clerk of the Circuit· •Court of 
Princess Anne County, Virginia; that he left no wife, but. 
that one Adelaide M. Grady was holding herself out as his 
wife, and that she was living at Virginia Beach, in the State 
of Virginia, and asked that citation be served on her in con-
nection with this application. The citation was duly served. 
It then became necessary to determine whether or not-I 
mig·ht say in passing that the service was made in the State 
of Virginia-it then became necessary to determine whether 
or not the application for letters of administration in the 
State of New York could be safely ignored. 
The question in that aspect turned upon the character of 
the proceeding, of whether ·in rem or in personam and on the 
question to what extent we would be bound by the decision 
of the Surrogate in the State of New York on the question. 
of domicile and on the question of the validity of the mar-
riage. That was .a matter of some considerable complexity 
and required a great deal of study before I could conclude 
in my mind safely that the proceeding could be ignored. 
Q. Do I understand that there was another attook made 
on the validity of the marriage in that applying for letters 
of administration in the State of New York they denied that 
the decedent was married but stated that there 
Jlage 137 } was one holding herself out as his wife! 
A. That is right; if she was his wife, she would 
be entitled to letters of administration rather than the sis-
ter who was making application. 
Bv the Commissioner: 
"Q. Under the laws of New Yodd 
A. Yes. 
By Mr. Maupin: -
Q. And under the laws of New York if she was entitled to 
them, she would be entitled to one-half of the estate? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Pursuant to the application of l\fary Hayes Guilfoil for 
letters of administration on the estate of William R. Haves 
and upon her allegation that he was unmarried and that-she 
was the sister of the unmarried intestate, were letters of ad-
ministration issued to her by the .Surrogate of Orange County, 
New York? · 
A. They were. 
Q. Where was the personal estate of this decedent during 
all of these maneuvers? 
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.A. At the time of the decedent 1s death there were two 
policies of insurance on his life payable to bis estate which 
could not be i.nµnediately found, but which were afterwards 
found bi M.i..-~:.:Hayes in the State of New York. She re-
.· ~ tumed with them to Virginia. 
page 138 ~ - ··certain household furniture owned by the de-
cedent had been stored in the City of New York 
and was there at the time of his death. This household fur-
niture was afterwards transferred to Virginia Beach, in the 
State of Virginia. The remainder of his property, consisting 
of stocks and bonds, or rather his personal estate, were 
lodged in a safe deposit box in the name of the deceased and 
his wife, in the National Bank of Commerce, in the City of 
Norfolk, and he had a bank account of approximately $900 
-at the Virginia Beach Branch of tbe National Bank of Com-
merce of N orf ol.k. 
Q. Now, after letters of administration of the estate of 
William R. Hayes were issued in Orange County, New York,. 
to Mary Hayes Guilfoil, what was the next legal step taken 
by the contestants for the purpose of depriving Mrs. Hayes 
of the estate of her husband 1 
A. Mary Hayes Guilfoil, as administratrix of the estate of 
William R. Hayes, broug·ht a snit in equity in the District 
Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Vir-
g·inia ag·ainst Adelaide M. Hayes. ~Phe bill alleged that Wil-
liam R Hayes had died intestate, leaving a large personal 
estate which had come into the unlawful possession of Ade-
laide :M. Hayes. It set forth the qualification of l\Iary Hayes 
Guilfoil as administratrix of the decedent and asked for an 
accounting and recovery of these assets. 
Q. I take it that that was the suit brought by the adminis-
tratrix under her qualification in -New York, de-
page 139 ~ man ding a transfer of all the assets which were 
held by Mrs. Hayes, as executrix under her Vir-
ginia qualification, to the New York administratrix under the 
allegation that the only lawful qualification on the estate was 
the one which had been g-ranted to :Mrs. Guilfoil in New York? 
A. There was no reference to the Virginia qualification at 
all, nor was Mrs. Hayes sued in her capacity as executrix. 
She was simply sued as having unlawfully possessed herself 
of the securities. 
Q. Did you, after the institution of that suit, look into the 
law referring to the respective· rights of the parties thereto 
and what the probability was of the outcome of the suit! 
A. A number of questions wer~ presented in that c.onnec-
., 
"· 
. ' 
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tioil-:--first, whether or not the administratrix. appointed in 
the State of New York could maintain a suit in a United 
States ·Court iu the State of Virginia; the next question pre-
sented was whether or not the United States District Court 
could adjudicate the right to the possession ·of these assets 
as between two contending personal representatives~whether 
or not they could determine which of these· courts appointing 
personal representatives had jurisdiction;· whether or not 
they could require· the transfer,of the assets· in· Virginia held 
I · by personal representatives to- a- personal ·repre-
page .140-l sentative appointed by the laws of another state. 
: · · The first question, namely, the right of the ·New 
¥ ork administratrix. to sue in Virginia,. was made the basis 
of a motion· to dismiss the bill. A· brief ·was prepared on the 
question of law and presented in that com1ection; the case . 
was argued before Judge Wa~, Judge of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, and the 
motion. was overruled. So the case · then stood to be heard 
upon. its merits. , · . 
Q. All right. ·while that case was pending, were any other 
legal .proceedings instituted by the contestants, and, if so~ 
what was their nature and where vtere they instituted r · · 
A. Followiilg .the institution of that suit, a second suit in'' 
the United States District Court ·for the Eastern District of 
Virginia was instituted· by Mary Hayes Guilfoil in her own 
rig·ht against Adelaide l\.L Hayes, the object of which ,v1.is·· 
to obtain under the provisions of Section 5259 of the Vir-
ginia Code an issue of devisavit vel non to determine the 
validity .of the decedent's will. 
Q. I understand from your answer that was an attack on 
the will, an attempt ta .attack t,he .. ,will' in the Federal Forum 
rather than in a State Forum 1 · . 
A.· ·That is right. · · · . . 
Q. What happened to that-suit? What pro"Ceedings were 
ta.ken and what was the outc.ome? ·· 
page :141 ~ A. The important _quest.ion there was to deter-
mine whethe1· or not the Federal Court had juris-
diction 'to entertain. the -proceeding authorized by Section 
5259 of- the Virginia Code. It was regarded as very important 
from a· practicle" standpoint that the contest, if there should 
be a contest, be had in Princess Anne County where prac-
tically all the witnesses resided, where Mrs. Hayes was liv-
ing and owned property, and it was determined if possible to 
remove the case from the federal jurisdiction. 
The question presented there was a difficult question of 
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federal procedure and the federal decisions on the question 
were confusing. The principle of law applicable was that 
if the proceeding· in question was a purely probate matter, 
then the federal courts would refuse jurisdiction, but that 
if under the state practice, or under the state statute, the 
validity of the will could be thrown into question in what was 
designated as a suit inteparties, then the federal courts 
would take jurisdiction. 
The question presented, accordingly, was whether or not 
the proceeding under Section 5259 was a suit ititerparties. 
That question was thoroughly investigated, and as the re-
sult of this investigation I drew a motion to dismiss the bill 
on the ground that the proceeding in question was a probate 
proceeding and that the Federal Court had no jurisdiction to 
entertain it. 
page 142 ~ That question was argued at length before Judge 
vVay, who requested ea.ch side to file briefs with 
him. He took it under advisement for a matter of some five 
months before he did decide it, and when he did he filed a 
lengthy opinion in support of his conclusions. 
Q. Now, let me ask you there, what counsel represented 
the contestant in both of these proceeding·s in the Federal 
Court? 
A. In each proceeding the contestant was represented by 
l\fr. James E. Heath, and I think Mr. Smith Britting·ham, 
Jr., was still here and associated with him in that case. 
Q. Now, proceed with your answer. 
A. Judge Way, after considering the matter as he did, sus-
tained the motion to dismiss the bill on the gTound that he 
lacked jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding. 
Q. Was any appeal taken by the contestant from that de-
cision of Judge ""\Vayf 
A. From that decision the contestant appealed to. the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. They got their 
appeal,, as they were entitled as a matter of right to have, 
and briefs were prepared in that court, and the case was 
arg'Ued. 
I mig·ht state that before the case could be reached on the 
docket of the Circuit Court of Appeals, that a third will 
contest, which will be afterwards ref erred to, was 
pag·e 143 ~ instituted in the Circuit Court of Princess Anne 
· County and had b~en dismissed on special pleas. 
As the result of that, a motion to dismiss the appeal in 
the Circuit Court of Appeals .was made and a brief filed in 
support of that motion. 
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Q. What was the outcome of the -Circuit Court of Appeals' 
decision? Was Judge Way's opinion affirmed or reversed? 
A. The Circuit -Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Way's 
opinion. The matter was argued before them in due course, 
and a month later it affirmed the decision of the lower court. 
Q. Did the contestants abandon that particular suit, or 
did they carry it further on 1 
A. The contestants filed an application or a petition with 
the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of cer-
tiorari from the Circuit Court of Appeals in that matter. A 
brief in opposition to the granting of the petition was pre-
pared by me and filed with the Supreme Court of the United 
States, and in due course the petition was refused. 
Q. In the meantime the other suit in the Federal Court at 
Norfolk, namely, the suit that was brought by Mrs. -Guilfoil 
as administratrix of William R. Hayes, deceased, against 
Mrs. Hayes, was still pending in this district here f 
A. That was still pending. I made no effort to bring that 
to issue because there were certain dang·erous 
page 144 ~ questions connected with it that I did not want 
to have to meet unless I had to. _ 
Q. All right. Now, we have two cases in the Federal Court, 
one of which has been finally disposed of by writ of certiorari 
and the other depending· in the District Court at Norfolk. 
Were there any other proceedings taken by the contestants 
in the state courts 1 
A. F·ollowing· the second case in the United States Dis-
tric.t Court, and apparently in order to come within the time 
limit within which contests of this nature have to be :filed, a 
third will contest was instituted in - the Circuit .Court of 
Princess Anne County, Virginia. This time the bill asked 
for an issue of devisavit i·el non. The former proceeding had 
taken the form of a.n appeal from the. Clerk's ex parte order 
admitting the will to probate. Tliat bill was filed, and after 
that bill' two special pleas were filed. 
Q. ·was Mr. Heath still representing the contestants? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you representing Mrs. Hayes? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. For the sake of tl1e record, let me ask you if in all of 
this litigation and in all matters _pertaining to the estate of 
the late William R. Hayes you were assisted by any other 
counsel, or was your representation by yourself 
page 145 ~ alone? 
A. I was not assisted by any other counsel, al-
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though :M:rs. Hayes . from time to time asked my opinion as 
to whether or not, in vjew of the combinati9n I was opposing, 
it would not be ~advisable for .1.ne ::- to associate other counsel, 
and I told her r:felt I GQuld: safely assume the responsibility, 
and I did so. : 
. Q. ~y ·_q~es.ti?n w~s. _pased 9n the litigation in the original 
court m V1rgm1a t· . · . ·· · 
_.. A. That is. right . 
Q. Now, ·we have the ~hancery-suit asking an issue devisavit 
vel non, that. was instituted in the Circuit C~mrt of Princess 
Anne County, Virginia t . . · 
. · A.· That was the last one . 
.. Q. I think your answer went to ti1e point where two s:pecial 
pie~s haq. been .filed; ,,rill you state what th~se two special 
pleas were Y. · · · . . . · 
.A. Subsequent to the date that the will was admitted to 
probate-· by. th~ Clerk of ~he Circuit Court of Princess Anne 
County, but prior to the institu_tion of this last contest, the 
-Legislature of Virginia had,:changed the time within which 
_such an appeal could be filed from two years to one ye~r. 
'In my view the new limitation applied to a. suit of this char-
acter by reason of the fact that it w~s a statutory proceed-
ing·, limited by the statute as to the time-withil,'\ which it coul~ 
. . be brought. , . · ·. . · · 
page 146 ~ Q .. _Refen-ing to·:both the right and the remedyr 
A. Yes. I accordingly filed one plea based on, 
the ground that the snit had been barred by limitation. Ii 
filed a second plea based on the ground that the decedent 
died domiciled-in the State of Virginia, tl1at he left nothing 
bµt. personal property, that he left no issu~ of any other 
marriag·e, and. that in the event of _his death intestate his 
wip.ow would inherit his entire personal estate, and · accord-
ingly the contestants were without .interest to. maintain the 
suit. . Q. Did the case come on to hearing on those pleas Y 
A._ A motion was mad~ as to each plea to. reject and as · 
being illegal and insufficient. The motion was sustained by 
the ,Princess Anne Court :with · resp~ct to .the :qrst- plea 3:nd 
overruled as to the second plea-the question. of interest .. 
Q. With reference- to the ·first piea, the question of domi-
cile, was it necessary to take evidence and prepare for that 
hearing and to have affidavits 1 . 
A. Issue was taken on the plea,. and it was necessary to ex-:. · 
amine and obtain witnesses who could testify as to ,the facts 
relating to . the change of .. domicile. -As I ·1:i~ve previou'sly 
... 
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stated, the presumption was that the domicile continued in 
New York, and the burden was on me to establish a changed 
domicile. 
page 147 ~ Witnesses were collected and subpoenaed and 
brought before the Court at Princess Anne. The 
evidence was taken on one day, subsequently written up, and 
on a later day the question whether or not there had been a 
change of domicile was argued before Judge White of that 
court. 
Q. Tl1at was without the use of a jury! 
A. That is correct. Judge ·white decided the change of 
domicile had been proved, sustained the plea and dismissed 
the suit. 
From that decision the eontestants applied to the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia for an appeal. In that con-
·nec.tion, they filed a brief in support of their application, and 
I filed a brief in opposition to it. The appeal was neverthe-
less granted. It was necessary to prepare a brief for the 
Supreme Court of Appeals. The question was argued in 
due course. In January, 1938, the Supreme Coµrt of Appeals 
of Virginia. affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court of 
Princess Anne County, so that the contest was dismissed. 
Q. Then you had, so far as one proceeding in the Federal 
Court was concerned, a final decision by the denial of the 
certiorari, and you had, so far as the contest in the state 
court was concerned, a final decision by the decision of the 
Supreme -Court of Appeals of Virginia? · 
A. That is correct. 
page 148 ~ Q. Tha.t left still pending the other proceeding 
in the Federal Court which was broug·ht by Mrs. 
Guilfoil as administratrix of William R. Hayes, deceased, 
against Mrs. Hayes 1 
A. That is correct. 
Q. What happened to that? 
A. Feeling safe at that point in proceeding with the case 
still automatically pending, I notified Mr. Heath that I would 
apply to the District Court to have the case set down on the 
merits and heard. After consultation with his principals 
and his associate counsel, Mr. Heath concluded that he would 
not pursue that case further since the decision in the other 
cases had rendered the question more or less a moot one. 
He, therefore, consented to dismiss the case on the motion of 
the plaintiff, and that was done. 
Q. All rig·ht. In this litigation, as I recall your answers, 
and you will correct me if I am wrong, begun in June, 1934, 
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it was practically concluded in January, 1938, except for the 
arrangement for the dismissal of the other suit in the Fed-
eral Court, which was subsequent thereto; is that correct f 
A. That is correct. 
Q. A period of nearly four years. Now, during that time, 
while these various suits and appeals and leg·al matters were 
pending· in the various courts, as just detailed in· your evi-
dence, did you, or not, have frequent conferences 
page 149 ~ with your client? 
.... \. If I can interrupt you, or rather make a 
suggestion at this time, there is one litigated matter whic.h 
has not been adverted to, and which was started in 1934. 
Q. Are you speaking of the New York matted 
A. Yes. 
Q. I was coming to that. 
Note : The question was read : ''Now, during that time, 
while these various suits and appeals and legal matters were 
pending in the various courts, as just detailed in your evi-
dence, did you, or not, have frequent conferences with your 
client Y '' 
A. I did. 
Q. About how frequently, "Mr. Parked Let u.s know 
whether or not you were merely given your head to do as 
you pleas~d, or whether every step and every proceeding 
was explamed to your client? 
A. I kept no exact record of the number of conferences I 
had with Mrs. Hayes, but I am safe in saying that they were 
almost innumerable. 
Mrs. Hayes wanted. to have explained to her everything 
that was done; she wanted to have explained to her the ques-
tions of law that were involved; she wanted to be kept ad-
Yised of everything that happened; she wanted to be present 
at every proceeding that was ta.ken regardless of its nature, 
whether motion, argument before the ·Court of 
page 150 ~ Appeals, or whatnot. In addition to the numer-
ous conferenoos having to do with litigated mat-
ters, there were a large number of conferences in which the 
general administration of the estate affairs were concerned 
and various business connected with it. 
Q. I was confining myself to the present simply to liti-
gated matters, and I wanted t9 :find. out whether or n_ot in 
t.hese matters which appear to have been largely of a legal 
character you were given your head, as I expressed it, or 
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whether everything was subject to the approval of your clieni: 
and everything had to be explained? 
.A.. Everything I did had to be explained in detail to Mrs. 
Hayes. I was frequently ,criticized for my methods in_ han-
dling certain of these matters. I had to justify myself at 
considerable length. I recall one circumstance in particular, 
following the argument before the .Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia, in which Mrs. Hayes produced a document 
of some length in which she had listed numerous faults and 
deficiencies of that argument. I recall that conference lasted 
several hours. The fact I was winning these points seemed 
to make very little impression on her. 
Q. Do I understand from your answer that not only were 
you obliged to explain in detail every step you took but you 
were criticized for the steps you did take and experienced 
opposition from your client t 
page 151 ~ .A.. That is true. 
Q. Now, :M:r. Parker, in the legal steps you have 
taken it seems you were successful throughout without ever 
getting to a jury trial? 
A. That is right. . 
Q. Will you state whether or not Mrs. Hayes wanted these 
matters settled without a :jury trial if she could avoid iU 
A. She was naturally very reluctant to have that, and 
in that respect I was entirely in accord with her. 
Q. Was the nature and character of this case such that 
it would have and did, for that matter, have considerable 
newspaper publicity? 
A. It did receive a great deal of publicity. In each case 
when, there was a public hearing the local newspapers were 
filled with lengthy articles on the subject, and not only did 
it appear in local papers, but was carried over the Associated 
Press through papers all over the country. 
Q. And if all the matters which were simply alluded to 
in the papers had been ventilated by trial, would that pub-
licity ha.ve been accentuatedf 
A. It ,vou1d have been a:ccentuated. 
:Mr. Lanning: I don't know whether he knows about that. 
Mr. l\faupin: He can give his opinion as a man 
page 152 ~ who was thoroughly conversant with all the cir-
cumstances of the case. You can argue that he 
doesn't kno,v what he is talking about. 
Witness : On a number of occasions I was approached by 
newspaper representatives for additional details with respect 
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to the case, ·which I refused to give other than those which 
had become public. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Were you requested by your client to avoid publicity 
and to keep her association with and marriage to Father 
Hayes out of the newspapers! 
A. Not only is that a fact, but she consulted me on numer-
ous occasions to know whether she could take legal proceed-
ings against the newspapers for what they did publish, and 
I advised her against it. 
Q. So mucl1 as t.o the proceedings which originated in the 
courts in Virginia. 
Had the Rev. Mr. Hayes, during· his lifetime, _owned any 
real estate in the State of New York? 
A. In 1933 he owned certain property in the City of New-
burgh, New Y ork,-real estate. That was a lot improved 
with a dwelling house, in which he had lived at one time, and 
which, in the summer of 1933, he had converted into an apart-
ment house. 
In October, 1933, which w·as the occasion that 
pag·e 153 ~ I first saw him, he requested me to prepare a deed 
conveying that property from himself to his wife. 
I explained to him that I had no expert knowledge of the laws 
of New York relating to real estate, but he said that he 
would supply me with the deed conveying the property to 
him, and if I would make a deed conforming· to that it would 
be satisfactory to him. So I proceeded to carry out his in-
structions. 
vVhen the deed had been executed he asked me if that deed 
had to be recorded. I told him not unless he wanted to, that 
the only effect of recording it would be to protect his wife 
against creditors or subsequent purchasers. He said there 
was nothing to that. So I had him, in my presence, deliver 
the deed to_ Mrs. Hayes, and she in turn deposited the deed 
in the safe deposit box wl1ich she had common access to with 
him. 
Q. Was that deed recorded after the dea.th of the Rev. 
1\1:r. Hayes? 
A. After the dismissal of the first will contest in Princess 
Anne, in July, 1934, I forwarded this deed to Mr. A. W. 
Bennett, at Newburgh, and requested him to record it in 
tl1e appropriate court in Orange County. . 
Q. Subsequent to the admitting of tl1at deed to record were 
any proc~edings had in the courts of the State of .New York 
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with reference to the validity of that deed and an effort to 
set it aside f 
.A. Shortly after the deed had been admitted 
page 154 r to record a suit was instituted in the Circuit 
Court of Orange County to set this deed aside,· 
the allegations being very similar to those set forth in the 
grounds of contest of the will ~led in the probate proceeding 
here. I determined if I could to reiµove the case from Orange 
County, where I knew local. prejudice would play a consid-
erable part in any decision which might be arrived at, and I 
accordingly took steps and prepared the papers and for-
warded them to Mr. Beru1ett to effect the removal of the case 
from Orange County to the United States District Court for 
the Southem District of New York. In · that we were suc-
cessful ; the removal was duly accomplished. 
Q. "\¥hose idea. was it to remove that case from the state 
court to the federal court? ,vaR it vours or Mr. Bennett's! 
A. It w::is entirely my idea, and when I stated to Mr. Ben-
nett my desire to effect the removal, he wrote me. with a cita-
tion of authorities, tlmt it could not be done. 
Q. Well, it was done. What became of the matted 
A. The case having been removed to the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, the United States .Court for that district, 
it was carried over to the City of New York. Mr. Bennett 
felt that he could not safelv watch the case there and stated 
that he felt it e
0
ssential to associate counsel prac-
page 155 ~ ticing in the City of New York. Accordingly, the 
firm of Hunt, Hill & Betts, at Mr. Bennett's sug-
gestion, was associated in the defense of that case. That 
case remained on the calendar there for some considerabfo 
period of time before it was reached. 
· ,vhen it was reached it became apparent that the contestants 
were very reluctant to try that case. The reason for that I 
do not know except for the fact tllat they did not care to try 
it in the City of New York. 
When the case was finally reached, I arranged for the 
taking of depositions of sundry witnesses here; the deposi-
tions were taken and forwarded to the District Court. and 
I notified m.v New York associates that I would insist· on a 
trial. The contest.ants endeavored to have us stipulate that 
the result of the caso might be determined by the result of 
the Virginia litigation. I refused to consent to that, and 
insisted on a stipulation tl1at we would continue the case 
provided that in the event we won the litigation in Virgfoia 
we should be entitled to a decree on the merits, adjudging· 
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the deed valid in the New York proceeding, and in case we 
lost the Virginia litigation tliat it would be without prejudic~e 
to our right to def end the New York suit. 
Q. Upon the successful outcome of the Virginia litigation, 
the New York suit was dismissed, I take iU 
A. That stipulation was consented to by Mrs. 
page 156 ~ Guilfoil and signed by her counsel, and it waa 
approved by the Judge of the District Court for 
the Southern District of New York and entered of record. 
When the litigation was ended here, I forwarded the vari-
ous mandates to the New York counsel, and, upon its being 
accepted, to the District Court in New .York, and decree was 
entered adjudging the deed to be valid. That ended the 
New York litigation. 
Q. That real estate is now vested in Adelaide :M. Grady? · 
A. By virtue of the deed, from the decision in October .. 
1933. 
Q. At one point in your testimony you spoke of a lot which 
had been acquired by the decedent sometime prior to his 
death, at Virginia Beach, upon which he had contracted to 
have erected a dwelling house; will you amplify that state· 
ment and tell us what happened with regard to that and what 
your duties in connection with that were? 
A. In the early part of 1934, and it may have been the lat-
ter part of 1933, the decedent had obtained the consent of 
his wife to build this dwelling at Virginia Beach. He pur-
chased a lot at Cavalier Shores, at Virginia Beach, the pur-
chase price of which, ns I recall, was $3,000. 
Title to this lot was taken in the name of his wife, and he 
paid on account of the purchase price $1,500 in 
page 157 ~ cash, and the remainder of the purchase price was 
· evidenced bv notes secured by deed of trust. 
In the early part of °1934 he entered into a contract with 
Conrad Brothers, who are engaged in the building and con-
struction _business in the City of N orfo1k, for the erection 
of a dwelling house on this lot. The contract price was 
some $11,000, as I recall it. 
·work had been started on this house when he left for New 
York in the early part of 1934. He clied before he returned. 
as I previously stated. A.t his death the construction was 
·actively proceeding. 
Q. Then tl1e lot, I think you said, l1ad been taken in the 
name of Mrs. Hayes, and the contract for the erection of a 
l1ouse thereon had been executed bv the decedenU 
A. And Mrs. Hayes. They both' executed the contract .. 
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Q. Then he died and the contest over his will was insti-
tuted? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you have any duties to perform in connection with 
the completion of tha.t house or what the legal situation wat> 
of Mrs. Hayes with regard to iU 
A. I had to determine first whether or not the house could 
be paid for by the executrix, and credit al.lowed her for it. 
A serious question arose there as to whether or not that 
was a gift or a completed gift. He had con-
page 158 ~ tracted with the contractor to build the house, and 
his wife was also party to the contract, and noth-
ing had been paid to the contractor at the time of his death. 
I investigated that question, and came to the conclusion that 
the house could be safely completed and the executrh: al-
lowed to finish it for the indebtedness thereby inc.urred with 
the contractor. ' 
The second question presented was whet.her or not we could 
safely stop construction of the house in order to save money. 
That was concluded to be impracticable by reason of the 
fact that the construction had proceeded to some very sub-
stantial expense, and in addition if we refused to carry it out 
we were confronted by a suit for breach of contract by the 
contractor. It wa.~ therefore concluded to continue with the 
construction, and in that connection it was necessary for me 
to superintend as best I could the work of the contractor. I 
inspected tlle work from time to time and conferred with him 
on numerous occasions as to the details of construction. 
Q. ·was there any supervising architect? . 
A. There was no supervising architect at all. At the con-
clusion of the work I retained Mr. Wicklmm Taylor to make 
a general inspection of the house and determine as best h.e 
could whether there were any apparent defects in the con·-
struction. He reported to me that. the work had 
pag-e 159 ~ been apparently done in acc.ord~nce with the 
tem1S of the contract. 
Q. Did you state what the purchase price of that lot was V 
A. $3,000. 
Q. And how much was the contra et pric.e of the house? 
A. The contract pric~ of the house was approximately 
$11,000. 
Q. It involved n transaction in which th() estate was in-
volved, or might have heen involved, to the extent of $14,-
000? . 
. A. That is correct. 
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Q. No~,_ -you stateq. in the early part of your testimony 
that at the time of the qualifi~ation of Mrs. Hayes on her 
husband's estate, as executrLx under the will, which was pro-
_ bated in the Circuit. Court of Princess Anne ,County, a bond 
of $50,000 was required of her. Surety on that bond wa::; 
given, was it not? 
A. That was giv~n, with the National Surety Company as 
surety. 
Q. A.nd Mrs. Hayes was the l)rincipal t 
A. Yes. 
Q. What developed in regard to that bond after the al-
most endless litigation which you testified to was instituted! 
A.. Shortly after the institution of the contest, 
page 160 ~ I was called to the office of lVfr. Walton Taylor, 
who was local counsel for the National Surety 
Company, and there met Mr. Taylor Johnson, who is local 
agent for that corporation, and Mr. Bilbrey, who, at that tirne, 
was the general attorney for the National Surety Corpora-
tion. They informed me that representations had been made 
to their head office in New York that the ·will under which 
Mrs. Hayes had qualified as executrix was invalid, that no 
lawful martiage had occurred between herself and the dece-
dent, that she was wasting the assets of the estate, that the 
contest which Mrs. Guilfoil had instituted would be success-
. ful, with the result that the National Surety .Company would 
be let in for a heavy loss as surety.. They stated that it was 
their intention to take appropriate steps to be relieved as 
surety on this bond, as they had a legal right to do. 
The only thing I could do then was to seek tq persuade 
them, by g·oing fully into the case and all the facts and cir-
cumstances connected with it from the leg·al angles involved, 
to continue as surety. I realized that with a contest pend-
ing it would be impossible to obtain a new surety who would 
be accepted by the colll't in this large amount; that, in that 
event, the estate would in all likelihood be committed to a 
curator; that Mrs. Hayes' freedom of action in dealing with 
the affairs of the estate would be g·one; that there would 
be no way in which her living expenses could be 
page 161 ~ provided, nor the expenses of the litigation with 
which she was confronted; that the result. would 
be paralysis so far as she was concerned, and a compromise 
011 the best terms that she could make with these contest.ants, 
who evidently determined to pursue this matter to the bitter 
end. 
I had a number of conferences following that with Mr. 
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Bilbrey, and I agreed that I would assume a lot of respon-
sibility with this executrix for whatever she did, and signed 
an agreement to this effect with the National Surety Com-
pany. 
Q. You mean you assumed personal liability¥ 
A. I assumed full personal liability for any default that 
the executrix might be guilty of whereby the National Surety 
Corporation, as Sl!rety, became liable. 
Q. Have you that agreement? 
A. I have a copy of it. (Witness looks through file.) That 
apparently was left in one of the other files, but I will pro-
duce it. ' 
Q. Did that agreement remain in effect until after all of 
this litigation had been terminated? 
A. That agreement remained in effect, and still remains 
in effect. I also agTeed to keep Mr. Bilbrey fully advised of 
every development in the case, of all questions that arose, 
whether of fact or of law, and that I did. I maintained a 
continuous correspondence with him and saw him on several 
occasions throughout the litigation. 
page 162 ~ Q. N o,Y, as to the joint control, what, if any-
thing, was done with the executorial bank ac-
count 1 How were the checks on that account to be honored 
after the execution of this agTeement? 
A. I think that they required me to countersign checks. I 
had executed tlw agreement in question, and they required 
me to assume joint control of the safe deposit box; the bank 
account was maintained in the National Bank of Commerce 
of Norfolk, in the name of Adelaide l\f. Hayes, as executrix 
of ·william R. Hayes, with the understanding that no check 
would be honored un]ess countersigned by me. All the se-
curities were deposited in a safe deposit box in the National 
Bank of Commerce jn the joint name of Mrs. Hayes, as e.xecn-
trix, and myself, a.s attorney, with the requirement that 
neither could enter the box without the presence of the other. 
I have a copy of the agTeement with the bank. 
Note: Paper is handed to Mr. Lanning. 
Mr. Lanning: Was there also an ag;reement with the surety 
company with respect to signing· cliecks f 
Witness: The surety company required me at the outset 
to sign all checks and hand]e the safe deposit box jn that 
way, but the agreement to make us jointly liable was not 
made until a ·later date, and was made as the resul~ 
128 Supreme Court. of Appeals of Virginia 
William, L. Parker. 
. Mr. Lanning: Is that agreement with the 
page 163 ~ surety company in w~·iting Y 
Witness: That is the agreement I told you I 
would produce. It is fo writing. · 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. vVas there any motive for you to enter into this agree-
ment with the surety company whereby you assumed joint 
responsibility and liability for any waste or default on the 
part of the executrix except for the protection of the estate f 
If so, what was it? 
A. There was not anv other motive I had. I realized un-
less we had full control that our ability to fight this determined 
contest was lessened, and that we would be unable to con-
tinue to fig·ht the then contestants without making that agree: 
ment. 
Q. With respect to the personal estate which came into 
the hands of Mrs. Hayes, as executrix, at the time of her 
qualification, was there any part of that personal estate 
represented by certificates or shares of common stock in vari-
ous corporations? 
A. Yes, quite a considerable part was represented by such 
certificates. · I ~ t 
Q. Were those certificates in the name of William R. Hayes? 
A. They were in the name of William R. Hayes. 
Q. "Where were the transfer offices of these cor-
page 164 ~ porations located? 
. · A. In the Citv of New .York. 
Q. vVhat, if anything, was done, and by whom, regarding· 
the forestalling of any attempt to put the transfer office on 
record that there should be no transfer of these stocks to 
the name of the executrix or to the name of the beneficiary in 
the will? 
A. When J\fr. Heath announced he took the non-suit in 
the first will case in Princess Anne, on July 19, 1934, that 
they had concluded that the Virginia courts were without 
jurisdiction to administer this estate, he further announced 
that it was their intention to transfer all proceedings in con-
nection with the estate to the State of New York. 
I realized that there waR a possibility, a f;trong possibility, 
that efforts mip;ht be made on their part to seize these se-
curities by legal process ag·a.inst the transfer offices. I then 
determined, as soon as I possibly could, to effect a transfer 
of these securities. I soon learned that by attempting· to 
transfer them in any other manner than an outright sale 
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that my difficulties wo1dd be increased, and I further realized 
that if I transferred them to her, as executrix, that they would 
be just as readily reached by any personal representative who 
might be appointed in the State of New York. 
page 165 J I accordingly instructed the firm of brokers 
having a local office here in Norfolk to sell the 
stock, and for the next thirty days or more I was engaged 
in supplying necessary affidavits, conducting the necessary 
correspondence, giving the necessary assurances to obtain 
the transfers of these certificates. That was a somewhat 
troublesome matter in the case of anv decedent and it was 
-considerably complicated in this instance by reason of the 
fact that the decedent had domiciled in the State of New 
York shortly prior .to his death and that he had, in fact; 
executed a deed conveying the Newburgh property to. his 
wife, in which he referred to himself as a resident of the 
State of New York. 
In the course of time these matters were finally ironed out 
and the transfer effected, the cash received and deposited to 
the account of Mrs. Haves as executrix. 
Sometime after that," or at least shortly after that had 
been completed, Mrs. Guilfoil had been appointed adminis-
tratrix in the State of New York, and I remarked to Mr. 
Heath that I anticipated some trouble in connection with the 
stock and had devoted a great deal of time immediately after 
this announcement ... to effecting the transfer, fearing some 
effort would be made to reach the securities-
1\Ir. Lanning: I object to that. 
Mr. Maupin: We will follow it up with Mr. Heath's testi-
mony. 
page 166 ~ Witness: (Continuing): Mr. Heath informed 
. me that immediately after the qualification of the 
administratrix in New York they had attempted that but had 
found that they were too late. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Suppose you had invested the money realized from the 
sale of these securities in other securities and had taken 
those other securities in the name of Adelaide M. Hayes, 
Executrix of William R. Hayes, deceased, would you have 
been subject to the same dangers that you were when the 
stocks were originally in the possession of William R. Hayes! 
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Mr. Lanning: I do not think he can speculate as to that. 
Mr. Maupin: He is not speculating but is testifying as an 
expert. 
A. Undonbtedlv his stocks would I1ave been listed in the 
name of Adelaide M. Hayes, Executrix of William R. Hayes .. 
deceased, and in attempting to reach these securities belong~ 
ing to the estate of ·wmiam R. Hayes, if successful, would 
have been just as successful in either case, whether they re-
mained in his name or in the name of the executrix. 
Mr. Lanning·: Yon do not know that that would happen? 
Witness: I assume it would. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Whatever the outcome, there would have 
page 167 ~. been fresh litigation which would have been ln-
stituted in the State of New York~ 
Mr. Lanning: He cloesn 't know that. 
By Mr. Maupin : 
Q. Yon anticipated it as careful counsel of interests en-
trusted to yon¥ 
A. Yes, and the reason was explained to Mrs. Hayes. 
Q. '\Vhat was done with the moneys realized from theso 
securities? Were any other securities boughU 
A. A number of common stocks were bought with the sm-
plus funds of the estate and the certificates were taken iu 
what are known as street names. That means that the cer-
tificates were in the names of brokers, members of the New 
York Stock Exchange, endorsed by them in blank, and their 
signature guaranteed by some New York bank. Such cer-
tificates are dealt with bv brokers in their settlements and 
passed from hand to hand ·just as bearer securities are passed. 
The securities stayed in that condition for some period of 
time. 
A. A great deal of difficulty was experienced in collect-
ing dividends because the stocks were split up in various 
lots and the dividends would go to the various brokers, and 
had to be recovered. 
In addition to that, I wag informed by the broker that I 
had been dealing· with in Norfolk that it was 
page 168 ~ contrary to the rules of the Exchange to permit 
·. these securities to be held by individuals and 
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listed in street names. He accordingly said that some ar-
rangement had to be made whereby the securities were trans-
ferred to some other name. That matter was discussed with 
Mrs. Hayes fully, the reasons given, and it was ag-reed that 
the certificates should be taken in my name and deposited 
in this box to which we had foint access. 
Q. Those certificates that finally were transferred to your 
name, do you now or have you ever claimed that those cer-
tificates are not property of the estate of William R. Hayes 1 
A. I do not. 
Q. Have you ever contended that you had any ownership 
in them at all 7 
A. I have not. 
Q. Was Mrs. Hayes fully cognizant of the reason why 
this course of procedure that you have outlined was taken? 
A. Certainly. 
Q. vVas it done with her full consent¥ 
.A. Absolutely. 
Q. Vt as there any other motive for taking the stock m 
your name except the protection of the estatef 
A. None wl1atsoever. 
Q. Where are those securities now f 
page 169 ~ A. They arc now in the lock box in the National 
Bank of Commerce of Norfolk, referred to previ-
ously in my testimony. 
Q. Now, was there at any time any litigation instituted 
against Mrs. Hayes, as the executrix of her husband's es-
tate, by any creditor, or alleged creditor, of that estate? 
.A . .A Dr. Samuel Johnson, of the City of New York, who 
performed the operation which finally resulted in the dece-
dent's death, asserted a claim for $2,000 for his services. 
Two associates of his, Dr. Corwin and Dr. Richie sent in 
small bills I think aggregating· about $150. Mrs. Hayes re-
fused to pay any part of these bil1s at all. Dr. ~Johnson and 
his _associates had testified at considerable length and with 
considerable force as to the lack of mental capacity of the 
decedent during the time that he was under their ca re, and 
Mrs. Hayes resented it very strongly. She further felt that 
Dr. Johnson had been negligent in performing the operation 
and that his negligence was largely responsible for the de'" 
cedent's death, and she ac<'ordingly refused to pay it. 
I received various communications from Dr. ,Johnson and 
subsequently from a lawy~r that he had employed, and told 
him tl1at the executrix refused to pay the account.. He did 
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· nothing until the litigation had been completed, 
page 170 ~ in the early part of 1938. At that time his claim 
was forwarded to a Norfolk attorney, Mr. W. 
M. Phipps, who instituted suit against Mrs. Hayes for $2,000 
with four years interest, in Princess Anne County. The suit 
was instituted ag·ainst her as executrix. 
I prepared and argued several motions in connection with 
this lit.iga.tion. I asked for a bill of particulars, which I got. 
I asked that the plaintiff be required to give security for the 
costs. I think Judge "\Vhite overruled it. There were several 
other minor motions in connection with it. I went to New 
York City and attended the taking of depositions on behalf 
of Dr. Johnson, and cross-examined him and other witnesses 
that he produced. 
Mrs. Hayes was extremely anxious· to compromise this liti-
gation, and I a·g, .. eed with her that it should be compromised 
if it could be. The total claim amounted to $2,400, and em-
braced two major operations, one for a cancer of the mouth 
and the other resulting· from hemorrhage, requiring the tying· 
up of one of the principal arteries. On m.y return, or shortly 
before the case was to be tried, this litigation was settled 011 
the payment of $1,500. 
Q. Now, was there any other service that you performed 
in connection with litigated matters for the estate of ·wmiam 
R. Hayes, or for Mrs. Hayes, the sole beneficiary of that es-
tate! I am speaking now of litigated matters. 
page 171 ~ .A. No. T]1at covers the litigated matters. 
Q. Now, Mr. Parker, did you, during the pe-
riod of time that you were employed by Mrs. Hayes, namely, 
from sometime in May, 1934, until sometime in July, 1938, per-
form other services for the estate and for Mrs. Haves which 
were not in connection with matters of litigation? That is to 
say, any matters of aclvic<1 or matters of handling details of 
the est.ate, or any matters of that sort? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Now, will you please detail to the Commissioner w~at 
those matters were, what you did, and what the result of 
your service was? 
A. I have referred to the duties which I have performed 
with respect to having the wiH admitted to probate before 
any litigation arose over the validity of the will. I think 
I have covered that fullv. 
In addition to that, ,,Thile Mrs. Hayes was the executrix 
of the estate, all of the actual work, other than keeping a 
record of receipts and disbursements, was done by me. Every 
Adelaide M. Hayes, et al., y. William L. Parker. 133 
Jl'illia.m L. Pa:rker. 
detail connected with the duties of the executrix, it was neces-
sary for me to help. Those duties were numerous and prin-
cipally concerned with details of administration. In an es-
tate of thiR size they were quite numerous. There were -vari-
ous claims asserted against the estate, such as the under-
taker's bill, which both Mrs. Hayes and I re-
page 172 } garded as somewhat large. As I rec.all, it was 
some $1,400 or $1,500. That was a subject of 
negotiation and was finally paid. 
There was a claim of some rental agent, amounting to sev-
eral hundred dollars, for negotiating leases on the apart-
ment house which l1ad been owned bv the decedent at New-
burgh. "' · 
There were minor claims of various sorts as well as the 
actual details of handling the securities of the estate. 
I mig·ht state that all of those matters, including the liti-
gated matters as to which I have testified, were outlined in 
the Rtatement which I rendered to Mrs. Hayes, a copy of 
which I eventually intend to file with my testimony, which 
will go into more detail than I can recollect at this time as 
to these various matters. 
Q. One item of the estate, as I recall, was a number of 
mortgage bonds · which were guaranteed by Straus & Co.; 
will you state what the situation was with regard to any 
such bonds as came into the possession of Mrs. Hayes, as 
.executrix, and what service it was necessary for you to per-
form in connection with these securities and which vou did 
perform in connection with the same 1 • 
A. Among the assets of the deceased were mortgage bonds, 
issued by S. W. Straus & Company, wllich finally went into 
bankruptcy, aggregating par value of approximately $88,500. 
They were divided into ten or twelve different 
page 173 ~ issues. In almost every instance the issue was a 
very large one, and the bonds of that particu-
lar issue held by the estate were not large as compared to the 
total bond issue involved. In every instance, the concerns 
which had issued these bonds were in financial difficulties. 
They were principally secured by mortp;age on New York 
real estate, the buildings had been constructed during the 
boom period, and following the depression year, 1929, had 
had their income substantially cmtailed, so that they were 
unable to promptly meet their oblip:ations. Bondholder com. 
mittees in most cases were being formed, at the outset mostly 
by people connected with Straus & Compan~r. These were 
succeeded by other bondholding committees, which took steps 
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in most instances to effect a reo;rganization of the property. 
These reorg·anizations took various forms. In some cases 
Section. 7f-~-of the Bankrupt Act was resorted t9 for the pur-
pose of making reinvestment of the capital structure of these 
companies. In many cases new corporations were form~d 
and the property boug·ht in by the new company for the benefit 
of the bondholders. In some cases the reorganization oc-
curred under the Burchill Law of the State of New York, 
which provided for reorganization somewhat similar to 77-B, 
but in each of these instances plans of reorganization were 
prepared. I informed myself as well as I could of the status 
of the various proceedings, examined them to see whether 
or not there was any possibility of any advantage 
page 17 4. ~ being· taken of the smaller bondholders, whether 
or not the people in charge of these various or-
ganizations were reliable people and could be trusted to pro-
tect the interests of the individual bondholders, and in most 
instances I deposited the bonds with the bondholding com-
mittees and received their certificates. I g·ot copies of the 
various plans where I could and followed the proceeding as 
best I could and arranged so I was notified of steps being 
taken in these proceeding·s. 
In some few instances f oreelosures occurred, and there 
was practically no recovery, but in most instances these prop-
erties have, since the death of the decedent and during th_e 
course of my en1ployment, been reorganized and new securi-
ties obtained. In some instances the par amount of the se-
curities were cut in half, and in lien of the principal loss 
stock certificates have bel?n received. 
In some instances the rate of interest on the new securities 
have been reduced as compared with the old ; in some in-
stances the return on the securities have been placed 011 an 
income basis-that is, if and when earned. 
These transactions are also detailed in the statement to 
which I referred, a copy of which has been furnished Mrs. 
Hayes. 
Q. Were there any tax matters in which the estate was 
involved, with regard to which yon performed any servic~ 
for the benefit of the estate f 
page 175 ~ .A. At the outset it was necessary to prepare 
the federal estate tax return-at least the pre-
liminary report which is required to be made in that case,-
and it was necessary, in order to properly prepare tliat, to 
have appraised the securities of the estate and to list them. 
That return was duly prepared. The bond return was ma.de. 
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In that connection an adjustment was necessary for the Ex-
aminer of the Collector of Internal Revenue. Some qu~s-
tions arose between us which were the subject of extended 
conferences, and we finally agreed on a settlement closing 
that. 
In addition, I had quite a bit of correspondence with re-
spect to income tax returns which the decedent apparently 
did not make for th~ year 1933, the year preceding· his death. 
That was explained to the Commissioner for the appropriate 
district in New York, as best we could, and apparently the 
matter has been settled so far as they are concerned. I have 
heard nothing from them for the last several years. 
In addition, for the period of four years during· which this 
estate was being administered, it was necessary to file fed-
eral income tax returns, and when the litigation was con-
cluded it was determined that the decedent had died domi-
ciled here in Virginia, and it was then neeessary to file the 
various state returns, such as the intangible property tax 
return, the tangible property tax return, the state income 
tax return for this period of four years. As I stated. that 
could not be done until it was determined that. 
pa.ge 176 ~ the decedent died domiciled here. Otherwise, he 
was not taxable on anything- except tangible per-
sonal property in the State of Virginia: and when that ques-
tion had been determined I prepared all these returns for 
the period involved and filed them with the appropriate au-
thorities. 
I think that covers the subject of tax return·s. 
Q. You testified a.tone point in your examination that from 
time to time you were subject to severe criticism from your 
client because of your methods of procedur~ and your de-
cision to take action along certain lines ; let me ask you if 
there was any criticism from your client of the results that 
you obtained for her in any particular, and, if so, what was 
it? 
A. Before I answer that, I want to add one thing to my an-
swer with respect to tax returns. 
Q. All right. 
A. There is one thing I overlooked. During this entire 
period, from time to time it was necessary for me to com-
municate by letter or to talk with the Supervisor of In.;. 
heritance Taxes for the State of Vindnia. I had explained 
to him the reason why it was impossible for me to make that 
return until it was determined the question of domicile here. 
I took up this with him and had all the figures necessary to 
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file the final return with him except the fee to which I was 
entitled and for which the estate would be entitled 
pag·e 177 ~ to a. reduc.tion. I was discharged from my em-
ployment before that question could. be deter-
mined and that return filed. 
Note: The last question was then read as follows: 
'' Q. You testified at one point in your examination that 
from time to time you were subject to severe criticism from 
your client because of your methods of procedure and yo_ur 
decision to . take action along. certain lines ; let me ask you 
if there was any criticism from your client of the results that 
you obtained for her in any particular, and, lf so, what was 
it?" 
A. There was no criticism as to results obtained because 
the results were all in her favor, but there was a considerable 
amount of criticism with respect to the methods by which 
those results were obtained. 
Q. Having· pursued the methods that you as a lawyer 
tboug·ht proper to be pursued, and having· obtained certain 
results, there was no criticism as to results? 
·A.No. 
Q. Nor dissatisfaction of any sort expressed as to re-
sults Y 
A. No. 
Q. Wben was this el olmson matter :finally concluded, do 
you recall, Mr. Parker? 
A·. I think in April, 1938. 
Q. Then, at that time, all litigated matters with 
page 178 ~ respect to the estate, both with respect to the 
question of testacy or intestac.y of the decedent 
and as to the qualification by :M:rs. Hayes and as to the fact 
that she was entitled to the entire estate of the decedent and 
as to any outstanding claim against the estate except your 
own fee, had been concluded? 
A. They had all been concluded. 
Q. Did ·you thereafter prese11t a bill to Mrs. Hayes for 
your services covering the matters which you have outlined 
in your testimony today? 
A. After that had once been completed, I began work, on 
compiling a statement of the services. It was almost im-
possible to keep in my mind exactly what I had done. Just 
as other lawyers practicing in this vicinity, or most of them, 
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I keep no book account with detail items of s~rvices, and it 
was necessary for me to go through these voluminous files and . 
reconstruct and reduce to written form exactly what I had 
done during the period of these four years. That took me 
approximately two month~ all together-not working con-
stantly, but working. off and on. 
Q. Let me interrupt you. Did you make any charge for 
· those two months time? 
A. Not at all. I simply said that for this reason, that 
from time to time Mrs. Hayes would ask me during the course 
of this litigation what t.he eventual charge to her would be. 
I invariably told her it would be impossible to 
page 179 } tell until the results of the litigation were known 
and until I could then review what I had done, 
because her affairs took up a considerable space in my files 
and, as I say, it took me a considerable time to reconstruct 
what I had done. 
Q. Having reconstructed it, have you put it in writtel) 
form? 
A. I have. 
Q. And did you make definite charg·es for the work as 
broken down and divided into the various types and forms 
and characters of services you have rendered Y 
A. I did. 
Q. And did you present that bill to her? 
A. I did. 
Q. Now, I show you here a paper which is headed ''State-
ment of services rendered by William L. Parker, Attorney. 
in the matter of the estate of William R. Hayes, deceased, 
beginning May 5, 1934, '' and ask you if that is a copy of the 
statement of your services and the charges made therefor 
w llich you rendered to Mrs. Hayes? 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Lanning-: I object to the bill being offered in evi-
dence as evidence of the services that he performed. I 
l1ave no objection to it being offered as a copy of the bill 
· that he rendered to Mrs. Haves. I think the wit-
page 180 ~ ness shou]d testify as to what be has done and 
what he has testified to already should be ac-
cepted as what. he has done. 
Mr. Maupin: I have not offered it in evidence. 
Mr. Lanning: I thought you had. 
Mr. Maupin: Counsel has not yet offered this paper in 
evidence. 
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By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Was- this paper prepared by yon f 
.A.. It was. 
Q. Is it a true and accurate statement of the services which 
you r~ndered as attorney in the matter of the estate of Wil-
liam R. Hayes, deceased, pursuant to your employment by 
Mrs. Hayes, his wife and executrix t 
A. It is. 
Q. Do the charges made in this statement and bill repre-· 
sent according to your contention the fair value of the serv-
ices you performed Y 
A. They do. 
Q~ And is this statement an accurate statement of what 
services were performed and the amount of compensation you 
claim for your services! 
A. It is. 
Mr. Maupin: I offer it in evidence. . 
Mr. Lanning: I object for tl1e same reasons . 
. Note : The paper referred to is filed marked 
pag·e 181 } "Exhibit No~ 1." 
By Mr. Maupin.: 
Q. Do you recall when, or approximatelv when, that state-
ment of services and bill tiierefor was presented to Mrs. 
Hayes? 
A. I tbink that statement was mailed to her _at "Virginia 
Beach the latter part of June, 1938. 
Q. Subsequent to that did you have any discussion with 
Mrs. Hayes about your services and tbe bill w11ich had been 
rendered to her for tliat sum? 
A.. Mrs. Hayes came to my office and stated that she ob-
jected to the amount wJiich I had clmrg-ed for my serviceR, 
and we discussed the matter at soine length. 
Q. Was there any conclusion reached? 
A. No agreement was reached. 
Q. Did she at that time make any claim that wl1at sl1e bad 
already paid you was full compensation for your services f 
A. Absolutely not. 
Q. Was the discussion, or not, limited to what additional 
compensation was fairly due yon f 
A. It was limited to that. 
Q. Did you, succeeding that discussion, receive a letter of 
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July 23, 1938, which you referred to at a previous point in 
your testimony 7 
A. I did. The discussion as I recall occurred 
page 182 r about the last of Juno or the first part of July be-
cause it was a matter of approximately a month 
before I received any reply, and I received that letter of 
July 23 in reply. 
Q. T)lat is signed Adelaide M. Hayes f 
A. It is. 
Mr. Maupin: I offer it in evidence. 
Note: This paper is filed marked "Exhibit No. 2", and 
was read by Mr. Maupin. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Now, the statement is made in the letter which has been 
filed as Exhibit No. 2 with vour testimonv and which I have 
just read aloud for the information o{ the Commissioner 
that your compensation was in no way contingent upon the 
final success; is that a correct statement of fact, or noU 
A. It is not correct. 
Q. Will you state why it is not accurate t-
A. For the reason that had this litigation been lost, Mrs. 
Hayes would have had no funds with whieh to pay me, ac-
cording to her statement. 
Q. That is according to her statement now? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If. she had any other funds, were you advised of the 
factY 
A. No, I was not. 
Q·. Did you understand that you bad to look to 
page 183 ~ the estate fo1· your compensation entirely? 
· A. Tba t was mv understanding-. 
Q. Now, she states furthe~· in this letter,--"Under all the 
circumsta.nces, I therefore withdraw the offer of settlement 
which I have heretofore made to you." According to her 
statement, she made an offer of settlement to you; what was 
that offerf 
Mr. Lanning: I object to that. 
1\fr. 1\faupin: ·why? 
1\fr. Lanning·: Any offer that was made in an effort of 
<~om promise is not admissible testimony. 
Mr. Maupin : She doesn't say so. 
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Mr. Lanning: It is a fact. 
Mr. Maupin: I don't know that it is a fact. 
Mr. Lanning: Mr. Parker knows it. 
Mr. Maupin: Was it made in any sort of compromise? 
Witness : I do not know what her motive was. I did ex-
plain to her t.hat any discussion we had would be without 
prejudice. 
Mr. Maupin: In that case, I do not think the question is 
proper, and I ask that it be stricken out. I simply say the 
statement was made on the part of Mrs. Hayes that she 
offered a settlement. If it was made without prejudice, it 
ought not to be brought out. 
page 184 ~ By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. I take it that this letter was a definite dis-
missal of you as attorney of Mrs. Hayes either in her private 
capacity or as executrix Y · 
A. I so construed it. 
Q. There is a request that you return to her all papers 
and documents relating to her employment of you and all 
securities held by you for Mrs. Hayes, including thosei trans-
ferred in your name; did you accede ·to that request and 
make return of those documents or all of them Y 
.A. I did not. 
Q. WbyT 
.A. For the reason that I am advised that I am entitled to 
hold everything under my control or in my custody by virtue 
of an attorney's retaining- lien for whatever compensation 
may be due me from Mrs. Hayes. 
Q. Now, from the time that this statement was rendered 
by you to Mrs. Hayes, which was I think you said sometime 
towards the latter part of June, 1938, has Mrs. Hayes volun-
tarily paid you anything on account of your fee? 
.A. She had not. 
Q. I understand that there are certain moneys collected 
by you from time to time which will be applicable ~owards 
any fee which may be found to be due you? 
A. That is correct. 
page 185 ~ Q. I · do not want, unless counsel insists on it, 
to go into it at the present time, as that is a mat-
ter which can be taken up by stipulation. 
Mr. Lanning·: We cannot stipulate as to that .. 
· ,vitness: As to what I have gotten t 
.. 
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Mr. Lanning: Yes. What I want is what he has received 
and what he has done with it. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Will you make for the benefit of the Commissioner a 
statement of all dividends received on these stocks or any 
other moneys which have been collected by you on behalf of 
the estate of William R. Hayes and retained by you, sending 
a copy to opposing counsel 7 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you hold any papers, securities, moneys, or any 
other matter which you may hold, which are the property of 
the estate of the late William R. Hayes subject to such dis-
position as the court may decree concerning it f 
A. I do. I brought this suit in order that the court may 
direct me what to do. 
Q. And you will obey the court in that regard! 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Maupin: I will introduce at. this time a copy of con-
tract with the Norfolk National Bank of Commerce & Trusts 
_ with regard to the safe deposit box and concern-
page 186} ing which Mr. Parker .testified just now. 
Note: This paper is filed marked "Exhibit No. 3." 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. In connection with the litigated matters regarding which 
you have testified, and particularly with the appellate phases 
of these matters, I take it that. it was necessarv for vou to 
prepare and :file briefs as counsel in these matters? . 
A. That is correct. . 
Q. Have you copies of the briefs which you did file, which 
set out the legal questions involved, and how they were at-
tacked or defended by you in your capacity as counsel 7 
A. I have. 
Q. I have in m~r hand ~opy of brief of Adelaide, l\f. Grady 
Hayes. appellee, in case No. 1867. in the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of Virginia, at Richmond, under the style of Mary 
Ha11e8 G'ltilfoil, appellant, v. Adela,idP. llf. Grady HaJ1es, vn 
her own right and as exemetrix, appellee. Is that one of the 
briefs you filed in connection with your representation of 
1\frs. Hayes? 
A. I pi·epared., lmd printed and :filed that brief. 
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:Mr. Ma~pi.n: I offer that in evidence. 
Note: The same is filed marked '' Exhibit No. 4.'' 
. By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. I have in my hand a brief o_f counsel for appellee in 
case No. 4092, in the United States Circuit Court 
page 187 ~ of Appeals, FoUI"tb Circuit, in case under style of 
Mary Hayes G1cilfoil, appellant, v. Adelaide M. 
Grady Hayes, appellee, the same being an appeal from the 
District C-ourt of the United States for the Eastern District 
of Virginia-, at Norfolk, in equity, which appears to have been 
filed by William. L. Parker, counsel for appellee. Is that a 
brief which yon prepared and filed in the United States Cir- · 
cuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in your ca-
pacity as attorney for Mrs. Adelaide Grady Hayes t 
A. It is. 
Mr. Maupin: I offer that in evidence. 
Note: The same is filed as "Exhibit No. 5." 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. I J1ave in my hand a brief in ease No. 4092, in the United 
States Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, under the 
style of Marv II ayes Guilfoil, appellant, v. Adelaide M. Grady 0 
HaJtes, appellee, which is styled "Motion of appellee to dis-
miss the appe81. Exhibit A filed with the motion. Brief in 
support of the motion to dismiss the appeal. Appeal from 
the District Court of the United States for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia, at Norfolk, in equity,''· whicl1 purports to 
Iiave been filed by William L. Parker, counsel for appellee. 
Is this docmment a brief which was prepared and filed by 
you in the United. Stat.es Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth 
Circuit, in your capacity as attorney for Mrs. 
page 188 ~ Adelaide M. Grady Hayes? 
A. It is. 
Mr. Maupin: I offer that in evidence. 
Note : The same is filed marked '' Exhibit No. 6. '' 
BY Mr. Maupin: 
·Q. I have fo my hand a bl'ief in case No. 711, in the Sn. 
preme Court of the United States, October Term, 1936, under 
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the style of" Mary Hayes Guilfoil, petitioner, v . .Addaide M. 
Grady Hayes, 'respondent," being· "brief for respondent in 
opposition to petition for writ of certiorari,'' which purports 
to have been filed by \Villiam L. Parker, counsel for respond-
ent. I ask you if this document is a brief which was prepared 
and filed by you in your capacity as attorney for Adelaide M. 
Grady Hayes Y 
A. It is. 
Mr. Maupin: I offer that in evidenc.e. 
Note: Same is :filed marked "Exhibit No. 7." 
Mr. Maupin: Let it be understood that t.he contract be-
tween Mr. Parker and the National Surety Company, which 
opposing counsel asked be produced, will be produced as soon 
as Mr. Parker has the opportunity to go to his office and 
get it. . · 
Mr. Lannin~:: ,v e ask for the production also of the rec--
ord in these litigated cases; also copies of the pleading·s in 
thP. cases in w·hich appeals were not taken; also 
pag·e 189 ~ any memoranda and briefs filed in the lower court. 
Mr. Maupin: You can produce tliem 1 
Witness: Yes. 
Mr. Maupin: Al1 riglit; you will get copies of them. 
You may take the witness, Mr. Lanning. 
Note: At this point, at 12 :25, an adjournment for lunch 
was taken until 2 :4fi. 
page 190 ~ All,TERNOON SESSION. 
The hearing was resumed at 2 :45 P. M., pursuant to ad-
journment. 
Mr. Maupin: :Mr. Commissioner, with your consent and 
that of opposing counsel, I will just question Mr. Parker 
about certain documents that he was asked to introduce so 
that they may be introduced. 
The Commissioner: All right. 
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resumed the stand and further testified as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Maupin: 
Q. I hand you what purports to be a copy of a contract 
between yourself and the National Surety Company. Is this 
the contract regarding which you testified this morning and 
which opposing counsel asked that you produc~ ! 
A. It is. 
Mr. Maupin: We offer it in evidence and ask that it be iden-
tified by the appropriate number as an exhibit. 
(Marked "Exhibit No. 8"). 
Q. Before the adjournment for lunch, you were requested 
by Mr. Lanning to produce the pleadings in those 
page 191 } cases involving litigation in which you were coun-
sel for the estate which were not the subject of the . 
appellate procedure, and the printed records in those cases 
which were. Have you made a .search of your office and have 
you the papers which Mr. Lanning requested 7 
A. I have to some extent. So far as the printed records 
are concerned, the only record which I have ancl which is 
available to be offered in testimony is the record in the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in the case of Mary 
Hayes Guilfoil v. Adelaide M. Grady Hayes, Record No. 1867. 
The record in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit and in the Supreme Court of the United States on the 
appeal from the decision of the District Court of the United 
States for the Eastern District of Virginia, I appear to havP 
only one copy, which I have incorporated in a bound volume. 
Mr. Lanning: You may use this if yon wish (handing tht=' 
witness a copy). 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Mr. Lanning has just handed you a transcript of the 
record in Case No. 4092 in the Circuit Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit. Will you introduce that as your record f 
(Record No. 1867 in the ·Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia and Record No. 4092 in the United States 
page 192 ~ Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
were marked '' Exhibit No. 9'' and '' Exhibit No. 
10 ", respectively.) 
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A. I have no record in the Supreme Court of the United 
States. 
]fr. Lanning: The record would be the same thing. 
A. (Continuing:) It would be the same thing, yes. 
Now, with respect to the first will contest at Princess Anne, 
which was not appealed, I have here a statement of the 
grounds of contest filed by the contestants in the case. There 
were no formal pleadings on behalf of contestants on an 
appeal from the clerk's order of probate, but certain orderl 
were entered and bonds executed, and the first matter of 
record filed by the complainant was the grounds of contest, 
which I now irrtroduce. 
(Marked "Exhibit No. 11".) 
I was asked for copies of other things done by me in that 
proceeding. I now introduce copies of instructions, consist-
ing of eleven instructions, from 1 to 11., which I prepared and 
was prepared to ask for in; that case. 
By Mr. Lanning: 
Q. They were not used, were they? 
A. They were not actually used. They were prepared-
not used, because a non-suit was taken. I introduce that 
and ask for it to be marked. 
page 193 } (Marked ''Exhibit No. 12".) 
I have here a memorandum, partly typewritten and partly 
in manuscript, of various authorities which I had collected 
for use -during the course of that trial and which were not 
used. They are now introduced and asked to be marked as 
an exhibit. 
(Marked ''Exhibit No. 13".) 
In conclusion, so far as that proceeding was concerned, 
I have here the order dismissing the case on the non-suit 
being taken by the contest.ant-a copy of the order-which I 
:file and ask to be marked as an exhibit . 
. 
(Marked "Exhibit No. 14''.) 
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With respect to the first suit instituted in the District Court 
of the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia in 
which Mary Hayes Guilfoil, as Administratrix of the estate of 
William R. Hayes, deceased, · was plaintiff and Adelaide M. 
Grady Hayes, hr her own right, was defendant, I now produce, 
first, a copy of· the bill of complaint and, second, a copy of the 
motion to dismiss, combined with the answer which was filed 
by me, and, thiri, .a memorandum of authority in support of 
the motion to dismiss which was filed by me with the judge 
of that court, and I now ask that these be filed and appro-
priately marked. 
(Marked "Exhibit No. 15".) 
With 1·espect to the second suit instituted in the District 
Court of the United States for the Eastern Dis-
page 194 r trict of Virginia, the record in that case appears 
in the record which has been introduced of the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, where that case was subsequently on 
appeal, and in accordance with request made of me, I now in-
troduce copy of the memorandum of argument prepared by 
me and filed with the District Judge in that case, copy of a 
memorandum prepared by counsel for the plaintiff and filed 
with the Judge, copy of a reply-brief prepared by me and 
filed with the Judge, and a copy of a letter dated February 
25, 1936, written to the Judge, containing a supplementary 
citation of authority. They may be marked as one exhibit. 
(Marked "Exhibit No .. 16".) 
With respect to the va.rious questiorn~ ari.sing in connec-
tion with the Federal Court proceedings, I have here a mass 
of miscellaneous manuscript memoranda of authority pre-
pared by me, which were not filed but which I had made avail-
able for my use in connection with those proceedings. 
By Mr. Maupin : 
Q. They are the basis of your briefs? 
A. That is correct. 
Mr. Maupin: Let them be filed and marked. 
(Marked "Exhibit No. 17".) 
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A. (Continuing:) In connection with the last will con-
test at PrincesEt Anne, I now ask to introduce a 
page 195 ~ memorandum of authority on the point that the 
contestant was not a party interested, a separate 
memorandum with respect to the effect of the ownership by 
the decedent of the New York real estate, on the question of 
law raised on the special plea there with respect to domicile, 
the trial brief in manuscript form on the question of domi-
cile, and a supplemental or additional brief in typewritten 
form on the same subject. 
Mr. Maupin: They may be filed and marked as one ex-
hibit. 
(Marked "Exhibit No. 18") 
A. (Continuing:) With respect to the litigation instituted 
by Mary Hayes Guilfoil in Orange County, New York, to set 
aside the deed conveying the Newburg real estate, I hav·t~ 
here a copy of the summons, attached to which is a copy of 
the complaint filed by the ·plaintiff in that case, a copy of 
the directions of the clerk to enter special appearance for th~ 
defendant for the purpose of removing the action to the Dis-
trict Court of the United States for the Southern District of 
New York, prepared by me, copy of the petition to rcmov-e 
the action to the District Court, prepared by me, and, then, 
the removal bond prepared by me, and, then, the bill of par-
ticulars filed by the p]aintiff on motion made by associate 
counsel in New York, copy of the answer prepared by asso-
ciate counsel and approved by me, a certified copy of the 
court's order which incorporates the stipulation 
page 196 ~ dismissing tl1e New York case, together with a 
copy of an order of the Supreme Court of the 
State of New York for the County of Orange, directing that 
the lis vendens which had been filed against the property in 
question be released. 
Mr. Maupin: Those may be filed and marked as one ex-
hibit. 
(l\farkecl "Exhibit No. 19".) 
Q. Those are tlw papers that were requested by opposing 
counsel, so far as you understand it, and so far as you have 
been able to get them T 
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A. That is correct. 
Q. Now, with regard to the exhibit which was filed a moment 
ago by you and which was a copy of the contract with the 
National Surety Company, I observe that that is dated the 
29th day of May, 19341 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Was it actually entered into on that date? 
A. No, it was actually executed at a considerably later date, 
and as a result of my agreement with the surety company, I 
had assured the representative of the surety company ihat 
I would require the executrix to open the aceount subject to 
my joint signature and. to deposit the securities in a safe 
deposit box requiring my presence to open, but I had not un-
dertaken any personal responsibility. As a result 
page 197 ~ of the negotiations had by me with the surety com-
pany when they had threatened to ask to be re-
leased from their bond, I then agreed to execute a formal 
agreement which bound me personally to see that the executrix 
handled the funds of the estate in a proper manner. That 
agreement, according to my recollection, was dated back to 
correspond with the date of the bond so as to take care of any-
thing that may have happeMd in the meantime. 
Q. In other words, as of the actual date of the execution, 
having a retrospective as well as a prospective effect? 
A. That is correct, so there would not be a hiatus under 
which I would be bound. 
CROSS EXAMINATION . 
.By Mr. Lanning: 
Q. Mr. Parker, the will was probated on the 28th of May; 
is that correct? 
A. That is correct, yes. 
Q. Are you certain that this agreement with the surety 
company was not executed on the following day1 
A. It was not executed by me until a considerably later 
time. I know that. I had verba11y agreed with Mr. Taylor 
.Johnson that I would exercise joint control, but I had not 
undertaken any personal responsibility' and did not undertake 
it until I signed the formal written agreement, 
page 198 ~ which was at some considerably later date. 
Q. Did not joint control contemplate that you 
would look after the affairs of the estate and see that no 
funds were improperly used? 
A. It was simply that I would exercise joint control with 
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Mrs. Hayes to see that the estate's securities and funds were 
not absolutely made away witli. T]:iat was my understanding. 
Q. Now, when do you say this contract, Exhibit No. 8 which 
you offered in evidence, was entered into? 
A. I do not recall the exact date that it was. There is 
nothing to fix that in my mind, except it was executed at a 
considerably later date than the date of the qualification, 
probably two or three weeks. 
Q. "When did the dispute arise with the surety company? 
A. Very shortly after the qualification and the contest was 
entered into. The contest was started on the 2nd of June, 
which was four days after the probate of the will, and it is 
mv recollection that immediatelv afterwards or within a 
very few days, this occurrence happened in New York, with 
the result that these representatives of the surety company 
came here with the idea of being released from their bond. 
They did not waste any time. They were on a $51,000 bond. 
Q. And how soon after this controversy arose was this 
agreement entered into? 
page 199 ~ A. I agreed to do that in some conversation 
I had with Mr. Bilbrey and Mr. Walton Taylor. 
We had several conferences at that time. I don't recall how 
long it was afterwards; it was not very long. 
Q. Two or three weeks afterwards, would you say, Mr. 
Parker? 
A. I coulcl not say, to ~ave my lif c. · I could not :fix it 
definitely. . . 
Q. Well, can you fix the time at all at which you entered 
into this arrangement with the surety company? 
A. I can't fix it very definitely. I would say it was within 
thirty days of the date of the qualification of the executrix, 
maybe sooner, but that was four years ago, Mr. Lanning, and 
the date that is stated on that agreement is not the actual date 
of the execution, I know that. It is my recollection that it 
was dated back so that no hiatus would occur in between the 
date of the bond and the date of the- · 
Q. Well, this contract settled the diffieulties that Mrf::. Hayes 
lrnd with the surety Mmpany. did it not? 
A. I would not say that it settled all of the difficulties. 
There was a general understanding that I was to be person-
ally responsible-No. 1. I had, in the meantime, pretty well 
satisfied them that they were safe. In the con-
page 200 ~ ferences I had, .I had agreed to keep them in-
formed of ever~r development and I had, in addi-
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tion, stated I· was going to resist ~my effort on their part 
to be relieved· on· the bond. The general upshot was that 
they agreed to go along with me after these negotiations. 
Now, what particular thing induced them to go along, I am 
unable to say, except that agreement was a. part of it. 
Q. Well, they agreed to go along when this agreement was 
entered into, whenever that. was 1 
A. Yes, that is very trne. At the time of the execution of 
that contract, they had agreed to go along. 
Q. So, at the time of that agreement, the difficulties Mrs. 
Hayes had witl1 the surety company had been ironed out! 
A. Oh, of course, subject to be re-opened at any time. That 
was a continuing right they had, to be asked to be relieved 
at any time. 
Q. Did they ever come back to re-open it? 
A. They never re-opened it, but they corresponded with me-
to find out the status of the case, and I saw :Mr. Bilbrey from 
time to time. He came down here from time to time. I saw 
him in Richmond once. He was stationed in Washington. 
But he was in very close contact with the case and followed 
it very closely, because it had been a matter of considerable 
dispute and controversy in the home office. 
Q. Mr. Parker, isn't the contract that you entered into 
the usual and customary contract with an attor-
page 201 ~ ney when he takes joint control with a personal 
representative! 
A. I am unable to say. I know that I never executed one 
before, and I have entered into joint control without any 
formal contract. I have never been required to execute any-
thing of that kind before. 
Q. Have you ever handled au estate as large as this be-
fore? 
A. No, not an estate in which I had anything to do with 
the actions of the executrix in this manner. 
Q. Isn't it a fact, Mr. Parker, tlrnt the surety companies. 
where the estate is more than $5,000, usually require joint 
control by the attorney or by the agent of the surety com-
pany at the place where the bond is executed Y 
A. I don't know about what the usual practice is. I Imow 
that in this case I told :Mr. J olmson at the outset-l1e wanted 
to know if I would consent to joint control by the companv, 
and I said I would not. Then he asked me if I would counte~-
sign checks and haYe the sa~d deposit box in my name with 
Mrs. Hayes' joint name, and I said that I would, and no formal 
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agreement was ever submitted to me until this controversy 
arose. I do not know what the general custom is. 
Q. Had you ever handled an estate as large as this be-
fore? 
page 202 ~ A. I had been connected with estates ; I had 
never had joint control in any estate of this size 
before. 
Q. Do you contend that you are entitled to extra compen-
sation on account of having executed this agreement with the 
surety company, Mr. Parker? 
A. I contend that I am entitled to extra compensation for 
~aving negotiated that agreement with the surety company-
induced them to ref rain from moving to get off that bond, 
and having assumed joint responsibility for every act of this 
executrix. I treated that as one item in the account, lumped 
together, and I claim that I am entitled to compensation 
for it. 
Q. You were not required to do, in this contrac.t, anything 
that. anyone would not be properly supposed to do who was 
acting ·for a fiduciary, were you? 
A. Well, I did this on my own responsibility-
Mr. Maupin: Let m~ see that contract, will you, Mr. Lan-
ning. 
(The paper was handed to counsel.) 
A. Let me understand your question. 
(The pending question was read by the Reporter.) 
A. Certainly. I have represented fiduciaries time and again 
without assuming any personal responsibility for what they 
did with the assets of the estate. 
Q. All you had to do, Mr. Parker, was to see that all 
funds that came to the estate were deposited in 
page 203 ~ the estate's account, and countersign checks and 
see that all seeurities belonging to the estate were 
put into the safe deposit box; is t.hat correct? 
A. That is not correct. I took responsibility for every 
expenditure the executrix made-for the expenditures that 
she made in connection with defending the suit, for the expeud-
itures that she made for supporting herself. I took respon-
sibility for all of the investments which she made and which, 
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as you know without my telling you, were not investments 
authorized by the Virginia statute; so that I did a great deal 
more than what you suggest. 
Q. Do you think that you are entitled to extra compen-
sation because you permitted her · to use the estate's funds 
for her own personal purposes and to invest moneys in securi-
ties which were not c.onsidered proper for investment of 
trust funds T · 
A. I did not say they were not considered proper; I said 
they were not authorized by the Virginia statute. You evi-
dently are not very familiar with the interpretation placed 
by the courts on that statute. 
Q. Well, do you consider that you are entitled to extra 
compensation for allowing her to invest in securities that 
are not enumerated in the state statute¥ 
A. I think I took a risk of possible litigation and possibly 
being held liable. I thought I was fairly safe in 
page 204 ~ doing so, but the risk existed, nevertheless. · 
Q. Why did you think you were taking a risk 
i~ doing so? 
A. Well, I thought those securities could be establisiied, 
under the circumstances, as being reasonably safe, and the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia has held that that 
statute is not exclusive-the securities listed in that statute 
are not exc.lusive; buf this much is true: if a personal repre-
sentative wants to be entirely safe, and will follow the direc-
tions of the statute, there is no question of liability. I did 
use mv judgment m1d take the risk of a possible attack. 
Q. Did you not assume from the very outset, Mr. Parker, 
that Mrs. Haves was entitled to at least one-half of the estate 
of Mr. Hayes·! 
A. I certainly did not. Right at the outset there was an 
obvious indication of an attack on the validity on the merits. 
I had consulted the North Carolina statutes and learned of a 
provision that a marriage between persons one of whom 
was of unsound mind was void. 
Q. -:Void or voidable? 
A. Void. I will produce the statute i-f you would like to 
~eP it. The word is ''void". ' 
· Q. Now, as to the account which has been offered in evi-
dence, Exhibit No. 1, is this an exact copy of the 
page 205 ~ one that you presented to Mrs. Hayes? 
A. It is not. I under~tood that your attention 
was called to the fact-· · 
Adelaide :M:. Hayes, et aJ., v:. William L. Parker. 153 
W. L. Parker. 
Q. I mean, except with that one page V . 
A. No, because the accounting which appeared at the end 
waP 1eft off. There were mistakes in that accounti_ng, which 
Mrs. Hayes called my attention to and which I acceded to 
as soon as my attention was called. The reason for it was that 
payments which she had made to me in 1934 were not in-
cluded in the statement which she gave me and, therefore, 
were not included in that. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Let me see if I understand it. It is an exact copy, 
with the exception of the page which has been substituted 
and except for the casting of the account at the end of itY 
A. Except for the account of receipts and disbursements. 
There is a summary at the end of that statement of all charges 
which had been made and, in addition, that is an exact copy 
of what was on the former statement. · I have left off from 
this statement the account which I explained to you had to be 
corrected. 
Q. That is the account which you promised to put int 
A. That is the account which I promised to com-
page 206} bine in one account and produce separately. It was 
my understanding that this hearing was simply 
confined to the value of my services, as such, and another 
hearing would be had as to what the facts and figures were. 
By :Mr. Lanning : _ 
Q. On the statement which you originally presented to her. 
there were certain· credits, were there not? 
A. Yes, an account of what she had paid to me and what 
I had expended, and, as I stated, the account as I rendered 
it to her was in error in that I failed to give her credit for 
two payments which she made to me. 
Q. And also a list of disbursements Y 
A. A list of disbursements. There are no changes in that. 
Q. Do you admit that she has paid you $10,020.03 on ac-
count? 
A. I do not recall the exact amount and I am certain that 
that is not what she paid me. ·Mrs. Hayes turned over to 
me a eertain amount of funds and she also, at my direction, 
paid direct certain other expenses. It is my recollection with-
out going into the details of the account that the $10,200 she 
refers to includes all of the disbursements which she made, 
some of which were 110t made through me. 
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Q. Well, yon are not prepared to admit or deny whether 
the sum of $10,020.03 represents the aggregate of 
page 207 r the sum she paid yon Y 
A. I am not. As I said before, Mr. Lanning, 
I understood that. the question of accounting was not before 
us at this hearing, and I am not prepared to say anything 
one way or the other on it. I can he in a day 1s time. 
Q. Now, at the outset, Mr. Parker, as I understand, you 
made an investigation in Newburgh, in New York, and at Nor-
folk; is that correcU 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was that done prior to the probate of the will Y 
A. No. The only thing I did prior to the probate of the 
will was to discuss the matter very fully with Mrs. Hayes. 
Q. You have made a charge of $500 for the probate of the 
will, have you not 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. And all you had done at the time tlie will was probated 
was to discuss the matter with Mrs. Hayes; is that correct? 
A. That is not correct. If you will examine the statement 
which I filed, you will find that I inve·stigatecl and decided 
some very important and intricate questions of law before 
I decided where to probate it. That was the prime considera-
tion then. Following that,,I offered the will for probate, went 
to Newburgh and took the formal deposition of 
page 208 ~ Mr. Bennett, one of the attesting witnesses, and 
while there I stated that I made certain investi-
gations, knowing that a contest was then ineYitable, but 
that was not a part of the services w11ich I rendered in con-
nection with the probate; that was involved in the contest. 
To my mind, the important matter of the probate was to 
decide where to make the probate and whether it could be 
sustained after the jurisdiction had been selected. 
Q. Some two or three days after the will was probated, an 
appeal was taken from the order of probate; that is correct. 
is it not? 
A. That is correct, yes. 
Q. Then you made ecrtain im1estigations and took certain 
depositions to_be used in connection with that appeal from the 
order of probate; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, the depositions that were taken in connection with 
that first matter, the appeal from the order of probate, were 
used in what you called the third will contest? 
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A. A part of the depositions were. The depositions taken 
at Newburgh were used, but the depositions taken at New 
York were never used anywhere. I have never known what 
became of them. 
Q. Those were the depositions of the doctors, were they 
noU 
page 209 ~ A. Yes. 
Q. But the depositions taken at Newburgh were 
used in the third will contest? 
A. Yes. They were supplemented by other depositions 
which were taken, but we stipulated, as I recall it, that they 
could be used in these other proceedings in order to save the 
expen~e of taking them over. 
Q. Are you sure, Mr. Parker, that any depositions were 
used in the third will contest other than those that you took 
prior to the hearing of the 19th of July Y 
A. I know it-I don't know that they were ·used: I know 
that they were taken. 
Q. Here is a copy of the record. 
A. Depositions of Dr. Howell were taken at Newburgh, for 
example. The depositions of Dr. Howell were taken at New-
burgh shortly before the hearing· on the pleas in the third will 
contest. Now, I assume that they were not used, for the 
reason that it never got .to a trial on the merits, but those 
depositions were taken, and if you want a copy of them, I 
have them in my files and w·ill produce them for you. 
Q. I just wanted to find out what testimony was used in 
tlie third will contest. that is all. 
A. Well, that is perfectly obvious. It is in the record 
there. 
page 210 ~ Q. Well, I menn. taken in the tllird will c.ontest. 
A. "'\Vell, those that were taken-
Q. How many witnesses, Mr. Parker, were examined in the 
third will contest, in nddition t.o those mentioned in the record? 
Mr. Maupin: Do you want to know how many were taken f 
Mr. Lanning: Yes. 
The Commissioner: Other than those mentioned in the 
record. 
· 1\fr. Maupin: In other words, how many more were taken 
tlum were used Y 
The Commissioner: Yes. 
A. These depositions of Dr. Howell were taken at New-
burg, and I do not recall that any other depositions were 
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. taken in connection with this contest. Now, the depositions 
of those doctors were taken in connection with the first will 
contest. · 
By Mr. Lanning: 
Q. Yes. The appeal from the order of probate. 
· A. The same thing in a different form. 
Q. Isn't it a fact, Mr. Parke1~, that the only case in which 
ther~ was any issue of fact was in the third will contest Y 
A. Well, that is certainly not true. There was an issue 
of f ar.t all the way through in every case. There 
page 211 ~ was an issue of fact in the first casP.-
Q. But that was dismissed? 
A. Yes. My answer is that there was an issue of fact pre-
sented in each case, as well as very intricate questions of la:w. 
It was all an issue of fact throughout as to whether or not 
the decedent was of sound mind at the time of his marriage 
and at the time of the execution of his will, and whether 
or not he changed his domicile. They were both issues of 
fact. 
By the Commissioner : 
Q. Isn't it a fact that the same issues of fact were in all 
the cases? 
A. Yes. 
By Mr. Lanning: 
Q. The only cases in which any evidence was taken wer~ 
in connection with the appeal from the order of probate and 
in what you call the third will contest; is that correct? 
A. No, that is not correct. You did not understand my an-
swer. I said extensive depositions were taken on the first 
will contest which, by stipulation, c.ould be used in the othe1· 
contest. 
Q. I mentioned that. And the appeal from the order of 
probate was the first will contest, wasn't it f 
page 212 ~ A. Yes. 
Q. There was evidence taken in that case and 
evidence taken in the third will contest? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Those are the only cases in which evidence waR ta.ken 1 
A. Evidence was also taken in the New York ease . 
. Q. Was there any. evidence taken in the two questions in 
the Federal Court in Virginia? 
A. No. They turned on questions of law. The issues of 
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fact in those cases were perfectly simple. The difficult ques-
tions were questions of the law involved. 
Q. Now, you.have made a blanket charge of $3,750 for duties 
of the executrix T · 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you have made charges for attending to specific 
services of the executrix; is that correct Y 
A. Not according to my understanding. I have made a 
blanket charge for performing all the duties of the· executrix, 
which is based on approximately :five per cent of the value 
of the estate, which is the usual executrix's charge in this 
state-on the appraised value of the personal property. 
Q. Well, haven't you made other charges for specific work 
that you did which vou considered to be the duties of the 
· executrix .. Y 
page 213 ~ A. Not according to my views of it. 
Q. How about your fees with respect to the 
estate securities and investments? 
A. I ·did not consider that was the dutv of the executrix 
because, in the first place, the matter had run over some 
four years pending the litigation. There was a great deal of 
responsibility devolving on me, as well as a great deal of 
work in watching these investments and safeguarding them 
as best I could. The executrix, or t11e executor, as the case 
may be, is entitled to charge a flat sum for his services, and 
those services contemplate a prompt settlement of the estate. 
This matter ran over a period of some considerable years and 
involved a great deal mqre than that, so far as the manage-
ment of estate securities is conc.erned. 
Q. On what sum did you ba~e yom· charge of $3,750? 
A. It was approximately on the appraised value of the 
estate, somewhat over that, but that was the approximate 
c•harge. I considered there were some matters which I did 
in connection with the services of the executrix which rei, 
quired legnl service, for whic.h I added a slight amount more. 
The appraised amount of the personal property was approxi-
mately $73,000; five pe1· cent of that would he in the neigh-
l>0rhood of thirty-five or thirty-six hundred dollars, and I 
charged a little more because, included in the statement of 
the Rervices I rendered as executrix, were som~ 
pag-e 214 } services which were really legal services and were 
somewhat beyond the strict duties of the execu-
trix. 
Q. Tl1e total value of tl1e personal property, which you have 
158 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
W. L. Parker. 
stated to be aro~nd _$73,000, was subject to certain deductions, 
was itnoU · 
A. I did not shite that that was the total value of the per-
sonal property. It_ is far from it. I said that that ~as the 
appraised value. . 
Q. Well, whatever was the appraised valu(l or tlu~ actual 
value, that value was subject to certain deduetions on account 
of debtsY 
A. Yes, some deductions. 
Q. You do not say that the appraised value is not correct~ 
do youY 
.A.. I do. 
Q. In what respects do you say that the appraised value 
is incorrect Y 
A. If I can get my memorandum which I have and refresh 
my recollection, I will tell you. Over the period of time this 
estate was administered there was an accretion by reason of 
increase in market values of the securities in which a. portion 
of the estate funds were invested. That accretion, based on 
quotations of yesterday less a loss on certain other securi-
ties, left a net increase of $7,225. The Newburgh property 
( real estate) which is included in the estate gen-
page _ 215 ~ erally was not included in the appraised value. 
because it was real estate. 
Q. Well, we are only dealing with personal property now. 
A. Well, I will leave that out. 
The bonds of the Argentine R.epublic of $4,000 par value 
were listed at $3,000, and were paid in full. There was an 
accretion of $1,000. · 
Bonds of the Republic of Chile: There lias been an ac-
cretion; since that valuation was made of approximately $500, 
and approximately $300 on the bond of the Bear Mountain 
Bridge, making a total of approximately $1,800. 
The Straus & Company mortgage bonds which had an aggre-
gate value of $88,500 were valued in that inventory at $16,000, 
approximately. That valuation was arrived at as nearly as 
could be on sporadic sales which were had from time to time. 
Since that valuation was made as of April, 1934, most of 
those properties, those that were not a complete loss, were 
reorganized, and in my opinion the fair value of those bonds 
is at least $35,000, or approximately $20,000-
Q. What clo yon base that opinion on, :Mr. Parker? 
A. I base that opinion on the fact that in these reorgani-
zations these properties were valued as of the new elate that 
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the securities that were placed on them were 
page 216 r placed on present valuations. Take one instance, 
in one of these securities the bondholders were 
able to secure a first mortgage so as to pay them an amount 
on account of their bonds in excess of what the old bonds 
were appraised for on this valuation, and still retain the 
equity in the property. They were credited with the amount 
that was paid to them. 
Q. Have you gotten a recent quotation on any of those 
bonds? · 
A. No, I have not gotten any quotations recently. 
Q. Would you be surprised if I told you that I had and 
that the present value of those bonds is less than $16,000, 
according to recent quotations T 
A. I do not think you can get any quotation that estab-
lishes the value of those securities. They are mortgage securi-
tjes; they have no standard market. There is an occasionaJ 
over-the-counter transacfion in connection with them, and 
whenever anyone buys such a security he buys it at pretty 
much his own price. I do not think that any sporadic sale 
is anv indication of its fair value. 
Q. ·no you think that your information as to the value of 
those bonds is better than the quotations which you get from 
time to time? 
page 217 ~ A. I think my opinion represents more nearly 
the actual value of these bonds, for this reason, 
that in these various reorganizations the properties were 
carefu1ly appraised by people who had nothing to do with 
the previous transactions; that where the circumstances called 
for it, the bond issues were reduced in amount; that the bond 
issues as finally placed on there represented the fair value 
of the properties as reorg·anizecl, and that they reflected more 
accurately the fair value of these securities than sporadic 
sales over the counter. There is no ready market for them, 
as with any mortgage security. They have no market value. 
like corporate bonds of good standing. 
Q. They a1·e not quoted on the New York Stock Exchange. 
but they arEl sold over the counte1·, are they not? 
A. Yes, they are sold over the counter, whatever that migl1t 
mean-over the desk, or anything· else. They are just so1d 
from time to time. They have no regular market quotations. 
Q. Would you consider the prices at which they are so]d 
from time to time are better evidence of the market price 
of those bonds than what you think they should be worth T 
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Mr. Maupin: Before you go further into that, I want to 
see what evidence there is upon which these questions are 
predicated. We are not informed as to Mr. Lanning's idea 
of what the bonds are worth, or how that idea was obtained, 
and if the witness is to be interrog~ted upon a 
page 218 ~ hypothesis, I think there should be some f ounda-
tion for the hypothesis. We have only an inti-
mation that, in Mr. Lanning's opinion, gathered I know not 
how, a fair market value of these bonds i~ less than $16,000. 
I would like to have more than that. 
Mr. Lanning: We haven't anything from Mr. Parker but 
liis own idea, which is not anything, I think. 
Mr. Maupin: Well, that is a matter for argument, but he 
told you, at least, how that idea was arrived at. Now, if 
you have any other valuation of them, it is incumbent on you 
to produce the valuation. 
Mr. Lanning: I will produee it at the proper time. 
Mr. Maupin : But I do not think the question should be 
predicated upon something which is not before us. 
Mr. Lanning: The only reason I asked the question was be-
cause Mr. Parker said he considered the value of those bonds 
was $35,000, and I think I have a right to cross examine him. 
Mr. Maupin: You have, undoubtedly, but you have no right 
to bring in some valuation, the basis of which is not ap-
parent. 
By Mr. Lanning : 
Q. In arriving at your figures, Mr. Parker, have you taken 
into consideration what the stocks that were found in the 
estate would have been worth if they had been 
page 219 ~ held down to the present time? 
A. I do not see that that has anything to do 
with it. The stoeks which were sold and not re-invested in, 
in my opinion, were highly speculative. They might be worth 
a great deal more, or a great deal less. In arriving at the 
valuation of the entire estate, I took into consideration the 
depreciation between the value placed upon the securities and 
the amount actually received on the sale. 
The Commissioner: Some time in the proceeding I would 
like for this to be developed: How long can a fiduciary hold 
highly speculative stocks that come into his hands from the 
decedent without becoming liable Y 
Mr. Maupin: I am in position to give yon a good deal of 
authority on that point. 
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The Commissioner: All right. 
By Mr. Lanning:. 
Q. Do you know, Mr. Parker that it is a fact that the stocks 
that were found in the estate are now worth about $16,000 
more than the sum for which they were sold? 
A. I have not checked that up, but I am not interested in 
knowing, for this reason: I do not think a fiduciary would have 
been justified in retaining any of the securities which I sold 
and did not re-invest in. 
page 220} Q. You think the securities which you bought 
are much better than the ones that were in the 
estate¥ 
A. I know they are-I don't think anything about it. 
Q. Did you not have some American Telephone in the 
estate? 
A. That was bought back, the exact amount. I said, those 
that were sold and not re-invested in. 
Q. Do you think the stocks you bought were better than 
the Endicott-Johnson, which was in the estate originally? 
A. No, I do not, but I think Endicott-Johnson, which was 
a preferred stock, based on the price at that time, the return 
was very low. I thought, based upon other stocks, that the 
revenue capacity should be better. 
Q. I understand that in July or August, 1934, you ad-
vised Mrs. Hayes to invest in stocks; is that correcU 
A. I did not advise her to invest in stocks. She wanted to 
invest in stocks, and I consented to it and did the best I could 
to pick out the soundest stocks. I did not advise her to in-
vest in stocks. 
Q. How many lob; of stocks did you buy? 
A. If you will let me have that first exhibit, I can re-
fresh my memory and tell you. There were purchased 50 
shares of Consolidated Gas Company which I advised Mrs. 
Hayes against buying, not because I thougl1t the concern 
was unsound, but because I thought that the at-
page 221 } tack then being made by the Administrative De-
partment of the United States Government would 
have a tendency to depress those securities. 
She bought, with my approval, 100 shares of General Elec-
tric. Company at 18-5/8. She bo1ight, with my approval, 25 
shares of the Norfolk & Western Railroad at 172-1/8. She 
bought, with my approval, 50 shares of United States Steel 
at 33-7 /8. She bought 100 shares of United Gas & Improve-
ment, which I also raised the same objection to that .I did 
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to the Consolidated Gas Company-that it was a utility. And 
she bought, with my approval, or re-bought, 100 shares of 
American Telepho~e & Telegraph at 109-3/4; she sold it at 
approximately 111.; 
Q. Did you advise her to buy American Telephone~ 
A. I did. 
Q. In July or August, 1934, she bought these lots of stocks; 
is that correct¥ 
A. Yes. 
Q. The certificates for those stocks were taken in your 
name! 
A. They were taken in the street names. 
Q. But finally taken in your name? 
A. That is eorrect. 
Q. And then, in 1937, she bought thre~ further lots of stockt 
A. Yes. She bought 25 shares of Continental 
page 222 ~ Can, slrn bought 50 shares of National Dairy 
Products, and 25 shares of American Tobacco B. 
· Q. Were the certificates for those stocks taken in your 
name, also? 
A. No, they wete taken in her name. 
Q. Were those last mentioned stocks taken in street names 
first, or in her name Y 
A. No, they were taken direct in her name. 
Q. United Gas & Improvement lias been sold, has it not? 
A. It has. 
Q. That was sold for around $1,5007 
A. It was sold at a slight profit, as I recall. 
Q. Some other stock was sold, was it noU 
A. Consolidated Gas was sold. I urged her to get rid of 
those because, as I said, they were utility stocks that I never 
approved of especially in the first instance. 
Q. Will you please state again why you thought it was 
necessary to take the certificates for these stocks in your 
name¥ · 
A. For the reason that I anticipated that the administra-
trix appointed in the State of New York would attempt to 
reach the stocks through the transfer office. When this trans-
action occurred in 1937, the litigation was such then that I 
felt it was safe to let them go ahead in her name, 
page 223 ~ and made no point at aU of the matter. 
Q. Could not these stocks have been traced to 
you, just as well as they could have been traced to her? 
A. I don't think it would ever have occurred to them to 
attempt to tie up anything that was in my name. 
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Q. The fact is that they were in your name, but they be· 
longed to Mrs. Hayes, did they not f 
A. That is what I said, and that is in accordance with the 
facts, yes. I have never claimed that they belonged to me. 
Q. Why could you not have taken these stocks in her name 
as executrix? 
A. For the reason that I explained, Mr. Lanning-they 
were taken in the name of Adelaide l\L Hayes, Executrix of 
William R. Hayes, deceased, and any effort to reach securi-
ties standing in the name of ·wmiam R. Hayes, which I am 
advised was attempted, would certainly have been successful 
in precipitating litigation over these stocks, which would have 
had to be fought in the State of New York, with additional ex-
pense to tlie esfatte, and a possible recovery by the New York 
representative. 
Q. Did you not say on your direct examination that you 
advised Mr. Heath these securities had been sold? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you also tell him what you had done with the funds Y 
A. I did not. I was not as foolish as that. 
page 224 ~ Q. Mr. Heath knew, of course, that you were 
acting for Mrs. Hayes¥ 
A. Oh, yes. 
Q. And might have recognized the possibility of the stock8 
being taken out in yom name, rather than in her name? 
A. I don't see why he should think I had invested in any 
stocks at all, or re-invested these estate funds. I do not think 
he knew anything about it. In fact, it was somewhat of an un-
usual transaction that there was a re-investment in stocks 
at all. I have other lists of stocks standing in my name; simply 
because I may happen to represent some client, I do not think 
it is going to occur to a litig·ant, or an opponent of that par-
ticular client, that he can attach anything that stands in my 
name. It certainly would not occur to me. 
Q. You have made a charge of $1,500 for advice, as I un-
derstand, to purchase these six lots of stock? 
A. It is not confined to that, :Mr. Lanning. It is confined 
to the transaction having to do with the management of 
these securities over this period of four years. That is one 
element of it, but there are a great many other elements! 
I have set forth exactly there the basis of that 
page 225 ~ charge in the statement· which I filed, and if you 
want to go fully into it, I would have to read it to 
refresh my memory. If you want to re-read it, it is all right 
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with me, but there it stands in the statement, the basis of 
that charge. 
Q. What was the other basis for this charge of $1,500f 
A. No basis other than what I have set out in the state-
ment. As I said, if you want me to re-read the statement to 
you, I will do it. · 
Q. I am not asking you to re-read it. 
A. I can't tell it to you without refreshing my recollection. 
The statement is 100 pages long. I cannot remember that. 
verbatim. I never have attempted to memorize it. 
Q. Where did you get your information with respect to the 
purchase of these stocks? 
A. By consulting with brokers, by following the market 
reports, by following the general news, by forming my own 
opinion as to trends as best I could, like anyone does in · 
investing funds and making himself informed as well as he 
can. 
Q. As I understand, Mr. Parker, you have charged for ob-
taining the sale of the stocks found in the estate in the item 
Duties of Executrix Y 
A. I cannot answer that without reading it over, Mr. Lan-
. nin,2;. I do not recall the details of the statement, 
page 226 ~ but it is in the record here, but if you want to read 
it, or want me to read it, I will be glad to do so. 
It is all there. 
Q. What you did in connection with estate securities and 
investments is covered in Article 4, as I understand, of your 
statementf 
A. I assume that is correct-yes, that is correc.t, Article 4. 
Q. Now, some of the services which yon performed were 
apparently performed for Mrs. Hayes per~onally, and not fo1· 
her as executrix of the estate, is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Take the item Virginia Beach House; do you say that 
that service was performed for her personally, or for her 
as executrix? 
A. If that includes the investigation of tl1e question as to 
her rig-ht to pay for that, it cmrers both, bec.ausc the property 
stood in her name-
Q. Well, look at the item and see what it covers. 
A. That other item was covered under Item 2, the advice 
rendered in connection with that, w11ich was incorporated 
under Duties of the Executrix, and, really, consisted of legal 
advice rendered to the exeeutrix. The Item 5 includes simply 
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the supervision of the building of this home, the 
page 227 } adjustment of numerous matters which arose in 
connection with it, the question of when payments 
could safely be made to' the contractors and, just as I state 
here, the selection of an oil burner, the question of a con-
troversy with the builder arising i11; that connection-he 
claimed a commission on that-numerous consultations with 
Mrs. Hayes with respect to complaints which she had after 
the house had been completed, taking these matters up with 
the contractor, all extending over a period of four years' time. 
Q. You consider your services under this heading per-
formed for Mrs. Hayes personally, do you not? 
A. Yes. The property belonged to her. 
Q. Now, the Item No. 6, Newburgh real estate, $350; that 
is service performed for her personally, too, is it not Y 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Now your services in connection with the New York 
litigation were performed for her personally, too T 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Now, all your work_in connection with the probate of t~e 
will was completed, I supp~se, at the time of the probate of 
the will, was it not T 
A. Yes. 
Q. That was on May 28; is that correcU 
A. That is correct. 
Q . .And you were employed when, Mr. Parked 
-pag·e 228 } A. About May 5, I think. 
Q. Now, your ,vork in connection with the con-
trovenrv with the surety companv on the hond. for which vou 
made a"' charg·e of $2,000, was completed about a month after 
the will wa~ offered for nrobatc; ii:; t11at correct? 
A. It was not completed, as I explained, J\fr. Lanning, be-
cause I had to keen the representatives of the surety com-
pany, at all times during· this four-year period, satisfied with 
the administration of the estate and the conduct of the liti-
gation. At any time during: that period they could liave re-
verted to tl1eir original idc~a and asked to be relieved on this 
· bond, with disastrous conse(luences to Mrs. Hayes. I might 
add that I did not consider tliat I waf.! working on a daily wage 
in this matter. I attempted to fix my charges on what wa~ 
accomplished and what was involved. For example, in de-
termining that one qu(:lstion of probate, a mistake in t~at 
would have meant disastrous com;equences for M' rs. Hayes. 
I think the one clecis~on and the investigation which led to 
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that decision as to the place of probate was worth more than 
the charge that was made for it, considering the value of tho 
~state that was _involved and the consequences that would 
have followecl a w.rong decision. 
Q. The logfoal thing for you to do was to at lea.'>t ti-y to 
probate the will in Virginia, was it not t 
page 229 ~ :A.:.~~ ot · at all. 
Mr. Maupin: Let me ask counsel what he means by "logi-
cal" t 
A. (.Continuing:) I had to do what the lawful thing to 
do was. Mr. Lanning. 
By Mr. Lanning: 
Q. Well, you considered it lawful, did you not, to probate 
the will here? 
A. After I had investigated it, but it was by no means a 
matter that could be decided in a few minutes or in a few 
seconds, as you seem to think. 
Q. I do not say you could decide it in a few seconds. You 
. preferred to have the will probated here, did yon not 1 · 
A. Oh, yes, undoubtedly. I thoug·ht it would have been 
disastrous for Mrs. Hayes had it been necessary to probate 
it anywhere else, but this much was trne: had it been pro-
bated in the State of New York, the question of the· revoca-
tion or non-revocation of the will hy the subsequent marriag~ 
would never have arisen. That. possibility always confronted 
me when I decided on probating in Virginia, that the result 
might follow, under the Virginia law, that the subsequent 
marriage had revoked the will. It would not have confronted 
me had I probated the will in New York. 
Q. I understood you to say, in answer to one of my earlier 
questions, that your work in connection with this ·item of con-
trovcrsv with the suretv on the bond of tlJe exe-
page 230 ~ cutrix ,,ras largely completed within a month af-
ter the will was probated 1 
A. I had that tentative agreement with them. There wasn "t 
any hard and fast agreement. Tl1ey simply a.g1·eed to let the 
situation ride along as it was and, as long· as they were satis-· 
fled, and they reserved full freedom of action to move to be 
relieved from that. bond at any time they saw fit, the result 
was tl1at the question was a contsant question during thP. 
whole four-year period. 
Q. But you say they made no fmther move? 
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A. No, because I conferred with them and corresponded 
with them and kept them satisfied with the progress of the 
matter. That is why they made no further move. .. 
Q. Now, as I understand, the duties which you performed 
with respect to the estate securities and investments had been 
largely completed in Aug·ust, 1934? 
.A.. They had not, because I felt it was my duty and I had 
the general responsibility with Mrs. Hayes on the question 
of originally making those investments, io continue to follow 
them, a.nd if conditions changed, to make a change in the in-
vestments. That was a continuing responsibility. It neces-
sitated following market trends, following general trendR in 
the country and, in g·eneral, using what experience I have had, 
what knowledge I have, in keeping those investments as they 
. were. As I stated, there were a couple of sales 
page 231 ~ and subsequent purchases after that time, but, as 
the situation turned out, it was not necessary to 
make any radical change in the original policy. 
· Q. In 1937 you advised her to invest in three other small 
'blocks of stocks f 
.A.. I told lier at that time that I saw no reason whv she 
should not take it in her name then because by that tinie the 
controversy was pretty well flattened out, and for the added 
reason that, having once made their move nnd notified the 
transfer officers and ]iad a water-haul, they were not likely 
to try it again. 
Q. I understand that the work that you have described un-
der Virginia Beach House was completed witl1 tl1e comple-
tion of the house? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And when was the house completed? 
A. I do not recall. I could g·et my file on that subject. 
Q. It. was completed in two or three months, wasn't it--
A. Several montl1S after that, yes; I do not recall exactly. 
Q. The work that you did with respect to the Newburg 
real estate was completed in the first two months f 
A. It was not. It was a continuing supervision 
page 232 ~ that existed throughout t.he four years. :M:rs. 
Hayes was away on a Europe.an trip, I think, in 
1937, and a number of matters came up in connection with 
that Newburg property. 
Q. "\Vhen did you yisit Newburg last? 
A. The last time I visited Newburg was when I took Dr. 
Howell's deposition, wllich I think was alJout April or ,Tune 
of 1937. 
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Q. Well, just what work did you do with respect to this 
Newburg real estate? 
A: I have got an extensive file on that subject. and if you 
want me to go into the details, _I will be glad to refresh my 
recollection and tell you, but if you have had any experience 
in managing real estate, particularly an ·apartment house 
occupied by a number of people-
Q. How large an a.partrnent house was this Y 
A. Three-familv. 
Q. Just a smali apartment? . 
A. Just a. small apartment, but there was a great deal of 
trouble arising in connection with the t.enants in the property, 
-in connection with repairs to the property, in connection witn 
improvements that were demanded by the tenants, various 
matters of that kind that will trouble any person that owns 
apartme·nt house property. It is a matter of common knowl-
edge that it is a matter of constant work and trouble, particu-
larly when you have property of the character 
page 233 ~ here. · 
I will refer to the statement I have made with 
respect to· that, which is the first exhibit. The accounts fur-
nished by the rental agent, I got copies of those, looked into 
the details in connection with them and went over them, ques-
tions of insurance arose, questions of an oil burner being 
installed was considered and decided, questions relating to 
the tenants discussed, rentals considered, repairs and im-
provements discussed and authorized, the question of re-
frigerators was considered ·and settled, and t.ax matters in 
connection with tl1e property l1andled. I will say that the 
real estate ag·ent who was l1andling that property has stated 
that it should not h~ so]d for less than $20.000. :mil that, in 
my opinion, 'the fair value of tJ1e property itself is certainly 
at least $15,000. · 
Q. Now, yom work with respect to the first will contest 
was completed when the contestants t.ook a non-suit on July 
l9 ; is that. correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. For that service you made a charg·e of $3,000? 
A. ,vithout looking at it, J assume that is correct. 
Q. Now, when was Mrs. Guilfoil appointed administratrix 
in New York? 
A. I think in about September of that same year. It was 
sl1ortly after thii;;. Irnmedifltelv after the non-
paye 234 } suit ,;as taken, the a-pplication · for her appoint-
ment as administratrix w·as made. A certain 
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length of time had to elapse, 1mder the laws of New York, 
before the appointment could be made, and it seems to me it 
was within -less than sixty days time -that the -appointment 
was made.· .. 
· Q. I think your account says that she was appointed some-
time in September f · 
A. That would be about what I think, yes. 
Q. And upon her appointment, your work in connection 
with this item ceased Y 
A.. That is correet.- .. 
· Q. And you made a charge of $1,500 for this service 7 
A . .Yes. iThe basis of that charge, as the b~sis of all. other 
charges, is set out in this statement, and the reasons why I 
thought that charge was a reasonable one .. 
Q. Mr. Parker, was it not originally agreed that the ap-
plication of Mary ·Hayes .. Guilfoil ..for letters of administra-
tion should; be opposed? 
Mr. Maupin: .-Agreed by whom, Mr. Lanningt 
A. No, it was never agreed to· by.me.· Mr. Bennett urged 
me to do so. 
By Mr. Lanning: 
Q. To do what-oppose it? 
A. To oppose it, but I r~alized that if I did oppose it that 
I submitted myself to the jnrisclict~on of the New York court 
and accomplished the purpose that Mr. Heath was 
page 235 } trying to accomplish, namely, to transfer the will 
contest from Virginia to New York, but before 
taking that position, I made an extremely careful investiga-
tion to determine wliethei· I could safely ignore the proceed-
ing·. In other words, to the extent that proceeding· was in re1n 
it would have bound me, regardless of whether I appeared or 
~10t. I the ref ore had to decide whether I could safely ignore 
it. I never for one minute thought the wise thing to do wa~ 
Jo contest it., but. Mr. Bennett urged me very strongly to con-
test it a11d to offer the will for probate there. · 
Q. lVIrs. Hayes ":,.8:S served with citation at Virginia Beach, 
was she noU 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Did you not consider she was as much before the court, 
by being served there,. as if she had been in New York Y 
. A. Certainly· not, because the pro~ess wa~ served in Vir-
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ginia, without the bouuds of the ~tate, but certainly to the 
extent that that proceeding was in rern, I had the proposition 
to decide whether or not that bound me in any respect. Hav-
ing concluded it did· not bind me, I ignored those proceedings, 
with the result that nothing came of them. In other words, 
the event proved that I was right. 
Q. Of course, you do not know what would have happened 
if you had opposed it? 
A. I have a very good idea of what would have 
pag·e 236 ~ happened. I know what happened because I did 
not oppose it. 
Q. Now, did you have any contract with Mi's. Hayes t 
A. None at all-no written contract. 
Q. Did you hav~ any oral contracU 
A. No. 
Q. I understood you to say on direct examination that you 
considered that you were handling this estate on a contingent 
basis. Why did you say tbaU 
A. I said, to all intents and purposes, because if I had 
not been successful, Mrs. Ha.yes would have had nothing to 
pay me with. 
Q. How do you know what she had f 
A. I can only base that on what she told me. I haven't 
any idea at all except what she said, herself. 
Q. Did you not state in your brief in the Supreme Court of 
Appeals ~ 'that it was not disputed that prior to the death 
of the decedent, he and appellant were ]awfully married and 
so continuP-d until hfa death'' f 
A. Yes, I made that. statement. 
Q. That is correct, is it notf 
A. That is correct so far as it goes. It is just a matter of 
argument. I said, '' it is not disputed in this proceeding''; 
it was not. I meant to say there had not been any evidence 
produced on that subject in the proceeding at all. .As a mat-
ter of fact, that questionj as a matter of law, 
page 237 ~ could not be lawfully raised in that proceeding, 
because the only question that can be raised there 
is the. question whether or not the will that is offered for 
probate is the will of the decedent; that. is the sole issue in 
that,proceeding. Now, the question would have become ma-
terial and could have been raised had the will been set aside 
and then litigation ],aye resulted over the rig·ht to the own~r-
sbip of the estate. 
Q. Do you claim that anything )ron did with respect to the 
Straus bonds yielded any benefit to the estate f 
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· A. I certainly do. I certainly consider that if I am em-
ployed to investigate the status of securities of that character, 
that if I possess myself of every bit of information that r 
can possess myself of, if I inform myself as to the legal 
characteristics of the proceedings which are involved there 
and see that the proceedings a.re ,conducted in a legal man, 
ner, that if I satisfy myself. that no injustice is being done. to 
the bondholder in question, that I liave certainly performed 
a service for which I should be compensate.d ... 
Q. Was anything constructive accomplished T 
A. "What do yon mean by ''constructive"·f . 
Q. Did the estate derive any benefits f'rom your advice? 
. · A.· Jt. certainly derived this benefit, that bad 
pag·e 238. ~ anything· irreg·ular taken place, I had prepared 
myself to be in position to resist it. 
Q. Did you attend any meetings of bondholders f 
.,.~. I did not, but I did obtain copies of the various pro-
ceedings that ·were taken in these matters-copies of :financial 
plans which I examined. I inquired into the personnel of 
the committees who were acting· in these various cases and 
satisfied myself they were reputable people, and I certainly 
safeguarded, to the best of my ability, the interests of ·my 
client. The fact that ·my ·client may have gotten the samP-
thing· without that service, it doe·s not occur to me excuses her 
from paying· for the services. It frequently happens in law 
practice that a· 1awyer is retained to represent a client who 
might very well get the same tesults without the lawyer, but 
the lawyet is, nevertheless, entitled to compensation for what 
he does, the lmowledg·e a·nd experience he bas, and ·fot being 
always in position to safeguard the interests of his client in 
case anything· irregidar takes place. · All of those things take 
time and take experience, as you well know, and they involvCl 
responsibility. 
· Q. There lmd been default. with respect to many of thest1 
bonds prior to the deatl1 of l\fr. Hayes, had there rtot? 
A. That ·is true. If there had not been any default, there 
would not have been· any occasion for these re-organizations. 
Q. "\Vell, defaults might have occurred after Mr. 
page 239 ~ Hayes' death f 
A. We1l, in some cases thev did. 
· Q·. Did you advise Mrs. Hayes in every case to acquiesce 
in the plan proposed by the bond]101ders' committees? 
A. In every case in which there was a plan which I con-
sidered best. under the circumstances and where I had con-
fidence in the reprm;entatives of tlJe bondholders. In some 
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cases I did not file these bonds with bondholders' ·committees, 
because I did not have anv confidence in the committees. 
Q. Did you oppose the plans that the bondholders pro-
posed 1 
A. No. 
Q. And the extent of your work was to advise Mrs. Hayes 
to acquiesce in plans proposed and, in some cases, to '' sit 
tig-ht" and do nothing; is that correct? 
A. That is con·ect, but I did not do that by guesswork. 
Q. Now, you have stated that :Mrs. Hayes criticized the 
way you were handling· the case, or the procedure which you 
recommended at different stages; is that correct Y 
A. That is correct, yes. 
Q. State in what way she criticized you Y 
A. Well, I will tell you this-this was impressed 
page 240 ~ very forcibly on me-that just prior to the argu- · 
ment on one of these matters, she came to me 
and told me that she had been advised that I was colluding 
with Mr. Heath to lose the case for her. That was one thing 
that impressed me to a great ext()nt. "When I finished the 
argument on the pleas before Judge White, she criticized me 
for allowing Mr. Heath to argue the case in a manner w l1icb 
she did not like. In the Court of Appeals at Richmond, where 
she attended the argument, she made a scene up in the lobby 
to such an extent that I was compelled to leave her, and told 
me that I had not stood up for her rights at all, that I was 
not looking out for her, that I allowed Mr. Heath to say a 
great many things that should not be said, and that, in gen-
eral, I was neglecting her interests. They are some of the 
instances that occur to me. There were a great many more. 
Mr. Maupin: May I ask the witness a question: 
Q. Have you with you a letter that Mrs. Hayes wrote you1 
criticising you? 
A. I have. I do not know wl1ether it is iu this file or not. 
The Commissioner: May I ask this question: What does 
criticism or nou .. criticism have to do with the matter? Could 
that not he left out? 
1\fr. Lanning: I think so. 
page 241 ~ l\Ir. Maupin: It showR the worry and t.rouble 
in representing a client who criticizes everything-
you do, and if they indulge themselves in that respect, I think 
they should be willing to pay for it. 
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A. (Continuing:) Completing my answer to that question, 
Mr. Lanning, for whatever value it may have here: After 
I had returned from Richmond, she produced a memorandum, 
about three pages long, which was a general outline in manu-
script of the various sins of omission and commission I had 
committed in the conduct of that particular case, and it to_ok 
her about an hour to go thr_ough it. Now, if you wish to 
have that outline produced, I ·-have it in another file and I will 
give i.t to you. 
By Mr. Lanning: 
Q. Wasn't her criticism based almost entirely upon your 
permitting M:r. Heath to say things that were d~trimental to 
the character of Mr. Hayes? 
A. Not at all. It would not have taken three pages to write 
out au outline criticising my argument in the Court of Ap-
peals to object to that particular phase of the matter. As· I · 
say, if you want the outline, I w:ill produce it for you. 
Q. Now, Mr. Parker~ prior to the differences that arose be-
tween you and Mrs. Hayes, you had been turning over to 
lier interest which you had collected and divi-
page 242 } <lends on stocks wJiich w.ere held in your name; 
is that correcU 
A. That is correct. . 
Q. And after these differences arose, you failed to turn 
over to her any more dividends and interest; is that cor-· 
rect? 
A. I retained it, yes. 
Q. And you used these dividends and interest, yourself, 
didn't you? 
A. I applied them on my account. 
Q. At that time you had brought suit, had you notY 
A. 1· had. 
Q. And you knew that she was claiming that she did 11ot 
owe you anything? 
A. Yes. Q. Well, what rig·ht did you think you had to use funds of 
the estate? 
A. I do not co·nsider them as funds of the estate; I con-
sider that I Jmve a right. to offset them against my claim 
against her, or apply them on my claim against her. 
Q. After there is a controversy? 
A. I cert.ainlv do. 
Q. And it has not been settled as to whether she owes you 
anything or not? 
. . 
W. L. Parker. 
. . . 
A. I do. . , . . , 
. ·. Q. Don ~t yQu think it would have been proper 
page 243 ~ for yoJ( _to have turned thQse dividends and in-
terest ;payments into the estate's account f 
A. I do .not. -Q. Why¥ . ; 
· A. I think I have. , a rig·ht to recei¥e those dividends ancl 
to· apply them to my account.1· That is a well:1·ecog·nized right 
of a .lawyer until the court determines he, hasn't any rig·ht to 
do so. . · : 
Q. YOU: thinJ,:, it is proper ,for ,yon to take advantage of 
your position an·d credit those interest payments and divi-
dends to ·yourself¥ , 
~.·.I have answered your question-I do-and tl1at is what 
I have done. · · · . · ' 
· Q. Now, you prepared a Federal estate tax return, did you 
not? · 
A. I did. 
· Q. And in tha.t. return the gross assets of the estate we~ 
stated to be $72,966.71; is that correct! 
A. Let me see. 
( Counsel handed a document to the witness.) 
A. (Continuing:) That is correct. 
The Commissioner: "\Vhat was the total amount of the es-
tate T 
Mr. Lanning: $72,966.71. · 
· The Commissioner: Before or after deduc-
page 244 ~ tions Y 
Mr. Lanning: Before deductions. 
By Mr. Lanning: 
·Q. In that· report· yon returned funeral expensei;; of 
$1,404 .. 38; is that correct? 
A. I did. · 
Q. And also debts of tllc estate totaling $4,118.74f 
A. Yes. · 
· Q. Mr~ Parker, ·the funds of the estate were used to huild 
the Vi:~inia Beach house, ·were they not f · · · · 
·A. It did not inr.lud·P tbP lot"' the $1,500 eqliity in tlle lot 
which Mrs. Hayes bad at Virginia Beach.· The cost of the 
con~t'ruction of the house waR taken from the g-ross assets as 
listed there. 
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Q. Well, my recollection, Mr. Parker, is that a.t the time 
of Mr. Hayes' death he owed the National Bank of Com-
merce $1,5001 
A. That is rig·ht. 
Q. On account of money which he had borrowed from the 
bank to make the -down payment 1 
A. That is right. 
Q. And the estate's funds were used to pay that note! 
A. Yes, but that corresponding credit represented by the 
payment on that lot is not reflected in that gross amount. 
Q. And Mrs. Hayes assumed a mortg·age or deed of trust 
on the Virginia Beach property of $1,500; is that correct f 
A. That is correct. 
page 245 ~ Q. And the estate's funds were used to pay 
that off, were they not f 
.A. That is correct. 
Q. Well, how much do you claim that the Virginia Beach 
lot increased the value of the estate? 
A. $1,500. That was the amount that had been paid on 
that. · 
Q. But there was a note in the bank that had to be paid 
off, wasn't there V 
A. That is correct, yes. 
:M:r. Maupin: Mr. Lanning, isn't that reflected in the $4,000 
of debts there f 
:M:r. Parker: Of course it is. 
Mr. Lanning·: That is rig·ht. 
:M:r. Maupin: And nothing is shown there for the equity 
of the $1,500, so you have g-ot to offset it in some way. 
By Mr. Lanning: 
Q. Now, in the litigation that originated in Newburgh--
A. You mean, affecting· the rea] estate tl1ere? 
Q. Yes-you said you prepared the removal papers? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And corrected the stipulation f 
A. Yes. 
page 246 ~ Q. Do you claim that you did anything else in 
connection with that case? · 
A. That is all that was done in connection with it except 
to take the depositions that I referred to and prepare the 
questions of law involved and the questions of fact. They 
had no evidence up tllere as to the circnmstances. All t.he 
evidence was developed here. I explained to you that that 
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case was never tried, by reason of the fact that I was able 
to force that stipulation, so that by winning the litigation 
here I automatically won the New York litigation . 
. Q. I understand that, but that was all you did, was it not-
to prepare those papers? 
A. I won the case. I do not judge· the ·amount I should 
charge by the number of papers that I prepare, Mr. Lanning; 
I judge it by the amount of work that I accomplish. 
Q. The work you do is an element in arriving at your fee, 
is it noU 
A. To some extent; also, the experience that you have, th~ 
knowledge that you have, the judgment that you display, the 
amount of money involved in the particular transaction, the re-
sult accomplished-there are a great many things that enter 
into your fee, Mr. Lanning, besides the ty.r>ewriting that you 
might do. The stenographer does that. 
page 247 ~ Q. Now, in this case in the Federal court, of 
Mrs. Guilfoil, to obtain the assets of the estate 
and for an accounting: you said that yon prepared two motion 
papers? 
A. And the answer; I prepared a. motion to dismiss and 
an answer. 
Q. And also filed a brief; is that correcU 
A. In support of the motioil to dismiss. The brief was 
simply addressed to one Rpecific thing. The main questions· 
which were involved were not the subject of a brief, because 
the case was never reached, but the questions which would 
be involved, which were altog·ether quest.ions of law, or largely 
questions of law, were thoroug·hly looked into and prepared, 
and you have some manuscript mernoramlwnis of authority I 
had on those very subjects. It is fragmentary and some are 
hard to follow, because it is principally brief notes with cita-
tions of cases, but that represents the investigation I made 
into t.he questions involved. It represents the pertinent au-
thorities I found, after examining a great many which I found. 
not to be pertinent, and I was prepared to meet the issue 
raised there at anv time. 
Q. You made a ·charge in that case of $1,750, did you notf 
A .. I did. 
· Q. Now, in the second case in the District. Court of the 
United State~ for the Easforn District of Vir-
page 248 ~ ginia, there were only ]egal questions involved., 
were there noU 
A. That is al1-pasRed off on motion to dismiss. 
Q. You made a charge of $5,000 f 
Adelaide M. Hayes, et al., v:. William L. Parker. 177 
W. L. Parker. 
A. Yes, because it involved an intricate and difficult ques-
tion, because I was successful in the District Oourt qn it, 
and because the case was appealed to the Circuit Court of 
Appeals and I was successful there, because an application 
was made to the Supreme Court of the United States for 
ce·rtiorari and I was successful in resisting that, so it went 
to three courts, including the highest court in the land. 
Q. Now, the only issue involved in the third will contest 
was the domicile of the decedent, was it not Y 
A. No; the question of limitation was involved there also, 
as I explained previously, and was argued. 
Q. The court ruled against you on that. 
A. Yes, but it was raised again by cross-appeal and went 
before the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
Q. Mr. Parker, did you not, on several occasions, advise 
Mrs. Hayes '' that the contestants in this case hadn't a leg to · 
stand on''? 
A. I told her from time to time-her condition· was such, 
I re-assured her that I had every confidence of winning the 
case. I certainly was not g·oing to add to her mental distress, 
which was very .extreme at that time, by ex-
page 249 } pressing any pessimism as to the outcome. I 
, never do that. 
Q. You were always optimistic? 
A. In my expressions to her. I had some inner perturba-
tions, realizing I had a very ab]e antagonist and a very re-
sourceful one, and he seemed to be convinced he would be 
successful, as I was. I never goo a.round convinced that I 
will be peat.en in liti~;ation. That is not my policy. 
Q. Now, you have a last item here, Misc.ellaneous, $750? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What does that corver. Mr. Parker? 
A. I can refresh my recollection by reading- to you from 
this Exhibit 1. "Wliat it. covers, I do not recall offhand. Do 
vou want me to read this into t11e record! It is alreadv in 
11erc in the form of tl1iR (lXhibit. · 
Q. Tl1ere is no need to read it. I thoug·ht. you might give 
me a resume of wl1at. it covers. 
A. I mig·ht glance at them nncl brieflv summarize them. 
TI1ere was a gTeat deal of newspaper publicity on each occa-
sion when this casr came into tl1e onen.; and invariably. that 
caused Mrs. Hayes a great deal of-distress and anger and 
she consulted me on numeron~ occasiom; as to whether or not 
she could maintain a snit for libel against these nPwspapers. 
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I advised her as to those matters. 
page 250 }- She was verv resentful as to the activities of 
Mr. Paul H. G~uilfoil, a nephew of the decedent, 
who, by reason of his connection with another estate, had 
been conducting :Various investigations into Mrs. Hayes' af-
fairs and into the ·a.ff'airs of her deceased husband. In ad-
dition, he had stirred up the National Surety Company, re-
sulting in the controversy with the surety over the bond. 
1\tirs. Hayes want~d to know whether she could sue him .. I 
advised her as to that. 
She took exceptions to the statements of opposing· counsel 
time and time again and requested me to advise he1· as to 
whether she could sue Mr. Heath for his remarks. I ad-
vised her as to that. 
There was one question which I had forgotten about, I see 
here that I listed, which arose in connection with a prior 
will which had been executed by the decedent, a copy of 
which :Mr. Cantline, who 1who was counsel for contestant, had, 
although the original could not be found. There were some 
statements made to me in my conferences with those gentle-
men in Newburg to the effect that they mig·ht attempt to pro-
bate that will. I looked into the legal situation with respect 
. to whether or not they might be successful in establishing 
that will. I might say, as I recall it, under tha.t will Mrs. 
Hayes received $10,000 and the Guilfoils received $10,000 
and the remainder of the estate was left to 
page 251 ~ charity. 
The lease for the box at the Bank of Cemmerce 
contained the provision that in the event of the death of either 
of the joint lessors (it was in the ·joint names of William R. 
Hayes and his wife), the contents of the box should belong 
to the survivor. Mrs. Haves wanted to be advised whether 
or not that would eliminate the necessity of passing these 
securities throug·h tlie executrix or t11l'ough tl1e· estate at all. 
I looked into the question of whether or not that constituted 
a valid gift and advised her that it did not. 
At the date of the decedent's death, there was a balance of 
approximately a thousand clollarR on deposit to his account 
at the Virg·inia Beach Branch of.the National Bank of Com-
merce. Prior to his death, he had executed a power of at-
torney, deposited with the bank, authorizing Mrs. Hayes to 
draw on his account. She wiRhed to be advised whether she 
should withdraw tl1at fund by virtue of the power of attor-
ney, or whether it sI1ould pass tl1rougb the estate. I looked 
into that question and advised l1er as to that. 
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A question arose as to whether or not, in view of thi~ 
pen¢ling contest, Mr. Heath might have a rig·ht to apply for 
the ap.t,>ointmeut of a curator for the estate and take its con-
trol away from Mrs. Hayes. I looked into that question and 
advised her with respect to that. 
I neg~tiated a loan for her for $500 and a see-
page 252 ~ ond one for $1,500 to pro,1ide her with initial 
funds, whic.h I obtained by personal endorsement 
of mine. 
In connection with the settling of the affairs of the estate, 
there was a claim on the part of Mrs. Hayes that $500 was 
due the decedent for some past allowance of a hundred dol-
lars a month which he was supposed to receive and did not 
receive. That was a question of some correspondence and 
was finally, at Mrs. Hayes' request, abandoned. 
In connection with the claim of :Mr .• John W. Walsh, the 
undertaker, :Mrs. Hayes took exception to that, claiming it 
was exorbitant. That was the subject of considerable cor-
respondence between Mr. Bennett and myself, finally result-
ing in paying it in full. 
There was a small matter of Mrs. Hayes' personally, hav-
ing to do with the re-organization proceedings of the Hol-
land Brewing Company, involving· some securities which sh~ 
owed. I made a proof of claim in t.hat proceeding· for her 
and found out what there was to be found out in connection 
with it. 
There were a great many smaH matters which arose from 
time to time, no accurate record of which I kept. I made a 
lump charg·c under that heading for $750. 
Q. Mr. Parker, have you ever before made up an acc.ount 
involving· litigation ancl made additional charg·es for ancil-
lary or supplementary work in connection with the litiga-
tion? 
pnge 253 ~ A. I don't understand you exa~t.ly. This was 
not one piece of litigation, Mr. Lanning. There 
were six separate and distinct pieces of litigation involved 
in the matte1·. There were numerous other things connected 
with the estate, all of which were separate and distinct. I 
tried as well as I could, rather than make one lump charg·e 
for the whole thing, to set out in written form and to sub-
divide as well as I could the matters that I had done and to 
make a lump charg·e for each of those matters. They amounted 
to sixteen separate items, a separate charp:e for each of which 
was made by me. · I thought that was the most intelligible 
way I could make up this statement, and the only way, in. 
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fact, as this matter involved so many angles and extended 
over a period of four years' time. 
Q. My question was, have you ever made up an account 
this way before, eharging for litigated matters and making 
additional charges for services which you performed-
.A. Yes, I have done it. In the case of. clients, I have made 
separate charges for litig·atecl matters and other matters, 
a g·ood many of which were going on at the same time. I 
make separate charg·cs for everything I do for them. I think 
every lawyer does. 
Q. Yes, but you were just handling- this estate, weren't 
youf 
. A. I would not just express it that way. I 
page 254 ~ was handling the est.ate and everything that arose 
in connection with it, hnt it was far from being · 
a unit. 
Q. All of these matters for which yon have made a charge 
were matters related to the estate¥ 
A. Yes, they related to Mr8. Hayes and t"o the estate of 
her deceased lmsbancl, but they were s~parate matters. 
Q. During· all the time that you were handling this estate, 
you took care of what other business eame to your office, did 
you not? 
A. Yes. A good deal of it was neglected. When pressing 
matters arose here, they had to be neg·lected. I could not 
always attend to matters that were ~oming in to me as 
promptly as they might be, by reason of pressing matters 
that were involved here. 
Q. But you attended to the other matte1:s that came into 
your office? 
A. I attended to all of the other matters t.hat. came in, yes. 
Q. Now, you attended to filing an inventory of the estatP 
short]v after your employment, clicl you noU 
A. Yes. 
Q. I show you a copy of the inventory and ask yon whether 
that is a copy of the inventory that was filed T 
A. I suppose it fa-yes, I see this is a certified copy, yes. 
page 255 ~ Mr. Lanning;: I offer that in evidence. 
(Marked "Exllibit No. 20. ") 
Mr. Lanning: I also offer the certified copy of the -Federal 
estate tax return in evidence. 
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(Marked "Exhibit No. 21. ") 
Q. Mr. Parker, you have said that you had a conference 
with representatives of Mrs. Guilfoil? 
A. Yes. 
Q. With a view to making a settlement. 
A. Yes. . 
Q. Do you recall what offer was made at that time7 
A. Yes; they offered to settle it for one-half of the estate .. 
Q. One-half of the estate? 
A. Yes, at least, they suggested that they woulcl do that. 
RE-DIRECT lDXA !UNATION. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Was that suggestion on the part of the contestants to 
make settlement on the basis of an equal division of the es-
tate between the wife and the sister reported to Mrs. Hayes! 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was her reaction to it and what were 
page 256 ~ your instructions iu regard to it! 
.A. Her reaction was that she was not willing 
to do that, and to go ahead and resist the conteRt. 
Q. And you followed those instructions! 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Parker, you have stated that your services were 
partly to the executrix, as execuh!ix, and for the preserva-
tion of the estate which was committed to the executrix, and 
pa1·tly to Mrs. Hayes personally for the preservation of cer-
tain estate that had come to her from her husband f 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Now, what was the value of all the estate, that is to 
say, the estate of t.he late William R. Hayes and the estate 
which Mrs. Hayes acquired from her husband in her life-
time and which was also subject to attack-the gross value 
of the whole business which you attempted to protect: and 
successfully protected? 
A. The personal property of the estate was appraised as 
of the date of the deceased at $72,290. There has been an 
increment in investm(lnts made bv the executrix over and 
above loss, according to the current market value of securi-
ties, of approximately $7,225. Of course, in case of loss_ of 
the estate, the ultimate beneficiaries would receive whatever 
increment there had been. Added to that amount 
page 257 } of $7,225, the value of the property in Newburgh. 
I estimate, conservatively appraised, is $15,000. 
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Added to that is an increment in the value of the bonds listed 
in the estate, which I have previously referred to, of $1,870. 
Added to that is the value of the Straus & Company mort-. 
gage bonds in excess of the amount at which these bonds 
were appraised, in. my opinion, of $20,000. Added to that is 
the equity in tlie building lot at Virginia Beach, $1,500; mak-
ing· a total of. $117,885, less $3,169, which was the paper loss 
shown on the sale of the securities orig-inally held by the 
estate as compared to the amount for which they were ap-
praised, leaving· ·a net value of approximately $115,000. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Lanning: 
Q. When you speak of the equity in the Virginia Beach 
house, what do you think it is worth at tho present time? Do 
you think it could be sold for wllat. it cosU 
A. I haven't any idea what it could be sold for. It de-
pends on market conditions at Virginia Beach. It is generally 
comparatively easy to sell property there and to get a good 
price for it. This property is well located, it is excellently 
constructed, it is a very fine home and is in very good con-
dition, or was the last time I had any knowledge of it. I do 
not think any great loss would be taken on the 
page 258 ~ sale of the property, if any. 1 might say this, 
that that house was constructed under a contract 
entered into· in 1934, at which time building costs were very 
considerablv less than thev are now. There has been a verv 
subst.antiaf increase in b1iilcling· costs since the activities o"'f 
the Federal government in promoting building·, and I think 
that sa.ving will offset any depreciation that may have been 
brought. about by the lapse of time-more than offset it. 
Q. Why have you not taken into consideration the losf.' 
which result.eel from the Rale of these stocks originally as 
against what they would lrnve been worth if they had been 
held down to the present time T 
A. There isn't any occasion to take that into considera-
tion. I do not think that under anr theory any fiduciary 
could have been justified in holding· those stocks which I 
sold. They were purely speculative. One group of 500 
shares will l'ang-e anywhere from two or three points up to 
eighteen or twenty points, almost, in a montl1. It pays no 
clividcnds. It is purely a speculative stock; I would ca11 it 
an untried-out goldmine, myself. 
Q. You do not mean to say that the stock you have refer-
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ence to-Yell ow Cab-ranges from five to twenty dollars a 
share in the course of a m<'nth, do you? 
.A.. It may not and, on the other hand, it may. 
page 259 J It is purely a speculative security, and the first 
· thing my broker advised me to do-and my own 
investigations confirmed me in-I was not justified in hold-
ing such a speculative security. 
Now, there were two large holding·s in investment trusts, 
They might or mig·ht not be sound securities. They were not 
closely regulated. It is a1most impossible to know what is 
going on inside of those affairs, except very frequently some 
·scandal comes to light in connection with them. I did not 
feel justified in holding the investment trust securities. 
Q. But you did feel justified in investing· the funds of thf' 
estate in other stocks-common stocks f 
A. Certainly, of the character that I got. They are gift-
edge securities and have always been so regarded. I did feel 
there was the possibility of a suit against me if there had 
been a market slack and a different outcome to this litigation, 
but I think I could have justified myself. 
Q. Have you looked into the question as to how much th~ 
stocks in the estate which you took charge of are worth at 
the present time 1 
A. I have not considered that at all, because I regarded 
ihose stocks. which I did not re-invest in as speculative and 
dangerous securities and I did not think I had any right 
.to advise Mrs. Hayes, and I certainly on my owu 
page 260} account was not going to participate in a gamb-
ling· speculation with the assets of this estate. 
Q. But the stocks were already in the estate when you took 
charge? . 
. A. You are no doubt familiar with the fact that the mere 
fact that speculative securities are in the estate does not jus-
tify the fiduciary's holding them. His duty is to make a 
prompt disposition of them. 
Q. And to invest in other stocks? 
A. To invest in sound securities. I do not think that any 
of the stocks. which I recommended Mrs. Hayes to re-invest 
in could be regarded as speculative securities. '1,hey are 
sound, old-established stocks of national corporations of 
long years of success behind them. 
Q. You feel t}mt you are entitled to extra compensation 
on account of the increase in the value of stocks which were 
purchased by tlle estate, do you? 
A. I did not say that. I did not express· it in that way. 
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I said that the value of the estate had been enhanced to the 
extent that those securities enhanced in value. I did not 
predicate my compensation on that enhancement of value, 
except to the extent that the total value of the estate has been 
enhanced over and above the original value, to that extent. I 
simply tried to arrive at what I considered· to be the fair 
value of the estate in the ultimate analysis. · 
page 261 ~ Q. Did Mrs. Hayes a.t any time propose settle-
ment with Mrs. Guilfoil by turning over to her 
the Newburgh property? 
A. Yes. I made that suggest.ion-
Q. When did she make that proposal f 
A. I think she told me, when I first. went to Newburgh, tl1at 
she would be willing to pay them the $10,000 which they 
would have taken under the prior will, or would be willing 
to turn over the Newburgh property to them. I am not ~1-
together· certain when that was made, but 1 do ·Jmow this, 
that any suggestion of compromise that I made to Mr. Cant-
1iue-and I had several interviews with him--he would neve1· 
listen to anything less than fifty per cent of the value of the 
estate. 
Q. Did you advise against turning over the Newburg prop-
erty in settlement? 
A. I did not. In, fact., I think I told her if she could get 
off that lig·htly she would be wise to do so. 
. Thereupon, the furth~r hearing of this cause was continued 
until Thursday, February 2, 1939, at 10 o'clock A. M. 
page 262 }- OFFICES OF MR. GEORGE PILCHERt 
COMMISSIONER, 
Western Union Building, Norfolk, Virginia, 
February 2, 1939.' 
.Met pursuant to adjournment from lanuary 25, 1939. 
Present: The Commissioner, Mr. Maupin, Mr. Baird, Mr. 
Lanning and Mr. Poore. 
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a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being· duly sworn, testi-
fied as follows : 
Exami11ed by Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Will you state your name and occupation, Mr. Smith? 
A. J. Sydney Smith, Jr.; forty-three years old; attorney-
at-law. 
Q. Y_ou are practicing in Norfolk? 
A. I am. 
Q. And you have been practicing law how long? 
A. I graduated from University of Virginia in 1916, and 
I have practiced law ever since in the City of Norfolk except 
for a period of a little over a year during the wa.r. 
Q. You are acquainted wit.h ¥r. "\V. L. Parker, who is a 
party in this case? ~ 
A. I am, and have been ever since I have been 
page 263 ~ practicing law. 
Q. Mr. Parker is also a practitioner at the Nor-
folk Bar. is h~ noU 
A. He is. 
Q. Will you please state what his standing· is in the profe8-
sion as to competence as an attorney and his general reputa-
tion as au ::i.tt.orney and as a ma~? 
A. His general reputation and standing at t.he Bar is of 
the hig·hest both for integrity and abi1it.y. 
Q. Now, Mr. Smith, there has been an exhibit filed in this 
matter, which I think is Exhibit No. l, which is a statement 
by Mr. P::i.rke1\ rendered to his client, and a copy of which 
has been introduced as an exhibit, which states in detail the 
services which Mr. Parker claims to have performed for Mrs. 
Hayes in her capacity as executrix of her husband and per-
sonally; have you been over that statement and read it? 
A. I have. 
Q. Have you a]so read Mr. Parkel''s testimony which he 
g·ave at the last hearing in this matter? 
A. I have. 
Q. Do you understand the services that Mr. Parker claims 
to lmve rendered in the litiQ:ation were for services connected 
with the estate of the late ·wmiam R. Hayes and to Mrs. Hayes 
in attempting to protect. l1er a~rainst various at-
page 264 ~ tacks that werr. made on the propertv which she 
got from her husband by wi11 and otherwise? 
A. Yes. I have also read bri~fs that were filed in the 
various proceedings hy Mr. Parker, and I feel I understand 
the issues involved very well. 
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Q. Now, Mr. Smith, the matters which Mr. PaTker took 
up in this statement were itemized, and there was a grand 
total struck. Before going into it in detail, I will ask you 
if you will state to the Commissioner whether you think, taken 
as a whole, Mr. Patke-i·'s charges to his client are reasonable, 
or otherwise, and yo.nr reasons for your opinion¥ 
.A.. In my opinion the charges on the whole are reason-
able. 
I might say' that I am also a Commissioner in Chancery 
for the Circuit. Court of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, and 
have. been for practicallly fifteen yea rs and, in addition to 
having represented and been involved in litig·ation in con-
nection with a number of estates as ~ounsel, I have also, as 
Commissioner, had a number of similar matters before me 
and have been required to fix fees in certain instances in 
these matters, and I feel that I am in a position to express 
an opinion as to the charges. 
Q. Now, did you make any notes: when you went over this 
statement of Mr. Parker's, as to what you thought of the 
various i terns? 
A. I tlid, for my own information. 
page 265 ~ Q. Well now, do those notes reflect your ideas T 
There were sixteen different matters that were 
set up in this statement. Do these notes reflect your ideas as 
to these in detail¥ 
A. They do. · They are not in the form in which they can 
be filed. I would like to refer to them to state my different 
conclusions. 
Q. That is the re_ason for my asking the question. I will 
ask you to refer to them and give the Commissioner the 
benefit of your conclusions as they were formed and as you 
have them there. 
A. Referring to Item I, ''Profbate of Will", in my opinion 
the charge of $500 for that item is proper and reasonable. 
Q. All right, Sir. 
A. Item 2, "The duties of executrh ", my conclusions witb 
reference to that charge would include several other items 
probably. I think it proper in arriving at a charge for the 
duties performed for the executrix, or on behalf of the execu-
trix, that there are various other elements which have been 
separated here and very properly should be considered, and 
those would be, in my opinion, No. 4, which states '' Securities 
and Investments''; No. 7, the servicing of the Straus & Com-
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pany bonds; No.14, tax matters; No.15 the suit of 
page 266 ~ Dr. Johnson. 
In other words, I think all of those items would 
largely come under one head, ·but at the same time the ijervice 
performed in connection with each item can be very readily 
separated for the purpose of placing the value upon them, as 
]\fr. Parker has done. 
I would take them 11p in numerical order to place the value 
I have placed upon them, but. lumping together the numbers 
that I have just called, I malw the total of those, as valued 
by Mr. Parker, amount to $8,500, and I place a valuation on 
them taken together of $7,250. 
I will take them up as I go along and show the amounts 
on each one. 
The duties of executrix, treating it as such: I think the 
charge of $3,750 is very reasonable. I understand that Mr. 
Parker did more than merely advise the executrix in this case, 
and that in referring to that as the performance of duties 
of executrix, Mr. Parker actually did perform duties which 
a counsel representing an estate is not called upon to per-
form. It was not merely advising the executrix as to what 
she should do but, on the contrary, embraced the actual service 
by Mr. Parker of duties tllat ordinarily, in my experience, are 
performed by the personal representative and not ordinarily 
performed by or done by him unless he is the personal repre-
sentative, such as keeping accounts and handling 
page 267 ~ funds. The basis I approximate of five per cent 
of the appraised value of the personal estate, in 
round :figures, seems to me to be about right. 
On No. 3, "Controversy with surety on bond of executrix; 
While ordinarily, of course, the question relating to the 
bond of the personal representative would customarily be in-
cluded along with the general duties of the attorney repre-
senting the estate, the situation that developed with reference 
to this eontroversy with the surety over the bond was of a 
very unusual nature and one that is very rarely confronted 
by counsel for an estate, and I feel that a special charge for 
that is entirely in order. As to the eharge of $2,000, I con-
cluded $1,000 would be a proper charge for that. 
In my experience with a number of estates, and with one 
estate fairly recently, I recall, in which a $75,000 bond was 
given, no joint custody was required, and certainly the at-
torney is very seldom required to assume personal liability, 
as in this case, and, for that reason, I c.onsiclcr it a situation 
which justified additional compensation. 
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No. 4: "Estate securities and investments." 
I have stated a few moments ago that, in my classification, 
would probably be included with 2, 7, 14 and 15, but, in order 
to arrjve at a fair idea of what the duties coming under that 
general head would be, I think that that can be 
page 268 r considered separately to the exfent of placing a 
value on it, and I place the same value that Mr. 
Parker claims of $1,500 on that, because it involved more 
responsibility and probably more work than would ordinarily 
be contemplated by an attorney representing an estate gen-
erally, and it is rather difficult for anyone who did not actually 
do the work to place au absolute dollar for dollar value on it. 
There is no question about that, and it seems to me, to the 
best of my ability, that is a fair charge. 
As to No. 5, "Virginia Beach house", that, of course, in-
volved supervision and work and activities that would not 
ordinarily ·be included in connection with an estate. It is very 
rare a situation of that sort is confronted by an estate, and, 
in addition to that, there is the personal interest of the widow 
involved, and I consider that $500 is not unreasonable on the 
face of it, and, as I said in connection with the preceding one, 
unless you have actually done the work and know how much 
time and how much annoyance and work has been involved, 
it is hard de novo to place a value on it, but I consider that a 
fair charge. , 
As to No. 6, "Newburgh real estate"; $350 is claimed by 
Mr. Parker, and I consider that a reasonable and fair charge. 
No. 7, the servicing of the Straus & Company bonds, what 
I said with reference to No. 4 applies with equal, 
page 269 r if not more, force in comiection with that, namely, 
that it is very difficult, in my judgment, for an at-
torney who ha~ not actually clone the ,,rork de novo and on his 
own ~esponsibility, withotit any suggestion at all. to place a 
value on it, because there are so many; things, having l1andled 
n good many reorganizations myself, I feel that no one except 
tl1e lawver who has done it can realize what he has clone. As 
to the ~harge of $2,500 made by Mr. Parker, while I would 
not undertake for an instant to say it is unreasonable. I place 
a vAlue of $1,500 on it. That seems to me certainly fair ancl 
reasona·hle. 
No. 8: The will contest in the Circuit Court of Princess 
Anne Conntv. 
l\f r. Parke·r nlaeed a value of $3,000 on tllat, and I place a 
value of $1,500. 
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While I am cognizant of the fact that that case was termi-
nated without an actual trial, I consider that the work done 
in preparation for the trial and the investigation entailed, and 
the. responsibility involved, was reasonably worth $1,500. 
No. 9: ''Suit in State of New York to set aside deed con-
veying· Newburgh real estate:" 
Mr. Parker placed a valuation of $1,500 upol). that, and that 
is my conclusion as to the proper, fair and reasonable value 
of the service rendered in that suit. . 
· While that did not ultimately come to a final 
page 270 ~ trial, it was necessary to have it removed to the 
Federal Court, and there was a good deal of labor 
entailed in connection with other phases of it, and I consider 
that charge reasonable. 
No. 10: "Application of Mary Hayes Guilfoil for letters 
of administration in Orange County, New York": 
Mr. Parker placed a valuation of $1,500 on that item, and 
it seems to me that is a fair charge under the circumstances. 
No. 11: "Suit of Mary Hayes Guilfoil, Administratrix, in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia, to recover assets in the han!da of Adelaide M. 
Hayes:'' 
The valuation of Mr. Pai·ker is $1,750. I concur in that 
~harge also. 
Item 12: ''Second will contest, in United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,'' which proceed-
ing involved also appeals to the Circuit Court of Appeals 
and opposition to getting- a ,,rrit of certiorari before the United 
States Supreme Court. 
I consider the charge made of $5,000 in that case reason-
able. 
No. 13: '' Third will contest in the Circuit Court of Princess 
Anne County, Virginia,'' which also involved an 
page 271 ~ appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia. 
]\fr. Parker placed a valuation of $4,500 on that. I h'ave 
place a valuation of $5,000, the same as in the preceding item, 
as I consider the: services in the two cases are about the same 
and entitled to. the same compensation; they involve elements 
and points which are so dissimilar that they can be regarded 
as practically separate proceedings and entitled to separate 
compensation, and for that reason to approximately the same 
amount. 
No. 14: "Tax matters." 
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As stated before, that would ordinarily be included in the 
general representation of the estate, but a charge of $500 for 
the tax matters, including that in the charge for the estate, 
would be reasonable, I should say. 
Item 15: "Suit of Samuel C. Johnson," $250. 
That would ordinarily be a part of the represeuta tion o.f 
the estate, and I do not see personally how I could make a 
separate charge for that-that is, estimate the value of that,-
and I eliminated that altogether in my conclusion. 
Under Item 16, ''Miscellaneous," valued by Mr. Parker at 
$750, undoubtedly there were a number of matters whicl1 he 
was called upon to deal with under that I1ead which would 
be difficult to classify or value. I put a valuation of $250 
on that rather than $750. 
The total valuation of the various items, in accordance with 
my figures, amounts to $26,100 as against $29,-
page 272 ~ 850 by Mr. Parker. . 
Q. Mr. Smith, as I understood you, you said 
that had you been making up this statement you would have 
considered under heading '' 2. Duties of Executrix'', also the 
headings, "4. Estate Securities and Investments", No. 7. 
Straus & Company Mortgage Bonds", "No. 14. Tax matterg'', 
and ''No. 16. Miscellaneous''; is that right f 
A. '' 15. Miscellaneous.'' 
Q. As I understand it, in your testimony you gave what you 
thought was a proper amount to be charged to each one of 
these headings, although generally speaking it could be 
lumped under one heading, "Duties of Executrix"¥ 
A. That is not necessary under one heading of ''Duties of 
Executrix", but all those various headings could be consid-
ered under one. 
Q. But you did not mean, as I took your answer, that $7,250 
would cover all of those services 7 
A. No. I intended to state it would not. I meant to sav 
in making up these headings, if yon choose to group them 
under one, the various amounts which I stated in detail would 
go to ma.ke up a total of $7,250 as against $8,500, which they 
would make under Mr. Parker's segregation. 
Mr. Maupin: All right, Mr. Baird. 
page 273 ~ CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Baird: 
Q. Mr. Smith, I assume you lrnve no personal knowledge of 
the facts involved in this controversy; is that correct T ..: 
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.A. No personal knowledge other than the investigation I 
have made of the facts from the record which was submitted 
tome. 
Q. You have no personal knowledge other than what waEi 
contained in Mr. Parker's testimony and the exhibits? 
A. The exhibits and the briefs. That is correct, substan-
tially. 
Q. I understand you have no knowledge except what is con-
tained in Mr. Parker's testimony and the exhibits; is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. I was not associated in the case nor talked to the 
witnesses. 
Q. I want the record clear. You are testifying solely upon 
the basis of the statements in Mr. Parker's testimony and 
the facts so far as they are disclosed from the exhibits with 
his testimony; is that a fact? . 
A. I think all of the briefs are filed as exhibits with his tes-
timony, are they not? 
By the Commissioner: Yes. 
·witness: If that is assumed, then that is correct. 
page 274 ~ By Mr. Baird: 
Q. You are testifying upon the assumption that 
Mr. Parker's theory as to the amounts involved and the nature 
of the issues and the extent of the work which was necessary 
and the result that was obtained, are correct, are you not? 
A. Yes, coupled with the fact that by my own investigation 
and reading of the records I ha.ve informed myself as to what 
I consider the issues involved were. 
Q. Well, you are testifying, and your evidence is based 011 
M:r. Parker's testimony and the exhibits filed with it; that 
is my question. 
Mr. Maupin: He has answered once, Mr. Baird. 
Mr. Baird: I want him to answer it again. 
Mr. Baird: 
Q. Answer it, Mr. Smith 1 Do you say, "yes"? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If any of the views which Mr. Parker expressed in liis 
testimony, or if any of tl1e facts whic.h appear in these exhibit~ 
192 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
.1. Sydney 8mith, lr. 
are incorrect, the whole of your testimony would be meaning-
less! 
A. I expect so; I would say if some of the facts are incor· 
rect, that my testimony as to tha.t might be incorrect. 
Q. Are you attempting to so testify, in respect to these 
items, that you could distinguish between any of those which 
the Commissioner regards as established by tes-
page 275 ~ timony and the exhibits and any part that he did 
not consider established Y 
A. I have endeavored to do it by taking them up. seriat-im 
in the manner as split up in the bill. If there are any par-
ticulars which you wish to call my attention to as being incor-
rect, I will be glad to tell you to what extent I think that 
will affect my testimony. 
Q. In arriving at these figures, have you assumed that this 
was a contingent feet . 
A. Naturally. It is one of the elements-
Q. I didn't ask you "naturally". 
Mr. Maupin: I object to the attitude of counsel. The wit-
ness gave an affirmative answer, and I do not think counsel 
should attempt to bully-rag the witness. 
Mr. Baird: He might consider it natural, and I might not. 
Witness: I would like to answer it. In reply to your ques-
tion, I wish to state I have c.onsidered that fact, because it is a 
recognized and important. element as considered by the courts, 
includinp: our Court of Appeals, in arriving at the deteqpi-
nation of a proper fee, and for that reaRon I have considered 
it. 
By Mr. Baird: 
Q. Now, in determining or in expressing your views as to 
the proper charge, have you adopted Mr. Parker's 
p~ge 276 ~ views as to the amounts involved? 
A. I have endeavored not to be influenced to 
any large extent, except in two or threP. im1tanP.P.s which I 
mention, by his views, and I have endeavored, so far as I 
properly and conscientiously could, to place my own valuation 
on those services. 
Q. I do not. think you understood my question. I say 
have vou based it on Mr. Parker's views as to the amount 
of the billy 
A. Yes. I misunderstood you. 
Q. That is. what I thought. Have you based your testi-
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mony on Mr. Parker's views as to the issues that were in-
volved in these various matters with which he has dealt in 
his testimony! 
A. Partly and partly out of fairness to both interests in-
volved-to his interest and to your client's interest,-! tried 
to satisfy myself, insofar as I could, that those issues were 
involved and were important and were considered by the 
proper tribunal. 
Q. What do you consider the amount invol':ed in the 
services Mr. Parker rendered 7 
.A.. The amount in controversy, do you mean T 
Q. The amount involved? 
A. From $110,000 to $125,000. 
Q. What did you consider were the issues with which h_e 
dealt! 
page 277 ~ A. Well, in the first place, the first issue arose 
under Item No. 1 "Probate of Will". That in-
volved the determination of what appears to me to b~ a 
rather anomalous situation. ·Mr. Parker was called upon to 
probate iu Princess Anne County, Virginia, if possible, a wilJ 
which under the laws of the State of Virginia may have been 
revoked and probably was revoked by a subsequent marriag~ 
of the testator. Apparently, how to meet those two divergent 
situations was a matter that he had to consider and decide, 
and which he did decide, and it was apparently the successful 
way. That was one of the issues, and, as I say, an important 
and complicated one. 
Under "issues" do you mean or do you wish me, in reply-
ing, to confine myself to litigated matters in controversy in the 
courts, or do you wish me to also take up, for instance, the 
controversy with the surety on the bond? It was contro-
verted, but not an issue in the way that it went to court, and · 
I would like for you to make your question clearer. ... 
Q. What I thought you meant to say was, and that is what 
I questioned you about, in expressin,g your opinion you had 
acted on the assumption that Mr. Parker's views in all the 
respects in which they appear from his testimony and the 
exhibits, is correct? 
page 278 ~ A. Substantially so because I found from my 
investigation that the testimony is supported by 
the record. 
Q. That is self-evident if you have no knowledge of it. 
A. No; if the record doesn't hear it out, I would not be 
bound by his views. 
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Q. Did you take. i_nto . consideration if the administration 
were not in Virginia,,, ·!:,o far as Mrs. Hayes was concerned, 
it didn't make any di:frerence whether the will was valid or 
noU .· · · 
Mr. Maupin: Objected to as the record does not bear that 
out. The record shows tliat the marriage was attacked. 
A. I presume you wish me to reply. I had considered the 
situation, but I did not arrive at the conclusion that you say 
you arrived at, for the reasons that counsel has just stated. 
I would not voluntarily adopt counsel's objection to my re-
ply, but sinee counsel has made the objection, it would be my 
reply and I state that that is my opinion, that there was 
clearly through the proceeding an implied attack upon the 
validity of the marriage, and that was an issue which, if it 
had gotten to that point, would have been met. 
By Mr. Baird: 
Q. Let me put the question differently. Did you not know 
that under the Virginia law a widow, where there 
page 279 ~ are no issues, takes the ·entire personal estate of 
the husband Y 
A. That is correct. 
Q. All the will left in this case was the personal estate 
to the wife, wasn't it? 
A. That is correct. I do not recall what the will left, but 
as a practical matter I understand the decedent owned no 
real estate in his name and so the will could not operate on 
anything except the personal estate. 
Q. Can you point to any advantage in Virginia that there 
· would have been from the validity of the will, so far as Mrs. 
Hayes was concerned, anything more that she would ha.ve 
gotten under the will than she would ha.ve gotten without 
the will of her husband, there being no issue of the marriagef 
A. If the marriage was not questioned, and there was no 
attempt to have a qualification in another state where the lawe: 
of descent and distribution were different, then I would say 
''yes'' to- your question, but._ that was not the situation here. 
There was a hostile attempt in New York to force the quaH-
fi.cation upon the estate in order that the laws of descent and 
distribution in New York would apply, in which case the 
widow would have been deprived of half of the estate. 
Q. Now, Mr. Smith, I cannot deal with all of these issues 
I 
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in one question, and I am trying to deal with 
page 280 ~ these issues in my question. Your answer to that 
question, as, I understand it, is that you agree 
that the widow under the Virginia law, where the husband 
left no issue, would take ·the entire personal estate and the 
will of Father Hayes in this case left to bis widow the entir{\ 
personal estate; i~n 't that correct? 
A. That is correct, I think, as far as it goes. . 
Q. Well now, if the administration bad been in New York, 
and the will had not been valid, Mrs. Hayes would only have 
gotten half of the estate plus $10,000; isn't that so f Do you 
know that, or noU 
A. "Why the $10,0001 I don't recall that. 
Q. Why the legislature did it, !don't know. , 
A. I have made no personal investigation of the laws of 
the State of New York. I merely understood from the record 
that she would have gotten only half, or approximately half, 
of the estate under the laws of descent and dist.ribution in 
New York. As to whether there was an additional $10,000 
she would have gotten, I couldn't state. 
Q. You couldn't familiarize yourself with this record with-
out knowing the difference that she would have gotten if this 
domicile had ·been in New York and if it had been in Vir-
ginia 1 
Mr. Maupin: I ob,iect to the form of the question. If 
tl1at is contained in the record, I ask counsel to 
page 281 ~ point it out. 
A. I reply that my recollection is that the widow, under 
the laws of tlie State of New York, would have been entitled 
to only one-half of the personal estate. As to whether she' 
would get an additional $10,000, I don't recall whether that 
is true or not true, but I do not think it is of sufficient im-
portance to affect the issue one way or the otl1er, and I am 
unable to make statement whether she got more than half, or 
not. I don't recall. 
By l\fr. Baird: 
·Q. You testified, as I understood you, that your ideas of 
thi~ business were based on what appears in Mr. Parker's tes-
timony and the exhibits, and yon have said that you regarded 
the estate as worth $125,000. Now, is it a fact that although 
you examined these records, you did not know what was the 
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difference ·between the result of a qualification in New York 
and in Virginia Y 
A. I don't consider that that question is a fair one, and . 
I do not agree with the inference contained therein. If there 
is a difference between what she would receive in New York 
of half of the estate, or whether she would receive $10,000 
more, I do not think that is a sufficient difference to materially 
affect the fee in controversy. 
Q. You do not think the difference between the whole of 
the estate and half of it was sufficient to affect 
page 282 ~ your view? 
A. I made no such statement. 
Q. What is your view? 
A. I said I knew that she would get the whole of the estate 
in Virg1nia if the testator died intestate, and my recollection 
of the law in New York is that she would have gotten half of 
the estate. You asked if in addition she would not get $10,000, 
and I do not recall that. . 
Q. Wouldn't it have made a big difference whether she 
had in any event received only half of the estate? 
A. Of course, but I don't think you understand my ques-
tion. 
Q. Wliat I am getting at is that in some eventualities the 
whole of the estate was involved and in some only half of it. 
Did you take into consideration any difference between those 
evantualities? 
A. I did not so phrase it. 
Q. What do yon say about iU 
A. I say if the will was set aside in :Virginia and the mar-
riage was declared null and void in Virginia, I do not see 
how the widow would have gotten anything under any theory; 
she was not his widow, and she did not take under the will. 
so the whole estate was involved in the Virginia litigation. 
Q. You say one of the important elements in the litigation 
with respect to fees was the question of validity or 
page 283 ~ the marriage, clidn 't you? 
A. I stated that ,that was an underlying issue. 
It was not actually litigated and passed upon, but it was 
an issue which would have to ·be met, whether the marriage 
was valid, or not, if the proceeding had reached the point 
where that could he properly litigated. 
Q. Did you lmow that l\fr. Parker, in his memorandum 
attached to his exhibits. said that after investigation he had 
come to the conclusion that. the validity of the marriage could 
not be attacked Y 
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Mr. Maupin: "Couldn't be successfully attacked." 
Bv Mr. Baird: 
"'Q. Well, successfully attacked upon the death of one of the 
parties to the marriage Y 
A. I recall such a statement, that it could not be successfully 
attacked, because I believe that he considered the laws of the 
State of North Carolina would be applicable, or some similar 
conclusion, but regardless of what his conclusion might be, it 
could not prevent any attack being launched against the mar-
riage and bringing up the necessity of sustaining it. Did 
you understand my reply 7 
Q. Yes, I think so. In ar~·iving at the conclusion as to 
the value of Mr. Parker's services, did you accept or reject 
that conclusion of his as to a successful attack on 
page 284 r the marriage relationship Y 
A. Well, I concluded that it was not a question 
that could be decided iµ advance one way or the other, and 
bore in mind the fact that there was probably enough uncer-
tainty involved in the event that that question were finally 
raised to make it very important and a very considerable 
accomplishment to avoid the necessity of it-just as in the 
case of tl1e other . proceeding, in which the issue of mental 
capacity and undue influence was successfully avoided, because 
of the danger in having that submitted to a jury based upon 
the testimony of medical experts, whose opinions seemed to 
be rather unfavorable, as I gathered. 
Q. Do you mean that that statement of ,Mr. Parker meant 
nothing to you in your consideration? 
A. No, I didn't say it meant nothing to me. 
Q. What did it mean to you-anything? 
A. Just what he said. He expressed the opinion that it 
could not be successfully attacked, and if it was attacked 
lrn could not express an opinion what the result would be. 
Q. In arriving at the value of Mr. Parker's services, did 
you make any effort to differentiate between what he did 
for Mrs. Hayes, as executrix, and what he did for her in 
her own rig11U 
A. To a certain extent. 
Q. How do you separate the two? 
A. There were certain matters in which she was 
page 285 ~ personally and separately interested and under 
no theory could the estate have been interestec}f 
as the record stands. Now, for instance, the Virginia Beach 
house was prima~ily her interest; the Newburgh real estate 
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was pri~r:ily hers, and while if a· suit had been snccessfu] 
in setting _.aside the deed to that Newburgh real estate, then 
that w.oulq probably have constituted assets of the estate, 
but up to .the point where that question went in this proceed-
ing the deed conveyed it to her, and it was not an estate 
asset. 
Then again in No. 16, my answer to that question would in-
volve Items 5 and 6 also the suit brought under Item 9 to 
set aside the com1eyance, and also No. 16 '' :M:iscellan~ous '·, 
which I did not place a very great value on because of the 
difficulty of understanding what was done under No. 16. 
Q. In arriving at your conclusion, did you think Mrs. Hayes. 
as executrix, could be charged for any services rendered to 
her as an individual, and vice versa 1 
A. Did I consider that slie would render herself liable-
Q. Read the question back, please. · 
Note : The question was read. 
A. I would not consider that she, as executrix, could make 
the estate liable for services rendered to her fo 
page 286 ~ her personal and individual capacity. 
Q. How do you regard this bill-as a charge 
against her as executrix or as an individual, or as a joint 
charge¥ 
.A. Do you mean by "the bilP' Mr. Parker's charge f 
Q. Yes. 
A. I regarded it for services rendered in both capacities,-
both as an individual and as executrix. 
Q. If the Commissioner should consider that they could 
not be treated together, your opinion ,,rould not be of value? 
Mr. Maupin: I object to that. That is a question for the 
Commissioner. 
A. I ha.ve endeavored in my testimony to place what I con-
sider to be a fair value upon the various services rendered, 
as set up under these various numerical headings. If the 
Commissioner concludes that some of those services were ren-
dered and should be charged against Mrs. Hayes in one 
capacity and some in another, there is no difficulty in sepa-
rating them. 
By Mr. Baird: 
· Q. Suppose the Com.missioner should conclude that many 
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of these items are made up of services rendered to Mrs. 
Hayes in her capacity as executrix and in her personal 
capacity, is there any guide which he could follow in deter-
mining how to apportion the amount which you have said 
is proper for each item? 
page 287 ~ Mr. Maupin: Objected to for the reason that 
the question is argumentative; as it calls upon the 
witness to do the Commissioner's work; it calls for a conclu-
sion, and it is totally irrelevant to any issue in this cause. 
A. In reply, Mr. Baird, as I said before, the account and 
my testimony show certain items which were apparently ren-
dered to Mrs. Hayes in what would appear to be an entirely 
individual capacity. If there are any items which my testi-
mony relates to which the Commissioner so concludes, then 
I will be glad to attempt to separate them; but at the present 
stage of proceedings I do not see how I can unless you point 
out what items you have in mind and why you are asking 
the question, and give me an opportunity to know your 
reasons, and then I will endeavor to answer. · 
By Mr. Baird: 
Q. In arriving at the value of Mr. Parker's services, did 
you think that he could charge as a lawyer for endorsing a 
note or for supervising the construction of the Virginia Bea.ch 
house? 
A. As to the first question, I did not consider it in my 
estimation and I did not place any value upon his endorsing 
the note. I do not think a lawyer would charge so much money 
for endorsing a. note, but I do think that the absolute liability 
and responsibility that Mr. Parker assumed were much fur- . 
ther than the responsibility that is ordinarily as-
page 288 ~ sumed by an attorney representing an estate. 
· As to the other item, as to whether he could 
charge for supervising the erection of a. house, I see no ob-
jection to that. 
Q. You think that he could charge, as a lawyer, for thaU 
A. I think he could charge, as a la,,1yer, for that if he per-
formed that service as a lawyer. 
Q. The basis of compensa.tion would be very different, 
wouldn't iU 
A. The service of a lawyer in supervising the completion of 
n building would probably not be of any more value than any 
other competent person. Is that what you mean 7 
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In other words, an architect, for instance, in whom the 
widow had confidence, could no doubt have performed the 
same service equally as well or possibly better, but since the 
widow availed herself of Mr. Parker's services in that con-
nection, I consider that they .have a value. 
Q. Did you, in your estimate, place any value upon Mr. 
Parker's service and his advice as regarding the securities? 
A. Yes, I certainly did. I think that was very valuable 
service-very valuable·. 
Q. Don't you think information in regard to the securities 
can better be goten from ·brokers and lawyers and , 
page 289 ~ bankers without any charge 1 
A. I do not. I think bankers and brokers are 
the legitimate and natural source from which to secure in-
formation, but in determining the value of that information, 
I think a lawyer can very properly consider and report it, and 
it has been my experience, not only very frequently but prob. 
ably in the majority of instances, persons prefer to hav~ the 
advice of a competent lawyer in the last analysis rather 
than to rely on the advice of bankers and brokers, which is 
gratuitous, where they make no charge, where the lawyer 
making a charge is presumed to exercise a little higher degree 
of care at least in analyzing the· possible conflicting reports 
which might come from brokers and bHnkers. 
In that connection I call vour attention to the fact that 
under "4" (that is "securities and investments'', and "7, 
Straus & Company honcls ", I qualified my testimony, and I 
wish to do so again, by saying that it is much more difficult for 
any lawyer ( certainly, it is for me )1 to place a value upon that 
kind of service tlian it would be to place a value upon a 
straight litigated matter such as these cases which ,vent from 
one court to another and which, from a lawyer's experie_nce 
and my experience, you can usually place some measure of 
value upon. But where the question of making investments 
or advising investments and the questions of re-
page 290 ~ newing these various Straus bond issues rmd re-
financing, and things of that kind, there is very 
little on the record· that any lawyer can get from a record· 
of this kind that will determine exactly the amount of time 
and labor involved, but I think from the record the charges 
I havf:l expressed are fair, and that is as far as I can go on 
these items. 
Q. You know that a lawyer, as such, would not have any 
knowledge of the value of securities, and any advice that he 
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gave his client would necessarily be predicated on information 
that he got from others? 
A. I would not say that that is always true. I think that 
lawyers who have had experience are as well informed as 
bankers and probably more so in many instancee¥ 
Q. Did you get any concrete idea of how much time Mr. 
Parker had given to this service 1 
A. Do you m~an in hours? 
Q. Any way you care to express it-monthly, if you like: 
A. I did examine the office files of Mr. Parker in his office, 
his own original office files ; I looked through them. Of course 
I did not read each document, but I did go over them, in addi-
tion to examining the record which I have already testified 
to, and while I did not attempt to place any actual number of 
hours or days or weeks he spent, it is perfectly 
page 291 ~ apparent that the task was of gigantic magnitude 
and that he has spent an enormous amount of 
time upon it. 
Q. Do you recall that Mr. Parker said it took him two 
months to make up the account t 
A. I recall such a statement in the record, yes. 
Q. Did that indicate that he worked fast or slowly f 
A. vVell, he didn't say that he took two months every day 
working nights and Sundays. My recollection is that he 
stated that the preparation of this account covered a period 
of two months, and that he did not work constantly all that 
time. I can readily see, from looking at his personal records 
and files in his office, that with other office matters to handle 
he could very easily have taken that lo11g. The files in his 
office take up one entire drawer of the cabinet, the average 
size, three feet deep, possibly. 
Q. Did you consider in connection with these various items 
as to which you have testified what percentage they repre-
sented of the amount involved in those particular matters 7 
A. I do not think it would be possible to do that. I do not 
see how you could separate a controversy involving an amount 
so you could consider any of those items with the exception 
of "investment of securities" and the handling of the mort-
gage bonds and the real estate. Two or three of 
page 292 ~ those did have some separate and separable value, 
perhaps, but as to the others I do not think you 
could separate them alone because eaeh one of them involv.ed 
the whole estate-each one of the other issues, in other words, 
if decided adversely to Mrs. Hayes, would have meant the loss 
of the entire estate probably. 
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Q. Coming to ·the first item of $500 for probating the wiU, 
are you cognizant of any reason for doing anything more 
than carrying that will to the Clerk and having it admitted 
to record, as ordinarily would have been done? 
A. Well, of course, among the other details, the 
page 293 ~ question of taking testimony away from here was 
necessary, but the investigation entailed before 
that decision could be properly made was cpnsiderable. As I stated before, Mr. Parker was confronted with the 
question of probating a will which under the laws of the State 
in which it was offered for probate ( that is, this State) was 
apparently revoked by the subsequent marriage, if valid, and 
I.would say that if, after that question had been decided by 
Mr. Parker and the will properly probated, if at that stage 
his services had been disposed of and he had been no longer 
retained in connection with the estate, I do not see how any-
one could fairly say that his services up to that point were 
not worth $500.00. 
Q. Nothing would have been necessary for the probate of. 
the will except to take the ex parte deposition or statement of 
one witness who could testify as to the genuineness of the 
signature of the testator; isn't that correcU 
A. If Mr. Parker had been willing to practice law that way-
hit or miss. 
Q. What would he do about going to Newburgh f 
A. I say his investigation for the purpose of determining 
the method of procedure was most probably the most im~ 
portant element in fixing the procedure. 
page 294 ~ Q. Would you say that he ultimately did what 
he could have done at first without any trouble or 
expense? 
A. No, I would not say that. I do not think any lawyer-
Q. (Interposing) What is your reason for thinking that? 
A. Because if the lawyer, without any regard to the con-
sequences and just hoping maybe he is right, takes certain 
action and it later turns out that he is not right, I do not 
think he discharged his duty to his client if he just guessed 
right. · · 
Q. What was the oblig·ation on Mr. Parker to go to New-
lmrgh and make th~ investigation before he admitted this will 
to probate¥ 
A. Because he knew there were circumstances of importance 
which he should be familiar with affecting tl1e validity of the 
will, and also the Question of tl1e mental capacity of the testa-
tor at the time of the marriage. 
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Q. Are you still of the opinion that there would have been 
any difference, so far as Mrs. Hayes is concerned, whether· 
he admitted the will to probate, or not, in Virginia? 
A. I say it is entirely possible there might have been. 
Q. How could there have been? 
A. I explained in some detail my reasons, . I 
page 295 ~ think. I think my answer on that subject is full 
eriough. 
Q. Did you testify the item of $500 for probating the will 
is one of those wl1ich should have been included in the charge 
for general services? 
A. It could properly have been. It could have been. 
Q. Now, coming to this item of $3,750, No. 2, for perform-
ing the duties of the executrix, do you think that Mr. Parker 
could have performed the duties that the law imposed upon 
the executrix Y 
A. He could insofar as the actual detail performance of 
those duties was concerned if she intrusted them to him. 
Q. Do you find anything in this record to prevent the execu-
trix from getting the fees allowed by law to her? 
A. I do not. · 
Q. If :Mr. Parker is paid $3,750 and she is paid the ordi-
nary fees, the estate is charged with double expense for ad-
ministration, isn't it? 
A. If anyone other than the widow were interested in that 
question, it might be of some importance insofar as what 
compensation the executrix would be allowed, because the 
measure of compensation under our statute is reasonable com-
pensation, and if a creditor or some other person interested 
in the estate could show that an additional charge of that 
amount, or of a large a.mount to the executrix, was unreason-
able, she would be disallowed. In other words, if 
page 296 ~ it appeared that Mr. Parker had done everything 
that she should have done, and she did nothing, 
if proper· objection was made I have no doubt that her com-
pensation would be reduced or limited. 
Q. You, as a lawyer, think nobody could perform the duties 
of an executrix-imposed on another? 
A. I know the personal representative is always charged 
with the responsibility for the proper performance of them. 
Q. A lawyer could be advised with about it, but I mean 
the performance? 
A. If the personal representative sees fit to have some-
one else, for instance as a trust company, where they qualify, 
they have some employees who do the bookkeeping, and I have· 
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no doubt that a representative can have someone else to do 
the acts necessary to administer the estate. 
Q. In approving the $3,750, did you have in mind that he 
would do the whole administration under the circumstances, 
or not} 
A. No, I did not. I stated that that charge, in connection 
with items 4, 7, 14 and 15, could properly be considered under 
one heading, if so desired. I think it is better to split up 
the various items that go to make up one particular heading, 
as has been done h~re, hut I consider that the items which 
are referred to as the first will cas-e and the suit 
page 297 r in the State of New York to satisfy the deed to 
the N ewbnrgh real estate, wh~t is referred to as 
the second and third will contests, I think that they have a 
very distinct difference from one another, but these .other 
items which I have referred to it is difficult to separate ex-
cept to arrive at a fair value, because they all come under 
one heading. 
Q. Do you think the issue of stock certificates which be-
longed to the estate, but ::M:r. Parker put in his own name, 
has any effect in protecting those certificates from any at-
tack, if they did not really belong to him? 
A. As a practical matter and as a legal matter, if a suit. 
were properly brought against Mr. Parker to set up a re-
sulting trust of some sort, of course they could be reached, 
hut if the purpose in him taking them in that way was in 
the first place so that there would be nothing of record to 
invite an attempt in New York to bring a suit in New York 
to subject those-furthermore, it would have been necessary 
no doubt to have proceeded down here in Virginia against 
him if the other parties liad wis·hed to take any action along 
that line. 
Certainly bi$ method of ·protecting the securities was a 
wise one, I would say, and one which it was better to have 
done than not to have done it. 
Q. Then you agree that the purpose of taking 
page ?98 ~ those certificates in his name would have been un-
accomplished if the parties in interest had really 
known the facts, don't you? 
A. That would call for too mn<~h expression of opinion. I 
would not be prepared to say. If the other parties knew 
all the facts and they brought proper proceedings in the 
proper tribunal and in the proper jurisdiction, and succeeded 
in the attempt, then his efforts would have been nullified. 
Q. "\Vouldu 't the taking of these certificates in Mr. Parker's 
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1iame have rendered them prima facie liable to-his creditors 
or his devisees' 
A. From the record, that action was taken with the full 
knowledge and request of the widow, and if there was any 
liability she assumed it; but; regardless of that, as a proposi-
tion of law, where a trust of that nature is established, it is 
valid as against creditors of the trustee. 
Q. Would you say in tha.t respect that that was one of the 
elements of the consideration that he thought he was entitled 
toY 
A. That was one of the elements because I thought the re-
sponsibility involved was extraordinary and not of the nature · 
that ordinarily existed .of an attorney representing an estate. 
Certainly it is my practice to aV'oid becoming the personal 
custodian of securities and funds of an estate which I repre-
sent purely as an attorney, unless there is some 
page 299 ~ particular reason for it, such as instituting suit. 
Q. I understood you to say yon approved of 
the charge, or disapproved of the charge, of $2,000 for the 
controversy in regai'cl to the bonds, but that a charge of $1,000 
would be proper 1 
A. That is what I stated. 
Q. What theory is that based on 1 Wha.t could the surety 
have done under Section 5~17 in order to get out of liability? 
A. ·without referring to that section, but assuming it is 
that section, the surety company, at all events and without 
any reason the ref or, could have been relieved of liability 
on the matter. 
Q. You know that is a matter of judicial determination, 
don't you 1 There was no right of the surety to be relieved T 
A. I disagree with yon. The statute says, referring to the 
section : '' The court under whose order or under the order of 
whose clerk any such fiduciary derives his authority, on the 
application of any surety or his personal representative, shall, 
at any time, whether such fiduciary shall or shall not have 
before given bond • * * revoke and annul his powers." I 
have omitted from that quotation the part beginning with or-
'' Or when it appears proper on the report of such clerk or 
commissioner." So the statute gives the surety 
page 300 } the absolute right, without giving any cause what-
soever, to be relieved from its liability from that 
time forward. Of course, he cannot be relieved from liability 
that may have accrued prior to that, but the latter pa.rt of 
the statute, where someone other than the surety applies, 
it does require some proof. 
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Q. Your idea is that Section 5417 gives the surety the 
right! ~ 
A. That has always been my under~tanding of the proper 
construction of that section. 
Q. Of course, the Commissioner is to construe that statute. 
Did you have any reason for thinking that if the Court did re-
lease this surety, that Mrs. Hayes would have any trouble in 
getting another surety? 
A. I would say that if a surety is permitted to get out under 
these circumstances, it would be very difficult to get another 
surety to take its place. I think it would be practically im-
possible. 
Q. It was on·that theory-(that is the one you have just 
stated) you thought Mr. Parker could properly make a charge 
of $1,000 for that service! 
A. As an additional item by his rep1·esentation of the estate~ 
I would say that that would be a proper additional charge, be- . 
cause he was required, as a condition to the surety remaining 
upon the bond to become personally responsible 
page 301 ~ for every act of the personal representative. 
Mr. Baird: If your Honor please, I object to that state-
ment, as I do not think it proper. We will introduce at the 
_proper time the document Mr. Parker signed, and, as I read it, 
it does not do anything more than:.__ 
The Commissioner: (Interposing) He can state his reason 
for coming to the conclusion that $1,000 is proper. .As to 
whether the statute justifies it, that is a matter for considera-
tion. 
Witness: My conclusion is that he did perform services of 
substantial value and importance which would not be per-
formed in the representation of the average estate by the 
average attorney, and that the services were reasonably worth 
$1,000. 
Mr. Maupin: Here is the joint control agreement whieh we 
introduced the other day (handing paper). 
By Mr. Baird: 
Q. Will you look at the agreement signed by Mr. Parker, 
"Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 8", and say whether it contains any 
undertaldng· upon his part except not to wrongfully or im-
properly expend the funds or dispose of the a_ssets of the 
estatet 
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· . · . · . Mr. Maupin: Are you willing tQ put on that 
page 302 ~ question "or. permit to be expended"? 
Mr. Baird:. Yes,. whatever that paper says. I 
haven't the exact language . in. mind. 
- A. That is s_ubstantially the undertaking, as I construe 
it from reading it, and my-answer to the question is the samo 
as I have just made previously, -namely, that. the requirement 
imposed upon Mr. Parker by that agreement was of a nature 
which he, as- an attorney representing the estate, was under no 
obligation to.assume by virtue of his usual representation un-
less he saw fit to do·so, ·-and-he did so because of the urgency 
of the occasion, and, as the result, I consider -that he is en-
titled to additional .compensation for that reason. 
' . 
By Mr. Baird: . . . 
Q. What was. the proper charge for that particu.l.ar service Y 
Did you. feel that Mr. _Parker. ever undertook ·any risk for 
which he should be compensate~U :. 
A. Anybody :who 'has custody-pf securities, whether they are 
joint or separate, takes a risk.··.'. . 
· Q. Do you think as a lawyer. he .could, charge :for assuming 
a risk for his clienU ~ ~ · · · : 
.A. I see no reason why he should not. . 
Q. Do you know that, in arriving'·at the value o.f the estate, 
Mr. Parker took into considera.tion accretion in value of some 
of the stock? · : · ,; 
A. I recall there were · spme accretions, · but 1 
page 803 J do not recall that they wei·e of great amount. 
· Q. If there were.losses, _do you think that they 
should also have been taken into ·corisidC'ration? 
A. I think that a substantial loss should be considered 
if a substantial increase were considered, yes. 
Q. Wol)ld your opinion as to the .. value of the service be 
changed if you knew the .net differ<?nce between the gains and 
losses was a loss of $9.000 T · 
.A. I do not think that that would, unless there is some 
evidence of negligence or some circumstance which would 
make it appear that Mr. Parker was any more responsible 
for it, that that should make any material difference in the 
ultimate compensation. 
Q. When you approved the item of $H50, No. 6, for serv-
ices ht reg·ard to the N ewburg·h estate, did that mean the con-
troversy over the title T 
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A. No. That had to do with the management of the prop-
erty, which services could no doubt, just as in the case of 
the Virbrinia Beach house, have been performed just as welJ 
by some other competent person, but since someone had .to 
supervise that property for the benefit of the widow, and she 
availed herself of those services, that. is the reason I think 
a fair compensation should be allowed. 
page 304 ~ Q. What do you mean by that expression '' su-
pervise''? 
A. That she apparently felt, from· the fact that she per-
mitted Mr. Parker to supervise-and I will explain what I 
mean by that,-a.nd took the benefit of his service, apparently 
she considered that merely a real estate agent in Newburgh 
to run the property was not satisfactory, and, as in the 
case of any owner, any careful owner, they naturally have 
got to supervise closely the activities of the agent charged 
with renting th~ property, collecting rents, repairing and do-
ing other things necessary to protect the property, and since, 
in this instanc«?, the owner did not do it and allowed Mr. Par-
ker to do it, I think he should be compensated. Do 1 make 
myself clear, what I mean by "supervise"! The owner 
naturally supervises, but if the owner doesn't do it and em-
ploys someone else, that should be an element of compensa-
tion. 
Q. I understand ... from your answer that the property was 
in charge of an agent, and Mr. Parker's charge of $350 was 
for supervising the agent; is that right? 
A. It had to do with installation of other items, such as 
improvements and other items which, without referring fo 
the record, I could uot enumerate. The same. thing is true 
about that particular item as is true, as I said before, about 
, the Virginia Beach house, and also items 4 and 7. 
page 305 f Q. The one that we are dealing with now only 
relates to Newburgh·¥ 
A. I mean· that it is difficult for a lawyer to place n value 
on that kind of service unless he himself performs it. R:e-
ferrin~· to the detail bill which I read, and which I consid-
ered at the time I renched that conclusion, it is apparent that 
there were a number of items which were passed upon by 
l\fr. Parker which an agent. could not properly determine, 
and which either the owner or someone acting for the owner 
could only properly determine. Reference to these items, as 
set out in section 6, will show in detail, and I considered them 
,in arrivjng at my conclusion. 
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Q. Now, coming to Section 7, which is spoken of generally 
as the Straus bonds, there are lettered items commencing 
at A and ending at M; did not that service relate to bond 
issues secured on real estate, and all of which were in de0 
fault? 
. A. My recollection is that allt or practically all, either were 
in default or later became in default. I do not recall the 
exact time, hut I think practically all. at one time were in 
default. 
Q. Isn't it a fact that the estate held a very small per-
centage of any of the issues 7 
A. In most instances, compared with the. individual issuet 
the proportion of the estate was relatively small 
page 306 ~ because the issues were very large. 
Q. Now, you have said that Mr. Parker was en-
titled to a fee of $1,500 for that service; now, what I want to 
know is what could he have done with respect to those bonds Y 
Could he have done anything to affect tl1e interest of the es-
tate one way or the othert 
A. He could and did in several instances satisfy himself 
that efforts that were being made by ce.rtain reorganization 
committees were of questionable nature,· or at least some 
of the personnel of these committees were not such as to be 
relied upon, and, as the result, in certain instances, as I recall, 
the reorganization was handled through other committees, 
because the committees soliciting their support were not per-
mitted to function. 
If the person who was interested had not taken the action 
that was taken in this case, but had permitted those other 
committees to function, the result to the estate might have 
been much less satisfactorv than it was. 
Counsel are frequently subjected to inquiries and solicita-
tions from various groups of persons interested who are en-
deavoring· to solicit control from other stockholders, fre-
quently from a purely selfish and sometimes, I should say, 
fraudulent motives in some instances, and certainly if the 
estate avails itself of the benefit of investigation to try to 
prevent the estate being subjected to such possi-
page 307 ~ bility, some compensation should be paid for it. 
As I said before, it is very difficult, and I do 
not hesitate t.o say I consider it very difficult for me to place 
a flat valuation upon what the services are worth, but as 
near as I can arrive at a conclusion, it seems $1,500 is not 
unreasonable. 
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· .. -:Q. You know th~-minority bondholders co.uld not have fore· 
closed the mortgage; or do you T , i ·., 
A. I do not know that they could not have foreclosed. 
Q. Did you assume that they could o:r; could not have fore-
closed, in arriving at the value of these services i 1 
A. I do not know why a minority of tbe ·stockholders could 
not have foreclosed, subtect to a prior· lien. , · · · 
Q. Do you. think th~ estate ·could; have· protected itself by 
buying in the prope11ies Y 
A. I did not. assume, on. the · basis of the interest of the 
estate, that the estate would have ·been justified alone in do-
ing so, but by' aligning· other interests similarly situated, and 
some of which· were as· small as this, they were able to get 
the benefit through a reliable committee. · · · · · · 
Q. I ask you if it is not ·completely evident to you that Mr. 
Parker did not and· could not have done- anything in regard 
to these bonds in def a ult· except to go ih with the b<indholder$ 
committee and· a'CCept' the best terms that they offered 1 
A. If the circumstances justified other action, 
page 308 ~ there was· a ce1:tain other action w~ich could have 
· be~n 'taken-: .. : ..iction towards crystallizing their in-
terests with other .similar interests, but, regardless of that 
fact, the question of what 1\fr. Parker did api)eared to me to 
he the controlling sittiation,~not' the question of what he 
might have done. It was the question of what ·he did with 
the knowledge and approval of his client which entitled him 
to compensation, even though the client migbt have gotten 
along without it. · · · 
Q. Can you point to anything that Mr. Parker did in re-
gard to the Straus bonds, ftem No~ 7, which resulted in any 
benefit to. the est~te~ qr a.nythinj~ tllat he could, in the nature 
of things; ·have ·clpne except to read the reports t]1at were sent 
out by the reorganiza.tion· committees? · 
· A. In the" first" instance, the· question of benefit to a client, 
by the rul~ of ·our. court., whn~· it is an item which may be 
considered, it is in no way· controlling. If a lawyer perform~ 
service of vafoe; he is entitled to compensation for it, and 
all I can· say 'is that in order ·to answer your question I will 
have to re3:d the entire f?p~cificat.ion. It is already in the 
record, and I base my answer on the specification as set out 
in that item for services that he had apparently rendered. 
Q. Would you think a lawyer could charge a client for use-
- · less service rendered in g·ood faith T · 
page 309 ~ A. I do not think that question at all pertinem,t 
be~ause these services were not useless, but, if 
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you want me to answer the question in the form you asked 
it, I will say that while I think the question and answer both 
are immaterial, to my point of view if a client employs a 
lawyer to do a useless thing, then the client is expected to 
pay for it. 
Q. What do you understand to have been the services for 
which you approved a charge of $1,nOO in what is designated 
as Item 8, the first will contest T What was done there Y 
A. Mr. Parker placed a valuation of $3,000 on those serv-
ices, and I consider them to be reasonably worth $1,500. 
The nature of the services involved preparation for trial 
upon the issue of testamentary capacity, the taking of depo-
sitions of considerable length and importance, and, except to 
actually go through the trial, counsel had done everything 
that was necessary. 
Of course, as we all know, the most duties and the most 
responsibility towards the preparation of any case i~ before 
the trial of it. I think that the services rendered in preparing 
for trial are of very substantial worth and value to the client 
· .even thoug·h they may not have used the services in the trial. 
· Q. You know that there was not any trial of 
page 310 } that case, don't you f 
A. I so stated. But that was not known to Mr. 
Parker until the morning· the case was called for trial, and lw 
was prepared to proceed with the trial on that morning. 
Q. Your basis for the char~e is preparation for the trial f 
A. Since it was not tried, there was no charge on the basis 
of the trial. 
Q. What was the point? Was it an appeal fi·om probate? 
A. I so stated. · 
Q. Isn't that. the same point as involved in all the other 
litigation 7 
A. It was not. It was always a possible issue in the back-
ground, particularly in the third will contest, but in no other 
case wa.s it necessary to make preparation to t.he extent that 
preparation was made in the fi.rst will contest to me(lt the 
issue of testamentary capac.ity, for the reason that in the so .. 
called second will ront.est in the f cderal court the issue wai:; 
avoided upon the question of jurisdiction, and in the third 
will contest the testamentary capacity was avoided because 
of the question of domicile which was raised and finally dis-
posed of the case, so that actual question of testamentary 
capacity and possible undue influence was closer at hand in 
the first will contest than in either of the others, as I gather 
it. 
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page 311 J Q. ·wen, if the same preparation was appro-
priate in respect to all of these matters, is it 
proper tha.t Mr. Parker should charge for the preparation 
of each of them? 
lVIr. Maupin: The question is objected to for the reason 
that the question is predicated on a situation the exact op-
posite of what was disclosed in the record, and, therefore, 
the matter of preparation has nothing to do with the matter 
before the court. 
A. As I just stated, the preparation for the second and 
third contests was different in every respect from the prepara-
tion likely in the first. will contest. 
In the second will contest it. was conducted through the 
federal court, including the Circuit Court of Appeals and up 
to the point of application being made to the United States 
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, the question involved 
was one of jurisdiction of the courts, nnd such a question 
was not and could not possibly have been raised in the state 
courts because the jurisdiction of the state court was un-
questioned. . 
lVIr. Parker, through these proceedings, was confronted by 
Mr. Heath, a very able and resourceful lawyer, and Mr. Par-
ker was faced with the necessity of meeting what amounted to 
three entirely separate and distinct issues although ulti-
mately, of course, what !fr. Parker was trying to do was to 
have the will sustained, and, in order to ac-
page 312 ~ complish that, he was also endeavoring to avoid 
having a show-down upon. the mental capacity of 
the testator and undue influence. He was successful in do-
ing so, as the record shows. 
As I said before, in the second wiH contest the question 
differentiated between the proceeding of a probate proceed-
arirued successfully. and it was ultimately held that the pro-
ing and a proceeding inter-parties was brought out, was 
ceeding was really a probate proceeding· in another form, 
which the federal court could not take jurisdiction on, and 
it wa~ thrown out. 
So, I say the preparation a.nd trial of the three will cases 
were just as separate and distinct as if there had been dif-
ferent estates involved, so far as the particular issues were 
involved. · 
Bv Mr. Baird: 
·Q. It would simplify this examinatioil very muc]1 (and I 
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do not mean to confine you) if you will answer my question. 
I asked you about one item, and you talk about two or three 
others, and it confuses the record. 
Mr. Maupin: I object to tha.t statement of counsel. The 
answer of the witness was directly responsive to the ques-
tion, and the witness should not be lee.tured by counsel for 
answering in a way whieh is not pleasing to opposing coun-
sel. 
page 313 } Mr. Baird: I ·object to this witness not answer-
ing my question. Mr. Smith is· a lawyer. I do 
not mean to be technical, but I think he should answer it. 
Bv Mr. Baird: 
., Q. My question related distinctly-
A. (Interposing) You asked in effect if the preparation 
for the first will contest. would not have been sufficiFmt for 
all three contests. Tlmt is the substance of xour question, 
and I told vou it could not be. 
Q. I asked you wl1at was the service to be performed in re-
gard to the first wi11 contest, item 8? 
Mr. Maupin: That is not the question. 
A. I would like the reporter to read the question back, be-
cause I did not understand that that was the question. 
Mr. -:Maupin: The question was if the preparation was not 
the same in all cases. The witness told you it was not, and 
gave his reasons why it was not. It was directly responsive 
to your question as propounded. 
Mr. Baird: Let us see what it was. 
Note: The quest.ion was read. 
Mr. Baird: I stand corrected, your Honor. I am wrong. 
Bv Mr. Baird: 
·Q. What was the service that l\Ir. Parker rendered in con-
nection with Item 8, spoken of as the fir~t will 
page 314 } contest, and for which you say ]1e was entitled 
to a fee of $1,5001 
A. I was under the impression I bad answered it, but I 
will repeat it if you think I have not. . 
Q. I would like to know what you have to say about it. 
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A.. The service that he rendered was making a full, thorough 
and complete preparation in the first will contest to meet 
the issue of mental incap~city of the teE;tator and the ques-
tion of undue influence in the execution of the will, and, in 
order to be prepared to meet that issue, Mr. Parker had 
taken depositio~s -himself, attended the taking of other depo-
sitions for the contestants, prepared inst.ructions to be used 
at the ·trial, ai#l; .,..of · course, made a considerable investiga-
tion of authorifies1 applicable thereto, and until that morn-
ing, in a shol'i.~w·N,le before the case was called for trial, was 
.under the impression that he would be requhed to try it. 
So, otber than go through the actual physical process of 
trying the case, he did everything else up to the point of ac-
tual~y going to trial, because of the action by contestants' 
counsel in taking· a non-suit. 
Q. I find in that answer the same objection as I found 
with the fi.rst. vVhat sort of preparation did he makeY What 
did he prepare for Y 
Mr. Maupin: Mr. Baird, he just told you that. 
Mr. Baird: He said he made preparation for 
page 315 ~ the contest. 
Mr. Maupin: Let us get the reco1·d at reason-
able length. The witness has told you three times that Mr. 
Parker interviewed witnesses, took deposition~, examined au-
thorities and everything bnt try the case. 
Mr. Baird: I understand. that as well as Mr. Maupin. I 
asked him in what respect he made preparation. 
A. What do you mean by ''respect'' t 
By Mr. Baird: 
Q. I mean prepared it. with respect to the competency of 
Father Hayes, or whether it was a valid marriage, or whether 
there should be probate here or in New York 7 
A. I do not think there was occasion on this particular 
issue to prepare it on the question of the marriage. The 
sole question was mental capacity and undue influence, as I 
recall it. He had made some investigation as to the validity 
of the marriage prior to that time. 
Q. For you to measure the worth of his investigation, I 
want to know what the investigation was? 
A. I stated the investigation up to that point had included 
everything that any. reasonable lawyer could think was neces-
sary, in my opinion. 
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Q .. What did you understand to be the issue in the New-
burgh suit, Item No. 9, for which you approved 
page 316 ~ .a charge of $1,500 f 
A. The principal issue was the question of the 
mental capacity of the grantor to execute the deed and the 
question of the undue influence-principally undue influence, 
I assume. Usually where undue influence is asserted and 
mental capacity, the two are closely related. 
Q. You are cognizant that Mr. Parker, through the estate, 
employed Messrs. Hunt, Hill & Betts to defend it T 
A. I knew counsel had been employad, but did not recall 
the name. 
Q. Did you take that into consideration 7 
A. I did, because I understood the associate counsel acted 
purely under instructions from l\fr. Parker, and in certain 
instances Mr. Parker had to overrule their conclusions as to 
what could be done, and especially the removal to the federal 
court, which, if it had not been accomplished, would have 
resulted differently from what it did. 
So, while services were perf armed by other counsel in New 
York State, the burden of directing those services and mak-
ing decisions in relation thereto were borne entirely by Mr. 
Parker. 
Q. In that matter, he was the forwarding counsel and con-
sulting counsel, and that is all f 
A. No. I just stated that he was the guiding and direct-
. ing and controlling counsel. 
page 317 ~ Q. Did be conduct the litigation? 
.A. He prepared papers with reference to the 
removal of the proceeding to the federal court, and he either 
prepared or directed t.he. preparation of the other pleadings, 
as I recall. The case was never tried, so I-
Q. (Interposing) There was never any trial of that suiU 
A. There was not on the merits. 
Q. Now, you have expressed the opinion that $1,500 was 
a fair charge for Mr. Parker's services in regard to Item 
10, the application of l\frs. Guilfoil, who was Father Hayes' 
sis_ter, I believe, for letters of administration; isn't it a fact 
that Mr. Parker's services in that connection consisted of a 
consideration and investigation as to whether he should op-
pose the application and the determination that he should 
not, and so nothing was done whatever? 
A. ~riefly stated, that is correct. The chief item to be 
considered in connection with those services was the· respon-
sibility involved and entailed by that decision; and, in order 
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to arrive at the conclusion that was arrived at, of course it. 
is onlv reasonable to assume that considerable research was 
i1ecessary to determine whether a proceeding of that nature 
was solely in. rem, and whether or not by ignoring it they 
might not find themsP.lves bound by the proceeding. 
It was a very difficult decision to make, a.nd if 
page 318 ~ the decision were w!·ong it would have resulted 
at that point disastrously. I think the charge is 
reasonable. 
I considered whether or not. the same charg·e that was made 
under No. 1 of $500 would be sufficient, and I realize on that 
particular item of $1,500 there might reasonably be ground 
for disagTeement wit.11 other counsel, lmt I still consider that 
$1,500 is not unreasonable under the circumstances and is a 
fair charge. 
Q. So far as you know, as I understand, Mr. Park0r 's serv-
ices in that connection consisted in the conclusion which he 
arrived at in not opposing the g-ranting· of those letters ·y 
A. Taken in connection with my preceding answer, I would 
say yes. Of course, it is hard to say ''Yes" or "No" to a 
hard proposition of that kind. 
Q. I do not mean to limit you. Now, you said in regard 
to Item 11, which was the first suit in tbe United States 
Court, that you tl1oug·ht a charge of $1,750 was reasonable; 
what did Mr. Parker do in that suit which you think was 
worth $1,750? 
A. In that suit Mrs. Guilfoil instituted proceedings in 
equity, proceedings in a somewhat analogous way to a 
replevin. In other words, she treated the widow as being· n 
person having no legal standing in any court and having 
wrong-fully taken possession of the assets of the estate which 
l\Irs. Guilfoil claimed under her qualification she 
page 319 ~ was entitled to. The bill in effect, I assumed, 
asked for an accounting and the delivery of the 
assets to her, and brought, of course, on the ground of diverse 
citizenship. 
That case was not tried, but t]rnt pre~f'nted a number of 
questions which required an investigation of a nature that 
could not be covered bv the invesforntion that had been made 
up to that point, or which was made subsequently in any of 
the other cases, and, as the reRult of the tactics employed 
bv Mr. Parker, the case was not tried and was ultimately 
disposed of, and I consider the service~ that be rendere~l very 
important because if that r.ase lrnd gone to trial on the t11eory 
.: :., ' :~: I 
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on which the plaintiff had ~rought the proceeding, namely, 
that the qualification.here could be ig·nored, the plaintiff could 
accomplish indirectly what up to that· time she had been un-
able to accomplish directly. 
Q. Your idea about the charge is tha.t $1,750 was reason-
able for the preparation of that suit, for the trial of that 
suit, although it was never tried; is that right f 
A. There were some proceedings in the case. Without re-
ferring to the record, I do not recall exactly what they were. 
While the case was not ultimately disposed of on its 
merits, there were some proceedings I would say that sub-
stantially-
page 320 ~ Mr. Maupin: (Interposing) I ask that the 
witness be permitted to refresh his recollection 
on that. 
Note: Paper is handed to the witness. 
·witness: By referring to the particulars, the proceedings 
in court, which I referred to but which I did not recall with-
out referring to it, was a motion to dismiss, and a brief of 
authorities was prepared and other pleadings prepared and 
filed, so I would say that substantial services were rendered, 
and that $1,750 was not an excessive cliarge for tha.t. 
Bv Mr. Baird: 
· Q. Can you, or not, point to any difference between the 
issues in that case and the issues in the second suit in the 
United States Court and in either of tl1e cases in Princess 
.Anne Countv or in New York State f , 
A. 'Nell, as to the second will contest in the Federal Court, 
there was no principal similarity. That was decided on tbe 
question whether the Federal Court had probate jurisdic-
tion and whether or not the proceeding instituted under the 
title of the second will contest was or was not a probate 
proceeding. That issue was not raised under No. 11 except 
that-it does not appear that the issue raised in the second 
will contest was raised in the suit referred to under No. 11. 
It was an entirely different proceeding·. 
page 321 ~ Q. vVasn 't the issue in that suit whether Mrs. 
· Guilfoil had a ri~·ht to the estate? 
A. The controversy between the various litigan.ts over the 
entire period of time that the estate was in 1it1sation had 
as its fundamental and underlying basis who w 
1
s going to 
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get- the estate, of course, but the methods in which that ques-
tion was rai~d and the various proceedings that were in-
stituted were. definitely fo1·. the purpose of ultimately arriving. 
at the conclusion that was arrived at, and were. all definite 
and separate and distinct, as I have previously stated. 
Q. We agree that the methods were separate and the end 
was the same Y. _ .•
A. Ce:rtainly-·insofar as the proceedings themselves were 
concerned. · TJ,Je.-riltimate desire, of course, of the various 
eontestants was. that each one would g·et what they were con-
tending for, but the methods which the contestants used were-, 
very separate and distinct, as I stated before. 
Q. T.he result in all the cases depended on ijle same set of 
circumstanees, did they not °l 
A. Positively not. 
Q. Can you point ont any distinction between them t 
A. I have done so numerous times, and I refer you to my 
previous answers. I do not see any use in repeating it un-
less. the Commissioner thinks it necessary~ 
page 322 } The Commi~sioner : I think it is·· in the rec-
ord. 
By Mr. Baird: 
Q. What was the question in the second snit in the Unite'(] 
States Court? What did the case go up on! 
A. On the question of the jurisdiction of the Federal Courf;. 
Q. There was never any trial on the merits? 
A. There was no trial on the question of mental capacity 
and that sort of thing, because that is exactly what Mr. Par-
ker wanted to avoid .. 
Q. You have said that a fair fee for that service was 
$5,000. Now, the record shows that that case was tried in the 
District Court and went to the Circuit Court of Appeals, and 
there was application to the Supreme Court for a writ .of 
certiorari; and that controversy related to the right of th~ 
· ·Federal Conrt to take jurisdic.tion over probate matters? 
A. That is right. There were otller points raised, I be-
lieve, but it was decided on that ground. 
Q. That was substantially the only question before the 
courtf 
A. There was another question on the motion to dismiss 
on another ground whicl1, I believe, had to do with the fact 
that the third will snit was subsequently instituted and the 
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decision upon which the "second will case was 
page 323 ~ based had to do with the fact that the Federal 
Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the pro-
ceeding, and since the d_ecision of the District Court was ap-
pealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals and the attempt was 
made to appeal that decision to the United States Supreme 
Court, naturally the same question was presented on appeal 
that was presented in the lower court. 
Q. Now, in item No. 13, which is described by l\fr. Parker 
as the third will contest in Princess Anne County, yon thought 
Mr. Parker's charge of $4,500 was too little, didn't you? 
A. I thought if that was all :Mr. Parker wanted to charge, 
that it was perfectly all right, but :fixing an independent value 
upon it I considered the second and tbfrd will contests in- · 
volved a. degree of responsibility of about the same nature, 
because each one of them, either one by itself, would have 
settled the question of wl1ether or not the will was properly 
probated in Princess .Anne County, but since they were 
brought as separate proceedings and brought upon questions 
and issues which were separate and distinct, they wPre to 
my judgment separate from the standpoint of labor involved 
and compensation to which that labor entitled counsel as if 
different estates had been involved. 
Q. How long did it take to try that case? 
- A. The third will contest, or which one do you 
page 324 ~ ref er to T 
Q. The third will contest t 
A. How ·1ong it actually took, I understand from the rec-
ord (I was not present at the hearing) the better part of the 
day to introduce the testimony, and at a subsequent date the 
question was argued before the Judge of the Circuit. Court 
of Princess Anne County, and ·subsequently a brief was pre~ 
pa.red in opposition to the petition for appeal, and still later 
a brief in opposition to the appeal was prepared anrl :filed 
and the case argued in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia. · 
In addition to the steps that were taken with reference 
to the actual trial of the case, naturally there were other 
steps necessary prior to the trial of H pending argument ill 
the lower court and pending· opposition to the case in the 
Supreme Court of Appeals. 
Q. Wbat was the difference between the issues involved 
in that case and tl1e issues involved in any other l1earing 
in Princess Anne County, or in the Federal Court, or in the 
snits in New York¥ 
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A. There was no other hearing· up to that time in Princess 
Anne County because the first will contest had not gone to a 
hearing. 
The second will contest in the Federal Courts involv~d the 
· question of the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts. 
page 325 ~ The third will contest in Princess Anne County 
involved th~ question of the domicile of the tes-
tator and also as an additional issue the question of limita-
tions, whether the proceeding had been instituted within the 
sta.tutory time, in view of a change which had been made by 
the Legislature with reference to when such proceeding could 
be instituted. 
That was not finally passed upon by the Court, and the 
question of domicile-that is to say, the other issun was 
passed upon by the lower court adversely to the contention 
to Mr. Parker,-and the case was disposed of on the issue 
of domicile. 
Q. Now, apart from the different questions which arose 
in connection with the different methods in which these vari-
ous controversies were presented, the substantial underlying 
facts were the same in all of them, weren't they? 
A. I do not think so, Mr. Baird. I think in all the will 
contests, the first, second and third will contests, the issues 
involved as presented to the courts were distinct. 
As I said before, the purpose to he accomplished through-
out was, on the widow's side, whether she owned the estate 
and on t.he coutesfamts' side. that they get it. 
In the Federal Court, in the third will 'contest, if Mr. Par-
ker had been successful in having that proceeding 
page 326 ~ decided on tl1e issue of jurisdiction, and the Fed-
eral Court had taken jurisdiction, then it is entirely 
possible that what was raised in the State court could have 
been litigated in the Federal .Court, but that point was never 
raised, and it was clearly most advantageous to the widow to 
avoid having· the Federal Court pass upon the question and 
have it passed upon by the Circuit Court of Princess Anne 
County, if it had to be passed upon at all, and that was what 
was accomplished by Mr. Parker. 
Mr. Baird: That is all. 
Mr. Maupin: "\Ve have no more qu,estions. 
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a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being duly 
sworn, testified as f oHows: · · 
Examined by Mr. Maupin: 
Q. You are Mr. Nathaniel T. Green, are you not, a prac-
titioner at the Norfolk Barf 
A. Yes, what is left of me. 
Q. How long have you practiced law 7 
A. 44 years. · 
Q. How long have you been practicing in Norfolk? 
A. 39 years. 
Q. Are you acquainted with Mr. W. L. Parker, one _of the 
litigants in this case Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. How long have you known him? 
A. I ha.ve known him 15 or 20 yea rs. 
Q. Have you ever been engaged in any litigation with him 
or opposed to him? 
A. Yes ; both. 
Q. Do you know what his standing is at the Bar as a com-
petent lawyer and what his st.anding is ip the community! 
A. I think I do. 
Q. vVhat is itf 
A. I do not think any lawyer. stands better either for 
ability or character. 
Q. Now, Mr. Green, here is a. s.tatement of tho 
page 328 ~ services rendered by ]\fr. Parker for Mrs. Hayes 
over a period of about four years, which has been 
introduced as an exhibit.; I will ask you if you have read a.nd 
• considered a copy of this? 
A. I llave not read it, hut considered that copy. as a state-
ment; but I have read Mr. Parker's testimony given before 
the Commissioner. 
But outside of that, I have been familiar, through intimacy 
with Mr. Parker, with tlie facts of the litigation, out of which 
this controversy arose, f ro:pi their very inception to their 
conclusion. 
Q. You say you have read Mr. Parker's testimony in which 
he went over in more detail what he has done? 
A. I have. 
Q. And you saw from that testimony what charges he made 
to :Mrs. Hayes for the services which he claims to have per-
formed for her? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Will you·_ ~tate, generally speaking, whether you con-
sider the charge tliat h~ made a reasonable fig'llre and the 
reasons for it!.: . · 
A. In some I think he charged too little and in others I 
would reduce -them a little.. 
Q. Can you state in what gross amount his charge should 
be increased or decreased, as the case may be? 
page 329 ~ !,. I think, under my estimate, that Mr. Parker . · 
should be entitled to a fee of $30,000 in this case. 
Q. A fee ·of $30,0001 
A. Yes. 
Q. You are familiar with the fact, are you not, that the 
litigation in these matters, in which he represented Mrs. 
Hayes, embraced first an attack by Father Hayes' sister, Mrs. 
Guilfoil, on the validity of the will which was p1·obated in 
Princess Anne Countv 1 
A. I imagine I know all abou~ this litigation from begin-
ning to end. Mr. Parker, during the course of this litiga-
tion, which was about four years, had it as his particula-
baby and talked about it all the time. 
He made up his own mind as to what various steps he would 
take, and, I can say, after reading his statement this morn-
ing·, that there was not a step that he took that he had not 
either immediately subsequent thereto or immediately prior 
thereto talked over the same with me. 
Q. Then you knew from time to time, as the steps pro-
gressed and de:veloped, exactly what was done and why it was 
done? 
.A. I did. 
Q. And that is your considered opinion that a f e.e of $30,000 
for the services that he rendered is a reasonable 
page 330 } and fair fee to be charged by a 1·eputable lawyer 
to his client? 
A. I arrived a.t mv conclusion on three bases: In the first 
plaee, Mr. Parker 'sw fee was nece~sarily bound to be con-
. tingent upon his success. He would tell me, during the course 
of this administration, a.bout furnishing his client from the 
estate monev on which to live and for her necessities. It 
demonstrated to my mind tl1at she had nothing that she could 
pay with except the result of this suit. 
I based it next on the very sound judgment that Mr. Par-
ker displayed in the various steps that l1e took in this ~ase, 
and I based it, third, on· the legal research and work that 
he did; a.nd, fourth, and not least, I based it on the results 
that he attained. 
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Q. Now, you are acquainted with Mr. James E. Heath, 
of the Norfolk Bar, who was Mr. Parker's antagonist through-
out this proceeding? · 
A.I am. . 
Q. What is his reputation as an astute, lea~ed, and re-
sourceful lawver? 
A. He is l\£r. Parker's equal, and he possesses one charac-
teristic that you did not mention-persistency to _the conclu- . 
sion of a case. 
Mr. Maupin: You may cross-examine him. 
page 331 ~ CROSS EX...L\.MINATION. 
By Mr. Baird: 
Q. Mr. Green, what percentage of the property involved. 
have you considered would he represented by the fee you 
mention? 
A. I mentioned $30,000, and I notice in Mr. Parker's depo-
sition that he valued the estate at $117,000. The percentage 
can be calculated easily there. It is not quite 30 per cent. 
Q. Your testimony is based on that assumption Y 
A. Yes, sir, in. part. . 
Q. Is your testimony based also upon the assumption that 
the theories stated by !fr. Parker in his testimony and the 
facts as they are shown by the exhibits are correct T 
A. I read l\fr. Parker's testimony fully, and, as I told 
you, I had been acquainted with the facts of the litigation 
as it went on. I knew nothing about the exchange, for in-
stance, of the Straus bonds and some other matters of that 
sort that he attended to himself; but I knew everything from 
the probating of the will, the appeal from that probate, the 
controversy about the bond of the executrix, the suit in New 
York oyer the Newburgh property, the qualification in New 
York of opposing parties as administrator. 
I knew a bout t11e suit of Mrs. Guilfoil again8t 
page 382 ~ l\frs. Hayes individually in the Untted States Dis-
trict Court l1ere. I knew a bout the second con-
test, so-called, brought by l\f r. Heath in the United States 
Court, and I knew a bout the will contest, third, broug-ht by 
Mr. Heath in Princess Anne County Circuit Court prior to 
the conclusion of the last named conteRt in the United States 
Court. 
I knew something about the suit of Dr. Samuel Johnson 
for operating on him. 
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I clid not know of my own knowledge about his acting 
virtually as executrix himself. I did not know about his 
changes in the· securities or investments, but I did know in 
addition, however, to his getting into control of the execu-
trix's share of all the shares of stock belonging to the estate 
before the administrator in New York could interfere there-
with. 
Q. Now, was your estimate also based upon this being a 
contingent feet 
A. :My estimate is based on the fact that the fee, from the 
surrounding circumstances and from the fact that Mrs. Hayes 
was in such condition that she had to have money to live 
on from the estate, was necessarily bound to be contingent, 
because if she did not prevail here she could not have paid 
~fr. Parker anywhere near a fair compensati~~ for his serv-
ices. 
Q. How can yon think that when the record 
page 333 ~ shows that she paid Mr. Parker $10,0001 
A. The record does not show that to me. 
Q. You would not tl1ink it was contingent. if you knew that 
he had been paid nine or ten th()usand dollars-I don't know 
the exact figures ¥ 
A. He could not have been paid that amount of $1.0,000 
until it had been gotten out of this estate. It was not paid 
from Mrs. Ifayes' personal property. 
Q. I am asking you not what source he got it from, be-
cause we have not gotten to that yet, but if it is a fact that he 
got eight or ten . thousand dollars, or ten thousand dollars 
and something, in fees and disbursements, you could not have 
regarded that employment on a contingent basis, could you 1 
A. You will have to tell me, in order to answer that ques-
tion, from what source she got the $10,000 and at what time 
she got it. 
Q. Do you deeline to answer the question 1 
A. I can't answer it intelligently without that informa-
tion. 
Q. You can tell me t.ha.t it was your theory, in stating the 
value of servi~es, that it was a contingent fee 1 
A. Yes, that is my theory, and it is based on this: Whe?n 
this litigation was started, from the probate of 
page 334 ~ the will on, there was no source from which Mr. 
Parker could look for l1is fee exce'pt from success 
'in the litigation. 
Q. Now, I have two things to ask: First, tha.t your under-
standing· was that the estate amounted to $125,000Y 
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A.. No; $117,000. 
Q. And, second, it was a contingent fee. ·basis f 
A.. Yes. · 
Q. Now, did you consider tl1e whole estate at risk¥ 
A. Yes, I considered the whole estate at risk. 
Q. And it was on that ha.'?is you named the fee? 
A.Ye& -
Q. Did you consider in all of this litigation I have men. 
tioned that the issues were different and that the estate de-
pended and the interest of Mis. Hayes depended upon the 
result of each one independent and separate from the other f 
A. You had better let me tell you what I did consider. 
The first question that arose in this case, if my recollec-
tion is correct, was as to whethei~ the will should be probated 
here or probated in New York, or not probated at all; or 
whether Mrs. Hayes should qualify as administratrix simply 
on the ground that the will had bee.n revoked in Virginia. 
That was a matter that demanded a great deal of thought. 
Now, I do not pretend to say I gave it any thought, but I 
listened to Mr. Parker in his reasonings in the 
page 335 } mattei-. I thought his determination to probate 
the will and to qualify the executrix on it here in 
Princess Anne Countv was a master stroke. 
It enabled Mr. Pai·kcr fitst to get under the control of 
the executrix in this State (whether in her ~ame or in his 
name or in tl1e name of brokers) all the stocks and bonds 
whic.h belonged to this man's estate. I think that that was 
as true and as practical and as advantageous a move as 
could have been made by any lawyer anywhere. I am re-
membering it myse]f now to act on it next time if I ever get 
a chance to do ·so. 
Now, the next thing- that bappenerl was about the bond. 
Mr. Parker ta]ked to me about that, and I am talking about 
it as of at tha.t time. He said somebodv connected with the 
bonding company, or with some bonding ·company that was of 
kin to the people opposed to MT's. Hayes, was trying to 
persuade the bonding- compa-nv to g·et off the bond, and I re-
member him coming· to my office two or three times in con-
sulta t.ion witl1 Mr. Ta:vlor about it. and I remember the fina] 
arrangement tha.t he n1acle, which he outlined in his testimony . 
hera . 
Of course, the retention of that bond was essential, because 
if the court had r,~quirecl Mrs. Hayes to give a new bond it 
would have been very difficult to do so. 
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By probating the will here, Mr. Parker not only 
page 336 ~ achieved possession of these bonds, if I may put 
it that way, but he also put the cas~ in such form 
that any attack made on that will the question of domicile 
would be dete:r~ned and determined here, and I think it was 
a very important tlling for him to have this litigation here 
instead of in New York. 
The appeal that was taken from the probate of the will 
was taken by Mr. Brittingham and some other lawyer, if I 
recollect, and Mr. Heath was not in the case. 
Mr. Parker talked to me about associating Mr. Kellam with 
him in the case-
Mr. Baird: Mr. Commissioner, I do not like to interrupt 
Mr. Green-
The Commissioner: Go ahead. Get along as :fast as you 
can. 
Witness: (Continuing) At any rate, Mr. Parker prepared 
to try the case at the time Mr. Heath appeared in it, at the 
time the case was set for trial, and dismissed it over the 
protest of Mr. Parker, Mr. Parker's protest being based, as 
I recall at that time, on the ground that he was tl1e plaintiff 
in the case and Mr. Heath's client was the defendant, and 
that they could not take a non-suit. Judge White ruled against 
him on that. -
Now, the next thing· I Imew of was the appoint-
page 337 ~ ment of tl1e administrator in New York. Mr. 
Parker was verv much worried as to what would 
be the effect of that proceeding and whether he should ap• 
pear in the proceeding in New York for his client. 
He was afraid that if he appeared there, that he would 
cause the locus of the litigation to be transferred there, and 
he determined not to appear,-and I think that was another 
evidence of p;ood judgment. · 
As I recollect it, at that time he looked up the question 
as to whether he could make a special appearance there, and 
decided that he could not. 
After the suit in New York to set aside the deed for the 
N ewburg·h land, he debated also whether he should make a 
general appearance there, or not, and decided tllat 11e would 
not. 
He had some difficultieg with t11€' New York lawyers, who 
represented Mrs. Hayes with him, about the question whether 
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that suit in New York could be removed to a United States 
Court there. · 
After looking up· that question he decided that he could 
specially appear for. the purpose of removal, and he did re-
move it to the United States Court somewhere in New York 
State. 
There it stayed until he got the stip1ilation that , 
page 338 ~ it should abide the litigation here and could not 
have an independent hearing of it there. 
Now, the suit brought by the administrator that qualified 
.in New York against Mrs. Hayes individually to recover these 
stocks and bonds was brought in the United States District 
Court here, and Mr. Parker made a motion to dismiss it on 
the ground that it was a contest between the administratore. 
He looked into that, but he did not prevail as to that, and 
that case was on the docket until it was voluntarily dismissed 
at the end of the litigation over the will. 
The suit brought by Mr. Heath in the United States Court 
for the purpose of setting aside the will that was probated 
in Princess Anne, presented questions with which I was not. 
well acquainted, and which I dare say 90 out of 100 lawyers 
you can pick up never heard of. 
l\fr. Parker investigated the question of the jurisdiction 
of the United States Court there at gTeat length, and it was 
a question so important that Chief tTustice White d~livered 
an opinion on it of many pages. 
He argued the question before Judge Way, and filed a writ-
ten brief, which I saw, but J udgc Way was so doubtful of it 
that he held up the decision for five months," and then decided 
that he could not take jurisdiction. . 
pag·e 339 ~ There was an appeal from that decision to tl1e 
Circuit Court of Appeals, in which Mr. Parker 
filed a brief and a motion to diRmiss. They have both been 
filed as exhibits here-the brief has been filed as an exhibit 
here. 
An attempt was made to obtain a writ of certiorari to the 
decision affirming Judge v\7~y, and a brief in answer to the 
petition for certiorari was :filed by him. 
I mention all of these things because I read every one 
of these briefs, motions to dismiss, and so forth, before they 
were filed with tl1e Court, or even printed, and I was· $truck 
with the ability, thoroug·hness and good judgment with which 
l\f r. Parker presented the qu<1stions. 
The certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme 
Court, and that finished the litigation there. 
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The litigation then in the Circuit Court of Princess Anne 
was taken up-I mean by "the litigation" what might be 
called the second contest of the will in that court,--and Mr. 
Parker filed in that court pleas which raised questions first 
as to the domicile of l\Ir. Hayes by claiming that he was a 
domicile of Virginia.and even if there was no will, or if the 
will was set aside under the Virginia law, she would be en-
titled to his entire personal .estate; and, secondly, on the 
g-round that the second suit was brought too late under the 
limitations fixed by the Code. 
page 340 ~ He prevailed on· the first plea, and it was de-
termined in the Circuit Court of Princess Anne 
that the domicile of Mr. Hayes was in Virginia. This case 
was appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, 
which affirmed the decisions of the Circuit Court of Princess 
Anne, and finally ended the litigation. 
By this course, a proceeding- started from the probating 
of the will to the end of the last case, Mr. Parker so managed 
this litigation that the whole question was finally determined 
on the question of the domicile of Mr. Hayes, and all other 
questions as to his capacity to make a will were eliminated 
from the litigation. 
I think a man that can manage a course of litigation with 
that deftness and that judgment is entitled to a fee sucl1 as 
I have fixed or named. 
I do not hesitate to say, and I commend to l\fr. Bah-d that 
he keep a copy of 1\fr. Parker's testimony in this case as a 
guide as to what ig to be done in like cases in his own office. 
He will not find it in anv book that I know of. I have learned 
it by heart, as· you will~ see, and remembered it for three or 
four vears. 
I mig·ht say further that during the four years that Mr. 
Parker was working on this case1 the only danger that he 
encountered was that he might become over-
page Ml ~ trained in fl1e matter, but he avoided that rock, 
too. That is all. 
Mr. Baird: Now, 1\fr. ComrniRsioner, I move to strike out 
]\fr. Green's nnswer as entirely irresponsiv<' to my question. 
The Commissioner: I havf? declined to strike it out. 
Mr. Baird: I know you have, but I am getting the record 
straight. I move to strike out the answer as entirely irre-
sponsivc to my quest.ion, and I submit Mr. Green ba.s no 
right to use my cross examination ng a medium for express-
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-ing high opinions of l\fr. Parker's services and ·the value of 
them, which is the subJect of this c'ontroversy. 
· By 1\fr. Baird: 
Q. Now. l\:fr. Green, if you will be good enough to confine 
your answers, as far as you can within the realm of your 
discretion, to my questions, I will not keep vou so long, and 
it will save us a lot of trouble. I understood, but I ain not 
certain that I got you right, that your theory as to the pro-
priety of this charge- is based on the value which you have 
mentioned of the estate and on the theory which you have 
stated that the fee was contingent; that is rig·ht, isn't it Y 
A. Let me have that deposition. I based it . on the value 
of the estate, the entire estate, including the_ New 
page 342 } York land, fixed ,by Mr. Parker in his cross ex-
amination before the Commissioner at, I think, 
one hundred and seventeen thousand some odd dollars. 
Note : Record of testimony taken before the Commissioner 
was handed to the witness. 
The Commissioner: My recolJection is tha.t it is about 
$117,000. 
l\fr. Baird: I will agree with Jiim on that. 
·witness: I should say I believe it is $117,000 less three 
or four thousand, but nob enough to make any difference. 
Bv Mr. Baird: 
··Q. Is it also based on the theory that the whole estate was 
at risk? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Has it ::i]~o been based on the theory that there were 
different questions involved in each of these proceedings, 
and that the whole estate was at ri8k in each of these pro-
ceedings? 
A. t would sav it hnd different questions involved in each 
of these proceedings. Some of the qnestioµs were very 
similar. 
Q. Perhaps I should Pxpress it in thi~ wny: There were 
different questions in the different cases growing out of the 
. form of procedure, but that tl1e essentials which 
page 343 ~. were the subject of controversies were the same in 
all of them? 
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A. No, sir. T.he case in the United States Court turned 
entirely on the issue of the jurisdiction of that court. The 
case in Princess Anne County turned on the issue of the 
domicile of the testator. In other words, Mr. Baird, I do 
not think you will find the case of Farrell v. O'Brien, 199 
United States, 89, whfoh ,vas the main authority relied on 
in the United States District Court and in the Supreme Court 
of Appeals, cited-::'in, the state court briefs, or in the opinion 
of the state court, at all helpful because the question decided 
by that case had nothing to do with the litigation in the state 
court. 
Q. Did your acquaintance with. this case. and your examina-
tion of the record lead you to conclude that so far as Mrs 
Hayes was personally concerned, the result would have been 
the same to her whether the will of Father Hayes was sus-
tained, or not, if the probate proceedings were in Virginia T 
A. To a certain extent that is true, all depending, how-
ever, on the question of the domicile of Mr. Hayes, but it was 
not true as to the New York real estate as to which the will 
might have been valid in that state, although revoked by 
marriage in the State of Virginia. 
page 344 ~ Q. I am coming to the New York matter in a 
moment; but it is a fact that if Father Hayes was 
domiciled in Virginia and probate proceedings could be had 
in Virginia, that, so far as Mrs. Hayes individually was con-
cerned, she would have gotten the same thing as his widow, 
there being no issue of the marriage, as she got under the 
will! . 
A. She would have gotten the entire personal estatP- in 
Virginia. · 
Q. There was nothing but personal estate; yon know that, 
don't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did your investigation bring you to the conclusion that 
.if this will had been held invalid, and it had been held that 
the domicile was in Now York, that she would have gotten 
half of the estate plus $10,000f 
A. I gathered what the law in New York was~ from the 
statement of Mr. Parker-I did not know anything about the 
law in New York, but you must remember, Mr. Baird: amongst 
the contentions made in this litigation was the contention 
that 1\fr. and 1\tfrR. H::1.yes were not married, that it was a 
void man-iage because· of the want of mentality on the pa1·t 
· oi Mr. Hayes. That was on.e of the contentions in this case. 
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Q. Of course, I agree if that had been ah issue, 
page 345 ~ and if it had been decided against Mrs. Hayes, 
that she would have lost in both directions, but 
that was never au issue, and Mr. Parker says that he came 
to the conclusion that the marriage could not be successfullv 
attacked; you agree with him on that, do you Y • 
A. He came to the conclusion on the facts. I knew nothing 
about the facts. 
Q. You agree as a matter of law that after the death of 
one of the parties the marriag·e relations could not be at-
tacked 7 
A. No. I knew there had been numerous cases because of 
property rig·hts conducted after the death of the pa.rties. 
Q. Now, if either of the theories I have stated in tl1e pre-
ceding questions are sound, it would change you view en-
tirely as to what he was entitled to, would it not! 
A. No, sir, it would not, becatlse I do not think that by 
any other course of procedure this litigation could have been 
maneuvered as easily and as dexterously to the mere determi-
nation of the domicile of the testator as the p1incipal point. 
Q. But tny question assumes that the Commissioner might 
decide it the way I have indicated. If he does decide it that 
way, the result would be the same as I have stated, would 
it not! 
A. If you ask my opinion, I say it mig·ht be, but 
page 346 ~ I can't tell what commissioners or courts will 
do. 
Q. I say, if he decides it that way? 
A. Of course, if he decides it your way, it would be your 
way, and that would be all. I want to say right there, Mr. 
Baird, that with that will probated, even if they had set 
aside the deed in New York~ Mrs. Hayes would have gotten 
under the will the entire New York property, and that would 
have made a difference. 
Q. If the Commissione1· should conclude (hat there wa~ 
substantially but one. issue in this situation, although it was 
presented in different. proceedings and in different manners, 
would your conclusion still be what you have stated in re-
gard to the proper fee? 
A. If the Commissioner were to decide that the only issue 
in this case from the start was the domicile of the testator. 
I should agree, but there were other issues as a matter of 
fact, and the issue as to his mentality,-and the will waR 
attacked on that ground hcre,-and what I assert is tbe skill 
of Mr. Parker in so conducting the litigation that it finally 
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g·bt down tb the issue of domicile alorte; whe11 otherwise it 
would have had other issues in it. 
Q. Well now; if it is a fact, 01· it is ~o concluded by the Com-
missioner or by the Court, that there never was anything in 
this controversy except whether there should be 
page ;347 ~ a probate in Virginia or in N~w :York, and whether 
hr not the will was good, aiid that if the will was 
g·ood Mrs. Hayes wouJd have gott,m the whole estate, no mat~ 
ter whether the probate was in New Ybrk or .in Virginia,-· 
if that is a fact; do you think that is, a prbper fee? 
A. If any coui·t. can arrive at such, coriclusion as that, mi-
der the will and the te,stimony, I· will reduc~ it. 
Q. Can yo~ aiTiv_e ~t i.t in any other wayT 
A. There are plenty bf reasons. . . _ . . ; 
Q. It. is a _f a~t, is it riot, in ':irgini~, ~.;tuit .the surviv~r of 
a married_ c.ouple, when there 1s no rnsue of the marriage; 
inherits all t.be pei~sonal property 1 
A. That is a fact.. .. . _ 
Q. You Imow it h, a fact, under the New Yoi:k law, the 
same situation wo1;1ld exist exc;ept,. instead of g·etting all, the 
survivor would get half plus $10,000; isn't_ that rig·ht T 
.A.. I have to rely oii ,vl1at you and Mi·. Parker say as to 
that. I don't kno,v. . ,. . . 
Q. And, of comse, if this will had been l1eld to be valid, 
Mrs. Hayes would have g·otten all the. estate in New York-~ 
I mean if the domicile was the1~e and the qualification was 
there! . , . . . , 
A. Yes. But, ]\fr. Baird, I do not suppo;le that if yon had 
: been in Mr. Padrnr.'s position; :with the allega-
page 348 ~ tions contain~d in the second suit and the first 
appeal in Princess Anne County, you would have; 
prepared to defend that_ litig·ation solely on the ground of 
domicile, or not, but would have 11repared to defend it on the 
ground of mentality also._ . . . 
Q. Have you considered wl1ether there .were .any items go-. 
ing to make up Mr. P.arker',s account for which a lawyer 
could not charge as such Y . 
A. Let me see the account. 
Mr. Maupin: Those are the items. They are all in those 
papers, and the headings are there for those items (handing~ 
paper). 
·witness:: I do. not. lmo'Y exactly what. you ni,ean ;by the 
question. He certainly could charg·e as a lawyer for the pro.: 
I· I, 
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bate of the ,vill mid for advising ·and perf 01~ing the du tie~ 
of the executrix thereunder ; he could certainly· charge for 
his services in the controversy with the surety company. 
By M:r .. Baird: _ . , , 
. Q. I do not _,~a.nt t9 i~1te~rupt ybu, but there is no ques~ 
faon bet.ween us ·as to most of those items. Do you think Mr. 
ParJrnr could charge f-0r_ the duties of executrix 7 Wouldn't 
the: law impose the obligation on the executrix to perform t.he 
duties of that .position? . . . . 
. A. Yes, I think tl1at is so, hi tlle.or·y, .-Mr •. Baird,_ but using 
the word ":ex~~iitrix" for j-ust 'Yhat it means, a feminine 
personal representative, I do .not think there i~ 
page 349 }- one 'of them that ~an cfo it by herself, and if she has to get a lawyer fo do it, she ought to pay 
for it. . . .. J .. 
Q. As a matter 'of.fact, ,the ~xecutrix has. the power of an 
executrix, and is entitled to compensation for iU 
A. Yes. . . 
Q. Nobody else c·an exercise tl1e power and get the com. 
t. ' . pensa 10n. . . . . 
A. But H she gets somebody el}3e to <l.o the work for her, 
and if the authority virtually b.elong-s to her, as it does here, 
I think she ougl1t to compensate the. person she .employs t<> 
do the work. I say a lawyer could charge there just like an 
·accountant could charge. . . 
Q. Is there anything in this record which indicates to you 
that l\frs. Hayes is barred from her right to compensation a:s 
administratrix? . . - .· 
. A. No; but I think when she pays _herself for compensation 
she takes it from one pocket. and puts it into another. . 
. Q. That may be true, but the result of allowing :Mr. Parke1~ 
for this would be making the estate liable for it twice? 
A. No, because she is not g·ofog to pay it again .. 
Q. You are. assuming that, but you do not know iU 
A. I know it, if. she acts with common reason. _. . 
Q. You do.not think that that can be asfmmed in this litiga-
tion, do yon? . . . . 
page 3.50 ~ A. I do not think that she will ev-er pay any 
more commission~.than she has paid Mr. Parker 
for doing her work as executrix . 
. Q. Did you make amr effort, in arriving at your idea of 
fha.rge,. to differentiate between what part of it was pr~perly 
~ssessable against .Mrs. Hayes as e;x.ec1,1trix and what part 
was assessable ·against her individually? 
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A. I did not. 
Th~ C,o:mmissioner:: M1·. Baird, that question has arisen 
several times, and to the best of my information and in order· 
that I may :have a clear view of it, wasn't the bill principally 
npon the ·ground that he bad certain funds in his hands 011 
which he had a lien t 
Mr. Maupin: That is right. 
The Commissioner: And are not the two accounts so inter-
woyen that it does not make any difference, as he brought it 
against her as executrix and also personally, and he has funds 
in his hands on which he llas a lien? 
Mr. Baird: I have not beard vou. Mr. Commissioner. 
The Commissioner : So I can keey.> the thing straight in 
my min~ as I go along·, my recollection of the bill is that he 
broug·ht it against her as executrix and also against her in-
dividually; and that the basis of this snit is that he has cer-
tain securities in his possession upon which he 
page 351 ~ has a lien, some of which are probably held against 
her as e:x:ecutrix and some are in his name, though 
the beneficial title is in her; doesn't the suit contemplate that 
both of the acconnts are to be settled here and that they are 
made up as one, but the same result will be reached, w bfohever 
way yon go, whether yon separate the account or whether 
you do not separate itf 
Mr. Baird: My idea is that you cannot charge an executrix 
-you cannot bring a suit against the executrix .. 
The Commissioner: That is tnrn. 
Mr. Baird: But you can sne the executrix in her own rig·ht .. 
Then the executrix has the right to look to the estate, so you 
have to separate the charges to see what is chargeable against 
the estate and what is chargeable against. Mrs. Hayes. ~-
I know in this particular case it makes no practical dif-
ferencP. but we have to proceed according to law, and if we 
violate that rule there will be no telling. 
The Commissioner: I know some courts l10ld that tl1e execlt-
trix, not as executrix but personally, is liable, and sl1e rP--
coups, and then it is subject. to confirmation whether she can 
get everything that she paid the attorney. 
page 352 ~ Mr. Baird: My recollection is you cannot sue 
the executrix. but you have to seg-re~ate the 
charges so that she can look to the estate. Practicallv it 
makes no difference but legally it makes a difference. ~ 
The Commissioner: J don 1t know whether vou asked it 
from a practical standpoint or from a technical standpoint. 
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Note: The question was read as follows : 
'' Q. Did you make any effort in arriving at your idea of 
charge, to differentiate between what part of it was properly 
assessable against Mrs. Hayes as executrix and what part 
was assessable against her individually 7'' 
A. I did not. I regarded the two as a single entity because, 
Mrs. Hayes individually owned everything that she held as 
Mrs. Hayes, executrix. 
By Mr. Baird: 
Q. If it is ultimately concluded that your theory is wrong, 
your testimony has no probative value here, has it? 
.A. That is for the Commissioner to decide. I think it is 
very powerful. 
Q. The Commissioner could not possibly apply to a half 
evidence tha.t related to the whole? 
.A. I do· not know what courts and commis-
page 353 ! ~ sioners can do. I know that here is a · fund in 
court on which this man claims a lien, and while 
the fund may be regarded as a fiduciary fund it is held by 
.the executrix and it can be regarded as personal property of 
.Mrs. Hayes, and that is all I can say. 
Q. Are all of these items raised by you in order to increase 
the amount over what Mr. Parker fixed, due to the detailf; 
you named? · 
.A. I raiserl thP. fee in the Newburg·h litigation in New 
York by $1,000; instead of making it $1,500, I think $2,500 
is a fair fee for that litigation, and I base it on not only the 
value of the property but. on what Mr. Parker did with 
·reference to it and to the stipulation procured by him that 
they should abide by the decision of the court in the cases 
here which finally resulted in his winning the case. 
I increased the fee for the probate of this will and what 
was done immediately thereafter from $500 to $1.000. I did 
that- on the celeritv and the scheme devised bv Mr. Parker 
and the actions which he took in bringing these stocks and . 
bonds down into this jurii:;dicti.on heforP the aclministrator 
in New York had a chance to see them. I believe that if those 
stocks and bonds bad not been gotten here in that way and 
gotten into the jurisdiction of 'this court, this lady would 
have lost her litigation in New York State. 
page 354} Q. I am comin:2: to that in a moment. Did you, 
in determining the value of 1\fr. Parker's serv-
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ices, consider that he was entitled to compensation for e~-
dorsing a note, or for determining what kind of heater should 
go into the house at Virginia Beaeh, or for supervising the 
construction of the house T 
A. Well, Mr. Baird, I will tell you : I didn't count his 
endorsing the note as being entitled to compensation by him. 
I thoug·ht, but I did not know, that Mr. Parker's endorse-
ment was about as valuable as mine, which was nothing, and 
I did not put that in the compensation. 
As to superintending the construction of' the house, I knew 
nothing about that personally, of course, nor did he talk to 
me about that while he was doing it. That was not a legal 
question. I should think a man ought to have some compen-
sation when he superintends construction work. I would not 
be able to do it myself; I would not know how. 
Q. Do you think that he is entitled to compensation for 
his judgment as to the value of securities and exchanging 
them, as a lawyer f 
A. I do not differentiate between him as a man and as a 
lawyer so much. I think he is entitled to compensation for 
exchanging those securities and putting them into sounder 
investments, and I think he is entitled to compen-
page 355 ~ sation for what he did relative .to Straus & Com-
. pany bonds, though that only appears to me by 
his deposition taken in this case, because, when that was be-
ing done, I knew nothing about it. No legal questions were 
involved in it. 
· Q. I understood you to refer, in what you said about the 
securities and getting them out of New York, to the securities 
which were sold and the proceeds invested in other securi-
ties taken in l\fr. Parker's name; is that right? 
' A. I made them two distinct i terns. I think ( and I will 
try to talk loud) by Mr. Parker procuring or bringing the 
securities from New York to this jurisdiction, he prevented 
litigation in New .York by the administrator appointed there 
to ·recover them against this lady, and that that litigation in 
.a Ca.tholic community, or where there was a Catholic influ-
ence, would have been very disastrous to his client. 
· Q. Do you think there was any validity in l\fr. Parker put-
ting in his own name securities belonging to the estate? Do 
yon think people who ,~ere interested, if they knew the facts, 
· could· have been prevented from establishing their rights T 
A. I do not. I did not gather there was any such conten-
tion. Mr. Parker held them in liis own name, and the ad-
ministrator in New York did not know where th~y were. In 
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other words, he hid them from the administrator in Naw York, 
and I think that was justifiable under the cireum-
page 356 }- stances. He did not hide tl;iem from your client. 
Q. No. Didn't that transaction, instead of hav-
ing the great value that you speak of, carry with it the risk 
of those securities being liable to Mr. Parker's c.reditors, if 
he had any, or to his heirs in the event of his death Y 
A. l do not think it carried much risk in that respect, Mr. 
Baird. 
Q. I hope it didn't. 
A. I think she could have gotten them back mighty easy 
under that sort of thing. I do not think he carried much 
risk there. Then, you must remember that Mr. Parkei: is 
not like you and I; he is young and vigorous and he can have 
an heir for a long time. 
Q. In arriving at the value of .Mr. Parker's services, do 
you consider that he undertook any personal responsibility 
to the surety company T 
A. I never put that down as a charge in that sense, but. I 
do consider it in that way. 
Q. He could not have had any reason for it if he had joint 
control over all that the estate had Y 
A. I don't know, but I will tell you what has happened 
to me recently: I am joint administrator of an estate which 
had $1,800 of warrants in bank; the other administrator went 
there and got it and brought it down and de-
pag·e 357 ~ posited it in this bank without my signature and 
without my knowing about it. 
Q. Do you know, as a matter of fact, what was required 
and agreed to was that all of the assets, moneys and securi-
ties, should be subject to the joint control of Mrs. Hayes ancl 
Mr. Parker? 
A. I have never read the agreement between them. 
Q. There was nothing that he could do with them-I mean, 
there was n·o way anybodv else could do anything with them 1 
A. I don't know. I can't answer that question. 
Q. In arriving at your idea of the value of services, did 
you consider that but for Mr. Parker's negotiations the surety 
company could have gotten off this bond arbitrarilyf 
A. I did not think at that time that the surety company 
could get off the bond arbitrarily, but I have looked up the 
law since in another matter and suppose that it could. 
· Q. That is your construction of Section 5417? 
A. I do not know the section, but the fact remains that as 
the result of Mr. Parker's negotiations with the surety com-
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- pany, they did not exercise that arbitrary power, if they had 
it. 
Q. Do you think there would have been auy 
page 358 ·t difficulty in getting another surety if that surety 
had been allowed to get off the bond? 
A. I think there would have been difficulty, yes. 
Q. Why! 
A. Because when one surety company turns a man down it 
gives him a black eye. It is like when one insurance com-
pany turns a rislr down, it gives him a black eye. You must 
remember that Mrs. Hayes was a comparative stranger in 
this community, that she had comparatively few friends here, 
friends of any great influence. 
. Q. What necessity do you think there was for Mr. Parker 
doing anything in regard to the Straus bonds and what bene-
fit do you think the estate got out of anything that he did 
dof 
A. As I say, I knew nothing about the Straus bonds ex-
cept what Mr. Parker said. He seems to have done, from 
what he says, a great amount of work and a great amount of 
investigating, more than I would have done and more tha:o 
most lawyers would have done. 
Q. So far as your approval of that charge of $1,500, it is 
without information at all? 
A: ·Except what he testified to. 
Q. Do you see anything from wh~t he says to bidicate that 
there was anything that he did or could-accomplish 
page 359 ~ for the estate T 
A. Yes, from what he says, that the Straus 
bonds were appraised at $16,000 when the administrator quali-
fied, and that now they are worth $35,000, I think he has ac-
complished something if what he says is true. 
Q. Do you think a charge of $1,500 for ~onsidcring whether 
:M;rs. Guilfoil could qualify in New York and deciding not to 
oppose her qualification is reasonab]e? 
A. I will tell you what I think about that: Whether .]\fr. 
Parker should go to New York and resist that qualification 
and attempt to have Mrs. Hayes appointed there was a crucial 
question. In it was complicated the question of g-etting the 
jurisdiction of the New York courts over Mrs. Hayes and 
the bringing of suit up there. 
I would say this, I thoug·ht that Mr. Parker's fee in that 
matter was $500 too much. I say I thought his fee in that 
matter was $500 too much .. 
Adelaide· M. Hayes, et al., v:. William L. Parker. ?~9. 
N. T. Green-. 
Q. You think $1,750 was a proper fee for making prepara-
tions for the first suit in the Federal Court, alth'ough it was 
never tried Y 
· A. Yes, I think so. That was a suit that went to t.he ex-
tent whether Mrs. Hayes should retain here the money or 
whether she would have to give it up to the administrator, 
and I think the retaining· of that money in Vir-
pag·e 360 ~ ginia was essential to the success of this suit. 
Q. You think that $5,000 for the second suit, 
which turned upon the issue of the jurisdiction of the Ji,ederal 
Court in the probate proceeding, was a reasonable feet 
A. Yes, going as it dicl to the Circuit Court of Appeals 
and the United States Supreme Court, I can see you charging 
$10,000 for that. 
Q. What is thaU 
A. I can see you charging $10,000 for that. You will get 
it if anybody could. 
That case was in the District Court, that case was .in the 
Circuit Court of Appeals, and a writ of certiorari was ap-
plied for, and it involved the control of these securities. 
Not only is that a fact, Mr. Baird, but I do not think that 
I have come across, and I do not believe you have ever come 
across, that queRtion of jurisdiction of the United States 
Court in such a suit as that. 
Q. It was a very narrow question, wasn't it? 
A. If you had heard Mr. Heath's argument I have no doubt. 
you would have thought it was a very serious question. 
Q. I say a narrow question Y 
A. You know you have to turn ai;ound in a mighty narrow 
place now and then. 
Q. You l1ave to do it? 
page 361 ~ A. No, I don't. , 
Q. Did you ever take note of the fact tl1at the 
ng-gregate of these charges, as set out in l\fr. Parker's ac-
count for these several matters of court controversy, was 
$19,250? 
A. I have never separated the items. 
Q. You never separated them? 
A. I mean in that respect to show what was the aggregate 
of different classes of items. 
Q. D~n 't you think attention to tax matters would. be a 
part of the general duties of counsel representing an execu-
trix? 
.A . .Yes, I think so, hut I think he should charge for it. 
Q. What? 
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A. Do you mean to say the administrator has to file the 
inheritance tax report l1erself l 
Q. No; I think she should have the assista1~ce of counsel. 
A. Don't you think he should charge for it 1 
Q. In the general item, but I ask you if you think a special 
charge should be added to the general items 1 
A. It would not make anv difference whether he turned 
back and added the $500 to the probate; it doesn't 
page 362 ~ make any difference where you put it. It is like 
the drummer's clothes-it is on there. 
I think Mr. Parker marlc one mistake iri this case when 
he separated his fees into separate items, and g_ave you a 
chance to pick at him here and pick at him there. ~ 
Q·. That is what I have found in my cases. 
A. I think instead of making separate items, he should 
make a lump sum and say '' That is where I stand.'' 
Q. I agree with you, that it makes a difference in cross-
examining him. That is all. 
Mr. Maupin: There are no further questions. 
page 363 ~ HENRY BO-WDEN, 
a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, being duly 
sworn, testified as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Maupin: 
Q. You are Mr. Henry Bowden, an attorney at law prac-
ticing in Norfolk, are you not Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. How long have you been practicing, Mr. Bowrlen 'r 
A. Since 1903. 
Q. Are you acquainted with Mr. W. L. Parker, one of the 
litigants in tl1is matter? 
A. Yes, very well. 
Q. Do you know him to be an attorney at law practicing 
at the Norfolk Bar? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How long have you known him? 
A. Very well ever since he returned from his service in -the 
United States Army during the war. 
0. That would be about 1918 or 1919? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you had any peculiar opportunities of observing 
him in his professional capacity and have you lmd, if I might 
s~y it, professional intimacy with l1im? 
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A. Yes; I have been associated with him in a number of 
rather important cases, and I might say I had the 
page 364 ~ misfortune of being opposed by him in two or three 
very important cases, which did not. terminate 
well for me. 
Q. :])-om your observation of Mr. Parker and from your 
observation of his ability and professional work, will you 
please state what his standing· is at the Bar as a capable law-
yer and in the community as a citizen? 
A. In matters of corporation law, real estate, equity and 
probate of wills, I do not know of any lawyer in this seQtion 
of the State who stands any higher and is regarded as any 
more capable, and there are mighty few that are regarded 
as equally capable. 
Q. What is his reputation in the community as a citizen f 
A. Excellent. 
Q. Now, Mr. Bowden, I have here, filed as :14Jxhibit 1 with 
Mr. Parker's testimony, statement made up by him of the 
services which he performed for Mrs. Adelaide M. Grady 
Hayes in connect.ion ,,11th her ]ate husband's estate and the 
attacks made on his will, and a survey of the estate in vari-
ous aspects; have you read thi~ exhibit or a copy of it? 
A. Yes. I read some parb~ of it rather carefully some two 
or three or four weeks a~o. Of course, I don't remember 
any details of it, but I read it not so much with the idea of 
. remembering what was in it as considering it 
page 365 ~ as a statement at the time. 
Q. Have you read M:r. Parker's testimony that 
he g-ave in a previous hearing: of this matter? 
A. I can hardly say I have read it. I have glanced over 
it, but I can't say very carefully. I l1ave read his statement. 
I considered that. 
Q. Having read and considered this Exhibit 1, or a copy 
thereof, you are familiar with the services which Mr. Parker 
claims to have performed for Mrs. Hayes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You are also acquainted with the value that he put on 
his services in the bill that he rendered? 
A. Yes. I say that witl10ut intending to remember them, 
but I read the statement in connection wit]1 what he says 
he has done, and I have given it careful thought and con-
sideration. 
Q. Did you read this with tl1e idea of being able to testify 
whet.her or not the value that Mr. Parker put upon bis serv-
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ices was in accordance with your own idea of the value of the 
services, as reflected by the statement 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. Will you please state to the Commissioner whether, in 
your judgment, the fees for the sixteen items that are reflected 
in this account charged by Mr. Parker are fair and reason-
able compensation for the services which he 
page 366 ~ claims to have performed, and, if not, wherein 
you differ with him, and state your reasons as 
briefly as consistent with the importance of the matter to the 
Commissioner Y You can take this list and go right down it, 
if y6u like-. 
A. My conclusion was that these charges were all abso-
lutely fair and reasonable, and especially so in view of the 
fact that it was for all practical purposes a matter handled 
on a contingent fee. That consideration would have justified, 
in my opinion, a right much higher charge if counsel had 
been inclined to make it. 
Q. You are a,vare of the fact that there were litigations 
involved in five proceedings of which two were in the Cir-
cuit Court of Princess Anne County, two in the District 
Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia, and one was begun in the State court at Orange County, 
New York, an4 removed to th~ Federal District Court there, 
and you are aware also of the fact that Mr. Parker, according 
to his statement, did what he considered was proper and 
appropriate and necessary for the preservation of the estate 
in the administration of the estate over a period of four years Y 
You are aware of that Y 
A. Yes. Also, if I am not mistaken, there was a petition 
for a certiorari to the Supreme Court of .the United States. 
Q. Well, I was speaking simply of the courts 
page 367 ~ of origin ·of these various litigations. One case 
which was begun in the Circuit Court of Princess 
Anne County, according to t1w records, was appealed to the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of "Virginia and Mr. Parker was 
successful in both courts; there was another litigation insti-
tuted by Mr. Heath, as his professional opponent, in the Dis-
trict Court .of the UnitPd States for the Eastern District of 
'Virginia, an appeal from that court to the Circuit Court of 
Appeals of the Fourth Circuit, and Mr. Parker was success-
ful in both of those tribunals, and an application for r::rwtiorar·i 
was made by his opponent to the United States Supreme Court 
and opposed by Mr. Parker, and the certiorari denied. Did 
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you also know that there was an application for probate, or, 
rather, an application for qualifieation on the estate of Wil-
liam R. Hayes in Orange County, New York, by his sister, 
Mrs. Guilfoil, whfoh was a matter that had to be considered 
by Mr. Parker in relation to whether or not it was to the 
interest of his client to intervene in this proceeding·? 
A. Yes, I understood that. 
Q. And did you know that that application for probate 
stated that Mrs. Hayes was unmarried and that one Adelaide 
M. Grady pretended to be his wife but was not his wife f 
A. I do not remember the details, but I remem-
page 368 ~ ber there was some question injected in t]1e mat-
. ter as to the validity of tlle fact of marriage. 
Q. And the record so states here? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you care to amplify your testimony in any way? In 
other words, I do not want to lead you, but I just mean if 
there is anything else in regard to this that you wish to stafo 
to the Commissioner before I turn you over to opposing coun-
sel as to the character and nature of the serviees and t.he 
reasons for your opinion, I will he gfad for you to repeat 
them. 
A. I was very much impressed with the quality o.f the legal 
services rendered; the exercise of very fine judgment in de, 
termining what forum and the avoidance, in his strateg-y i11 
handling the matter, so as to keep a-way from jury trial, espe-
cially in localities where the jurors might be and probably 
would have been adverse; and the gen~ral strategy in kPep-
ing· the litig·ation here rather than in New York. It required 
a very keen understanding of the leg·al problems involved 
and the exercise of vel'y fine judgment and very fine legal 
strategy, so the quality of the legal work impressed me a~ 
being very unusual. I would hate to name as many as fiv(?. 
other lawyers at this Bar I believe capable of doing that 
quality of work. I think the briefs that were filed in that 
litigation, those different matters that went to 
page 369 ~ the court.s of appeals, reflect a quality of legal 
lmmv"ledge and research and judgment and 
ability that is hard to duplicmte at this Bar or at any other 
Bar. 
In my opinion they a re very fine briefs and the work in-
volved was verv fine work. 
Q. Now, Mr. ~Bowden, are you acquainted with !fr .. James 
E. Heath, who was !fr. Parker's opponent in all of the liti-. 
g·ation which was begun in the court of Virginia? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Is he regarded at the Bar as an able antag·onist, or 
otherwisei 
A. A very able antagonist, very enel'getic and very re-
sourceful. 
Q. How does he stand for pertinacity1 
A. Awful. 
Mr. l\Iaupin: Take the witnf\ss, ~fr. Baird. 
CROSS EXA:MINA.TION. 
By I\f r. Baird : 
Q. Is your idea in this matter based entirely on the thought. 
that it is a contingent fee 1 
A. Not entirely, hut I think that should be taken into con-
sideration. 
Q. You regarded it as a ease in which the fee was contin-
gent1 
page 370 ~ A. To Rome extent. 
Q. It could not he to some extent contingent, 
could iH 
A. "\Vell, I underst:md that certainly he would not be able 
to be paid in full for his sel'viees if he had not prevailed. 
Q. Why do you think there was less chance of his being· 
paid in full than partially paid 0? 
A. I do not know exactly what hiR client's means arc, but 
I understood his chn.ncL~S of l'Cceiving· ad0quate compensa-
tion for his services were very slim if they did not get this 
estate. 
Q. How clicl you undcl'stnncl tluti. f 
A. I don't know whethe1· he told me, bnt I think so. 
Q. Did you know that he had been paid $10,0001 
A. I knew that there had berm a credit on that. account of 
something over $9,000 tliat hnd been 11aid on account of his 
services, and some for his expenses, I 1Jelieve. 
Q. ·with that knowle.dg;e, <lid you still regard the foe as 
conting·ent? 
A. Largely. 
Q. Larg·ely? 
A. Yes. 
Q. \\TJiat did I under~hmd you to say w·as t.he 
pa~~;e 371 ~ special va hw of the services-the work, the judg-
ment and the skill that vo11 cfocrihed f 
.A.. Well, l\Ir. Baird. thP. hvo tl1ing·s a re so intimately re-
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lated that it is difficult to say. You can go out here and get. 
any number of lawyers who, pel'haps, would duplicate the 
number of hours of work, but I do not think you will find 
many that can produce the quality of work, or that, after 
they have done a certain number of hours in legal research, 
would liave the judg111ent to obtain as fine results for their 
clients as he obtained in this case. 
Q. The object of my question was to develop whether you 
arrived a.t your conclusion on the basis of the skill that was 
displayed, or the amount of work that was done, or did you 
regard them both as the result? 
A. I say both were taken into consideration. No matter 
how many hours he might l1ave put in the matter of legal 
research, if it had not been fallowed up by fine judgment he 
would not have prevailed. 
Q. ·what is the matter of fine judgment 1 
A. First, manipulating the matter so that no litigation of 
any consequence was llad in the home town of this decedent 
in New York. 
Q. There could not have been much more litigation over 
one estate than there was in this, could there? 
page 372 ~ A. That was no fault of his. 
Q. Did you consider the whole estate at risk in 
arriving at your conclusion as to fee? 
A. To some extent. 
Q. It is hard for me to g~t at yC>ur meaning. What do 
vou mean bv ''to some extent''1 
~ A. I thini{ if the litigation had taken place in New York 
State, and in the home town, and the question had been raised 
and an attack had been made on the capacity of the testator 
tllere in tliat community, there were a number of religious 
issues which would have bPen involved and those questions I 
think offered very serious danger whether she would have 
gotten any part of the estate. 
Q. I am talking n hout tlw money(lcl interest, not the re .. 
ligious interest. ·what mmwy was involved? 
A. I rncntioued tlw religions isime as being something that ' 
he had and should have taken into c011siclerntion in attempt-
inp; to control tlic forum in which t.hese matters were to be 
Ii tig·a tccl. 
Q. Of course, lie would take into comddera.tion every ele-
ment that smTotmcled the situation or that w·as likely to enter 
into the litigation f 
A. Yes, and that was not the least of importance. 
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Q. What did you think the estate wast 
page 373 r A. What did I think it consisted off 
Q. How much in value 1 
A. Around $100,000. 
Q. Did you consider it all at risk! 
.A. I do not recall now exactlv what the laws of New York 
would have given the widow of the deceasecl It ha~ been 
some time since I read that. It seems to me, that if thev had 
attacked tye validity' of the will, and if they had attacked the 
validity of the marriage, of course,. they would not have gotten 
anything. 
Q. Didn't you know, so far as the Virginia law was con-
cerned, that if Father HayC's was domiciled here and the ad-
ministration was here, bis widow would get the whole estate Y 
A. Yes, but there were other questions, I understand, as 
to where the domicile was. 
Q. WhaU 
A. I understood one of H1e questions, one of the important 
questions, that his opponents were raising was whether or 
not his domicile was here or in New York City'. 
Q. Now, if the domicile was in New York and tl1e will was 
good, she would g·et all the estate, wouldn't she f 
A. I think that would be determined bv whether the will 
was good and whether the ma.niage was valid. 
page 37 4 ~ Q. I say, if the will was good 1 
A. That is a great big· if. I do not think it 
the litigation had been tried in New York it would have been 
decided that the will was good or that the marriage was valid,. 
from what I understood. 
Q. Do you ·know what she would get if he was domiciled in 
New York and the will was good t · 
A.. I do not know that I recall it. 
Q. Did you not consider the difference between what she 
would get if he were domiciled in Virginia and if he were 
~ domiciled in New York, and did you not consider tlmt she 
would get the same if the will was valid either in Virginia 
or in New York! · 
Mr.- Maupin: I do not understand that question. 
Witness: I <lo not. eithPr. 
Mr. Baird: Read it back. 
Note: The question was read. 
Mr. Maupin: I sti11 do not understand it. I would not 
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know how to answer it. You liave two separate questions in .. 
volving two separate things. 
Mr. Baird: Strike it out. 
By Mr. Baird: 
Q. Did you not know that if the will was good Mrs. Hayes 
~ot the whole estate, whether the domicile was in 
page 375 ~ New York or in Virginia f 
Mr. Maupin: That is self evident-if the will is good ancl 
the will gives her the whole estate, of course she gets it. 
By Mr. Bairrl: 
·Q. Will you answer that? 
A. Yes, that is my recolJection. 
Q. Did you know whether the will was good or bad if lie 
was domiciled in Virginia, she would get the whole estate Y 
A. That involved the validity of the marriage, doesn't it, 
and the mental capacity of the decedenU 
Q. No. I say if the will was not valid and Father Hayes 
was domiciled in Virgfoia, do you now agree that she ,vould 
get the whole esblte Y 
A. Not necessarilv. 
Q. ·wen, what CXC°Cption is tl1ere to it? 
Mr. Maupin: He ju~t told you that it involved whether 
it was a valid mania!-{<?, or not. I do not want to keep ob-
jeeting, but we are loading thi:;; reeord up with the same thing 
many times. 
Mr. Baird: Mr. Parker said that he reached the conclu-
sion that the marriage could not be at.tacked. 
l\fr. M:nupin: Could not he success-fully at-
page 376 ~ tacked. He has never convinced l\Ir. Heath of 
that. 
Bv l\fr. Haircl : 
.. 0. Will you answ"T it? 
A. Read it. 
Note: The qne~tion W}lS read. 
A. I s;:iy tlJat would involve the question as to wl1et.h~r or 
not t.lie validity of the marriage were attacked and tl1e suc-
cess of such an at.tack. 
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Q. Then, in my question I am assuming· tha.t she was the 
widow of Father Hayes. Now, will you answer it Y 
..A. Read the question again. 
Note : The question was read. 
Q. Assuming tlmt she was the widow of Father Hayes and 
the will was invalid, and Father Hayes was domiciled in New 
York, did you not know that she would have gotten half of 
the estate plus $10,000? 
A. That is my recollection of it, but I have been n little 
hesitant in saying· so because I am not certain the New York 
la.w would have g·ivcn her half, but, of course: whether she 
got half in New York would have depended on whether they 
had made a successful attack on the validity of the marriage. 
In a Catholic community I imagine the average jury would 
not be difficult to persuade if the marriage was up 
page 377 ~ there. I know I would have kept it out of it if 
I could have devised any way or means of doing 
it. 
Q. Isn't it a fact, from your examination of these variom.; 
proceedin~·s which are ~et forth in Mr. Parker's account, 
that all of them had for their eml a single purpose, namely, 
getting the esfate from 1f n:. Hayes and for :Mn,. Guilfoil. 
and that the only questions which arose other than that were 
as to the proceclu re and issues a rising out of the proc'3dure 
in those several suits or pieces of litigation? 
A. Yes, but there werP. several very difficult question~ of 
procedure. The question of procedure alone would involve 
some considerable difficulty. You know the question of fed. 
eral procedure was so difficult that our friend Thomas Shel-
ton devoted most of his life to it. 
Q. And all of this procedure had a common purpose-the 
same went to nre~erve the estate f 
A. Yes, for Mrs. Hayes. 
Q. Then all the other questions which arose out of the 
safe procedure were with relation to the procedural quest.ion 
in connection with it? 
A. A great many procedural questions a rose: to be sure. 
I can't say that all the questions that arose were procedural 
bv anv means. 
~ · Q. I think it is too fate to go over all of the~e 
pnge 378 ~ details, and I will let Mr. ·Maupin have thr. wit-
ness. 
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Mr. :Maupin: Do you want him for further cross examina 4 
tion when we reconvenef 
l\fr. Baird: No. 
Witness: I tl1ink it rather proper to add this, that in the 
event that :Mrs. Hayes had recovered half of this estate, and 
only half, that would necessarily liave affected the amo~nt 
that a lawyer would have charged, even though the same 
amount of work had been involved on his part, ·because he 
would not feel tha.t he could charge the same sum where he only 
recovered half of the estate as where he recovered it all, so 
in that sense the compensation was partly contingent. 
By Mr. Baird: 
. Q. ·w ouldn 't he be en titl eel to only half' 
A. That is a matter which troubles a great many lawyers. 
It is a very difficult. matter in fixing a fee. I do nol think 
it should have been diminished by anytl1ing like a half, but 
a lawver has to take into consideration what he has ac-
-complished for his c1ient .in determining· the fair value for 
bis services in what he should charge, and they usually do. 
The further taking of testimony in this case is adjourned 
until 2 :30 o'clock tomorrow afternoon, ·Feb. 3, 1939. 
pag·e 379} OFlnCES OF GEORGE PILCHER, ESQ., 
COMMISSIONER, . 
Norfolk, Virginia, February 3, 1939. 
The hearinQ: was resumed before the Commissioner at 2 
P. M., pursu~nt to adjournment of the preceding day. 
Present: Mr. Maupin, for the complainant. 
l\Ir. Baird and l\fr. Lanning, for the defendant. 
,JULIAN.S. LAWRENCE, 
a witness on hel1a]f of the complainant, having been duly 
sworn, testified as follows: 
Examined by l\fr. 1\faupin: 
Q. Your name is .Julian S. Lawrrnce and you are <1n attor-
ney and member of the Bnr of Norfolk; is that a facU 
A. That is correct. 
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Q. How long have you been practicing law, Mr. Lawrence! 
A. Since 1916. · . 
Q. You are a graduate of the University of Virginia 1 
A. I am. 
Q. Are you acquainted with Mr. "\V. L. Parker, an attor-
ney of this city, who is one of the litigants here Y 
A. I am. ·· 
Q. How long· have you known him °l 
A. Since about 1910. 
· Q. Are you acquainted with his professional 
page 380 ~ standing and his capability as a lawyer! 
A. I um. 
Q. Have you ever been in any matters involving profes-
siona! services in which he was either your opponent or your 
associate? 
.A.. I have. 
Q. You have had opportunities of making personal obser-
vation of his capacity and ability as a lawyer f 
.A. I have. 
Q. What is his standing at the bar as a lawyer and his 
standing in the community as a man? 
A. It is of the highest, I would say. 
Q. Mr. Lawrence, Mr. Parker is claiming compensation 
for certain services which were performed, as he alleges, for 
Mrs. Adelaide M. Grady Hayes, who is the widow of ·wn-
limn R. Ha:yes and who was named in his will as his executrix 
and who was the sole beneficiarv under that will. Those 
services, in general, c.onsiAted of ·an attempt, and a succes~-
ful attempt, to preserve that estate for Mrs. Hayes, and also 
other estate to which she was entitled which did not pass un-
der the will. In connection therewith, Mr. Parker has filed, 
as Exhibit 1 with the evidence in this case, a statement of 
the nature, character, and extent of the services wl1ich he 
claims to have performed and of the respective eo·mpensat.ion 
for each cla~s of service, which he thinks is rea-
page 381 ~ sonable and proper. Have you been oYer that Ex-
hibit 1 or a copy thereof? 
A. I have been over a copy of it., Mr. Maupin. 
Q. You are familiar, then, genernlly speaking~ with the 
task that confronted Mr. Parker and with tl1e wa.v that he 
performed it, according to his statement, and the results that 
were obtained by his services, a re you not? 
A. I am. 
Q. Now, I would like for you, if you will, to state to the 
Commissioner whetlwr the compensation ";hich )fr. Parker 
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claims as being- fair nnd proper compensation for his serv-
ices is, in your opinion and judgment, fair and reasonable; 
if it is, state your reasons; if it is not, please state wherein 
you differ with Mr. Parker, and your reasons. 
A. In my judgment, the compensation asked by Mr. Par-
ker is entirely reasonable. This Jitigation covered a long 
period, of nearly four yc~ars, as I understand it, involved 
complex questions, and a g-reat deal of skill and finesse was 
required in the succe~sful handling· of it, and I believe that 
the fee which Mr. ·Parker is charging is entirely reason-
able. 
Q. Now, Mr. Parker has divided his ~ervices under 16 head:.1 
by way of clarity and in order to promote an understanding 
of what was done. You have been over all of 
page 382 ~ those separate heads, have you, :Mr. Lawrence? 
A. I have. 
Q. Mr. Parker, in his testimony, claims that the estate 
at present is of the value of approximately $114,000; you 
have read his testimony, have you 1 
A.'. I have. 
Q. And you took that into co11sicleration in arriving at your 
conclusion 7 
A. Yes. 
Q. Will you please shlte whether or not, in your judgment, 
the steps which Mr. Parker took in the litigated matters and 
the services which he performed in t11e matters which were 
not litigated, as set out in tJ1e exhibit and in his testimony, 
were handled in a proper, competent, and what I might say, 
a lawver-like manner? 
.A. I would say, cerfainly in a most skillful, lawyer-like, and 
competent manner. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Bv l\f r. Baird : 
··Q. Mr. Lawrence, :ne you hflsing your views on any per-
sonal knowledge in respert to those matters, or entirely on· 
l\fr. Parker's dP.positions and exhibits Y 
A. Entirely on llis depositions tmd ex11ibits and persona] 
conversations I have had with Mr. Parker, usually 
page 383 ~ over the lunch table, during the past four years, 
Mr. Baird. 
Q. Can you give us any idea to what extent yo1fr <~onclu-
sions are predicated on conversations with Mr. Parker? 
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A. ·wen, primarily, they are predicated on his exhibits and 
his testimony. 
Q. Have you considered his fee from the standpoint of its 
being contingent, or certain 1 
A. I l1ave considered it as being primarily contingent, for 
the reason that, if he had not. sustained the will, there would 
have beeu nothing to have paid him with. l\fy information 
was tha.t Mrs. Hayes was unable to pay him except out of 
the estate. 
Q. Then, your views are predicated tipon the assumption 
or understanding· that the fee was contingent? 
A. Certainly there was a contingency of bis getting a fee, 
regardless of the outcome of the litigation. 
Q. I don't understand that answer. Do you mean that he 
would get his fee irrespective of the results ·J 
A. No, sir; I mean that he would not get anv fee if he 
had not been successful in the litigation. i unde;·stancl that 
to be a fact. 
Q. Do you think that view is consistent with the fact that 
he had received $10,000? 
A. As I undersbmd it, he received $10,000 to 
page 384 ~ be applied on account of expenses and his fee, 
which it would lrnve been necessarv for him to 
refund to the estate had he llOt prevailed in the litigation. 
Q. For him to refund, or for Mrs. Hayes to refund? 
A. ·wen, I think, both. 
Q. Do you think he would have been liable to the estate? 
A. As I understnnd it, he was personally liable on a surety 
bond. 
Q. ·well, that opinion that you have expressed, then, is 
. based on the idea that he was personally liable on the surety 
bond, is it 1 
A. In part, yes, sir. 
Q. In arriving at your figures, have you made any calcu-
lations as to the proportion of anything allowed Mr. Parker 
which should be treated as compensation coming from the 
estate, and what proportion should be treated as compensa-
tion coming· from 1\f rs. Hayes persona1ly 1 
A. No, sir, I have not, for the reason that I considered 
them practically one and the same, since Mrs. Hayes was 
without independent means to compensate l1in'i. 
Q. ·what is your understanding of what Mrs. Hayes would 
have received if the probate proceedings were in Virginia. 
either under t110 will or as the widow of her deceased lms1 
band? 
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page 385 } .A. In Virginia f 
Q. Yes. 
A. My understanding is that she would receive the entire 
estate under the will if it was probated in Virginia. 
Q. And she would have received the same thing as his 
widow, without the will, wouldn't she? 
A. As his widow, she wonlcl have, yes, sir. 
Q. If the probate proceedings had been in New York and 
the will had been valid, she ,,rnuld have gotten the whole es-
tate, just as she would in Virginia, would she not¥ 
A. If the will could have been upheld in New York, I un-
derstand so, yes. 
Q. Now, if the probate proceedings had been in New York 
and the will had been held to be invalid, what would she have 
gotten? 
A. My understanding- is she would have gotten one-half of 
the personal estate, if the marriage liad been upheld. 
l\fr. ·Baird: I would like, lV[r. Commissioner, to correct 
11ere some of the questions I asked yesterday, and it has 
reference to Mr. Lawrence's answer: 
Q. Isn't it a fact that, under tl1e New York law, she would 
have gotten $10,000, first, and half of the estate, as the widow 
of Mr. Hayes? 
Mr. Lanning: Half of the balance. 
Mr. Baird: Yes. 
page 386 } A. Mr. Bahd, that is not my understanding. I 
may he mistaken in it. 
Mr. Baird: On the r<~~ord, I would like to chang·e, if I 
may, mv (]Uestions yesterday. T think I said on the record, 
one-half of the estate plus $] 0,000. i\[y attention was called 
afterwards to the fact that. tl1e real rule is $10,000 and one-
half of tl1e remainder. · 
Q. Mr. Lawrence, will you look at Items 2, 3, 4, 7, 14, 15, 
and 16 of Mr. Parker's acrount nncl say whether or not they 
were not all parts of the duty of the executrix, in your opin-
ion? 
A. 1\1: r. Baird, I would say they were part of the duties of 
the executrix and her counsel. 
Q. I tl1ink that is a proper distinct.ion, too. That is, it 
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would have been the duty of the executrix, with the advice 
of her counsel. 
A. With such advice and service from her counsel as was 
considered necessary, yes, sir. 
Q. What would ·her commission on the estate have ·been 
under the practice in Virginia? 
A. Five per cent is customary. 
Q. Did you observe that, under Item 2, Mr. Parker has 
charged for performing· the services of the executrix, $3,7501 
A., I did, sir. 
page 387 ~ Q. Did you notice that his additional charges 
~ for the items that I have mentioned bring up the 
total charge for those items, plus Item 2, to $11,250 ~, 
A. I have not segregated those particular items. I as-
sume those figures are correct. I will say this~ .Mr. Baird1 
that I think Mr. Parker's figure on Item 2 is probably a 
little high. I think his figure on Item 9 is low and in .Item 
14 is low. 
Q. Can you give us the benefit of any suggestion as to what 
part of Items ·2, 3, 4, ·7, 14, 15, and 16 were properlv perform-
able by tl1e executrix, and what part by her counsel¥ 
Mr. Maupin: I tl1ink the witness would have to go through 
the exhibit to refresh his memory in order to do that, where 
the services are set out in· detail. 
A. Mr. Baird, I don't see that any part of those duties 
could have been performed in this case without advice of 
counsel and very active aAsistance from counsel. 
By Mr. Baird: 
Q. Well, you have said that they ou~;ht to have been per-
formed by the executrix with the adYice of counsel f 
A. With the advice nnd assistance of counsel. 
Q. Now, I ask you if it is possible--and frankly, I don't. 
suppose it is-for you to say wnat part of those items i:;l1ould 
have been pP-rformed by the executrix and whai. 
page 388 ~ part should l1ave been performed with tbe as-
sistance of counsel f 
Mr. Maupin: If your Honor please, I object to that ques-
tion because it is not susceptible of an intelligent answer. 
The question presupposes that an executrix-any executrix-
ought not to employ counsel ni:; to certain matters. and ought 
to employ counsel as to certain other matters. Now, that is 
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a question, it seems to me, that varies so greatly in differing 
conditions that it is impossible to give a categorical, dog·matic 
answer to it. 
A. Mr. Baird, I think, under the circumstances existing in 
this case, it was _not practica.ble for the executrix to per-
form any of those duties without the advice of counsel. For 
instance, under Item 3, she certainly needed counsel; coun-
sel was very necessary in handling the ma.tter with the surety 
company. Now, doubtless, had a corporate executor qualified 
in this case, they could have handled, without the ad,rice of 
counsel, the settlement of the Straus bonds, or the securities 
and investments without active advice of counsel. They could 
possibly have handled the fax matters with a C. P.A., rather 
than a lawyer but I do not see how Mrs. Hayes could have 
handled any of them without the very active assistance-
Q. ·well, my question was not directed to that 
page 389 ~ point. I understood that you thought that the 
services o.f counsel were necessary in respect to 
each of those items Y 
A. I did. 
Q~ Well, I understood· that you also thought a part of 
each of them should have been performed by the executrL""'{. 
Now, I ask you if it is possible for you to separate in your 
mind what part, or what percentage, should have heen per-
formed by tlie executrix and what by her counsel? 
A. I do not think it is posi:;ible to separate them, because 
the part which might possibly have been performed by the 
executrix is so small that it is hard to segregate it. It is 
almost negligible. 
Q. Your difficulty in segreg·ation is solely on the ground 
that the duties of the executrix were comparatively i;;malH 
A. No, sir, I don't think I said tha.t. I say the duties which , 
she could have performed without the assistance of counsel 
were a relatively small part of the entire proceeding. 
The Commissioner: Mr. Baird, you are not taking into 
t]rn assumption the capahnities of the executrix as an indi-
vidual in this instance. Some executors could haYe done all 
of tha.t work, and others conld not. 
:Mr. J\faupin: Exactly. Tlrnt was the point of my objec-
tion. 
pag·e 390 } The CommiS@ione·r: If Mr. E. Lee Rawlings 
had been executor in there, he eould have made 
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out certain things, and if I had Leen executor, I could have 
done certain things, but I could not have done Mr. Rawlings' 
part. 
Bv l\Ir. Baird : 
~Q. Looking a.t Item No. 2 of the aecount: Have you ob-
served that it is for all of the duties of the executrix under-
taken and performed by counsel? 
A. Yes, practically speaking, that is true, Mr. Baird. And 
for that reason, I sng·gested a reduction of $1,250 in that 
item. 
Q. You do not think that the counsel for the executrix 
in this case has any right, as a matter of law, to perform the 
duties imposed by statute on the executrix, do you 1 
A. Has any right to perform them? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I think he haR a right to perform such duties as he is 
employed by the executrix to perform. 
Q. You think the executrix can shift the performance of 
her duties under the statute to her counsel f 
A. I do not think that she can shift the liabilitv, lmt T 
know from personal experience that the work is q1.1.ite· fre-
quently shifted. 
Q. Do you think that b~r performing the duties of the 
executrix, he1· counsel can deprive her of the 
page 391 ~ rig·ht to the compensation fixed by law! 
A. "\Vell, 1 think if the executrix permits or 
requests or requires counsel to perform all the duties, that 
counsel ought to participate in the compemmtiou a1lowed by 
law. 
Q. Is it your idea in this case that the estate should be 
charged both with the $3,750 and the executrix's fees f 
A. My idea in thi8 cas<' was that that Item_2 should prob-
ably be cut to $2,500, on ~lie theory that Mr. Parker was en-
titled to two-thirds of the fees and :Mrs. Hayes to the other 
third. I might add, howrver, in case you do not cover these 
items in detail, tlrnt I think some of the subsequent items 
sl10ukl be increased. 
Q. Do you think 'Mr. Parker, as a la,vyer, was qualified to 
act for the executrix in regard to handling· real estate mat-
ters which were in the lurnds either of the contractor at Vir-
gh1ia Beach or the agents at N ewlmrg·h f 
A. Mr. Baird, I can i:;peak fr@m mv personal experience 
in that matter-and I don't suppose Mr. Parker is any bet-
ter qualified or any less qualified in handling real estate• 
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than I am-and I have been doing the same thing for twentv 
years and getting paid for it. "' 
Q. For what-for your judgment in regard to the values 
of land? · 
A. Handling real estate. 
Q. Now, will you turn to Item 8 of Mr. Par-
pag·e 392 ~ ker 's account. You will see there that he states 
the gr01mds of contest of the will, the witnesses 
whom he interviewed, and the legal questions that were in-
volve<l and with which he dealt. Now, isn't it a fact that 
those que~tions or issues were precisely the same as the 
<.1uestions or issues involved in all the different proceedings 
in this case-the matters of litigation or of controversy 
w ]1ic.h did not come to Ii tiga tion f 
A. To some extent, all phases of the litigation involved 
the same question. I think there were different questions, 
though-additional questions-in practically every phase of 
it wJ1ich were not common to each one. 
Q. ·well, he says that the grounds of contest were that the 
decedent was mentally incompetent, and then he enumerates 
the diseases from which he says that. he suffered, and that 
]1e waR under undue influence, and that tbe Clerk was with-· 
out jurisdiction, that the decedent was incompetent to con-
tract, and tl1at the marriage \Yas invalid and operated to 
revoke the will; and t]1at the leg·al questions which he con-
sidered wen~ the jurisdiction of' the court. mental capacity, 
11ndue influence. the effect of subsequent marriage on the 
will, validity of the marriage, and inheritance in case of in-
testacv. 
- : .. 
)fr. l\foupin: vVhieh contP.~t wa~ that-tlie first will case 
in the Federal Con rt? 
pag·e 393 } Mi·. B:1ird: It is entitled ''The first will con-
test.'' 
Bv ~fr. B::i.ird: 
· Q. Now, isn't it a fact. that those (luestions were the same 
questions. and al1 tlw qucRtions other than procedural ques-
tions. which came up in any of the different pl1ases of this 
mutter. and that if they had once been investigated, there was 
110 need or advantage in re-investigating- tliem? 
A. ,Vell. l\fr. Baird, I would not say that they were all of 
the qne~tions that. <?Yer came up in any phase of the matter. 
certainly in the Fedcrlll Court; tbe decision, as I understand 
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it, turned on an entirely different question, not raised in the 
Princess Anne Court. 
· Q. That was the question of whether the ],ederal /Court 
had jurisdiction of :probate! 
. A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That was a '' proceduml'' question, as I call it; I don't 
know whether that is the right name for it. 
· A. I would think ~o. .... 
Q. You cannot think of any other q t1estion, can you. 7 
A. No, sir, I can't think of any other question oftband. 
Q. Now, Mr. Pa1·ke1· made a charge of $3,000 for that serv-
ice. Don't you think that the information that he got in con-
nection with it ought to have been available, without any 
further charge, in connection with all other fea-
page 394 ~ tures of this situation? 
A. Well, in order t.o properly prepare for the 
trial of the will contest in Princess Anne, he certainly had 
to do a great deal more than investigate these legal ques-
tions-interviewing of witnesses and preparation of briefs, 
and so forth. 
Q. I did not ask you that question. I asked you whether 
that information that he had gotten, so far as it was needed 
in the other case, ought not to have been available in that 
without any further charge. Of course, I know he had to 
prepare pleadings and briefs and other proceedings. 
A. Well, I t.hink he necessari.Iy bad to take into account 
that he had done some of the work in preparation for the lat-
ter phases of the litigation, and, doubtless, did. 
Q. Now, take No. 9, which is headed, ''The suit in New 
York to set aside the deed conveying the real estate," for 
which there is a charg·e of $1,500. Call yon suggeRt any fact 
that had to be iJ!vestigated there that wa.s not covered by 
the investigation in connection with No. 8? 
.A.. Well, certainly, there he had to deal entirely with New 
York law, whereas, "in the first will contest in Princess Anne, 
he was dealing with Virginia law. 
Q. You have in mind what he said about the questions that 
he investigated in Princess Anne County 1 
page 395 ~ A. Yes, e:;ir. As a matter of fact, I think hfa 
charp:e in Item 9 was probably too small by a 
thousand dollars. 
Q. On what theory do you base that? 
A. Well, as I understand it, there was $20,000 of real es-
tate involved which, through his efforts, was saved for Mr~. 
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Hayes, and he was certainly confronted with a most difficult 
situation in this New York litigation. . 
Q. You express that view notwithstanding the fact that 
the estate had ample New York counsel to handle this matter 
-didn't it? 
.A. A.s I undl~rstand it, New York counsel were employed 
mainly to file papcrs--
Q. Not to handle the litigation-
.A. -and to watch the course of the litigation on the docket, 
and not actively to handle the litigation, and that Mr. Parker, 
in fact, did practically all the work. 
Q. What do you understand that he did that jm:;tified the 
charge of $1,500 in that matter? 
A. ·wen, it. appears from hiR memorandum here that be 
made a very careful and thorough investigation in and around 
Newburgh of the facts, in an effort to gather evidence. He 
was successful in removing· the case to the federal court 
against the advice of New York counsel, as I understand it, 
and, in my judgment, the probahi]ities are that 11e would 
have lost that particular phase of the litigation 
page 396} had it heen tried in Newburgh. 
Q. Do yon mean tl1at his compensation rested 
on the fact that be overruled the opinion of his associates 
in New York? 
A. Not entirely so, no, sir, but I think he certainly took 
a great deal of responsibility in doing that, and I believe the 
outcome justified bis judg1nent, for which he should be com-
pensated. 
Q. Are you speaking- of the litigation f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Don't you know the ]itig·ation was never tried? 
A. I know it was never tried7 but it wns removed to the 
federal court in New York City, as I recall, against the ad-
vice of local counsel up there. 
Q. Well, is it your idea that he was entitled to charge $1,500 
for instructing· his associates to remove tfle case to fede-ral 
court? 
A. Of course not, and I didn ~t say so. 
Q. Well, what is your idea Y 
A. I think lie should have been allowed $2,500 for his serv-
ices in connection with that litigation. 
Q. I am trying· to find out what the services were. 
A. Well, Mr. Baird, I think one of the most valuable t!JingA 
he did in connection with that litig·ation was to obtain the 
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stipulation which he did, that the outcome of the 
page 397 ~ litigation down here shou]d govern in that cas~, 
in the event the P.Xecutrix was successful in Vir-
ginia. 
Q. You agree that, so far ns the investigation of the facts 
in that case was concerned, that investigation had been cov-
ered by his investigation in connection with No. 8, do you 
not? 
A. To a certain extent, yes, sir---not entirely. 
Q. I wish you could qualify a little1 more accurately. ''To 
a certain extent" is pretty vap;ue. 
A. Well, I think his investigation of the conveyance of the 
N ewburg·h real estate involved facts that were not involved 
in the investigation of the will. 
Q. What facts? 
A. Well, the circumstances under wMeh tl1e deed was <lrawn 
and delivered. which lrnd 110thing to do with the will. 
Q. Well, what would the circumstances under which the 
deed was drawn have to do with iU It was only a question 
of. the capacity of the grantor to make tl1e deed, wasn't it t 
A. The ·question of the capacity of the gTantor, and the 
question of the delivery, I think, was raiRed. 
Mr. Maupin: I would like to remind counsel ·that the 
question of undue influence was a direct attack on the validity 
of that deed. Now, certainly, the circumstances under which 
the deed was dcilivered went irnrnecliatelv to the 
pag·e 398 ~ question of wl1ether or not nndm~ influe·uce waa 
employed to ohhtin the deed. 
The Commissioner : "'\Vha t was the di:ff P.rence in time be-
tween the deliverv of the deed and the execution of the will! 
Mr. Parker : The will was executed in J ulv of 1932 and 
the deed in Octo her of 1933. " 
Mr. Baird: I understand the deed was executed and pu1 
in a safe and not r()corded until after Mr. Haves' deatl1. 
The Commissioner: I wanted to know the dates of execu-
tion of the two instruments. · 
Bv Mr. Baird: 
·o. Now, l\Ir. Lawrence, corning to No. 10, wllich was the 
application of J[rs. Guilfoil for letters of administration. Do 
you t11ink the cha rg-e of $1,500 for that was proper? 
A. T do, sir. 
Q. miat did he do in that case that was not covered by 
fl1e investig·ation that ])c Imel made in connection wit11 No. 8 V 
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A. ·well, it certainly involved, I would say, Mr. Baird, ad-
ditional investigation and the responsibility for the various 
important decisions which he had to make as to what he would 
do in connection with that litigation. 
Q. Let me call your attention to this: Mr. 
pag·e 399 } Parker's account says: "The petition contained 
the following allegations: 1. That the decedent 
died domiciled in the State of New York; 2. That he left no 
will, but that a paper writing purporting- to be h~s will had 
been 'filed in tl1e Circuit Court of Princess Anne County, 
Virginia,' but that the same was null and void; 3. That 
'Adelaide lVL Grady, who resides at tl1e present time at Vir-
ginia Beach, Virginia, claims to be the widow of said de-
ceased, but such claim is not admitted, it being alleg·ed by 
petitioner that the marriage of said Adelaide M. Grady with 
the decenRed is n.ull and void.' '' 
Now, on the succeeding· page, Mr. Parker says the issues 
were these : The domicile of the decedent, the validity of 
the will, and the validity of the marriage. 
\Vere not those exactly the same questions that had been 
dealt with previously and for which there had been a 1mm-
ber of charges already made? 
A. The same questions were involved in the prior phase 
of the litigation, yes, sir. 
Q. Of comse, we lawyers know that~ whatever form these 
various pieces of litigation took, they were procedural ques-
tions and there were pleadings and other papers to be drawn. 
I am not meaning to contend that l\fr. Parker was not en-
titled to compensation for tlia.t; you understand my position 
in tha.t respect. 
page 400 } After your attention has been called to No. 8 
and the investig·ation made in connection with it 
and to what l\fr. Parker says was the issue in this applica-
tion of Mrs. Guilfoil for letters of administration, and your 
statement, which I understand to be that, in effect, the same 
principal issues were involved, do you still think $1,500 was 
reasonable f · 
A. I do, sir. 
Q. fan 't it a fact, from your investigation of this situation, . 
that there 1iever was but one principal question involved, 
and that was whet.her ::\frs. Hayes would get the whole of this 
estate. or half of it, and that that question came up and was 
put forward in different methods and by the different pro-
cedures that were adopted as part, of the litigation in this 
case? 
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A. It ·seems to me that the question was involved, whether 
she would get all of it, half of it, or none of it. 
Q. On what basis did you think the question whether she 
would get none of it was involved T 
A. Well, certainly, if she had submitted to the New York 
jurisdiction and the will had not been upheld and the mar-
riage not upheld, I don't see how she would have gotten any. 
thing. . 
Q. Do you have any information that you would charac-
terize, as a lawyer, as substantially tending to 
page 401 ~ raise any question aR to the validity of the mar-
riage! 
A. Well, I understand that that question was seriously 
raised and insisted upon by very competent counsel on the 
other side, and I can certainly see the difficult.ies of having 
that question submitted to a jury in Newburgh. 
Q. Did you consider, in connection with the answer you 
have just made, the following·, which I read from the contents 
of Mr. Parker's exhibit, page 3, Item 13: 
"A search was then made for all decisions of the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina interpreting this statute, and the 
conclusion wa.s reached tha.t the validity of such a marriage 
could not be attacked after the death of one of tl1e contract-
ing parties.'' 
A. I do not recall that statement. I assumed that he 
meant to say that, in his opinion, it could not be successfully 
attacked. 
Q. I think t'4at is a fair construction, but the statement-
meant that it could not be attacked so that any result would 
come from the attack, didn't iU 
A. In his judgment. 
Q. You have no reason to think his judgment was poor, 
and, in fact, you have a high opinion of his judgment, haven't 
youT 
A. Absolutelv. 
Q. Now, taking up Item ll, which is the first suit in the 
federal court: Did vou take note of what was 
page 402 t said by Mr. Parker a .. s to the allegations and the 
grounds of his motion to dismiss that proceed-
ing Y Let me read them to you. The allegations of the bill 
are these: ''Diverse citizenship of the parties as a basis 
of federal jurisdiction;'' there was nothing difficult in that, 
was thereY · 
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A. I would say 11ot, no, sir. 
Q. ''That William R. Hayes died domiciled in the State of 
New York;'' that certainly was the same question investi-
gated in No. 8, was it noU 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. '' That the plaintiff had been appointe.d administratrix 
of the estate of William R. Hayes by the Surrogate's Court 
of Orange County, New York, in a proceeding to which the 
defendant was a party;'' there was nothing difficult about 
that? 1'1:r. Parker had C'-onceded her right to those letters of 
administration, had he· not? - _ 
A. I would not say that he had conceded her right to the 
granting of letters of administration in New York. 
Q. I think you a.re rig-ht; he liad decided not to make any 
appearance in it. That is the accurate way to express it. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you any further answer to that question 1 
A. I, further, did not understand that Mrs. Hayes wa~ 
served with process in that New York proceeding, Mr. Baird. 
Q. You say you did not understand it? 
page 403 ~ A. No. 
Q. Com in~ to the next allegation: "That \\Til-
li~m .R. Haye~ died possessed of a large personal estafo of 
which, after his death, tl1e defendant took possession;'' was 
there any difficulty about that to Mr. Parker? 
A. I assume he conceded the truth of that. 
Q. "That the plaintiff was the so]e heir and disfrihutec 
of the decedent.": Now, that bring·s up the whole questio11 
between the parties, and tliat is all the question there was; 
isn't that so? · 
A. It certainly brought up a very large part of it. 
Q. N °'v, t.lle motion to dismiss was on the following.· 
p;rounds: '' The probate of the will of 1Vi11iam R. Hayes in 
the Circuit Comt of PrincesR Anne County, Virginia;" the1;e 
was nothing- difficult nhout that-it was conceded that the 
will had been probated there; isn't tha.t a fact.¥ 
A. It was conceded that it had been probated there, but, 
as I understand it, they were contesting the probate of it. 
Q. In regard to what wns done in that suit, I will read 
the following from Mr. Pa1·ker's account, which is the second 
page of Item 11: "A motion to dismiss on the ground that 
no such right existed in either caR0. was prepared and filed. 
. Combined with the motion to dismiss was an an-
pa~·e 404 ~ swer in which the f ol1owing was alleg·ed: 
• 
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'' (a) The probate of the ·will of ,vmiam R. Hayes in the 
Circuit Court of Princess Anne County, Virginia.'' 
There was nothing doubtful or difficult about that litigation, 
was there? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. '' (b) The qualification of the defendant as executrix 
of said will, and· her possession of the assets of the estate 
as such executrix.'' There wus nothing difficult or doubtful 
about that, was there f 
A. No, I don't. think so, except they were, of course, at-
tacking· the probate and the qualification both in this other 
proceeding. 
Q. "(c) That the assets of the estate were in the custody 
and control of the Circuit Court of Princess Anne County 
as a competent court of probate, and that no otl1er court 
could interfere with their administration there.'' There was 
no doubt about 'the assets being under the control of the 
executrix and that she was subject to the control of that court, 
was there? 
A. They were raising- the question as to the jurisdiction 
of the court, thoug·h, as I understand it. 
Q. I am talking about the issues that were made by the 
pleadings. 
A. ThP.y certainly rnised an issue, all rig'ht-, 
page 405 ~ I am willing to admit that. 
Q. But, I say, there was no question as to the 
fact, was there, that the assets at that time were in the pos-
session of the executrix and that, as such, they were subject 
to the control of the court? 
A. As I understand it, the plaintiff in this proceeding in 
the federal court was questioning thfl jurisdiction of the Cir-
cuit Court of Princess ..Anne. 
Q. I am talking about the value of wha.t was done, and I 
am reading· t.liesQ things to indicate what was done, and I 
am asking· you what you think of the importance of each of 
these items. 
A. "\;\Tell, I think it was very important for him to sustain 
that allegation. 
Q. I understand that, and supposing· tho case was never 
fried, he would still be entitled to preparation for trial, of 
course. 
A. Of comse, yrs. 
Q. And that is all, and if that preparation bad been previ-
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ously made, he would not be entitled to compensation for 
that, would he? . 
A. Well, I think he was c~rtainly entitled to compensation 
for appearing in the case. 
Q. ·well, some· compensation; do you think he would have 
been entitled to $1,750? 
page 406 } A. I think so, yes, sir. 
Q. For appearing in the case? 
A. For appearing and doing· what he did in the case. He 
argued the motion to dismiss, according to his statement, in 
.February, 1935, and filed a brief. 
Q. You have looked at what he says about the grounds of 
the motion to dismiss, have you notf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you think that a fee of $1,750 for arguing the mo-
tion to dismiss was reasonable 1 
A. For arguing the motion and for his other services in 
that particular litigation. 
Q. Wlmt were the other services f As far as the prepara-
tion goes, tliat ha.cl been done in connection with No. 81 
A. Mr. Baird, in the very nature of things, he had to ap~ 
pear in the case, follow the litig·ation, file the motion, and 
argue the motion. 
Q. Well, he has to attend the calling of the docket, as far 
as that g·oes. 
Now, we will come to the second will contest in the United 
States District Court. v\Tasn 't the Role question that was 
argued and decided there that a federal court was without 
jurisdiction of probate matters f 
A. As I recall it, it ·was, but in order to establish that, he 
. bad to go tlirough three courts. 
page 407 ~ Q. Yes, I understand that. That case was 
argued in the Distrfot Court, it then went to the 
Circuit Court of .Appeals, and then, on an application for 
a writ of ccrtiora·ri, it went to the Supreme Court. 
:Mr. Lanning: No, it did not go to the Supreme Court. The 
application for certiorari wfls denied. 
Mr. Parker: Tl1e application ~:ot there. 
Bv i\fr. Baird : 
·o. Do you think that a fee of $5,000 for arguing- the point 
that a federal court was without jurisdiction of probate mat-
ters, in tbe District Court and tl1e Circuit Court of Appeals, 
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and the application to the Supreme Court for a writ of 
certiorari, is reasonable? · 
A. I think a fee of $51000 for handling the will case through 
the District Court to th~ Supreme Court. was worth $5,000, 
yes, sir. 
Q. Did he handle it in any other way than as I have stated t 
A. As I recall it, Mr. Baird, the whole thing turned on 
that question. 
Q. If that question had been decided against 1\rlr. Parker, 
then the question of the merits would"bave come up, but, hav-
ing· been decided in his favor-: the other questions were never 
reached, were theyY · 
A. That is true. 
Q. Well, all the preparation as to the merits of 
page 408 ~ that case was covered by the investigation in No. 
8, was it not? 
A. I certainly would not think so as to questions of law. 
It involved entirely new law-
Q. No; I say, on the merits, if he had ever gotten to that-
the investigation of the me1·its was the same as was covered 
by No. SY 
A. I think it would have been, yes, sir. 
Q. And, in fact, he never had any occasion to investigate 
the merits in connection with that, did he! 
A. That is my understanding. 
Q. Do you consider the question as to whether a federal 
court has jurisdiction of probate is a very complicated or 
difficult legal question Y 
A. Well, judging from my reading of Mr. Parker's brief, 
it was. I have never had occasion to go into the question, 
myself, but it was evidently relied on very earnest_ly by Mr. 
· Heath, for whose ability I have very high regard. 
Q. Now, coming to what is described as the third will con-
test in Princess Anne, Item iNo. 13: What was done there 
except to present to the court, on the trial, the result of the 
investigations which .had been made respecting previous mat-
ters, and especially this item described in the account as No. 
8 T Will you look at the bill and see if you can 
page 409 } find anything in there except the mere presenta-
tion of those facts Y Of course,- I know thE.1,t Mr. 
Parker had to prepare pleadings and that he attended the 
trial and that he gave the necessary attention to the appeal, 
prepared briefs, and argued the appeal in the Supreme Court; 
I mean to exclude that from my question. 
A. The same general question was involved, :Mr. Baird, but 
Adelaide M. Hayes, et al., '!,. William L. Parker. 26 7 
Julian S. Lawrence. 
it appears from this memorandum that Mr. Parker did a great 
deal of additional work which he had not done before, in 
preparation for the so-called "Third Will ·Contest". 
Q. Well, will you indicate what he did that he had not pre-
viously done 1 
A. vVell, he took additional depositions in Newburgh, on 
two occasions, apparently; he argued the plea to the juris-
diction, which possibly involved some of the same questions, 
but he certainly had to do additional work on it, I would 
think. 
Q. What is your understanding of the issue in that case 7 
A. The question of domicile was very important, as I un-
derstand it, and the question of mental capacity also entered 
into it, of course. 
Q. Don't you know, from Mr. Parker's statement, that the 
proceeding was an issu~ of de1Jisavit vel non,, and that that 
was the only question? 
page 410 ~ A. That is true. 
Q. I call your attention to the very first para-
graph in No. 13. 
A. Well, that, as l understand it, involved the questions 
of domicile and mental capacity. 
Q. Undoubtedly, it involved mental capacity; do you think 
it involved domicile t 
A. I think the jurisdiction of the Princess Anne Court cer-
tainly involved the question of domicile. 
Q. There was no question raised about the jurisdiction of 
the Princess Anne Court, was there f 
A. It is my understanding there was. 
Q. That case brought up the question of ,vhether or not it 
was a valid will, didn't it f 
A. Of course. 
Q. As a matter of fact, if it had been declared invalid, 
and the domicile in Virginia, Mrs. Hayes would have gotten 
all of the estate, anyway, wouldn't she? 
A. If. he could have proved the domicile, yes, sir. 
Q. Do you think a fee of $4,500 for that litigation was 
properf 
A. I would certainly say that a trial in the lower court 
and fighting an appeal through the Court of Appeals in an 
estate involving this much property was easily worth that 
fee. · 
page 411 ~ Q. ·what do you mean by '' involving tllis much 
property'', if it really made no difference whether 
the will was goocl or bad '1 
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A. Well, I think it did make a difference. 
Q. What? Of course, it would have made a difference if 
he had been domiciled in New York. 
A. Of course, he had to establish the Virginia domicile in 
order for her to get the property, either under the will or as 
a distributee. 
Q. I know about that-that is a question of the domicile, 
but not of the validity of the will. That was the question 
in this litigation, wasn't itf 
A. I think it involved, ~lso, the question of domicile, Mr. 
Baird, as I understand it. I have not read this memorandum 
with that particular question in mind, but that is my recol-
lection. 
Q. Don't you think the settlement of tax matters, Item 14, 
was a part of the duties of the executrix, with the assistance 
of counsel? 
A. Either with the assistance of counsel or of a certified 
public accountant. 
Q. Don't you think this charge of $750 for miscellaneous 
services vms sufficient to cover all the necessary assistance 
from counsel which the executrix needed in connection with 
the administration of the property, outside of 
page 412 ~ the litigation and the investigations that have been 
described, or, in other words, it should cover all 
matters incident to the discharge of the duties of the execu-
trix if there were no special complications 1 
A. No, sir, I would not think so. 
Q. In what respec.t would you think it was not sufficicnU 
A. Do you mean that the charge of $750 under Item 16 
should have been sufficient to cover the tax matters? 
Q. Yes. 
A. No, sir. I think this charge for tax matters was too 
small by at least $250, and I think this charge covering ad-
vice on various and sundry matters over· a period of four 
years, as outlined in the memorandum, was entirely reason-
able. 
Q .. Do I understand you to mean that the executrix ought 
not to have attended to tax matters with the advice and as-
sistance of her counsel? 
A. No, sir, I certainly would not say that. I think that 
she ought to have attended to them with the advice aucl as-
sistance of counsel, and my experience is that counsel usually 
does it and the fiduciary 8igns the papers. 
Q. In arriving· at your conclusions as to the amount to 
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which Mr. Parker was entitled, what did you treat the value 
of the estate as being t 
page 413 } A. I understood approximately $115,000. 
Q. Possibly f 
A. Approximately. 
RE-DIRECT EXAl\HNATION~ 
By. :Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Mr. Lawrence, let me ask you this! Assume a lawyer 
is representing a widow who is the executrix and sole bene-
ficiary of her husband's will in considerable estate; that an 
attack is made upon the probate of the will, the principal 
grounds of the attack being mental incapacity of the testa-
tor and undue influence exercised on him to make the will 
which he did make; suppose you had investigated the situa-
tion and felt that the attack as to mental capacity of the tes-
tator was an exceedingly dangerous one for you to come be-
fore a jury on in any forum; do you think, or not, that it 
would be the part of wisdom if it were possible to so man-
ag·e your case as to avoid meeting the issue of mental ca-
}Jacity, assuming, as I say, that that was a very dangerous 
issue from your standpoint? 
A. I think it certainly would be the part of wisdom to 
avoid it if vou could. 
Q. N o,v, "'suppose, having· found that out, there is a will 
contest instituted in the federal court, and in order to meet 
the issue and win your case without. subjecting 
page 414 ~ yourself to the very serious hazard, as yon con-
ceive it, of submitting the issue of mental capacity 
and undue influence to a jury, you are able to win that case 
upon another point, to-wit: the jurisdiction of the court; 
would vou consider that vou had done your client a service 
by avoidi1Jg· a trial on t]1e merits, or otherwise f 
A. I certainlv do consider I would have done her a service. 
Q. Do you consider that a good lawyer would have at-
tempted to do that very thing? 
A. I do. 
Q. Assuming· another co~test, in a state court, on the same 
grounds, and you are advised of the same difficulty and the 
extreme danger, a.s you see it, of submitting to the jury the 
issue of mental capacity and undue influence, and, after con-
siderable study, you are able to have that case go off, still 
without the submission of the question of mental capacity 
and undue il1fluence, on the question of domicile, and the re-
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sulting incapacity, wider the statute, for the contestant to 
contest the will because said contestant is not a party in 
interest, under the laws of Virginia, and that is carried 
through two courts and you are successful in that, still hav-
ing· avoided meeting· the issue, and the dangerous issue, of 
mental capacity and undue influence; would you 
page 415 ~ think you had performed a still further service 
to your client 1 
A. I certainly would. 
Q. Let me ask ~ou this in the case that I have postulated 
to you: Is it or not a fact that it would be necessary for you· 
to make investigations to ascertain a.nd determine whether 
or not, in your judgment, the issue of mental capacity and 
undue influence could be successfully met by you and, to 
that end, to interview witnesses and to satisfy yourself on 
all the circumstances f 
A. It certainly would. 
Q. Now, would that have any bearing at all, either on your 
researches as to the jurisdic.tion of the federal court or as to 
the question of domicile in the third case 1 
A .. None whatever. Q. Would it or not be necessary for you to do other work 
which had not been done before, in your e:ff ort to protect your 
client, in so managing her case as to avoid a very dangerous 
issue for her f 
A. It would. 
Q. Let me ask you one other question, Mr. Lawrence: As-
sume now in this same case that, as a part of your duty to 
your elient, an attack has been made upon a conveyance of 
real estate which was made bv her husband in his lifetime 
and that that attack is made in a forum which is exceedingly 
hostile to your client; would you or not think 
page 416 ~ that it was your duty to endeavor, if possible, to 
have that case removed from that forum which 
is a hostile one, in your judgment, to another forum where 
that hostility would not be encountered? 
A. I certainly would consider it my duty. 
Q. Assume now that you have succeeded in removing it 
f.rom that forum, and you so man~ed the case that you still 
avoided the dangerous issue of insanity or undue influence 
by arranging for a stipulation that if you are successful in 
the other litigation in Virginia, which I outlined in my previ-
ous questio_n, the plaintiff in that particular case under con-
sideration would be foreclosed and you would have won the 
case, whereas, if you were successful in the other case, you 
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would still have won the case; would you think that the pro-
curing· of such a stipulation which resulted in settling that 
for your client was a substantial service for which you should 
be substantially remunerated f 
A. A most substantial remuneration. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Ivir. Baird: 
Q. 1\fr. Lawrence, you agree, as I understand, that there 
never was but one subject of controversy in respect to which 
Mr. Parker was employed, and that was the ownership, on 
the one hand by Mrs. Hayes and on the other 
page 417 ~ hand by Mrs. Guilfoil, of the whole or of part of 
the estate of l\fr. Hayes, do. you not Y 
A. That is the estate and all this property in Newburgh 
which was not a part of his estate, assuming the validity of 
the deed. 
Q. Now, all that these different proceedings did was to 
bring up that issue in different forms, and the forms in which 
it was brought up in those proceedings made it necessary to 
deal with particular questions arising out of that or having 
relation to the main matter of controversy; isn't that a facU 
A. V\T ell, all bore on the eventual rightful ownership of 
the property involved, yes, sir. 
By Mr. Lanning: 
Q. Isn't it a fact, J\fr. Lawrence, that in the original case 
in Princess Anne County, that is, the appeal from the order 
of probate, l\Ir. Parker was willing to _submit the facts to a 
jury, and was anxious tq do so T 
A. As I understand it, he was anxious to submit to the 
jurisdiction of the Princess Anne Court, and was seeking 
that jurisdiction, but I doubt that he was very anxious to 
submit the questions to a jury, either there or anywhere else. 
Of course, l?,e was in a position where he had to do it. 
Q. If that first case had been tried, it would 
page 418 ~ have been tried on the merits in Princess Anne 
County, would it not? 
A. .. That is my understanding, yes, sir. 
Q. And he was willing to g·o on with the case, was he not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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a witness on behalf of the complainant, having been duly 
sworn, testified as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Your name is John B. Jenkins, .Jr., and you are an at-
torney-at-law practicing in the City of Norfolk, are you not t 
A. That is correct, sir. 
Q. How long have you been practicing, Mr. Jenkins? 
A. Since June, 1914, with the exception of eighteen months 
when I was in the army. 
Q. You are also a commissioner in chancery, I believe1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. As to the nature of your practice, have you had any 
experience in probate law and in the handling of estates, l\Ir. 
Jenkinsf 
A. Yes, sir, I have. 
Q. Is it or not a fact that you have handled at 
page 419 ~ least one, or possibly more estates which ag·gre-
ga ted in value $800,0001 
A. That is correct, sir. 
Q. And you are familiar with what an executor or an ad-
ministrator ought to do in the settlement of estates, and with 
the problems that face such a fiduciary in handling invest-
ments and matters of that general character, are you not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you have also had some experience with litigation 
in co1itests of wills, have you not t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I think that you were, as a matter of fact, executor of 
a will involving an estate of somewhere in the neighborhood 
of a hundred thousand dollars, upon which there was an at-
tack, and a very violent attack, resulting- in a trial that lasted 
about a week, were you not? 
A. That is correct, yes, sir. 
Q. You are. acquainted with Mr. '\V. L. Parker, one of the 
litigants in this matter! 
A. I am. 
Q. And you have known him how long? 
A. I have known l\fr. Parker since 1912 or '13. 
Q. You are a graduate of the University of Virginia, both 
in its academic course and in its law school, are 
pag·e 420 ~ you not? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Diel you know :M:r. Parker before he graduated, or was 
it after he graduated f 
Adelaide M. Hayes, et al., v. William L. Parker. 2t3 
John B. Jenkins; Jr. 
A. I made Mr. Parker's ac.quaintance when I was a stu-
dent in the law school at the University, a.bout 1912 or '13, 
and I think he was in °the law cla.ss about one year behind 
me. 
Q. You have had the opportunity, then, to observe Mr. 
Parker during the whole of 11is professional life, have you 
n~I . 
A. I have. 
Q. Have you ever had any particular opportunity to ob-
serve the capacity.and the competence with which he handles 
cases that are entrusted to him, and all matters that are en-
trusted to him f 
A. I have observed him on number of occasions and I have 
been associated with him in one matter of some importance, 
and I felt the momentum that he could give to the matter in 
which we were associated in helping me handle it. 
Q. ,vhat is the reputation of l\fr. Parker at the Norfolk 
ha r in regard to professional competence and in the com-
munitv as a man 1 
A. The very highest. 
Q. Mr. Jenkins, this matter in which you are 
page 421 } testifying involves a controversy as to Mr. Par-
ker's services as an attorney. Those services 
were rendered to Mrs. Adelaide M. Grady Hayes, who was 
the executrix and sole beneficiary under the will of her hus-
band, the late Wi11iam R. Hayes: from the time of the death 
of the testator for a period of about four years in which 
Mr. Parker represented this lady, both with reg·ard to the 
estate and the handling of the estate, the defense of a num-
her of attacks that were made upon the will, and in other 
matters regarding real estate which did not come to her 
through her husband's will. He has filed as Exhibit No. 1 
a statement. in detail, setting forth the nature, character, ex-
tent, and result of those services and the value he puts upon 
them as fair compensation, in which he has divided those 
services under sixteen heads, more or less arbitrarily, hut 
for convenience of reference. Have vou read that statement t 
A. I have. ~ 
Q. And you a.re generally familiar, then, with the char-
acter of :.Mr. Parker's services, what he had to do, and what 
was accomplished hy his services, are you not? 
A. I am. 
Q. As set forth in that statement? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you read his testimony given in this caseY 
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A. I have. 
~age 422 ~ Q. Based upon your knowledge of what he did, 
what the result of it wtrs, what the issues in-
volved were, will you please tell the Commissioner whether 
or not you think the value of Mr. Parker's services, as set 
forth by him, is a fair and reasonable value for those serv-
ices Y If you do think so, please state your reason, and if 
you differ from him in any particular, please tell the Com-
missioner why you do not agree with Mr. Parker in his es-. 
timate of the value of those services . 
.A. Mr. Maupin, I have read the rnemorandmn, Exhibit No. 
1, in this case and Mr. Parker's testimony and given the 
matter some thoug·ht and study. 1 believe that of the sixteen 
items with which Mr. Parker has specified his work, that 
the charges that he has made for these sixteen items are, all 
- of them, fair and reasonable, with the exception of Item No. 
4 and Item No. 7. The reason I do not think that those 
charges specified as Item No. 4 and Item No. 7 are fair and 
just is .due to the fact that he has charged an item, No. 2, 
under the head of "Duties of Executrix", a fee of $3,750. Mr. 
Parker has arrived at that fee by assuming that he had acted 
as executor in fact and that his compensation should be that 
usually allowed executors for their services, that is, five per 
cent of the amount of the personal property passing through 
his hands. I think that if he has made a fair 
page 423 ~ and reasonable charge.for his duties acting as an 
executor of this will in fact, that those duties 
should include the making of investments and the servicing 
of securities which are in distress that come into his hands. 
With those two exceptions, I think all of the charges that 
Mr. Parker has made in those sixteen items represent fair 
and just compensation for the work that he bas done. 
Q. Item 2, as I recall, is the matter of the handling of 
the securities for the estate, and Item 7 is the Straus bonds; 
am I right about that? 
.A. Item 4 was the making of investments and Item 7 was 
the serv:icing of the Straus securities. 
Q. As I take it, you would eliminate those two items t 
A. I would eliminate those two items. 
Q. And include them under the general head of services to 
the executrix T 
.A. I would. 
Q. Had you finished your answer as to the remainder of 
the items, or is there anything you care to say about thaU 
A. My answer is complete. I said that I thought that. every 
Adelaide M. Hayes, et al., v.. William L. Parker. 275 
John B. Jenkins, Jr. 
other item on there except Nos. 4 and 7 represented fair 
and just compensation for the work that Mr. Parker has 
done. 
page 424 ~ CROSS EXAl\HNATION. 
Bv Mr. Baird: 
"Q. Mr. Jenkins, is your testimony based on l\fr. Parker's 
evidence and the exhibits filed ";ith it, or are you testifying 
to any extent from your personal knowledge? 
A. Mr. Baird, to some extent, I am testifying· from my per-
sonal knowledge, because I have known first-hand of the work 
that Mr. Parker did. For instance, when he arg·ued what he 
calls '' The Second Will Case'' in the federal court, I went 
up there that day and spent the whole morning listening to 
the argument betw·een himself and l\f r. Heath. Before that, 
I read the brief whieh he had prepared and was to use in 
arguing the case before ,Judge "\Vay on that occasion, and 
to that extent I suppose that my opinion would be based on 
what I actually saw and experienced, to a certain extent. 
Q. Well, tl1en, your opinion is predicated in part on cir-
cumstances that are not before the Commissioner; is that 
right? 
Mr. :.Maupin: I object to that question because it does not 
state the fact, as I understand it. What Mr. Jenkins has 
said was his personal knowledge is borne out by this statement 
of Mr. Parker, so the two are the same thing·. He derived 
them from two sources, but it is the same thing. 
A. I have not only read what is in that memo-
page 425 ~ randum, but I read l\fr. Parker's brief that he 
used in arguing that day, and I was present dur-
ing the whole argument. 
By Mr. Baird: 
Q. ·well, Mr. Parker's briefs arc exhibits and I referred 
to them and, of course, I referred to his testimony, but what 
I am trying to find out is whether your views are predicated to 
any extent on anything which does not appear in this record? 
A. I do not think they are, l\fr. Baird. 
Q. Then, they are predicated on Mr. Parker's testimony 
and the exhibits; that is correct, isn't iU 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And that means that you have accepted Mr. Parker's 
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view as to the character of the issues or questions and the 
amount involved and the risk there was, and the difficulties 
there were, and the extent of the work that was done, doesn't 
iO 
A. I have accepted them and they have become my own, 
yes, sir, after studying- them and thinking over them. 
Q. Did you reach your conclusion on the theory that the 
whole estate was at risk? 
A. vVell, that factor did e1iter into my conclusions. I could 
very readily see that if Mr. Parker did not prevail in any one 
or a number of these issues which he fought, and that if his 
opponents had g·one further, as they suggested, and success-· 
fully attacked the marriage, the whole of this es-
page 426 ~ tate would have been at risk and at issue. 
Q. Well, if this estate was not at risk, would 
you still say that the fee you have mentioned was proper 1 
A. Yes, sir, I would. 
Q. Wh~t did you regard the estate as being? 
A. I regarded the worth of the estate as being about $110,-
000, including the .Newburgh real estate. 
Q. And from what you have said, I g·ather that you looked 
upon the fee as a contingent fee 1 . 
.A. To a certain extent, it is bound to be. 
Q. Did you know that l\Ir. Parker had received $10,000? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you still thought it was contingent, or to an extent 
contingent 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That is, you thought that the greater his success, the 
more he would get? You did not think that if he were not 
successful, he would not get anythingf 
A. If Mr. Parker ""ere unsuccessful in this suit, he had 
-practically ag_reed to indemnify the surety, and if he had 
completely lost the estate,· he would have been obligated to 
replace in the estate what had been advanced to him from 
it. That is the conclusion I came to. 
Q. Well, is it based on the theory that if 1\fr. Parker had 
lost, he would have bad to return to the estate 
page 427 ~ ,,rhat he had received! 
.A. That is one of the factors that went into the 
equation, yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know anything about whether Mrs. Hayes could 
have returned to the estate anything that had been improp-
erly paid to Mr. Parker'? 
Adelaide M. Hayes, et al., v:. William L. Parker. 277 
JoJi.n B. Jenkins, Jr. 
A. I understood Mrs. Hayes was without any means what-
ever. 
Q. 1Vell, how did you understand that? It was mere gos-
sip, wasn't it? You had no real information about it 7 
A. Not before I read this record completely, but when I 
read the record, I had that impression which I had formed 
confirmed . 
. Q. 1Vell, isn't it a fact that there never was but one matter 
in controversy in this case, and that was the ownership of the 
whole or a part of this estate claimed by Mrs. Hayes, on the 
one hand, and Mrs. Guilfoil on the other-all of these pro-
cedures related to the same subject-matter in different forms? 
A. vVell, that was the question, but it was split up into 
any number of issues, Mr. Baird, and any number of phases 
which had to be treated separately and apart, and they all 
tog·ether formed one whole, and that whole was composed of 
many, many items and many, many parts. 
Q. Haven't you treated these charges as if they 
page 428 ~ were made in connection with unrelated matters Y 
A. No, sir, I have not. I think that is borne 
out bv the fact that I have eliminated two of these items here 
because they are related in a way. 
Q. Did you appreciate that :Mrs. Hayes, as the widow of 
Mr. Hayes, if he were domiciled in Virginia, would have got-
ten just the same thing under the law as she was to get under 
his will? -
A. Absolutely. 
Q. You knew that the maintenance of the will made no 
difference to her if the probate proceedings were in Vir-
ginia? 
A. Tlie question there, :M:r. Baird, I understood very clearly, 
w.a~ the question of establishing l\Ir. Hayes' domicile in Vir-
g1ma. 
Q. I know, but I am asking you if you appreciated that if 
l\fr. Hayes was domiciled in Virginia, Mrs. Hayes would get 
the same thing, as his widow, as she would have gotten under 
the wilH . 
A. I understood that perfectly, sir, and the question there, 
as I understand it, was upon the establishment of his domi-
cile. 
Q. You did not understand tJ1ere was any question as to 
the validity of the wilH 
A. I understood that that question did not en-
page 429 ~ ter into the result at all; that if the will had been 
revoked by the marriage, she would take, as dis-
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tributee,. exactly what sl1e would have taken if the will had 
been established. 
Q. ·That was the only question raised as to the will-
whether it was revoked by the marriaget 
A. No, sir.. The actual question in controversy was the 
question of the domicile of :Ofr. Hayes. 
Q. Did you understand what Mrs. Hayes w·ould have got-
ten as the widow of Mr. Hayes if he had been domiciled in 
New Yorld 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What? 
A. Well, now-
Q. vVe have all ag-reed on wlrnt the figures are. It makes 
no difference. 
A. If he had been domiciled in -New York, the will would 
not have been revoked by tl1c marriage, as I understand it. 
Q. That is not the question I asked you. 
A. 1lv ell, I beg your pardon. 
Q. I asked you what she would have gotten as his widow 
if he were domiciled in New York! 
Mr. Maupin: And intestate. 
By Mr. Baird: 
Q. Well, I will put the question the way I have 
page 430 ~ it. We are all ag-reed on what that is-I think we 
' are all agreed on it. 
A. One-half, I believe, Mr. Baird. 
Q. Ten thousand dollars and half of the remainder, l think, 
is correct. 
A. One-half plus ten thousand dollars; I have read it-
The Commissioner: No; ten thousand dollars and one-
half of the remainder. 
A. (Continuing:} Ten thousand dollars and one-ha]f of the 
remainder. I had read that. 
Bv Mr. Baird: 
0 Q. Diel you take that into consideration in thinking of the 
importance of establishing- the domicile here? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You knew, then, that, so far as the domicile was con-
cerned, it meant ten thousand dollars and half of the re-
mainder if it were in New York, and all if it were in Virginia 1 
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A. That is true if the proceedings had stopped there, but 
it was intimated that if the proceedings had taken place in 
New York, and those facts had come to pass which you have 
narrated, that their intention was to go further and attack 
the validity of the marriage, in which case she would not have 
' been his widow. 
page 431 } Q. I don't want to cut you off, but I ain trying 
to deal with one step. at a time. Of course, you 
can make any additional statement you want. Did you take 
into consideration that if the will was valid, Mrs. Hayes would 
have gotten the same if the domicile were in New York as if 
it were in Virginia T 
A. Yes, sir, but I want to go further right there: They 
were both attacking the will and the marriage-they were 
attaciking the will, and they intimated that they were going 
to attack the marriage. 
Q. I know, but what I am asking you, though, is with re-
spect to the domicile, which, I understood you to say, was re-
garded in your opinion as the chief question. 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Now, as to the domicile, Mrs. Hayes would have gotten 
the same thing in Virginia as in New York if the will had 
been maintained, and if the will was not good, she would have 
gotten all in Virginia and ten thousand dollars plus one-
half in New York; isn't that right Y 
A. Assuming that far, M'i. Baird, you are correct, but I 
assumed that they were attacking the will and the domicile 
in Virginia, and they were going to attack the will in New 
York and~ they were going to attack the marriage in New 
York, and they were going· to attack the marriage in Vir-
ginia. 
Q. Well, clidn 't you give any consideration to 
page 432 ~ the possibility of their being unsuccessful in their · 
attacks? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Then, you considered the possibility of what would be 
the situation if they were unsuccessful, didn't you f 
A. I did. . 
Q. Do you think that, under the law in Virginia, counsel 
for an executrix can discharg·e the duties of the executrix 
per se? 
A. Under the law? 
Q. In Virginia. 
A. No, sir, he cannot. 
Q. Mr. Parker has no right, in your opinion, to charge 
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for performing· the duties of the executrix, but, of course, 
can charge for his services as counsel for the executrix in 
connection with the administration? · 
A. Yes, that is cqrrect. 
Q. That is the way I understand it. Now, if he gets $3,750 
for performing· the duties of the executrix, that does not af-
fec.t her right to her compensation provided by law for the 
discharge of her duties as executrix, does it t 
A. No, sir. 
Q. And the result of that would he that the estate could 
be charg·ed twice for the administrative service, once by Mrs. 
Hayes and once by Mr. Parkert 
A. That is true, but as Mrs. Hayes was the ulti-
page 433 ~ mate beneficiary of the estate, the double charge 
would redound to l~er benefit in making a deduc-
tion for inheritance tax purposes. 
Q. That is true, but I am talking about the principle. There 
mig·ht be a ease where creditors would be affected by iU 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The items that you have mentioned, 4 and 7, are those 
which you have said you thought ought to be covered by 
No. 2? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Now, will you turn to l\rlr. Parker's account and look at 
Item 8. ·without my encumbering the record by reading from 
that item, because it is already· in the record in connection 
with the examination of another witness, will you tell me 
whether, in yom opinion, the services enumerated there did 
not cover the essentials of all the services in connection with 
all the matters whic.h arose in regard to this estate other than 
procedural matters respecting the filing of pleadings, the 
jurisdiction of the court, and similar questions? 
A. No, Mr. Baird, I do not think so. 
Q. Tell us wherein they differ, will you? 
A. For instance, the issues raised in the first will contest 
in Princess Aime County are absolutely unre-
page 434 ~ lated to the issues raised in the first contest in 
. the federal court, brought by :Mrs. Guilfoil, as 
Administratrix, to recover the assets of the estate, and the 
second contest brought in the federal court by Mrs. Guilfoil, 
which ii:, the case I ref erred to a moment ago and which I said 
I heard, the issue in that case turned on the question of 
whether it was an hlf <>r-varty proceeding· or an in rem,. pro-
ceeding·, and that question did not come into this first contest 
in Princess Anne County at all. 
I_ 
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Q. Well, I asked you an improper question, or you misun-
derstood my question, I dont know which it is. What I meant 
to ask you was, whether the investigations that were made 
in connec.tion with this Item 8 did not cover all the subjects of 
investigation which were necessary in connection with the 
other items 1 
A. No, sir. He could have investigated the questions which 
arose in this first will case in Princess Anne County without 
touching on the issues that came up in the case in federal 
court. 
Q. I will have to ask the question differently: Don't you 
know that the grounds of contest in the case I am speaking 
of were that the decedent was incompetent to make a will be-
cause of the diseases from which he suffered, that at the time 
of the making of the will he was under improper influence, 
· that the Clerk was without jurisdiction, and that 
page 435 ~ the decedent was incompetent to contract the mar-
riage with the beneficiary and that the same was 
a nullity, and if the marriag·e was valid, it operated to revoke 
the will? Those were the questions that were raised there, 
weren't they 1 
A. They were the questions that were to be raised if that 
first wiJI case had been tried-yes, sir-the questions Mr. 
Parker had prepared for and gotten his witnesses together, 
and he had prepared to meet those issues, yes, sir. 
Q. J\,Ir. Parker said the -questions that he considered, after 
investigating the facts, were the jurisdiction of the court, 
mental capacity, undue influence, effect of subsequent mar-
riage, validity of the marriag·e, and inlieritance in case of 
intestacy. Wlrnt other question was involved than one or 
the other of those in any of the other pro'ceeding·s 1 
A. ·well, the first con.test in the federal court was never 
tried. I believe that. was abandoned. The second contest in 
the federal eourt on the will turned on the issue as to whether 
the proceeding was an -inter-party proceeding or whether it 
was an in rwm proceeding. If it were cm in.ter-part~J pro-
ceeding, the federal court had jurisdiction, but if it were an 
in re11i proceeding, it had no jurisdiction. Now, that ques-
tion did not arise at all in that first will contest in Princess 
Anne. 
page 436 } Q. ·wen, do you agree that all the investigations 
made under No. 8. and for which Mr. Parker 
charged, were thereafter at the cfo1position of the estate, 
without any extra charge, for use in any other proceeding 
in which they were appropriate 1 
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A. Yes, Mr. Baird, they were available. 
Q. Of course, there could not be any doubt of that, I take 
it. . 
Now, when you- come to No. 9, the suit in New York, did 
not that involve exactly the same questions of fact that I 
' have called your attention to as having been under considera-
tion in, No. 8 and having been the subjects of investigation 
there¥ 
A. To a larg;e extent,. they were. 
Q. Do you think, then, that a charge of $1,500 for putting 
that information to use in respect to this Item No. 9 was 
proper! 
Mr. Maupin: I object to the form of the question because 
it is not supported by any evidence in this record. There is 
no evidence that any such thing was ever done. 
A. Mr. Baird, are yon ref eniug to Item No. 11 now? 
Q. No, I am referring to No. 9. 
A .. That suit was beg-un in the state court and removed to 
the federal court in New York. 
page 437 ~ Q. Yes. w· ere not the f act.s that were necessary 
for use in that litigation precisely the same as. 
the facts that were investigated in connection with No. 8! 
A. To a large extent, they were. 
Q. And the New york litigation was in the hands, actively,. 
of New York counsel, was it not Y 
A. It was, but Mr. Parker also was active and in command 
of the situation and made the decisions, and what he said 
went. 
Q. Now, in arriving at the reasonableness of his charg·e 
of $1,500, did that cover his services as leading counsel or 
counsel who associated the New York lawyers only, or did 
it cover the use of the material that he had gathered in con-
nection with his investigation under No. 8Y 
A. It covered both, Mr. Baird. He was leading counsel 
in defending the piece of litigation that was instituted in 
New York, had to act as counsel in that matter, and in the 
preparation of that suit, he naturally had to make use of 
information that he had acquired in preparing the first suit 
in Princess Anne. 
Q. Well, do you think he had a right to charge over again 
- in No. 9 for anything which lie had gotten and for which he 
had charged under No. 8? 
A. Mr. Baird, I cannot answer that question· as you have 
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propounded it. I can simply tell you that, taking 
page 438 ~ into consideration the fact that he did make use 
of other information and other knowledge that 
he had gained in a previous suit, the additional work and re-
sponsibility and time and energy and intelligence that he used 
entitled him to the fee which he has charged in that case of 
$1,500. . 
Q. Well, you understand that all I am trying to get at is to 
sift the reasons for your conclusions to see whether the Court 
and the Commissioner agree with you. 
A. Well, I have not tried to make as complete an analysis 
of that situation as to try to pick that situation to pieces and 
to place a value on exactly what the knowledge which he 
had gained from his previous study and the opinions he had 
formed in his previous study, were as compared to the new 
work that he had done and the new decisions that he made, 
and the time and the travel that it took to go to New York 
and confer with his associate counsel. I believe he had coun-
i:;el in New York and I believe he also had counsel in New-
burgh. If my recollection is right, he and the counsel in 
Newburgh were not in agTeement on some matters. I have 
taken all those into consideration. · 
Q. Now, coming to No. 10, which is the application of Mrs. 
Guilfoil for letters of administration: So far as the facts 
there were concerned, weren't they exactly the same as the 
facts which were of importance in connection with 
page 439 ~ No. 8? 
}1 .. I would say they were largely the same, Mr. 
Baird, but not exactly the same, but I considered Mr. Parker's 
judgment in that matter to have been of great value to the 
estate. That was a terrific responsibility to place upon an 
attorney-the decision that he made in that matter to ignore 
those proceedings, and especially in view of the fact that 
his associate counsel in New York urged him to take notice 
of them. 
Q. Well, is it your idea that a fee of $1,500 was proper 
because of the responsibility he assumed in determining, from 
the information that he had previously g·otten and for which 
he had charged, that he would make no opposition to the 
granting of the letters of administration f 
A. I think that the biggest part of his work in that con-
nection was making that decision ultimately. To ms.ke that 
decision, he had to do a tremendous lot of work. He may 
have used information that he had previously acquired and 
used conclusions that he had previously reached, but it is a 
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fact that he did have to g·o to .New York and that he did con-
fer with counsel in Newburgh, and that he did go down to 
the City of N e,,r York and employ counsel there, and, if I re-
member correctly, there was a difference of opinion between 
him and the counsel at N e,vburgh; and ,vhen situations of that 
kind arise and you have to come to a conclusion, when your 
associates differ, I consider the responsibility of 
page 440 ~ making a decision under those circumstances a 
very serious one. It is an awful responsibility. 
· Q. All he did was to decide not to make that opposition·? 
A. That is exactly what he did, l\fr. Baird, and I think 
that that decision that he made-tbe value of it to the estate 
was inestimable. That is all he did~ 
Q. That decision not to do anything is what you think was 
so important that it was worth $1,500? 
A. That is what he did, yes, sir. 
Q. Now, coming- to the first ~mit in the United States Court 
(that is Item 11), that suit was never tried! 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Now, I call your attention to what nir. Parker said he 
did in respect to the pleacling·s : '' A motion to dismiss on 
the ground that no such rig·ht existed in either case was pre-
pared and filed. Combined with the motion to dismiss was an 
answer in which the following was alleged: 
"(a) The probate of the will of ··william R. Hayes in the 
Circuit Court of Princess Anne County, Virginia." 
There was no difficulty in that. alleg·ation, was there? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. '' (b) The qualification of the defendant as executrix of 
said will, and her possession of the assets of the estate as such 
executrix." That is a mere repetition, isn't it? 
page 441 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. " ( c.) That the assets of the estate were in the 
custodv and control of the Cireuit Court of Princess Anne 
County ns a competent court of probate, and that no other 
court could interfere with their administration there.'' That 
is just a truh,m, isn't it? 
A. 'l\fr. Baird, it all depends on what you call "a truism". 
I dare say, if you had sat clown to have written out that mo-
tion and g·ive the grounds for that motion, that you would 
lrnve g;iven it a tremendous lot of thoug·ht and it would have. 
heen a rig·ht lengthy job, and it would have been pre.tty well 
done, and tlrnt is exactly w'11at 1\fr. Parker has done. Now, 
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you can't take the grounds of those motions now and whittle 
them away to n9thing in a very airy, light way like that. I 
know when ::vir. Parker did that, he sat down and gave it what 
I call "some real brain-sweat''. 
Q. vVell, there is no way the Commissioner can pass on 
this case except on the record before him, is there 7 
A. ·well, that is the way I have answered your question, 
Mr. Baird. I can't agree with you that it is just a truism. I 
would say it would take a man of some . experience, some 
study, some work, and then realizing the responsibility that 
was upon him, too. 
Q. Now, continuing· and lastly, he says: '' ( d) 
}Jage 442 ~ That the plaintiff has never qualified as personal 
representative in the State or Virginia and there-
fore had no right to maintain the action in such capacity.'' 
There was no question about that, was there? 
A. No, that. is correct. 
Q. Now, on the succeeding page, Mr. Parker describes the 
questions of law that were studied as these: '' (1) J urisdic-
tion of the court to admit the will to probate, assuming the 
domicile at death to be in New York." There was no diffi-
culty about that, was there! If he had died in New York, 
the court there would have jurisdiction, wouldn't iU 
Mr. l\faupin: ·wen, he did die in 1New York. 
Mr. Baird: I mean the domicile in New York. 
A. Mr. Baird, I don't think you can pick out from this first 
c.ontest in the federal court a.n item like that and just pick 
it away from the context and say it amounted to nothing. I 
am looking at these things as not items of that kind but items 
as a whole. 
Q. I am not taking them away from the context; I am 
reading· them as a. whole. 
A. I know· you a re, hut you take each one and throw them 
out and there is nothing left. 
Q. To ask them all tog·ether would be confusing, I think, but 
you can cover them all. I have no objection. 
'' (2) Extent to which the state court acquired 
page 443 }- custody and control of estat~ assets by reason of 
probate of the will and qualification of the execu-
trix.'' -
There ,va.s uo difficulty in that, was there? 
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A. I would say that it took time and intelligence and work 
to make that allegation. It. is a great deal more than dic-
tating· three lines, Mr. Baird, a great deal more than that .. 
Q. No court could have doubted that the court had juris-
diction where the executrix qualified, could it? 
A. No, sir, I don't think so. 
Q. Continuing· and lastly: '' The situs of the several kinds 
of property involved for purposes of administration.'' What 
question was there a.bout that? AU the personal property 
was here, wasn't it! · 
A. Yes, Mr. Baird, but when you g-et down to consider the 
question of the situs of the property, and different ques-
tions, it is a right broa.d question-situs of stock, situs of 
debts for the purpose of garnishment, and so on. It is a 
broad question. 
Q. Wouldn't yon say it is clear that the situs of stock cer- · 
ti:ficates is wherever they physically areY 
A. I would say that to start out from as a point of de-
parture, yes, sir, but if you want to garnish and tie up and 
try to stop the stock registers from paying stocks, you go into 
a rig·ht much broader field than that. 
Q. If this case was never tried, there wasn't 
page 444 ~ anything to do except to file the pleadings, to con-
sider the questions of law that were involved, and 
use the preparation as· to facts that had already been made 
when the case did go to trial, was there f 
A. Yes, sir, a great deal more than that. 
Q. Whatt 
A. Vvell, I can simply state that I have prepared cases that 
have never gone to trial and that, in my opinion, there is a 
tremendous lot of work, responsibility, and time involved 
in it. 
Q. You can't prepare a case except on the facts and the 
law, can you? 
A. Mr. Baird, I know of one-if this is relevant-that Mr. 
Parker and I were engaged in together and which we pre-
pared very thoroughly and did a lot of work on, and the 
time came for that case to be tried and opposing counsel 
dismissed it, but we did a tremendous lot of work and we 
were entitled to a fair compensation and, I am glad to say, 
we got it. 
Q. I am· glad to hear it, too. Now, coming to this-
A. I do not take as a criterion, and I do not accept as a 
criterion, the fact that the case is never tried. 
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Q. What is your idea of how the Commissioner is gomg 
to pass on this question f 
page 445 ~ A. He will have to take my answers, and if 
they don't mean anything, Mr. Baird, he will 
have to throw them out, that is all. If niy answers don't mean 
anything to him,. that is Mr. Parker's misfortune. 
Q. What! 
A. I say, if the Commissioner thinks my answers don't 
mean anything, that is Mr. Parker's misfortune, that is all. 
Q. No, there is no question about their meaning some-
thing; the question is whether they are right. 
Coming to this second will contest in the federal court, 
are you not aware that there was but one question tried 
there and the case went off on the issue as to whether or 
not the federal court had probate jurisdiction? 
A. I am. I was present when that case was argued. 
Q. That was the only question argued, wasn't it? 
A. Y cs, but it was a very big question, and if I may say 
so, I observed the Judge during the course of that argument, 
and Mr. Parker, I think, took about an hour and a half to 
open up in the opening statement, and my conclusion was tha.t 
Judge Way was against him-not following his line of argu-
ment, and when he w::i.s followed by Mr. Heath, the tTudge, 
somehow or other, seemed to take "a slant" against Mr. 
Rea.th and did not follow him, but that one issue was arg'Ued 
up there that morning from about ten o'clock until 
page 446 ~ half after twelve, and I will say this, that Judge 
Way was, when the argument was over, looked 
like he had a great, big question to decide, and it took him, 
I believe, some four or five months before he gave his opinion. 
So, you are correct in the statement that there was just one 
issue ar~:ued in that suit, but it was a mighty big issue. It 
took a long time to prepare it, it took a long time to argue 
it, and it left the Judge in quite an unsettled state of mind 
for a long, long time. 
Q. It is in evidence, of course, that Mr. Parker argued 
that case also in the Circuit Court of Appeals. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And prepared briefs in opposition to the writ of cer-
tiorari. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. It was for those three services in connection with a single 
issue of the jurisdiction of the eourt to entertain probate pro-
ceedings that you think a charge of $5,000 was proper Y 
A. '1'ha t is correct. 
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Q. Now, will you look at Item 13, the third will contest in 
Princess Anne County, and tell me whether there were any 
questions of fact involved there that were not covered by 
the investigations made in connection with No. 8, as described 
by Mr. Parker 1 
page 447 ~ A. Yes, sir. The issues in tha.t second will case 
in Princess Anne County were the question of the 
statute of limitations, which the lower court decided agamst 
Mr. Parker, and the question of domicile, which the court 
decided in his favor, and I assume that the facts introduced 
to support domicile in the second will case were the same 
facts that he would have used in the first will case had it been 
tried-identically. 
Q. I know there are different questions of law in all these 
cases, and of procedure, and there are different pleadings in 
all of them. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, do yon think it was proper to charge $4,500 in 
that case for services exclusive of preparation respecting the 
facts, which Mr. Parker had already made and for which he 
had al ready charged f . 
A. I think so, Mr. Baird. You have g·ot to consider that 
the evidence was heard one day, the case argued another, 
and then the case was taken to the Court of A.ppeals and 
argued there. I do not tllink that fee, considering the time 
that it took and the extra energy and work that it took and 
the intelligence that he had and applied to it, that $4,500 is 
unreasonable at all. 
page 448 ~ R,E-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. l\Ir. Jenkins, I am going to pose an assumption to yon 
which is based upon the facts appearing in this record: Sup-
pose you had been employed as counsel for a childless widow 
who was named in her husband's will as executrix and sole 
beneficiary, and you had probated that will before the clerk; 
suppose then an attack was made on the validity of the will 
and the main bases of the attac.k w·cre lack of testamentary 
capacity in the testator and undue influence exercised upon 
him hy the beneficiary, your client; suppose that in investi-
gations made both at the time and confirmed by subsequent 
investigations, you were convinced there was grave danger 
to your client in those bases of attack by very strong evi-
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clence that there was mental incapacity and strong evidence 
that there was undue influence; would you or not think it 
was tlie part of wisdom to avoid an issue on the merits before 
the jury on those bases of attack, namely, undue influence and 
lack of testamentary capacity 1 vVould, you think it was wise, 
if possible. to avoid meeting that. issue if you were "shaky'' 
about it? 
A. I think it would be the part of wisdom to avoid that 
issue. 
Q. If the testimony which you knew of and which you 
thought was pretty strong testimony prevailed, 
page 449 r you having met the issue, the whole estate would 
be lost, would it not? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Now t110n, suppose, having come to that frame of mind 
from your investigation, an attack was launched upon that 
will in the f edcral court on the same grounds, would you think 
that you had performed a distinct service to your client if you 
managed that litigation eo as to avoid meeting the issue of 
lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence and were 
able to bring that litigation to a successful conclusion without 
meeting those issues, that is to say, by raising the point of 
tho jurisdiction· of the court? 
A. I certainly think that I would. 
Q. Do you think that any lawyer who did that was exer-
cising the highest qualities of his profession and protecting 
his client by avoiding the dangerom; ground if possible? 
A. I think it was of thP. highest intelligence to do so. 
Q. Do you think that a lawyer ought to be compensated for 
that litigation and bringing that litigation to a successful 
conclusion, even if he did not meet the main issue that was 
raised? 
A. I certainly do. 
page 450 ~ Q. Now, going further on the same hypothesis, 
suppose still another will contest is instituted by 
the snmo contestant in 1hc state court, where you cannot raise 
the question of lack of jurisdiction of the court to hear the 
case, which you had successfu1ly raised in the federal court, 
and you were again faced with tho necessity I have outlined, 
instead of meeting those -dangerous is.sues of lack of testa-
mentary capacity and undue influence, you were able to man-
age that litigation so that it went off on another point suc-
cessfully to yon without ever meeting those dangerous issues~ 
to-wit, the point of the domicile of the testator in Virginia and 
the consequent lack of standing of the contestant as a party 
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in interest to institute the contest, and that resulted favorably 
to you, still without meeting the main issues in the case, would 
you think that you had performed a very distinct service to 
your· client-! . 
A. I certainly do, without any qualification. 
Q. And if any lawyer did that and maneuvered the litigation 
so as to bring it to a successful conclusion, ought he or not 
to be compensated Y 
A. I think so. 
Mr. Baird: I object to that question as being improper. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Is there any reason that occurs to you why 
page 451 ~ he should not be compensated for those services 
to the same extent as if he had brought that liti-
gation to a successful conclusion on those issues t 
Mr. Baird: I make a similar objection. 
A. Mr. Maupin. I think, if anything, his compensation 
should bP- higher for avoiding the dangers and taking the risk. 
If he can find a way to get the result that he seeks and does so 
in a way that he eliminates possibilities of loss in taking those 
chances, I think he has used the·best intelligence in avoiding 
the possibilities of loss. 
Q. Mr. Jenkins, in this case, you know what the theories 
were upon which Mr. Parker brought the will contest in the 
federal court and the will contest in the state court. I will 
ask you whether or not the policy pursued by Mr. Parker 
and the points raised by him and successfully prosecuted 
through the original and appellate court displayed a higl1 
degree of legal knowledge and legal skill Y 
A. It is my opinion that they did. 
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Baird: 
Q. Did you make any effort to decide what part of what-
ever is allowed Mr. Parker is properly chargeable to the 
estate. and what part is chargeable to Mrs. Hayes Y 
A. I noted, Mr. Baird;that some of these items 
page 452 r are services which sl10uld not, strictly speaking, 
be charged to the estate and should be charged 
to Mrs. Hayes individually, but I did not take any time to 
.Adelaide M. Hayes, et. al., v. William L. Parker. 291 
John B. Jenkins, Jr. 
press that matter any further, because I considered that Mrs. 
Hayes was the sole beneficiary of the estate and that she would 
ultimately pay the. charge, whetlrnr it was properly charge-
able to her or to the estate. I noticed that when going over it, 
but I did not take any time to try to separate or apportion 
the charges between the estate and herself, individually. 
Q. Now, in :fixing what you thought Mr. Parker was entitled 
to, did you consider that he had assumed any personal re-
sponsibility other than that you spoke of, to return to the 
estate any part of the fees if it should :finally develop that he 
was not entitled to receive them from the estate? 
A. Mr. Baird, if I remember correctly, and have read Mr. 
Parker's memorandum correctly, he almost made a contract 
to indemnify that surety company from any loss if it would 
remain surety on her bond, and it looks like to me that he 
agreed to indemnify the surety company in case Mrs. Hayes 
made any ''slip", and I did consider that item as an element 
in determining· the compensation that he was entitled to. 
Q. Well, you know that Mr. Parker did not do anything 
except sign the regular printed form which all 
page 453 ~ counsel for personal representatives have to sign, 
don't you? 
A. Mr. Baird, I can't agree with that assumption on your 
part that you have stated there in that question, for the simple 
reason that I have been executor of an estate and have, with 
the surety company, assumed joint control, and it is not the 
simple matter that you seem to intimate in your question to 
me. 
Q. How could anything happen to the estate when it was 
under l\fr. Parker's joint control with Mrs. Hayes-anything 
that he didn't want to happen to it? , 
A. The responsibility involved, 1\fr. Baird. 
Q. ·what responsibility¥ 
A. Well, Mrs. Hayes was taking money out of the estate 
to live on, wasn't she? She, from time to time, made ad-
vances to herself to live on. This memorandum states tliat 
if she had not had the advantage of that opportunity, she 
would have had nothing to support herself during this four-
year period. 
Q. Is that your theory of Mr. Parker's assumption of 
liability? 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. And that is the whole of his assumption of liability? 
A. That is one of the elements that go in to make it. 
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Q. Well, is there any other that you know of? 
page 454 ~ A. No, sir, but that is a large responsibility 
in itself, a very large responsibility. 
Q. What responsibility is there if she has joint control of 
the estate? How could she do anything without his consenU 
A. That is true, but it is a responsibility-so much so that 
when you get surety companies and trust companies to take 
that responsibility for you, they charge, and charge hand-
some fees. 
Q. I would like to have you indicate ,vhat kind of respon-
sibility it was, or responsibility in respect to what sort of 
matters there might have been? 
A. Mr. Baird, I consider the taking charge of and being 
responsible for some eighty thousand dollars worth of securi-
ties, and using the money that came into his hands from the 
income from those securities, and the sale of those securities, 
for conducting litigation, and for making advances to Mrs. 
Hayes from time to time to live on, and compensating him-
self from time to time when there was a chance that he might 
have to pay back what I consider to be a very substantial 
sum of money-I think those responsibilities in the aggregate 
are large and serious; they tend to make a ma_n think arid 
worry, and I think a man who goes through that experience 
is entitled to adequate compensation. , 
page 455 r Mr. :Maupin: We rest. 
Thereupon the hearing was continued, to be resumed at 
a time to be fixed by agreement of counsel. 
page 456 ~ Norfolk, Va., March 1, 1939. 
The hearing was resumed before the Commissioner, at his 
vtlices, at 11 o·'clock A. M., by agreement of counsel and pur-
suant to adjournment of Febmary 3, 1939. 
Present: Mr. Maupin, for the complainant. Mr. Lanning, 
for the defendant. 
HOW ARD W. BENTLEY, 
a witness on hehalf of the defendant, having been duly sworn, 
testified as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Lanning: 
Q. State your name, Mr. Bentley. 
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A. Howard W. Bentley, Co-manager of the Bond Depart-
ment of Abbott, Proctor & Paine, New York. 
Q. Where do you live, :M:r. Bentley? 
A. I live in Westwood, New Jersey. 
Q. ·what is the business of Abbott, Proctor & Paine? 
A. They are bond, stock, and commodity brokers, membets 
of the New York Stock Exchange, Chicago Board of Trade, 
Cotton Exchange, and numerous other exchanges. 
Q. What is your particular connection with the firm f 
A. I work in the bond and open market security 
page 457 ~ department as a buyer and seller of securities for 
our clients. 
Q. How long have you been with Abbott, Proctor & Paine f 
A. I have been with Abbott, Proctor & Paine since 1934. 
Previous to that, I was with Livingston & Company, and 
E. & C. Randolph. The .firm of Abbott, Proctor & Paine 
is the final consolidation of those firms. 
Q. \\That has always been your particular branch of the 
work for Abbott, Proctor & Paine? What department have 
vou been in? 
"' ll. I have always been in the bond department, the un-
listed securities department. We have different titles for 
those departments. 
Q. Have you looked up the market value of certain Straus 
bonds at my request f 
A. I have, Sir. 
Q. Do you, from time to time, get inquiries from customers 
for the purchase or sale of Straus bonds or other unlisted 
securities? 
A. vVe do, practically every working day in the year. 
Q. Do you have occasion to ]ook up the market value of un-
listed bonds, like Straus bonds, every day? 
A. Praetically every day, I would say. 
Q. How do you go about it, Mr. Bentley, to de-
page 458 ~ termine what is the market value of an unlisted 
bond? 
A. Why, we have different services which we use in our 
department that, you might say, are daily quotation services, 
such as this service I have here which is called "The National 
Daily Quotation Service". 
Q. ·who publishes that service? 
A. It is published by the National Quotation Bureau, in 
New York. 
Q. Is that a daily service? 
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A. This, here, is a daily service, and they also have a 
month- and--six-n:ionths period which they consolidate together 
and put in bindings which we can ref er to from time to time. 
Q. Does Abbott, Proctor & Paine take the daily service. 
as well as the.half-yearly and monthly service t. 
A. We do. 
Q. Is that a recognized medium in New York through which 
the ma1·ket value of unlisted bonds is determined 1 
A. I would say it is 01ie of the recognized services and the 
best we know in New York. This se1·vice goes, practically, 
to all dealers, who subsc.ribe to it, and I would say seventy-
five per cent of the unlisted and listed dealers in New York 
use this service. 
Q. Explain to the Commissioner how you go about deter-
. mining the market value of any particular issue of 
page 459 ~ unlisted bonds when you have an inquiry . 
.A. For example, if you gave me an inquiry and 
asked me to get the bid and offer of a certain unlisted se-
curity, I would ref er to the different services we have in the 
office and also, from years of experience, would know about 
what and where this market should be. The quotation in 
question might be a quotation where the market would be 
in New York; it might also be Chicago, Detroit, or any other 
city, and we as brokers should know that. 
Q. Does this service that you have spoken of go to people 
in the business in Norfolk and other places than New York? 
.A. Yes ; I would say it goes to practically every city in the 
country, even as far as the Coast. 
Q. How would you make use of this service if you wanted 
to buy an unlisted bond about which you knew nothing! 
.A. Why, we would insert our bid or our offer in what we 
call "The Daily Slips", which are consolidated by this quo-
tation bureau and put into this daily _quotation service. 
Q. Is there any other way tha.t you might determine what 
the market value of any particular issue was? 
.A. Why, yes; you would also go to, probably, the house 
of origination, or to some dealer that you knew that had, 
from time to time, inquiries on these certain se-
page 460 ~ curities. 
Q. Have you determined the market value of 
a number of issues of Straus bonds which I have told yo11 
were found in the estate of William R. Hayes Y 
A. I have, to the best of my ability. 
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Q. v\Tell, do you think that you are able to determine the 
market value of bonds of that nature? 
A.. I would say Yes, with the experience that I have had 
practically all my life, I might say, in executing orders of tbis 
type. 
Q. I show you Exhibit No. 1 which has heen marked in evi-
dence · and which is a list of certain Straus bonds found in 
the estate of W. R. Hayes. I will ask you to take one issue 
at a time and state what the market value of the bonds of 
that issue, found in the estate of W. R. Hayes, was on April 
27, 1934, and on February 8, 1939. Now, take the first one, 
Court and Remsen Street bonds, $5,500 face value, and give 
the history of the bond as you found it and what you deter-
mined to be the market value of those bonds. 
A. The old bond was called '' Court and Remsen Street 
6%' Bonds, Due in 1940", and the market value of those 
bonds, as far· as I could ascertain, on April 27, 1934, was 
quoted 33112 bid, offered at 351,.6. 
:May 6, 1937, these bonds were exchanged for Court and 
_ Remsen Street 31;,'t-5% bonds due 1950. They 
page 461 r were exchanged par for par plus a cash distri-
bution of $122.75 per $1,000. Now, this distri-
bution was $90.25 cash plus $32.50, the latter being account 
of interest at the time of exchange. 
Q. What did you find to be the market value of these 
bonds, including cash payments on account of, principal, as 
of February 8, 1939? _ 
A. I found the market quotation to be 30 bid, offered at 33. 
That is for the new securities. 
Q. W11at did that make the total market value of these 
bonds? 
A. That made the total eash market value, as I figure, 
$2,325.13. That includP.8 the cash distribution plus the in-
terest payment. 
Q. Why did you use February 8, Mr. Bentley? 
A. I used February 8 for the reason that, when you origi-
nally inquired, that was the day I had compiled all this data. 
Q. This slip was prepared by you? 
A. It was prepared by me. 
Q. It gives the figures whicl1 you have just testified to? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Lanning: I offer that in evidence. (The paper was 
marked "Exhibit No. 22 ".) 
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Q. Now, the next issue in the list, Exhibit 1, is Broadway 
and 41st Street, face value $10,000. Will you 
page 462 } please give the history of that bond and state 
what its market value was on the two dates, that 
is, April 27, 1934, and February 8, 1939? 
A. The old bond was called '' Broadway and 41st Street 
61/t % Due 1944". The market quotation on April 27, 1934, 
was quoted 34 bid, offered at 38. 
The new bond was called '' Broadway and 41st Street 3%~ 
5%, Due 1944." 
May 29, 1935, these bonds were exchanged par for par 
plus a cash distribution of $30 per $1,000 bond account of 
back interest. The market quotation as of February 8, 1939, 
was 34 bid, offered at 35,%.. There were $10,000 worth of 
bonds. Figuring the total amount involved as of April 27, 
1934, would be $3,400. As of February 8, 1939, it would be 
$3,700, taking into consideration the cash distribution of $30 
per $1,000. 
{The witness filed a paper relating to the last-mentioned 
bonds as Exhibit No. 23.) 
Q. The next issue is Fifth Avenue and 43rd Street, Mr. 
Bentley. ~Will you please give the same information as to 
that issue of the face valne of $10,000 ·i 
A. The old bond ·was called ''Fifth Avenue and 43rd Build-
ing Corporation General 6% Bonds Due 1939". The market 
quotation as of April 27, 1934, was 1%% bid, of-
pag·e 463 } fered at 2%. 
Q. ,,That does that "1%% bid" mean 1 
A. One and one-half per cent of a thousand clolla rs ; in 
other words, $15. per $1,000, $150 for the $10,000. 
The new bond waR called "521 Fifth Avenue Corporation 
4% Bonds Due 1951'' with two shares of voting trust stock 
attached. The date of exchange was in May, 1936, and the 
basis for exchange was par for pa.r with the two shares of 
stock attached. The stock has no separate market value but 
was traded along with tl1e new securities, and the market 
quotation as of February 8, 1939, was quoted 1/2% bid, offered 
at 1%%. That is for the new securities. I took an arbitnfry 
1wice and figured those at 1 %, making· a total value as of 
February 8 of $100. 
( A memorandum of the last-mentioned bonds was filed 
as Exhibit No. 24.) 
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Q. Now, the next issue on the list is Lombardy Apartment 
bonds, $5,000 face value. Please give the same information 
as to that issue. 
A. These are known as The Lombardy First 6% Bonds, 
Dated November 15, 1927, Due November 15, 1942. These 
bonds have not been reorgauized or changed in any way. The 
market quotation as of April 27, 1984, were quoted 55 bid, 
offered at 57. The market quotation as of February 8, 1939, 
were quoted 23 bid, offered at 27. That will give you the 
total value as of April 27, 1934, of $3,750, and as 
page 464 r of February 8, 1939, of $1,150. 
Q. There were no cash payments there, were 
there! 
A. No ; no change at all. They are still as is. I have a 
little notation there about defaults. 
(A memorandum of the last-mentioned bonds was filed as 
Exhibit No. 25.) 
Q. As to each of these issues you have given the value as 
of February 8, 1939, including any cash payments, have you 
notf 
A. Yes, I have so far. 
Q. The next issue on the list is Chanin Building Bonds, 
face value $10,000. Will you please give the same information 
as to that issue f 
A. The old bond was called ''Chanin Realty Corporation 
7 Per cent Bonds Due in 1940". The market quotation as 
of April 27, 1934, was quoted 1 bid, offered at 3 ( that is 1 % 
of a thousand), which gives them a total value of $100. 
Now, the new bond is ralled "Chanin Building 1-2%, Due 
in 1945 ", and the date of exchang·e was December 8, 1934, 
and the bash; of exchange was a $500 bond given for each 
old $1,000 bond, stock held in escrow-there was also some 
stock given along with these bonds, hut the stock is being held 
in escrow. 
The market quotation as of February 8, 1939, 
page 465 ~ was quoted ~h% offered, asked 6%%, giving 
them the value of $275. There would be $5,000 
worth of the new bonds involved. 
Q. Has the stock held in escrow any value t 
A. It has no value, as far as I can find out. 
( A memorandum of the last-mentioned bonds was filed as 
Exhibit No. 26.) 
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Q. The next issue on the list is Bark-Ray Holding Com-
pany, face value $5,000. Please give th.e same information as 
to these bonds. 
A. These are known a~ '' Bark-Ray Holding 61h % Bonds 
Due in 1934 ". Tliese bonds defaulted January 15, 1932. As a 
result of reorganization proceedings., this issue was wiped 
out. In .April, 1935, the bondholders received $54.30 per thou-
sand. Deposited-bondholders received $50.68 per thousand. 
The market quotation as of April 27, 1934, was quoted 
1% % bid, offered at 2% %, giving a total value for $5,000 
worth of bonds in 1934 of $87.50. I :figured here as of Feb-
ruary 8-you really can't give any value, because these bonds 
were deposited and they received the amount of $253.40. In 
other words, you did not have the undeposited bonds; you had 
the deposited l:>onds, as far as I could see and my memo-
randum shows. 
Q. The cash received for those bonds was how 
page 466 ~ much Y 
A. $253.40. I checked up witl1 the trustee to be 
sure I was correct. 
(.A memorandum of the last-mentioned bonds was filed as· 
Exhibit No. 27.) 
Q. The next issue is Dorcoe Mercantile Building, $5,000 
face value of bonds. 
A. The old bonds were known as "Dorcoe Mercantile 6% 
Bonds Due Serially 1925 to 1933". The market value as of 
April 27, 1934, quotation was 29 bid, offered at 33, giving a 
total value of $1,450. 
The new bond was known as the "Kashak R€alty Corpora-
tion Income Bonds 4-5%, Due 1943." 
These were exchanged ,June 12, 1936, par for par plus a 
cash distribution of 2% account of interest from June 15, 
1933, to December 15, 1934. 
The quotation aF: of February 8, 1939, was 14 bid, offered at 
181/2• I did not figure in the 2% interest on that for the 
reason that there was some quest-ion in my mind just how 
much money they received. I would not find out the exact 
dates; I got two different figures. Of course, the money was 
paid to the estate and they would probably know the specific 
amount of money they received on them, so I just figured the 
price on the bid side of the market, giving a value of $700 
for the $5,000 bonds . 
• 
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Q. That did not include what they receivedJ 
page 467 ~ A. No, that did not include what they received, 
in the one instance. I checked up with the trustees 
and they said that the interest had been paid direct for the 
2% and I thought I would be, maybe, one six-months period 
out of the way, so I did not figure it in. I thought maybe the 
estate would have that. 
Mr. Lanning: Do you remember, M:r. Parker, how much 
the estate got? 
Mr. Parker: No. I could get the information. 
Mr. Lanning: D'o you remember, Mrs. Hayes? 
Mrs. Haves: I think it was several hundred dollars that· 
came in at ·that time .. I don't recall exactly. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. ..What did that two per cent represent-two per cent 
of what? 
A. Two per cent interest for those periods. 
(A memorandum of the last-mentioned bond$ was :filed 
as Exhibit No. 28.) 
By Mr. Lanning: 
Q. The next issue on the list is Book Building, Detroit, 
face value $12,000. Will you please give the same infor-
mation as to that. issue 7 
A. The old issue wai;; known as the '' Book Building Addi-
. tion Bonds, Due Serially 1927 to 1940". These bonds car-
ried the June 1, 1930, a.nd subsequent coupons. 
page 468 ~ The reason I specify tl1at is because they defaulted 
at that time in the.ir interest payments. , 
The market quotation April 27, 1934, was quoted 22% bid, 
offered at 24, giving you the amount of $2,700 a.s of that date 
for $12,000 worth of bonds. 
The new bond is ealled '' Book Tower Income 2% Bonds-
5%, Due 1952", with five shares of stock attached. 
The date of exchange was in September, 1937. Each $1,000 
bond received a new $500 bond and five shares of stock. 
The quotation as of February 8, 1939, was 22 bid, no offer 
s110wing at that time, whic11 would give you the value for 
$6,000 worth of new bonds as of February 8 of $1,320. 
Q. How about the stock¥ Has that any value? 
A. The stock has no separate value. It is traded along with 
the bonds. 
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By Ml-. Maupin: 
Q. The bond prices carry the stock along ·with them? 
A. They carry the stock along with them. 
(A memorandum of the last-mentioned bonds was filed as 
Exhibit No. 29.) 
Mr. Lanning: • Mr. 1'Iaupin, the information I have is that 
$706.25 was received on account of the Dorcoe 
page 469 ~ Mercantile Building bonds. 
Mr. :Maupin: \Vell, put that in subject to veri-
fication. 
By Mr. Lanning : 
Q. So that th~ value of those bonds, including payments, 
would be $706.25 more than you stated; is that correct? 
A. Yes. I gave a value of $700, I believe it was. 
Q. The next issue is 59th Street and Madison A venue, face 
value $10,000. Please give tlie same information as to those 
bonds. 
A. The old bond was known as '' 59th and :Madison Avenue 
6t}t.'s Due 1947". The market quotation as of April 27, 1934, 
was 1%% bid, offerecl at 2%%, which will give you a value 
of $150 for $10,000 worth of bonds. 
They were exchanged in April, 1938, and the basis of ex-
change was that for each $1,000 bond they received two shares 
of common stock and the bond was canceled, and the stock 
is known as "625 Madison Avenue Corporation Common". 
The quotation as of February 8, 1939, was 2 bid, offered at 4. 
Q. That is for the stock? 
A. On the stock. They received 20 sliares of stock in th~ 
exchange, ,vhich would give you the value as of February 8 
of $40. 
pag~ 470 ~ (A memorandum of the last-menti0110cl bonds 
· was filed as Exhibit No. 30.) 
Q. Now, the next one on the list is 502 Park A venue, 
$4,000 face value. Please give the same information as to 
t]10se bonds. 
A. The bond was known as "502 Park Avenue 6% Bonds 
Due 1941 ". 
The market quotation as of April 27, 1934, was 151h bid, 
offered at 17Y.>. The value of the $4,000 worth of bonds 
held would be $620 as of April 27, 1934. 
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Because of default in the interest on April 1, 1932, a bond-
holders' committee was formed, the mortgage foreclosed in 
March, 1936, and deposited bonds sold to the N eilmo Realty 
Corporation. Holders of the ce1·tificates of deposit received 
$218.80 per thousand as final settlement, which amount was 
paid upon presentation at the Continental Bank & Trust 
Company, in New York. The certificates on which payment 
was made were then cancelled. 
The bonds in question, as far as I could ascertain, were de-
posited. You had in your notation that the amount received 
was $218.80 ·per thousand, so that _would give you-
Q. ·what did you make the value of the bonds, including 
cash payments, as of February 8, 1939 ·y 
A. $875.20. That was your total payment on those bonds. 
I also had another notation in here, but I don't 
page 471 ~ really believe it should go in the proceedings. 
The Lawyers Trust Company of New York an-
nounced, in 1936, .a payment of $398 to holders of the actual 
bonds, but you did not have the actual bonds, so I don't be-
lie-vc, that would come into the question at all. 
Q. So what the estate now has is the cash? 
A. It has the cash. It had deposited bonds and it received 
$218.80. 
Mr. Lanning: They no longer have the bonds. They have 
the cash in place of the bonds, amounting to $875.20. 
(A memorandum of the last-mentioned bonds was filed as 
Exhibit No. :n.) 
Q. Now, the next one is Majestic Apartment, face value 
$5,000. Please give the same information as to those bonds. 
A. The' o]d bonds were known as '' Majestic Apartment 6% 
Bonds Due in 1948 ". 
The market value as of .April 27, 1934, market quotation 
was 23:~i hid. offered at 24Y2• which g·ives the total amount 
of $1.187.50 as of April 27, 1934. 
The new bond is known as "New York Majestic Income 4% 
Bonds, Dne 1956", with 10 shareH of voting trust stock at-
tachecl. The date of this exchange was in August, 1937. Each 
$1,000 of the old bonds received $770 worth of 
page 472 ~ new second mortgage bonds and 10 shares of stock 
pl m; $250.50 in cash. 
Q. Per bond? 
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A. Per bond. I think I specified each $1,000 old bond re-
ceived it. The market quotation as of February 8, 1939,. 
was quoted 7 bid, offered at 7%. These new bonds are traded 
,vith the stock attached, and the price is figured per centum 
of $1,000 for the reason that the bonds are stamped "23o/o 
Paid". Now, the total value as of February 8, 1939, figuring 
the bonds at 7% plus the cash payment, would be $1,602.50. 
(A memorandum of the last-mentioned bonds was filed as 
Exhibit No. 32.) 
Q. Now, the next one ·is Cerana Apartment, $5,000 worth 
of bonds, face value. Please give the same information as 
to those bonds. 
A. The old bonds were called "Cerana Apartment 6% 
Serial Bonds Due 1927 to 1936' '. 
The market quotation as of April 27, 1934, was quotecl 
34 bid, offered at 36, which w·ould give them a market value 
as of that date of $1,700 for the $5,000 worth of bonds. 
The new bond is called "Cerana Apartment Ineome Bonds 
Due 1942'', with stock attached. The date of exchange was in 
1932 on a par-for-par basis with hito shares of 
page 473 ~ stock attached, to each $1,000 bond. 
The market quotation as of February 8, 1939,. 
was quoted 26 bid, offered at 29, which would give them a 
value as of that date of $1,300. 
(A memorandum of the last-mentioned bonds was filed as . 
Exhibit No. 33.) 
Q. Now, there is one other on this list: 1 West 57th .Street,. 
$2,000 worth of bonds, face value. Please give the same in-· 
formation as to this issue. ' ' 
A. They were known as "No. 1 West 57th Street 6% Bonds 
Due in 1933' '. There was no , exc.hange and the bonds de-
faulted in December, 1931. 
The quotation as of April 27, 1934, was quoted 1 bid, of-
fered at 2 (that is per cent), giving the value as of that date 
of $20 for the $2,000 worth of bonds. 
The bonds and certificates were wiped out, the bondholders 
receiving $39.22 per $1,000 bond and the holders of certifi-
. cates of deposit receiving nothing. Two payments of $29.33 
and another payment of $9.89 were originally paid to the 
bondholders, which gives you that total of $39.22. I be-
lieve those were deposited and the amount of money turned in, 
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according to the memorandum I had, which would give you 
the value of $78.44 as of February 8, 1939. 
( A memorandum of the last-mentioned bonds was filed as 
Exhibit No. 34.) 
page 47 4 ~ Q. Have you computed the total market value 
of all these bonds as of April 27, 1934, and Feb-
ruary 8, 1939 f 
A. I have, yes, sir. 
Q. ·what were those total values f 
A. The complete total 7 
Q. Yes. 
A. I have in my complete total a. memorandum of the 
$3,000 worth of Chile bonds which I have included in there. 
Q. Suppose you take out the Chile bonds. I will ask you 
about them afterwards. 
A. As of April 27, 1934, the total amount would be $17,-
157.50, and as of February 8, 1939, $13,719.67. 
Q. On the last total tfie cash payment on the Dorcoe Mer-
cantile bonds should be added Y 
A. It is not included in that. 
Q. That is $706.25. 
A. I figure that would give yon the total amount, then, 
of $14,425.92. 
Mr. Lanning: I offer that tabulation in evidence as Ex-
hibit No. 35. 
Q. Are yon asked from time to time to figure market 
values 9f unlisted bonds for the government for tax pur-
poses? 
A. Yes, we are, in many instances during the year, for in-
come tax purposes and estate purposes. 
Q. When yon arrive at the value of certain bonds for the 
government, do you arrive at that in the same 
page 475 r way that yon lrnve arrived a.t the market value 
of these bonds? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Why do you take the bid price, rather than the offer 
price? 
A. I take the bid price for the reason that the owner of 
a bond, wanting to dispose of a bond, would only receive 
the bid side of the market, or thereabouts. · 
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Q. If you had taken the offer, rather than the bid, would 
that have made very much difference in your totals? 
A. Oh, it might make, maybe, a thousand dollars difference, 
something like that. I did not figure it out. It might be a 
little more. 
Q. Mr. Bentley, did you bring down here with you a sum-
mary issu~cl by the service yon have just mentioned, cover-
ing from ,July, 1934, to- , 
A. I brought it down from ,January, 1934, to July, 1934. 
The reason I brought that down was that, in case you wanted 
to go to the ha.ck rcco rds, you could do so. 
Q. What other volumes did you bring down here? 
A. I also brought the stock volumes because there was one 
stock, I think, involved in there, fo sh°'v you quotations over 
a period of two or three months. I also brought along the 
February issue of 1939 to m'ore or less check back prices 
that, on a pre-vions date, would give you an idea 
page 476 ~ we are not far from right. 
Q. Arc these volumes you have just mentioned 
issued by this bureau you have just mentioned V 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Bentley, in the estate were found three $1,000 bonds 
of Chile, clue in 1960. Can you state wlrnt the market value 
of those bonds was on April 27, 1934, and on February 8, 
1939? 
A. As of April 27, 1934, there was a sale of 13%. I got 
that sale from the official New York Stock Exchange sheet. 
And on Feln·uar~r 8, 1939, there were no sales of the assented 
bonds. which I believe you own. Assented bonds were quoted 
on FebrnarY. 8, 1939, 11112 bid, only for one side of the mar-
ket. 
Q. What did yon compute, then, the market value of these 
bonds. was on the two dates f 
A. I computed them here, Mr. Lanning, just getting it from 
you that the bonds were assented. I have computed them on 
the unassentecl bonds. I will have to figure them out for you 
again. As of April 27, 1934, it would be $397.50. 
0. For the three honds t 
A. For the three bonds. As of February 8, 1939, figuring 
the bid side of the market, which ·was 11% for assented bonds, 
it wonld be $345. If you had not received that 
page 477 ~ reduction in interest, of course, the amount would 
have heen marlP. That is whnt I orfo:inally 
figured-that they had not been assented. '-' ~ 
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Q. What were the bonds worth on the two dates if they were 
not assented bonds f 
.A. They were quoted 15%,-16, as of February 8, 1939 . 
.April 27, 1934, there was a sale at 1314. 
Q. What was the market value of the bonds on those dates, 
assuming that they were not assented bonds t 
A. The market value on those dates, assuming that they 
were not assented qpnds, would be $397.50, and as of February 
8 it would be $472.50. 
(.A memorandum of the last-mentioned bonds was filed as 
Exhibit No. 36.) 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Maupin : 
Q. Mr. Bentley, in cases where there have been reorganiza-
tions of these bond issues originally made through Straus & 
Company and new bonds have been issued, have yon the in-
formation as to whether or not interest' is in default on the 
new issues in any case? 
A. For example, of the Court and Remsen 's, first issue, 
they pay at the present time 3% % and have paid since re-
organization-do you want those as exhibits num-
page 478 } her so-and-so f 
Q. You had better do that. That is what ex-
hibit f 
A. That is Exhibit No. 22. 
Exhibit No. 23 are traded flat and interest at 31h%· That 
is for the new security. 
By :Mr. Lanning: 
Q. Are they paying interest f 
A. Yes, they are paying interest. 
Exhibit No. 24, Fifth Avenue and 43rd, they are not pay-
ing anything·. They are still traded flat. 
Lombardys, Exhibit 25, I explained that situation to you 
before. Up to date, the last coupon was paid and there is 
some question about the next coupon being paid. 
Exhibit No. 26, traded flat. That is the Chanin Building 
1%-2%. 
Q. You mean by "flat", there is no interest? 
A. Not including interest. Of course, where I state here 
they are traded flat, for example Exllibit 26, they are income 
bonds and the interest is paid directly to the holder, therefore, 
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.. 
the trading amongst dealers on all income bonds is 011 a flat 
basis. ' 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. What I was after was, Is the interest in default? Is 
it being paid as and when it accrues? 
A. Well, on this Chanin Building, I can't answer that ques-
tion truthfully,. but the price would indicate to 
page 479 ~ me that they are not paying anything. 
-Q. Well, you don't know, though T 
A. I don't know positively, no. 
Q. Now, go back to Exhibit 24, Fifth Avenue. and 43rd 
Street. Are they paying interest? 
A. As far as I know, they are not. 
Q. But you don't know Y 
A. I am not ·positive. 
Q. Now, how about the Lombardy Apartments, which were 
afterwards assented, Exhibit No. 25? 
A. They paid the last coupon. They have not defaulted 
yet, but I understand they are to at the next interest pay-
ment. 
Q. They have paid so far, anyhowf 
A. They have paid so far, yes. 
Q. Now, let us go down to Exhibit 27. 
A. There is no question involved there, because the amount 
received-those bonds were deposited and they received cash. 
Q. Exhibit 28; that is the Dorcoe Mercantile f 
A. Those are income bonds. Thev are traded flat. I can't 
say definitely whether they have paid anything since the new 
bonds were issued, or not. 
Q. You don't know f 
A. No; I didn't. check that. 
Q. Now. p:o to Exhibi{ 29, the Book Building·, 
page 480 ~ isn't it? . 
A. The Book Building, yes. 
Q. How about that? Is that paying interest? 
A. They are an income bond also, and I did not check that 
to see whether they were paying interest, for the reason the 
interests goes to the holder. The holder would know whether 
they had paid interest to date. 
Q. Let us §?:O to Exhibit. HO. :i9th Street and Madison Ave-
nue. 
A. There is a stock involved there. There is no interest. 
Q. Does that pay any dividend that yon know on 
A. No, sir. 
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Q. 502 Park Avenue, Exhibit 31 : How about that Y 
A. Those bonds in question were deposited and they re-
ceived cash. · 
Q. Exhfbit No. 32 is the :Majestic Apartment. How about 
the interest on those 1 
A. That is an income bond also. The holder would receive 
the interest direct. I did not check-
Q. You do not know whether they are in def a ult, do you? 
A. I don't know whother they have paid any interest at all 
on those bonds. They are quoted 7 bid. I don't know wl1ether 
they have paid anything recently or not. 
pag·e 481 J Q. And One ,vest 57th Stret, Exhibit No. 34; _ 
that was sold? 
A. Yes, that was sold. 
Q. Now, in every case of reorganization, that was don~ 
pursuant to some court proceedings and pursuant to the ap-
praisal of the underlying properties securing the issue of 
bonds, was it not? 
A. I did not g·et the question. 
Q. I say, in all cases where these bonds were refunded 
and a new issue was put on and the old issue was retired that 
action was taken pursuant to some court procedure? 
A. By court procedure, yes. 
Q. And pursuant to an appraisal of the underlying prop~ 
erty which was the security for·the issue of bonds? 
A. I would say Yes. 
Q. Now, do you know what the appraisals show as to the 
ratio between the value of the property securing the issue 
of bonds and the total issue of bonds·? 
A. No. I did not go into that. 
Q. Have you made any sales of any of these bonds regard-
ing which you have testified, yourself, or have any sales of 
any of these bonds been made at these prices that you speak 
of, to your personal knowledge 1 
A. Well, I have bundled orders for some of these particu-
. Jar securities, myself. I can say about one in 
page 482 ~ particula.r, Exhibit No. 29. The last time I re-
member handlin~: a sale of that s·ecnrity was 
around the first of the year, and I sold bonds as. low as 20 per 
cent. I believe I Jmd an order at that t.ime from one of our 
customers to sell $20,000 worth of bonds, and the bonds were 
quoted-there was an indication that 21 might be paid for 
them. I sold a few bonds at 21 and finally had to sell the bal-
ance at 20 per cent. · 
Q. They were the Book Building bonds f 
308 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
JV. Taylor Johnson. 
A. ':I.1hey were the Books. 
Q. Any others T 
A. Not particularly. I called up a few brokers who I knew 
dealt in some of these real estate bonds and asked them if 
they had any sales at any time recently--
Q. I don't want that. l\iy question was, Did you sell any 
vourselfT 
w A. I can't say off-hand, outside of those Books-the Book 
Buildings. 
Q. These bonds are, of course, unlisted bonds, are they 
noU 
A. Yes, all of them. 
Q. Is there any great activity in them 1 
A. Depending on the orders that come in the market. I 
would not say there is a. whole lot of activity in them. 
Q. As a matter of fact, they are not dealt in 
page 483 ~ extensively in comparison with other types of 
bonds, are theyf 
A. No, not as extensively as what you call your high grade 
bond market. These are what we call second grade, specula-
tive issues. 
Q. They a re bought for speculation . and they are sold 
usually because somel)ody hns them and needs the money; 
isn't. that true 1 
A. You mean thev are sold for the reason-
. Q. They are sold~ for tbe reason that whoever has them 
wants the money? 
A. To raise some money, yes. 
Q. And if they art~ bought, they a re bought for specula-
tion? 
A. For speculation. There really isn't very much more 
you can say about it, because they are all just entirely in the 
speculative class. You or I would not recommend them to 
anybody. 
W. TAYLOR .TOHKSON, 
a witness on. behalf of the defendant, having been duly sworn, 
testified as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Lanning·: 
Q. Your name is "\V. Taylor .J o]mson 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 484 ~ Q. \Vlrn.t is t.Iw name of your company•/ 
A. National Surety Company. 
Q. ·what is the name of your company here f 
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A. -Yfv. Taylor Johnson, Incorporaj:ed. 
Q .. W. Taylor Johnson, Incorporated, is the agent of the 
National Surety Company, is it noU 
A. That is rig·ht. 
Q. Now, Mr. Johnson, did the National Surety Company 
execute a bond for Mrs. Adelaide l\L Hayes, Executrix of the 
Estate of "Tilliam R. Hayes t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. VVho took up with you the execution of the bond? 
A. Judge Parker. 
Q. When was that bond given? 
A. It was executed on Ma.y 28, 1934, at Princess Anne Court 
House. 
Q. In connection with the execution of that bond, were 
there certain other contracts entered into? 
A. Just what do you mean, l\fr. Lanning? 
Q. Well, were there other contracts that 'Mr. ~arker en-
tered into with Mrs. Hayes! 
A. Judge Parker sig11ed an indemnity agreement with us 
and also agreed to joint control. Mrs. Hayes did likewise. 
. Q. Is this Exhibit No. 8 a copy of the agree-
page 485 } meuts entered into by Mrs. Hayes a.nd Mr. Par-
ker! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. "\'\Then were those ag-reements entered into, Mr. John-
son? 
A. According to my reeords, Mr. Lanning, they were exe-
cuted on the 29th day of May, 1934, the day after the bond' 
was executed at Princess Anne Court House. 
Q. Did you take the acknowledgment of Mr. Parker? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know whether you took the acknowledgment on 
the date carried on the ag-reemenH 
A. I assume that. I did, sir. 
Q. Has the National Surety Company any requirement in 
connection with an executrix's bond where the bond is over 
$5,000? 
A. Y cs, sir; we require joint control. 
Q. How about tl1e indemnity agreement that you have men-
tioned? Is that reqnire<l to be executed, too? 
A. Only if someone other than the agent exercises that 
c·ontrol. 
Q. In the case of an attorney exercising~ joint control, do~s 
the surety company require an indemnity agTeement to be 
signed by the attorney? 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is that the usual and customary requirement? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 486 ~ Q. The agreement which Mr. Parker signed in 
this case was, then, the usual and customary re-
quirement? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. What arrangement dicl you have with Mr. Parker at 
the time you agreed to execute this bond for the National 
Surety Company T 
A. In what respeet? 
Q. Well, did you have an arrang·ement with him that he 
would execute this indemnity agTeemenU 
A. Oh, yes ; yes, indeed, that was the requirement. 
Q. At the time you executed the bond! 
A. At the time we executed the bond. 
Q. So, irrespective of the time that this indemnity agree-
ment wa_s signed by Mr. Parker, yon had an arrangement 
with him that he would have to sign an indemnity agreement 
in order to have joint control T 
A. That was definitely understood. 
CROSS EXA.1'1:INATION. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Mr. Johnson, isn't there a gentleman named Bilbrey 
who is connected with the National Surety Company as part 
of its legal staff? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 487 ~ Q. What position does he hold there? 
A. Mr. Bilbrey's position is general attorney. 
Q·. Where is his headquarters T 
A. His headquarters is in W ashi.ng·ton. 
Q. The National Surety Company learned of the fact .that 
there was to be instituted, or had been instituted, a suit for 
the purpose of setting aside the will of Father Hayes, dicl 
it not? -
A. That is right •. sir. 
Q. Which gave the company a good dP.al of concern J 
A. That is true . 
. Q. And Mr. Bilbrey came down here on more than. one 
occasion, did he not, ahout tllat matter T 
A. He probably made six or seven trips. · 
Q. The National ·Surety Company, I take it, was naturally 
exercised about the possibiHty that that contest might be 
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successful and there might be litigation which would involve 
itT 
A. That is right. 
Q. As to what this executrix had done under that bond? 
.A.. That is correct. 
Q. Do you know whether or not Mr. Bilbrey had several 
conferences with Judge Parker about this matter¥ 
A. Yes, he conferred with him each trip lie 
page 488 ~ made to N orf 9lk. 
Q. The National Surety Company, in the be-
ginning, was anxious to get off the bond, was it not 'f 
A. They asked to be relieved. 
Q. And except for 1\fr. Parker's efforts, you would have 
gone to court to make application to be relieved from that 
bond, would you not? 
A. I think that is correct. 
Q·. So that he was responsible, by. reason of his arguments 
and his assuring t.hem that he did have joint control of this 
matter, in keeping the National Surety Company on this 
bond? 
A. I can't answer that the way you put it. I think the 
reason that prompted the company to stay on the risk WM 
unquestionably due to the argument that Judge Parker ad-
vanced and questions of law that he explained to Mr. Bil-
brey and satisfied Mr. Bilbrey, who, ·in turn, satisfied tlie 
company. The thing· that first prompted the company to be 
uneasy about it was the payment that .Judge Parker and Mrs. 
Hayes made on the dwelling down there. 
Q. Now, Mr .• Johnson, that. matter was a continuing mat-
ter, to an extent, was it not Y That is to say, Mr. Bilbrey 
kept in touch with the situation as tl1ese various lawsuits-
A. Yes. ,T ud:2;e Parker furnished us with the 
page 489 ~ information in each case that was tried, and the 
result of it, and aA n matter of fact, we are still 
following it up. 
Q. Did you know, at the time that you wrote the bond origi-
nally-I assume tl1at you did w;rite it, or it was written un-
der your supervision, was it not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. !?id you know what the situation was with regard to 
Father Hayes' estate-that tl1ere was going to be litigation f 
A. No. 
Q. And it was after you found that out that this situation 
arose, largely, of the uneasiness of the National Surety Com-
pany about the bond? -
312 Supreme Court of Appeal& C\f Virginia 
.W. Taylor J ohns()n. 
A. That is correct. 
· Q. Let me ask you this, then: Suppose the National Surety 
Company had been successful in hejng· relieved of its re-
sponsibility as surety here: vVould l\frs. Hayes have had 
difficulty, in your judg·ment, in obtaining- another surety corn~ 
pany to act¥ 
Mr. Lanning·: I object to the question. 
A. I think, unquestionably, she would have been unable to 
obtain any surety company without putting· up full co~-
lateral. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Then, if ~fr. Parker bad been unsuccessful in convinc-
ing l\fr. Bilbrey by his arguments to permit the 
page 490 ~ National Surety Company to remain on that bond, 
in your opinion, it would have been impossible 
for her to obtain any surety at all? 
A. That is my opinion, ~fr. Maupin. 
Q. Upon what is your opinion based? 
A. On my twenty years in bnsineRs-not a case similar 
to this, but wliere a bond is refused by one company, it is 
almost impossible to secure it from another without col-
lateral. 
Q. You form it from your experience with surety com-
panies? 
A. That is c.orrect. 
RE-DIRECT EXAl\HNATIOX. 
By Mr. Lanning: 
Q. It is a fact that this indemnity agreement which you 
spoke of, which is elated 1\fay 29, was given at the outset, 
and not as a. result of the controversy with the suretv com-
pany? · · · 
A. No, that is definitely correct, because Judge Parker 
understood that we would not execute the bond for this 
amount without. joint control. 
Q. And at the time you issued tl1e bond, he entered into 
this indemnity ap:reement, or agreed to enter into it f 
A. He ag-reed to enter into it. 
page 491 ~ Q. And it was not executed as a result of this 
con t.roversv that a rose? 
A. Oh, no. ~ 
" 
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RE-CROSS EX.A::MIN .A.TION. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q . .As a mater of fact, in your conferences with Mr. Bil-
brey, was not the argument that Mr. Parker was responsible 
personally and that all expenditures would be made under 
his supervision and with his approval or consent, used as an 
argument for the retention of the bond. 
A. The general counsel at the home office in New York 
telephoned me, very much upset over this situation down 
here, and wanted to know who Judge Parker was and if I 
could personally sponsor him, and I told him that I could. 
I gave him a little history of Judge Parker and satisfied 
him insofar as the responsibility of Judge Parker in handling 
the funds that were then left in the estate. However, I do 
not think that that had anything· to do with the company's 
staying on the bond. I think what prompted it was Bilbrey's 
invcstig·ation down here as to what he thought the final result 
would be in connection with those lawsuits, and he satisfied 
l1imself as to ,Tudg·e Parker's responsibility. It was purely 
a question of law, in my opinion, witli Mr. Bilbrey being sat-
isfied that the company was safe to stay on this 
page 492 } bond. 
Q. And with confidence in tl1e ability of the man 
who was handling· this litigation to successfully conduct it? 
A. Exactly. 
Q. And !Ir. Bilbre? got his idea of what these matters 
involved and wlmt the law involved in them was primarily 
from Mr. Parker, did lw not 1 
A. Oh, yes, he obtained all of his information from Mr. 
Parker. 
Thereupon, at 1 :15 P. l\I., an adjoumment was taken until 
2:45 P. M. 
AFTERNOON SESSION. 
The hearing was resumed at 2 :45. 
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MRS. ADELAIDE M. HAYES, 
the defendant, having been duly sworn, testified as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Lanning: 
Q. Your name is Mrs. Adelaide M. Hayes f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You are the executrix of the estate of William R. 
Hayes! 
pag·e 493 ~ A. Yes. 
Q. And you qualified as executrix on the 28th 
of May, 1934; is that correcU 
A. Yes, that is true. 
Q. In Princess Anne County f 
A. Princess Anne County. 
Q. You employed Mr. vV. L. Parker to represent you in 
connection with the estate, did you not, Mrs. Hayes 1 
A . .Yes, I did. I went to see :M:r. Parker about the middle 
of May, 1934. I just had had a terrible loss in the death 
of my husband. Mr. Parker was most kind in his expres-
sions of sympathy, and I know he was sincere. He recalled 
having met Mr. Hayes several ~imes, one time going over 
on the boat to Cape Charles; said he had a very long con-
versation with him; and two or three other times, I think--
times Mr. Hayes, himse]f, had needed his advice to transact 
some business. Mr. Hayes had gone to see Mr. Hugh Davis, 
who was out of town, and Mr. Parker was there, so Mr. 
Hayes asked Mr. Parker to attend to the matters he had in 
hand. 
Q. After ·you came back from New York, you employed 
Mr. Parker, and you best. recollection is it was around the 
middle of May, 1934 f 
A. Y1es-to probate the will at that time. And I told him 
. at that time I thought there would be litigation 
page 494 ~ over it and I asked him if he would attend to that, 
and he said he would, and he recalled tlmt l\tfr. 
Hayes, himself, said that on his passing there would likely 
be litigation-bitter litigation. And then we went downstairs 
to the safe deposit box and got the will. Mr. Parker took that 
with him, and I believe an<l I know put it throug11 the neces-
sary steps for probating. 
Q. Now, on this first occasion, 01· subsequently, did you 
have any arrangement with Mr. Parker in regard to fees! 
Was there anything said about fees 1 
A. Yes. I asked Mr. Parker if he wanted a retainer. He 
said No. I asked him if the transaction would be on a con--
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tingent basis. He said, No, he did not work that way, that 
he would prefer to have payments from time to time. I 
asked him about what the litigation would cost, and he said 
he could not tell, it depended on what work he would have 
to do. 
Q. Have you prepared a statement showing what the liti-
gation has cost you down to the present time? 
A. Yes. I have it all there. 
Q. Is that a copy of the statement Y 
A. It is a copy of it, yes. 
Q. That shows that you ha.ve paid out for court cost and 
fees, down to the present time, $12,965.71, does it noU 
A.. Yes. 
page 495 ~ Q. And it also shows that you owe the National 
$108.67? 
Surety Company a premium for last year of 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that is past. due? 
A. Yes, and, I da.re say, for this year too. 
Q. ·well, that will not become due until l\£ay or ,June of 
this year. You also have added here the disbursements of 
W. ;L. Parker, $1,154.27; that, I assume, was taken from the 
statement whi~h he rendered you as to his disbursements? 
A. Tha.t is correct. 
Q. So that with the payments already made and those 
which you have been eallcd upon to make for disbursements, 
the total is $14,228.65? 
A. That is correct. 
l\fr. Lanning: I offer that statement in evidence as Ex-
hibit No. 37. · 
Q. Have you also, ofrs. Hayes, prepared a statement show-
ing the payments made to 1\fr. Parker and tl1e dates of each 
payment? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. That shows a total of $10,020.03 to :Ur. Parked 
A. That is correct. 
Mr. Lanning: I offer that statement in evidence as Ex-
hibit No. 38. 
Q. 'Mrs. Hayes, J1ave you the canceled checks 
page 496 ~ supporting t11e paid items set forth in Exhibit 
No. 371 
316 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Mrs . .Adelaide M. llayes. 
A. Yes, I have every one of them. 
Q. There is one missing, isn't th(lre, an $18 item? 
A. ,ven, that is litig·ation expense. You said Mr. Parker's 
payments. 
Q. Have you all the checkR supporting the items set forth 
in Exhibit 371 
A. All except one; that is this $18 check, and I believe 
that is probably in Mr. Parker's records. He has a great 
many of my papers. 
Q. Is that for the stenographer at Newburgh, $181 
A. The stenog-rapher at Newburgh, yes. It was paid, 
though. 
Mr. Lanning: I offer, as Exhibit No. 38-A, the canceled 
checks in support of the paid items set forth in Exhibit No. 
37. 
Q. How did you happen to go to i\fr. Parker, 1'f rs. Hayes 1 
Just briefly. 
A. vVell, I was a stranger here, and I did have a few good 
friends and each one recommended a different lawyer to 
me. I did not know to whom to go. Finally, I recollected 
Mr. Hayes, himself, bad been to Mr. Parker and I thought, 
well, that is the man I should go to, ancl I went to Mr. Parker 
for that reason alone, particularly that he knew and bad 
met and seen :M:r. Hayes, and it makes a difference 
page 497 ~ if you know a person-a difference when you are 
talking· a bout them or discussing them. 
Q. N ffW, Mrs. Hayes, what did you say to l\fr. Parker and 
what did Mr. Parker sa:y to you at the times v:ou made some 
of these payments to him tot.a ling· $10,020.03? ~ 
A. Right along, starting off in 1934-, I made the payments 
to Mr. Parker always, and quickly; he got them the clay he 
asked them-not the next day, the next week, or the next 
month. Rnt when it. came down that there was not much 
money in the account at times, naturally, I had to protest 
and sH.y, "Well, I don't see how I can make such a pRyment." 
For instance. on 1\fav 27. 1935. Mr: Parker aslrnd me for 
$500 tlrn.t clay, and up .. to that date I had paid him $3,750 and 
I told ]1im mv bank account was low and that I did! not know 
".,.here I wouid ~·Pt the money, and he said, ''I will take rare 
of t.hat. "\Ve can get money as we need it.'' 
I asked him tlwn if he thoug·ht the New York litig;ation 
would be expensive, and he said} ''No, I don't think so." 
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On November 26, 1935, be phoned me and said that Judge 
Way had taken the litigation under advisement and for me 
to go in on ,F,riday and talk over the case. I went in there 
all keyed up, thinking I would hear about that case, and all 
he had to say to me was that he would like to have a check 
for a thousand dollars. In order to give that to 
page 498 ~ him, it took every penny I had in the bank, in 
fact. more than I l1ad in the bank, and my ac-
count was short and I had to take some money from my per-
sonal account to pay him that. That day, I said to Mr. 
Parker, "The expense is high, very hig·h. I have given you so 
far (to that date) $3,7501 and the matter is still hanging." 
He said. '' Oh, you know litig·a~ion is expensive." 
On April 2, 1936, he asked me for $250. I gave him that 
without any comment a.t all. 
On November 30, 1936, he asked me for $1,500 and I said, 
":M:r. Parker, to date the payments amount to $7,750." 
And he said, "Well, we can go down to the bank and ar-
range a loan.'' 
I said. "I don't like to do that because the bank charges 
me six per cent interest. I would rather sell, say, the U. G. I. 
stock. That 4oesn 't pay much dividend and I don't think it 
will go any higher." 
So, he put over the sale of that stock--Mr. Parker said 
he put over the sale of that stock, but he did not say it was 
to pay him. The proceeds of the sale were1 not sufficient for 
the $1,500 and I had to make it up out of the· other money. 
He said, "Litig·ation is expensive "-ag·ain said it. 
On February 24 he asked me for another $250 to go to 
N cw York. Every time he would go to New York or Hfoh-
mond, be would ask me for $250. And he said, 
page 499 ~ '' There is the cost of these N cw York deposi-
t.ious.'' I did not know what he meant. but he 
did not exn]ain further. ·when I told him I did notj have the 
money for that, he said. ''Ob, we can arrang·e a loan." He 
mentioned that in testifying; ]ie did not say it was to pay 
him. We went down and took out a loan for $500 that day 
of which he had $250? 
Q. Who endorsed that note? Did he? 
A. Yes. and I did. 
Then, on October 12, 1937, he asked me for $1~500. I told 
him I did not lrnve the money, and he said, '' Oh1 yes you 
have." He says, ''Yon know that I have to supervise your 
account, and I know what you have in it." 
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I said, '' I know that, but this amount will take every cent 
I have there.'' 
He said, '"'No, you have $1,800 in your account and I have 
given you a. ~heck for the interest on the Court and Remsen 
Street bonds, and another dividend.'' So, I had to give 
him the check, but I fold him that he, was charging me more 
than I thought I would lmve to pay for the litig-ation, and 
he said, "Yes, I know that, but the work has been more than 
I thought it would be, and nobody knows the amount of time 
and labor I have put in on this, and so far. we have been suc-
cessful," and I told him, Yes, I was very thankful for that. 
On October ]2, 1937 (that same day), I told 
pag·e 500. ~ him tha.t a friend of mine had said to me that I 
was paying too much for Htigation-a man who 
was in the same profession as Mr. Parker and who knew 
and was able to give an opinion-and I asked him then what 
the balance of his bill would be, if any, and he replied, it 
depended on how much work he would have to do-would 
still have to put in--that his expenses were high and his time 
was costly. I. said, ''Well, please don't charge me too much 
for your time.'' 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. When was that, Mrs. HayesY 
A. October 12, 1937. 
By Mr. Lanning: 
Q. Now, what did you understand him t.o mean in that last 
statement? 
A. I understood that, according to the agreement when 
I first went to Mm, these payments would cover the work 
_he l1ad put in, and any necessary balance to be paid was 
for such matters that were Rtill pencling--tax matters-
which bP. got m.e into a tenible muddle about the inheritance 
tax. The ~mpervisor of the inhPrit.ance tax wrote in very 
strong letterR, bot11 to him and to me finally threatening to 
sell the assets at auction to satisfy the tax. And I thought, 
and I told Mr. Parker, on July-wl1ateyer was the last date 
of my conference with him-t11at. I felt that any bill I owed 
· him would not he any more than $1,200. I said, 
page 501 ~ "That would nieely cover-very well cover-11 
tl1ousand to twelve hundred dollars-anv mat-
ters of taxes that you I1ave got to get to~etl1er." because I 
knew t.he liforat.ion had bc~en finally ~ettlecl on .Tanna ry rn, 
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1938, and still my income and accounts had to be held up. 
That is a long time-365 days-over that-and my papers, 
my .documents, my certificates, everything I want to refer to 
is in Mr. Parker's possession. 
Q. Now, Mrs. Hayes, at the time you made this payment 
of $1,500 on October 12, when was that with respect to the 
time that your cont.est was argued in the Supreme Court of 
Appealst Was that about the time of the argument in the 
Supreme Court of Appeals 1 
A. I can't ref er to any of those elates and those things. 
I get them all muddled in the different contests. (J. I am talking a.bout the appeal from the decision in 
Princess Anne County the last case. . 
.A. That was finall); settled January 13, 1938. I 'remember 
that well. 
Q. When did he .go up there to argue H with respect to t.he 
time you made this payment T 
A. I could not recall. 
M:r. Maupin: Do you want that information? 
Mr. Lanning: Yes. 
Mr. Maupin: It was argued in November. 
pap;e 502 ~ By Mr. Lanning: 
Q. Well, :M.rs. Hayes. as T understand you to 
say. you understood that when you paid 11im that $1,500 that 
paid him up to date? -
A. Up to date, with the exception of what other tax mat-
ters and stuff he had to get together. And I said to Mr. Parker, 
the last day I was in th(\re, when he gave me that awful 
bill of thirty-two thousand--the final bill, Mr. Parker sent 
me by mail-I had beP.n asking· him time and time ag·ain to 
please let me know what I owed him-''Let me get finished 
with this litiA·ation. It has been a torture to me." No one 
knows w·hat I ha-\Te been through in all this, and be knows--
that man knows-Mr. Parker does know-he is the one who 
does know bow I Jui.Ye suffered through everything. I said 
to him, '' Let me g·et out of the eourts. Let me settle up.'' 
He said. ''Wen, I ca.n 't tell you," and kept padding my 
fee. 
"Please, Mr. Parker, attend to the tax matters." 
'' I can't do that until everything is settled. '' 
Finally, he did send me this bill of $32;914.30. Now, I will 
ask anybody if that is not an exorbitant bill to get~ and I 
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called him up and asked for an appointment, and he said 
Yes, and I went in and I said, "Mr. Parker, where wil1 I get 
the money to pay this exorbitant bill?'' 
page 503 ~ He said, ''I have shown it"-
I said, '' \Vhy did you get it up in this fashion °l '' 
He said, HI have shown it to all my friends and they a.ll 
sa.y it is a reasonable charge. 
I said, "I have shown it to my friends, not one of whom 
ha.s agreed that it is not an outrageous charge." Now, I 
left Mr. Parker, saying·, '·I am sorry we had any disagree-
ment about that, Mr. Parker, because I wanted to be friends 
with you,'' but I want to say right here, I had not read his 
bill then; I had not read his page after page-it is huge, it is 
a booklet-I say, if I had read it through, my conference 
with you would not have been a pleasant one; I would not 
have ~mid, "I want to be friends with you." He brought in, 
himself, that he never had to litigate in court-made state-
ments and assertions that he knows are not true, :md thing;s 
I never expected a man would do to me, rwvcr, in God's 
name! 
Q. Did you expect that l\fr. Parker would 11ave some dis-
bursements 1 
A. "\Vell, yes. I dicl. I knew Nlr. Parker would have some 
dislmrseme11ts, but I thoug·ht that probably he was. taking 
care of them from these $250 clwcks and so on, because I knew 
it ,,.,.onlcl not cost $250 to ~o to Richmond or to go to New 
York, and I thought the disbursements were being paid out 
of t.hose amounts. He did not itemize anything 
pag·e 304 ~ for me. . 
Q. Now, Mrs. HayeR, chd you have conversa-
tions with Mr. Parker with respect to the outcome of the 
case! 
A. Yes. Mr. Parker assured me, from the start, of suc-
cess. He said, ",v e can't lose "--that. would be his words 
time and time a~;ain-",Ve have all the facts of the case. The 
contestants haven't a leg to stand on. · We have the facts 
and you have an excellent case. I am sure of success.'' 
01i .Tune 2. 19~4. Mr. Parker told me that he was confident 
that we coufrl not lo~e: that he cloc~m 't see the other side 
lrns anv points in their· favor at all. He said that, even if 
they did succeed in lmving the will set aside; that would not 
make legal the former will of which they only have a copy; 
that the will w·ould have to be re-executed, and that cannot 
now be done. He said, even if tlwy can set the will aside, 
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as the former will cannot be re-executed or made legal ac-
cording to the Jaws of Virginia, the wife's inheritance of the 
personal property and the real estate is mine by deed, as 
well as bv wiU. He sajd that he does not see a chance of our 
losing; that they haven't a leg to stand on. . 
On March 15, 1935, Mr. Parker said he had no fear of 
winning on the question of domicile--no fear of winning-or 
no fear of losing, whichever you want to say-put it that 
way-which he said he could prove by persons 
page 505 }- bore ; second, by Mr. Hayes' telling of his in-
tentions to live here, almost with everyone be 
bad any conversation with, and Mr. Parker bad the names 
of the people; and, third, the fae:t that the state within which 
the property ( personal property) is located has jurisdic-
tion over the assets, which means Virginia in this instance. 
On May. 27, 1935, Mr. Parker said, "We can overwhelm 
them with our evidence.~ on domicile." On May 27, 1935, he 
said, '' The contestants are coming clown here to sue you in 
the federal court." That, I think, if I am not wrong, would 
be the second will contest. And Mr. Parker said, l1e cannot 
see how they could sustain that suit here, citing many au-
thorities tlmt the federal court had no jurisdiction over the 
state court which has the handling of the assets and tbe 
probate of the will. 
On ,July 10, 1935, Mr. Park«?r told me that he was confident 
about the outcome of the New York case and the deed to the 
Newburgh house. He said, "The contestaµts have gotten 
nowhere so far a.nd I don't believe tlmt they will g·et any-
where.'' 
On .November 15, 1935, I said to Mr. Parker. '' Evidently 
Mr. Heath must have some hopes of winning·, or else he would 
not want to bother with this case." 
Mr. Parker said, "I don't think he has any hopes." He 
said. ""\Vliat can ho have? vVe have the facts." 
page 506 } I then asked him if I should compromise, and 
ho said, ''I think you have an excellent case, but, 
of course, if you feel tlrnt you don't want to go through with 
it, I eannot advise you." He said, "I tl1ink they will want 
to postpone it, keeping- on frying to liarass yon into a. com-
promise.'' 
He said l\fr. Hayes conductPcl his bmdness himself, kept 
liis own little book, got l\f r. Rennett, who was a lawyer, to 
draw up his will, ancl although 1'.fr. Bennett told him that it 
would not be necessary to nnme llis sister (1\~r. Hayes' sis-
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ter ):J.J?.d his nephew in giving them a nominal amount, Mr. 
Hayes said, "I want to do it to show that I have them in 
mind." Mr. Parker said, ''That is proof in any contest that 
he knew what he wa.s doing." 
On June 25, 1936, Mr. Parker said that Judge White had 
set the da.y of August 4 to argue the point of domicile, and 
Mr. Parker said, ''We c~an overwhelm him with our evidence. 
We can prove by many reputable witnesses that it was Mr. 
Hayes' intention to make hi~ permanent home here and, in 
fact, he had purchased the lot and was building his home on 
that." 
On March 17, 1937, Mr. Parker told me that he wm; con-· 
fident of winning the case in the Supreme Court of Virginia. 
When he found me worried, he would be most sympatheitc 
. and say, ''You have nothing to worry about. 
· pa.ge 507 ~ Everything will be all rig·ht,'' and assured me 
time and time again and said, '' We have the 
facts.'' 
Q. Did Mr. Parker ever have anything to say·to you about 
the suggestion made in some of the papers as to the invnlidity 
of the marriage? 
A. That was brought up, of course, by the pleadings that 
Mr. Parker showed me from the start. They could not get 
· anywhere on that point. On May 26, 1934, Mr. Parker told 
me that the Guilfoils were investigating the records of the 
marriage and that they bad a lawyer from Richmond look-
ing into it. On J unc 4, 1934, he said that he was confident 
"that we cannot lose and that the contestants have no points 
to work on,'' whicl1, of course would mean that ·t11e marriage 
was all right. On l\fay 27, 1935, Mr. Parker said, ''They 
have not attacked the marriage and Mr. Heath knows he . 
cannot attaclr that marriage, tl1at it i.s legal, and if the will 
is declared invalid and they are not successful in attacking 
Virginia as a place of domicile, then everything goes to you 
as wife, will or no will.'' On ,July 21, 1936, Mr. Parker as-
sured me again that they could not attack the marriage and 
he,said, "Mr. Heath knows it is legal." He said, "The con• 
testants brought up this question to Mr. · Heath, and Mr. 
-Heath knows that marriage is le!2:al.'' 
. On September 1 O, 1937, I mentioned Mr. Heath's 
page 508 } tirade in t11e courtroom in Richmond, which was 
pretty bad. Mr. Parker said, "You have nothing 
to fear. Your position is impregnable. _If Mr. Heath has 
anything against you, he would certainly use it." 
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Q. Now, no one of the hearings in Princess Anne CotJ,nty, 
as I understand, Mr. Guilfoil, the son of the contestant here, 
te~tified; if3 that correct! 
A. Yes. That was on the domicile, I think. 
Q. The third will contest, the last will contest J 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall what he said as to the object of the con-
test? 
A. Mr. Guilfoil was on the witness stand and the discus-
sion was, from my recollection, about trying to prove New 
York was the domicile, and Judge White turned to Mr. Guil':' 
foil and asked him, '' In the event of success for you in that 
case, what would you share 1 '' Mr. Guilfoil 's answer said-
that his mother would share one-half with me in the fup.d 
if they were successful in the eventuality, in bringing it up 
in New York, 
Mr. Maupin: May I ask counsel what possible relevancy 
there is in this hearing in referring to testimony of witnesses 
on the stand in the court hearings f If he can show me the 
relevancy, 1 will not object; unless he can, I do object. 
Mr. Lanning: You may object if you want to. 
page 509 }- Mr. Maupin: I do object, then. If counsel de-
clines to state for the benefit of counsel and the 
Commissioner what relevancy there is in such testimony as 
that, I most assuredly object and a&k that it be stricke:n 
out. · 
By Mr. Lanning: . 
Q. Now, Mrs. Hayes, have you made up a statement of the 
stocks found in the estate at the time of the death of Mr. 
Hayes! 
A. Yes, such a statement was made up. 
Q. Of the proceeds of the sale of such stocks and what 
would have been the market value of those same stocks on 
the market if they had been held down to February 24, 19391 
A. Yes. That is a correct statement of the proceeds~ 
Mr. Maupin: Just one moment before the witness answers 
that. What is that based on f "\\That does she know about 
the value of stocks f 
J\fr. · Lanning: She knows what the stocks were sold for. 
1\1:r. Maupin: That is not what you asked her. 
Mr. Lanning: I am going to offer the Wall Street Journal 
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in evidence. Mr. Parker testified as to the value of the 
. ~o~s- . 
page 510 ~ Mr. Maupin: I am asking what she knows 
about the market yalue of stocks. -
By Mr. Lanning: . · . 
· Q. What do you know about the market value of stocks, 
Mrs. Hayes? 
A. Well, I have had quite a lot of experience. 
Q. Where did you get the values that are· set forth in the· 
stat~ment Y What were they taken from Y 
· A. Well, the market values listed would be taken from 
the New York Times or the Wall Street Journal, one of those 
papers. 
The Commissioner : Most of those stocks are on the New 
York Exchange. Some of them I see, and some of them I 
don't know about. 
Mr. Maupin: I think they are all listed either on the New 
York Stock Exchange or the Curb Exchange. 
Mr. Lanning: They are all listed in the Wall Street 
Journal and I am going to offer the vVall Street Journal in 
evidence, for February 24. 
Mr. Maupin: That is all right. I just wanted to find out. 
Yon asked the question without any qualification of the wit-
ness, first, to answer that. I wanted to know what it was 
based on. 
By Mr. Lanning: 
. Q. The market values as of February 24, 1939, 
}Jage 511 ~ were taken from the Wall Street Journal of that 
date; is that correct! 
A. That is correct. 
Q. That statement shows that the stocks held in the estate 
were sold between July 27, 1934, and August 9, 1934, for $36,-
919.02; is tliat correeU 
A. That is ·correct. 
Q. Is that the net that you g·ot for those stocksf 
· A. That was the net amount, commissions deducted. 
Q. And it also shows that those same stocks, if held in 
the estate, would have had the value of $52,926.63 as of Feb-
ruary 24, 1939 f 
A. That is correct. _ 
Q. This statement also shows· that, as a result of the sale 
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of those stocks rather than holding them, a loss of $16,007.61 
was sustained Y 
.A. Yes. 
Mr. Lanning·: I offer that statement in evidence as Ex-
hibit No. 89, and along with that statement I offer iri evi:--
dence the Wall Street Journal for February 24, 1~39, as Ex-
l1ibit No. 40. 
Mr. Maupin: I object to this in the 'form in which it is 
offered. I do not objeet to an exhibit, but I do object to an· 
argument offered in the guise of evidence. You can put your· 
figures in, but when you say '' Loss incurred 
page 512 } through selling,'' that is a matter of argument . 
and is not a· fact, and I object to the statement 
in that form. 
By Mr. Lanning: . 
Q. Now, Mrs. Hayes,. with some of the proceeds of sale of_ 
this stock in July and August, 1934, I understand, certain 
other stocks were bought; is that correct T · 
A. Yes, that is correct. 
Q. The stocks that you bought cost around $21,000; is that 
correct? · 
A. That is correct. May I say right here that I objected 
strongly to selling some of tho~e original holdings, partic!].-:. 
Iarly-is this in order now? 
Q. Well, it is not responsive to the questfon. 
A. (Continuing:) Particularly the Yellow Cab & Coach, 
on which a loss was sustained of $9,000, and I wanted to 
buy that stock back and I said, g·oina- down the hallway from 
l\fr. Parker's office that morning, "Mr. Parker, it is a crime 
to take that loss on that stock," and I wanted to buy it back 
because Mr. Hayes had a friend in the of.:fice of the company, 
and he always said to me, "That stock will come back. I 
know what I was doing when I bought it," and it is back 
t~day. 
Q. You are referring to the stocks that were found in the 
estate, and especially 500 shares of Yellow Cab; 
page 513 } is that correct? 
A. Yes, but I also wanted to buy American Can 
Pref erred back, and Endicott-Johnson Preferred-fine stocks. 
They could have been bought back at very low prices at that 
time, and, as the net result shows, those stoc~s all have in-
c.reased in value to the sum of over $16,000. 
t26. .: i1Pt~:.Cot1rt pf AJlReals of Virgini~· 
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Q. Now, :why were those stocks. ~oldY I am referring to 
those stocks that were found in the estate. 
A. The stocks we1·e sold because on the first proQeedings, 
the day we were all 1·eady for the first will contest, from 
which the contest~nts withdl·ew, ~nd ther~ Wl\B a non-suit, 
M1,·. Bennett, who ha<l ~ome down to testify, came to me and 
to Mr. Parker and it was Mr. Bennett's suggestion, I am 
quite sure, 'that they be sold, and Mr. Parker agreed to that. 
Q. Now, did Mr. Parker sug·gest to you that some of these 
original stocks were not suitable to held in the estate because 
they were too spec-qlative1 
A. No, I don't recall very much. He did not want to buy 
any of them back; that is all I remember. 
Q. I mean, at the time they were sold, did he suggest to 
you that some of these stocks in the estate were not suitable 
to be held in the estate because they wer~ too speculative! 
A. Well, I believe the Trust shares and things, 
page 514} he did not think so well of them and he said he 
thought we could probably get better stocks. 
Some were bought. Most of the stocks that were bought, 
were bought at my suggestion, not at Mr. Parker's. 
Q. I am ref erring· now especially to these stQcks in the 
estate. We will come to those in a minute. Did he have anv,.. 
thing to say about Yellow Truck at the time it was sold? .. ~ 
. A. He didn't like Yellow Truck at that time, but I told 
him, because of this officer in the company who was a per-
sonal friend of :Mr. Hayes, that would come back. 
Q. I mean, at the time they we~·e sold, did he say you ought 
to sell them anyhowf 
Mr. Maupin: 1\fr. Lanning, l have not said anything, but 
I think there ought to be a limit to this leading. 
By Mr. Lanning: 
Q. At the time these stocks were sold, did he have anv-
thing· to say about Yellow Truck? .. 
A. Well, not Yellow Truck any more than any of the oth-
ers. He wanted to sell the whole list. 
Q. Now, with some of the proceeds, I understand, you 
bought other stocks f · 
A. Bought other stocks, that is correct. 
Q. Some of the other stocks were bought in Ali-
page 5.15 ~ gust, 1934, at a cost of around $21,000, I think 
you have said; is that correct? 
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A. I believe that i$ rig·ht. I am not positive as to the 
figures. 
Q. And then, a little later, some three other stocks were 
bought? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Continental Can, American Tobacco, and National Dairy 
Products ; is that correct f · 
A. Yes. . 
Q. And the total cost of those stocks was $26,130.46.; is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, on whose advice did you buy these stocks¥ Take 
the first item here, American Telephone &l Telegraph. 
A. That was my buy, because I am very partial to .A. T. & 
T._ stock. Mr. Parker said he was not. I said, "Neverthe-
less, I want to buy it,'' and it was bought at 110. 
Q. The next item is United Gas Improvement; on whose 
recommendation did you buy thaU 
A. That was my buy, too, because of my knowing one of 
the officers of the company, but it was not doing well the 
past years, and that is why I agTeed to sell it, when I had to 
make a payment to Mr. Parker. 
Q. The next item is 100 shares of General Elec-
page 516 ~ tric. 
A. That was my buy because, also, of famili-
arity with the personnel of· the company. 
Q. 50 shares of Consolidated Gas; on whose recommenda-
tion was that bought? 
A. That was mine also, and the stock did not do so well 
and we let that go when we needed money, because it didn't 
go up or down. It was not worth holding. 
Q. 50 shares of United States 8teeH 
A. l\fy suggestion also. 
Q. And 25 shares of .Norfolk & ·western? 
A. Mr. Parker and Mr. Withers bought that. l\fr. Parker 
called over Mr. Withers, w110 was then, I believe, with Ab-
bott, Proctor & Paine, and J\fr. Withers would make some 
sug·gestions also. 
Q. 25 shares of Continental Can were purchased in 1937 Y 
A. Mr. Withers, I believe, suggested that. 
Q. 25 shares of American Tobacco B? 
A. That was my suggestion. 
Q. 50 sl1ares of National Dairy Products Y 
A. Mr. ,vithers' sugg·estion. 
Q. Now, Mr. Parker has made a charge of $1,500 in his 
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account under the heading· of "Estate .Securities and Invest-
ments" for his advice in connection with the pur-
page 517 ~ chase of these stocks that I have just mentioned. 
Just what did :Mr. Parker have to do in connec-
tion with the purchase other than what you have said 1 
A. L don't-know anything else, :Mr. Lanning, other than 
that he would call up :Mr. ·withers. Mr. Withers was sup-
posed to be the expert adviser. 
The Commissioner: vVho is Mr. vVithers t 
Mr. Lanning: Burk·s Withers. 
Mr. Maupin: He is a stock exchange man around here. 
The Witness: He put through all the sales and purchases 
of the stocks. 
By Mr. Lanning: 
Q. I hand you a statement which purports to show the 
prices which you paid for the stocks which you have just 
mentioned-nine lots in number--and also the market value 
of those stocks on :B,ebruary 24, 1939, and I will ask you where 
you got the market values as of February 24, 1939¥ 
A. From the Wall Street Journal. 
Q. As of that date? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the $26,130.46 is the actual cost of those stocks? 
A. Actual cost. 
Q. This statement shows that on those stocks 
page 518 ~ a profit of $7,951.51 has been realized since their 
purchase; is that correct? 
A. Yes, that is correct. 
Mr. Lanning: I offer that statement in evidence as Ex-
hibit No. 41. 
Q. Have any of the stocks shown on this statement, E~-
hibit 41, been sold? 
A. The U. G. I. stock has been sold and Consolidated Gas 
was also sold. 
Q. You have already stated why the United Gas Improve-
ment was sold? 
A. Yes. 
Q. ·why was the Consoliqated Gas sold? Do you know f 
A. I can't recall any special reason why that was sold ex-
cept that when we were buying in the new stocks, we needed 
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money to pay for the new stocks and probably sold it -for 
better stock. 
Q. Now, have you prepared a statement showing the pres-
ent stockholdings of the estate and the market value thereon 
A. Yes, that is the list of the present holdings. 
l\fr. Lanning: I offer that in evidence as Erliibit No. 42. 
Q. Mr. Hayes, Mr. Parker has made a charge of $500 for 
certain seryices in respect to the Virginia Beach 
})ag·e 519 }- house. That charge, as I understand, does not 
include his advice with respect to going ahead 
with the contract and using the estate's funds to complete 
the house, but it covers services which he performed in the 
process of building the house. Do you know what services 
Mr. Parker performed in connection with the detail of build-
ing the house 1 
A. No, I can't recall that Mr. Parker did anything in con-
1iection with the construction of the house. I was sick at 
that time. I was not down there, but my sister was there 
practically every day and she never saw :M:r. Parker-
Q. You can't testify to what she saw or knows. 
A. But I am sure he did not supervise the construction of. 
the house-I am quite sure. 
Q. Did you ever ask him to supervise the construction of 
the house1 
A. I never asked him to supervise the construction of the 
house, no. I did tell him, after I w~nt down there to live, 
that certain remarks had been passed to me that probably 
there were not enough ventilators in it, and I tqld that to 
l\fr. Parker, and he said, "Well, I will get an architect to go 
down there'': 
Q. Was that after you had moved in, Mrs. Hayes? 
A. Yes, and he sent down 1\fr. "'Wickham Taylor, and he 
said, "Now, maybe this will be a waste of money''. When I 
saw Mr. Parker the next time, I said, "Mr. 
page 520 ~ Parker, it was a waste of money". I said, "Mr. 
Taylor came down and was most pleasant to me 
and just looked at the house and said it was a fine house, and 
I said to l\Ir. Taylor, 'You are not going to inspect it?'" 
Well, there was nothing that I saw wrong with it, and then 
lie looked at it and said, "Good-bye", and wasn't there but 
ten minutes but sent me a bill for $25. 
Q. Upon the eompletion of the house, 1\fr. Parker says, he 
ref)uired the correct.ion of certain omissions, and contested 
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contractor's claims for extras amounting to $225; what do 
you know about that f 
A. Well, that is puzzling to me. I don't know what those 
omissions-there were some omissions, for instance, lights 
and closets, and things like that, and the contractor put in 
an additional bill and Mr. Parker said that it was not due 
him, and the contractor was going to sue for it, and then it 
was settle"cl That was settled and I had to pay the bill, I 
think. 
Q. $2251 . 
A. $225, yes, but J\fr. Parker claimed that bill should not 
have come in. 
Q. He also claims that he selected an oil burner; do you 
lmow what he did with respect to that, 
A. Yes. There was quite a little trouble about the oil burner. 
The contractor claimed ( and I know he was right 
page 521 r in so claiming·) that Mr. Hayes had told hiin he 
could put in the oil burner and said to him, '' The 
commission. you make on that you may have", because Mr. 
Conrad was most kind to him." He said, '' Mr. Hayes, you 
don't need to pay me a penny until this house is :finished.'' 
Mr. Hayes said, '' That is very fine of you. You don't 
know me and I am a stranger, and that is very good terms.'' 
So, he thought it would be only right to let Mr. Conrad put 
in the oilburner and make any little commission he could on 
it. Mr. Parker refused to allow Mr. Conrad to handle th~ 
boiler equipment, and turned it over to the Delco people, 
and :Mr. Conrad sued that. company and it was thrashed out 
in court and Mr. Conrad won. 
Q. He says he also considered several complaints of in-
spection defects which developed after eompletion of the 
house and advised you with l'espec.t thereto. 
A. vVell, there were certain little \hings that I would talk 
to him about. For instance, I thought there was not enough 
coating on the porches, and there were no gutters on the> 
porch, but we looked at the specifications and found that it 
had not been entered in the specifications, so, of course, it 
was not the contractor's fault that they were left out. 
Q. Do you know of any other things about which you talked 
to Mr. Parker with respect to the details of con-
·pag-e 522 ~ struction 1 
A. Well, it. was just as we are talking here; 
it was just conversation about it, nothing of real, worthwhile 
work that he did about it. I believe that he visited that house 
just once. 
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Q. Once that you know about1 
A. Once that I know about. 
Q. Was that after you moved in 1 
A. No, I think before I moved in. He was there once or 
twice after I moved in, but just about some business mat-
ters. 
Q. Mr. Parker has a charge here of $350 .for services in 
connection with the Newburgh real estate. That is not in 
connection with the litigation, Mrs. Hayes; it is in connec-
tion with the management of the Newburgh real estate. Do 
you know anything about what Mr. Parker did there¥ 
A. Yes, I do. Mr. Hayes turned that house into an apart-
ment and g·ot an agent up there to handle the rentals and 
look after the house in every way. Then, after Mr. Hayes' 
passing·, when complaints would come in, I would take those 
letters to Mr. Parker and just talk them over with him. The 
ag·ent wanted electrical refrigerators to be put in, and I said 
that was absurd because all new ice boxes and ne,v hot water 
boilers and everything else had been installed; why go to 
this expense to g·ive electrical refrigeration f So, 
page 523 ~ he would \\Tite up to l\fr. Bennett and tell Mr. 
Bennett to go around there and inspect the place. 
Q. vVho is Mr. Bennett, by the way? 
A. l\fr. Bennett is the lawyer in Newburgh who drew up 
the will. 
Q. Associated with :Mr. Parker in the litig·ation f 
A. Associated in the New York litigation, yes-the attack 
on the deed to the house. 
Then, one time when I went away, I was very sick, and I 
took this trip to Europe, and .I want to say right here that 
Mr. Parker did not have to countersign an executrix's check 
for that trip; it came out of my personal account. 
And the matter ~ame up about the oil supply. The agent, 
without my knowledge or consent, had changed to a different 
oil company and these people wanted payments promptly 
and there was no money in the account, so my sister went 
in there to see Mr. Parker. She knew that some dividends 
had come in in the meantime, and she said, '' You have some 
checks here. Let me take those checks and I can pay that 
bill that the oil company is demanding'', and Mr. Parker did 
not want to do that and he wrote to Mr. Bennett, and Mr. 
Bennett went to the oil company and· told the company I1e 
would be personally responsible for the bill. 
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Mr. Maupin: I object to that. It is entirely 
page 524 ~ hea~·say and has nothing to do with this case. 
By Mr. Lanning: 
Q. You can't tell what Mr. Bennett said. 
A. Well, it took place. 
Q. 1 know, but it is hearsay. 
A. He said the house would have been closed up for lack 
of fuel if it had not been done. 
Q. Do you know of anything else Mr. Parker did with re-
spect to the Newburgh real estatct 
A. Mr. Parker did nothing except write letters occasion-
ally, from time to time, to lVIr. Bennett, and Mr. Bennett would 
take the matter in hand. He never wrote directly to the agent, 
and after awhile I saw it was just useless to mention the 
matter to Mr. Parker and for the last two years I have been 
handling the matter directly with the agent, myself. 
Q. Now, Mrs. Hayes, 1\ir. Parker has another item here 
which you may know something about, and that is for services 
in respect to the Straus bonds, for which he has made a 
charge of $2,500. Do you know what Mr. Parker did with re-
spect to those bonds ¥ 
A. I know that I had to talk to Mr. Parker time and time 
and time again about the Straus l>onds and ask him what 
could be done about them, and I would read the papers and 
see in the New York Times about reorganizations 
pag·e 525 ~ taking ptace and I would bring in these clippings 
to him and ask him to write about them. Finally, 
maybe the uext interview, which would be probably two or 
three weeks, I would say, "HaV,e you heard about any of those 
bonds, Mr. Parked" 
'' Oh, no, I have been busy. I have not written it." 
I then wrote to a New York firm and got a huge pack of 
pamphlets. I brought these in to Mr. Parker. Everything 
I would bring in, he would take and keep and keep in his 
records. I would never get anything back for reference. On 
,July 2, 1935, I gave him a clipping· relative to the reorganiza-
tion of the 5th A venue and 43rd Street bonds, and it stated 
in the clipping·, '' if these are not taken care of by July 22, 
no claims will be recognized'',. and I made a note of it myself 
to watc.h that carefully. I also mentioned about the Chanin 
and the Broadway and 41st Street bonds which I had been 
mentioning- to Mr: Parker and also to Mr. Withers from time 
to time. On June 25, 1936, I asked him for the return of the 
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reports I got from tl1is New York .firm, but I did not. get 
them back. 
On F 1ebruary 23, 1938, I gave Mr. Parker $5,000 of the. 
Bark-Ray bonds which were being closed out for $50 per 
thousand dollar bond and I said to Mr. Parker, '' That is a 
terrible loss, :Mr. Parker," and he said, "Well, there is noth-
ing to be done about it". 
On March 10, 1938, I told him that the Lom-
JJage 526 ~ bardy Apartment bonds were passing interest 
and would he write about it, and I gave him a 
letter that I had received about it. 
On April 4, 1938, I went to the safety deposit box to get-
out the :Majestic bonds on which a payment had been made. 
on the principal. In each instance, I would talk to Mr. 
Parker about the Straus bonds, when he would go up to ·New-
y ork. I even said to him, "Please go into the main office. 
of the Straus Company, on Fifth Avenue, the Fifth Avenue 
Building, and make inquiry about these bonds and see what 
you can do". ,,7hen he came back, I would say, "Did you 
go there?'' 
"Oh, no. I didn't have time.'' 
A friend of mine wrote to the Referee for these bonds; his 
name is Gordon, I believe-
Mr. l\faupin: I object. 
A. (Continuing: )-and this Referee said that claims should 
be sent in. :M:r. Parker said, "I would not bother doing 
that. You are a minority bondholder and you might just as 
well g-o along", with the result that we secured on the 1 West 
57th Street bonds and the Bark-Ray, about which the expert 
testified this morniug·-I wanted to hold those bonds and I 
said, "Mr. Parker, in every instance these bonds are being 
bought in by bondholding committees. Now, they must have 
some value to those people, or they would not want 
page 527 ~ to be buying them. I think it would be better to 
hold them''. 
He said, "No, I think it is better to send them in. You are 
just a minority bondholder and it would be better to send 
them in'', and, unfortunately, I would take his advice. My 
ow11 advice would be to hold E!- bond on which you would get 
only $29-plus on a thousand dollar bond-or tear it up·, rather 
than sell it somebody else. 
Q. Now, did Mr. Parker, in all cases, advise you to accept 
the plan of these bondholders' committees? 
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A. His words were, every time, '' There 'is nothing else to 
do but go along with the terms and accept them", and I be-
lieve his booklet (the bill) has page after page on the Straus 
bonds which were just copied from the leaflets that were 
sent in. There was no new work that he had to do on it . 
. Q. Did he ever advise you to hold your bonds from the 
bondholders' committee? 
A. He never advised it. 
Q. Not as to any issue¥ 
A. He never advised it. 
Q. These were all bearer bonds, were they not¥ 
A. All bearer bonds. 
Q. And information as to what was being done with them 
had to be found in the daily papers f 
A. For instance, on the Court and Remsen 
page ·523 ~ Street bonds, I would go to the bank-Mr. Parke1·, 
of course, had to go with me to the safe deposit 
box, and when we g·ot the coupons, I would present them to 
the collection clerk at the National Bank of Commerce for 
collection. A great many of these bonds were coming back, 
returned with the notice on them, ''No funds". Well, that 
happened time and time again. Then I saw this reorganiza-
tion in the Times about the Court and Remsen Street bonds, 
and I asked Mr. Parker (I did not insist, because I never did 
insist) to please write again about those bonds, and he did, 
and the letter came back to send in the old bonds for reor-
ganization into the new and if any back coupons were avail-
able, payments would be made, I think. They were sent in, 
and I think that back interest amounted to around $800, or 
something· like that, and I said to Mr. Parker, ''Mr. Parker, 
we have slipped up on this". He seemed quite embarrassed, 
and I said, "Now, who would get this money if this had gone 
on f The company must have known they were not making 
payments on those bonds, they were not paying that inter-
est". 
''Oh," he said, "I think they would probably have noticed 
it and made settlement later on." 
"vVell,'' I said, "that is a question.'' . 
Q. Do you know of anything Mr. Parker did with respect 
to these bonds other than what you have stated? 
A. Nothing else. I know, on the days I would 
·page 529 ~ see him, I had elates of the interest payments and 
I would ask l\:fr. Parker for an appointment to 
go down to the box and get the coupons to send them in for 
collection. l\:fr. Parker, of course, did not know that the in-
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terest was due that day or the next day. He did not keep a 
check of that date. I had to do it for the income. For in-
stance, on July 2, 1935, I asked M~·. Parker to go and make 
a check up of the contents of the safe deposit box and to see 
if the ·Court and Remsen Street bonds were there and to make 
a list carefullv. I asked about the dividends outstandin2: as 
of that day-A. T. & T. Company, April 15 dividend, $225. 
Now, you see I waited until July 2 to ask him for that dividend. 
General Electric Company, April 15 dividend, $15, U. G. I., 
June 29 dividend, $25, .A.. T. & T. dividend, July 15, $225, 
General Electric Company, dividend July 15 $15. .Also for 
the interest on bonds to be collected from Abbott, Proctor & 
Paine on the Chanin Building, Broadway and 41st Street, 
Court and Remsen, and Fifth A venue and 43rd-cut coupons -
on the Argentine Republic, the Chile, Bear Mountain Bridge~ 
On July 10, 1935, I made a note to read over my letter to 
Mr. Parker, July 2, stock certificates; to keep this in mind 
until everything is settled and the certificates are returned 
to me. Ask for information on the following-: Have new 
bonds been received for the Chanin bonds¥ Have new bonds 
_ been received for the Broadway and for 41st 
page 530 ~ Street bonds 1 Also, for the Fifth A venue and 
43rd Street bonds 1 On July 10, 1935, I aeiked him 
if the bonds of the Majestic Apartment, 502 Park Avenue, 
59th Street and Madison Avenue, and others should not be 
paying interest, and I asked him where were the bonds for the 
Dorcoe Building and the Bark-Ray Company. So, I think I 
did a great deal of executrix's work. 
Q. Now, Mr. Parker has made a. charge here of $3,750 for 
attending to duties of the executrix. One of the items for 
which he is charging is the risk and responsibility he assumed 
in exercising joint control of the estate, with details attended 
to in seeing that all moneys were deposited and securities 
placed in the safe deposit box, countersigning checks, and so 
forth; advice with res·peet to the completion of the house at 
Virginia Beach, the construction of which had been con-
tracted for prior to the death of Mr. Hayes; advice to sell 
all stocks standing in the name of Mr. Hayes at the time of 
his death and to purchase other securities in street names; 
services in effecting transfers of such se·eurities ; services in 
obtaining· death certificate and making up proof of loss to 
enable Mrs. Hayes to collect $10,214.22; attending· to settle-
ment of sundry claims against the estate. I think those items 
are the majority of the items that he mentioped in his ac-
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count under this heading. Do you know what 
page 531 ~ s11rvices he performed in that connection t 
· A: Well, !·don't know. It would seem that Mr. 
Parker about charged ine for eyery little conversation and 
every little wora I had with him.' I think that is about what 
he has done .. but I will say one thing in connection with th~ 
insurance there; I had to go up to New York to secure tlie 
payment of that amount of money. The company requested 
it, and the1~e was another insurance policy of $2,000 that was 
turned over to "the contestants, and I told Mr. Parker that 
Mr. Hayes had forgotten bow that was made out. The last 
night before going into the hospital, we talked late intG thQ 
morning, and he thought, of course, 1t was a very minor op-
eration. The doctors called it '' just the same as paring your. 
fingernails", but l\Ir. Hayes said to me, ''You can't tell in an 
operation what might happen'', and he told me what pay"'. 
ments he wanted me to make and how to live and what to do, 
and so forth, so he also mentioned this other insurance policy. 
He said, ":Now, you will have that much money to pay for. 
the house. Pay that out of that." So I told that to Mr. 
Parker. This insurance had been taken out when Mr. Haves· 
was about nineteen years old, in his father's name, at ·his 
father's death to go to his mother, and at his mother's death 
to go to his sister, and her name was really on it, so he said, 
~'You had better turn that over", but that has never come 
out, but the contestants really got that insurance 
page 532 ~ policy. So, with that, I had to go up to New 
York to get that insurance paid-had to take the 
trip from here to .New York. 
Now, the other duties, of course, Mr. Parker had some 
work to do. He knew that when I went to him. That is why 
I had to get a lawyer. Every lawyer knows he has work t~ 
perform. That is part of their of flee. That is why people 
go to them; we can't do those things ourselves. 
Q. Npw, ::MrR. Hayes, I believe it has been testified that 
Mr. Rarker endorsed a note for you for $500. Is that the 
only note he endorsed for you? Do you remember any othe1~ 
note! 
A. I don 1t know whether it was one or two notes. 
Q. Hav.e you made a statement showing· what property yon 
owned personally at the time you employed Mr. Parke1·T 
A. Y.es, I bad a statement made up. 
Q. Is this the statement that I hand you, that you made. 
up, showing the properties which you held at the tinw you 
employed Mr. Parker? • 
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A. Yes, t1iat is my own personal holdings. 
Q. Do you still hold the stocks set forth in that list? 
A. I do. l\:Ir. Parker stated one time-I can't reca11, really, 
how that came up, but he asked me if I had any stocks in my 
own name. I said, "I have, stocks that cost m~ 
page 533 } over $30,000. '' 
He said, "What are U1ey worth today! Would 
you say they are worth $10,0001 '' · · 
I said. '' That would be a very conservative amount for 
them", and Mr. Parker asked that question, I think, in the 
early stages of the litigation. · 
Q. This statement shows that your worth in 1934 was $13,:-
994; is that correct? 
A. Yes. As testimony was brought out here that I was 
so destitute, I could have sold just one of those stocks there, 
the top one, and could have gotten $5,000 at any time out qf 
that which would have lasted me, because I am not extrava-
gant and don't waste money. · 
Mr. Lanning: I offer this list of Mrs .. Hayes' individual 
holdings as Exhibit No. 43. 
Q. l\f rs. Hayes, could you have gotten along without using 
any of the estate's funds to take care of your living expenses, 
l1ouse expenses, and so forth, during· the process of this liti-
gation f 
A. Yes, I could have sold any of my o-wn holdings if I 
had wanted to, or I could have made a loan through relatives 
who would gladly help me out if I needed money. 
Q. Have you had any funds from the estate since July, 
19381 
A. Not very much. Most all of that is coming 
page 534 ~ in to Mr. Parker and being held by him. 
Q. Have you borrowed any money? 
A. I had to borrow some money, ves. 
Q. Mrs. Hayes, what experience ·have you had, yourself, 
in making investments f 
A. Well, I was private secretary to a very wealthy man 
for a number of years-a man who would buy thousands of 
shares of stock at a time-and I think I know a little about 
atocks. 
Q. Have you made any study at a.II of stocks? Did you 
make any study of stocks when you were his private secre-
tary? 
.A. ,v ell, I would not call it "study", but one gets to know. 
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Q. Mr. Parke:r has a charge here of $250 for services in 
connection with the claim of Samuel C. Johnson against the 
estate. How much was that claim settled for and what was 
the original claim¥· _· 
A. The origin~lr amount of the bill ·was $2,000 and Mr. 
Parker settled it for $1,500. 
Q. Were there depositions taken in that case! 
A. Yes, there were. 
Q. Did Mr. Parker go to New York to attend on deposi-
tions! 
A. Mr. Parker went up to New York, yes. 
page 535 }- Q. Did you provide him with funds to take care 
of the costs of the trip? 
A. Yes. He asked for a hundred dollars that time. 
Q. Now, in this statement that has been offered in evi-
dence as Exhibit No. 37 t thern a1·e several items of payment't 
to Mr. Bennett and payments to Hunt, Hill & Betts. The 
items paid to Mr. Bennett are $52.65, $300, and $960.88. What 
· services did those items cover, Mrs. Hayes? 
· A. Well, they covered quite a bit of work. I should say 
that Mr. Bennett has done-everything from the starting of 
the case. The $52.65 is just his expenses to come down here 
from Newburgh for the first suit, which resulted in the non-
suit, and the $300, I think, is for the work that he did, all the 
other inve~tie:ations .and so forth, and the larger amount was 
connec:ed with the New York litigation against the deed. 
Q. Dves that item include some expenses? 
A. foJludes everything, yes. 
Q. Do you know what the fee was in the New York litiga-
tiool · 
A. I can't recall just what the fee was. I don't know what 
his fee was, and expenses .. 
Q. Now, Hunt, Hill & Betts were paid $904.69. Do you 
know how much of that item was fee 7 
A. Seven hundred and some-odd was fee, I thlnk, and the 
rest was expense. 
page 536 ~ CROSS EXAl\fINATION. 
By Mr. Maui;>in: 
Q. Mrs. Hayes, when did you first come to Virginia °l 
A. In 1932. 
Q. To live? 
A. To Hve? No, not permanently. 
Q. Well, when did you first ~ome here to live f 
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A. 1934, I would say, approximately. 
Q. 1934? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And where did you live then Y 
A. At the home Mr. Hayes built for us. 
Q. Let me put my question a little differently: When did 
you first come to Virginia Beach ·i 1932 ¥ 
A. Yes. 
Q. How long did you stay here then? 
A. I stayed here from September, I think, until the latter 
part of April or May 1st. 
Q. Ancl where did you go then? 
A. We went North .. 
Q. To New Yorld 
A. Yes. 
Q. That was April of 1933? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when did you come back to Virginia 
page 537 }- Beach 7 
A. In September, 1933. 
Q. And you stayed there until when? 
A. Until April or May of the following year. 
Q. April or May of 1934? 
A. Yes. · 
Q. And you left then because your husband was to be op-
erated on, I believe, did you not¥ 
A. 19341 Yes. 
Q. That was the spring of his death. And he was operated 
on in New York in April of 1934. 
Now, when and where were you married to your husbandf 
A. I was married in 1932, September, 1932. Q. 1Vhere? . 
A. In Elizabeth City, North Carolina. 
Q. What was the date of the will? Do you remember? 
A. It was previous to that. It was in September, I think-
Q. July or August of that same year? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It was made just before your marriage? 
A. Yes. 
Q. After your husband died in New York, you stayed for 
the funeral, I believe, before coming baek to Virginia, did you 
noU 
page 538 ~ A. I stayed up in :New York, I believe, for 
awhile. I was very sick. 
340 Supreme Court of Appeali of Virginia 
Mrs . .Adelaide 111. Hayes. 
Q. Until the latter part of May, and then you came baok 
down here; is that correct'¥ 
A. I think so-yes, that is correct. 
Q. And then you consulted Mr. Parker about the-
A. I went to Mr. Parker about the middle of May, 1934. 
Q. With i·egard to probating· the will. And you stated on 
your direct examination, I believe, that you anticipated there 
was going to be a bitter contest about the will. Why did you 
think so? 
A. Because Mr. Hayes, himself, expected it and he knew 
it would come, and these people had made trouble right be-
fore it-made trouble right at the funeral and the death, and 
even , during his sickness. 
Q. What do you mean by ''making trouble"? 
A. They made trouble, they quarreled-
Q. What do you mean by ''making trouble"? 
A. They made trouble at the funeral, they didn't act right, 
and they made serious trouble two years befoJ'e. 
Q. Well, what do you mean by '' making· trouble'' 1 That is 
what I am trying to get it. 
A. "\¥ ell, if you want to use the expression, they came and 
quarreled. 
Q. With whom? 
page 539 ~ A. "With Mr. Hayes and with me. 
Q. You were not married to Mr. Hayes, so far 
as they knew, were you? 
A. Mr. Hayes had been sick and I sent for his sister to 
come to see him, and she came down there and in the course 
of the visit created a scene. 
Q. Because of whaU 
A. Because of what, I don't know. Principally, first, she 
was talking to me and telling me some tales about her mother, 
and tales that I knew were not true, saying that Mr. Hayes 
was unkind to her mother. I said, "That is not so", and be-
cause I said that to her she turned on me. 
Q. ·what bearing· has that on the contest of the will f Why 
did you expect a contest of the will at that time? 
A. \Vhy did I expect a contest of the will? 
Q. Exactlyt 
· A. Because Mr. Hayes always told me that when he passed 
away they would -contest that will, and he taught me and told 
me to expect it. _ · 
Q. Why did he expect them to contest the will T 
A. Because he clid not leave them his entire estate, he 
said. · 
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Q. You k11ew that there was a prior will your husband 
had made in which he did not leave them the entire estate, 
didn't you? 
page 540 } A. I did. 
Q. It was partly due to the fact, too, that Mrs. 
Guilfoil knew nothing about his marriage? 
A. That is correct. -
Q. And you antieipated that when she learned of the mar-
riage, she would contest it f · 
A. I did. 
Q. "When you engaged Mr. Parker, then, you engaged him 
with the full knowledge that his duties would probably con-
sist not only of the probate of your husba~d's will but of 
the defense of what vou have termed a bitter contest! 
A. I asked M:r. Parker-I so testified-would he take care 
of the litigation; he said he would. 
Q. Your answer, then, is "yes"? . 
A. My answer is "yes", that Mr. Parker was to take care 
of the entire litigation. · 
Q. He did so, did he not¥ 
A. He did so. 
Q. And the result right down the line was successful for 
you, was it not¥ 
A. It was, because, as Mr. Parker said, he had faets. 
Q. ,;v ell, irrespective of the reas~n, the litigation was suc.-
cessful, was it not t 
A. It was. I am very glad it was. 
Q. So am I. At that time, had you ever seen 
page 541 } Mr. Parker before? 
A. Yes. I saw l\tfr. Parker on the boat, when 
we went across on the Cape Charles boat. 
Q. And you told J\fr. Parker at the time you employed him 
that your husband had said that in case you needed to con-
sult a lawyer in Virginia, he recommended Mr. Parker to 
you, did you not? 
A. I believe he did, yes, but at that time everyone was 
telling me to go to this one or that one or the other one, and 
it was only after long consideration that. I did remember that 
Mr. Hayes told me to go to J\fr. Parker m case of trouble. 
Q. Then, it is fair to say, is it not, that the reason you con-
sulted Mr. Parker and employed him was that you remem-
bered that your husband liad confidence in him and advised 
you to employ him; is that right? 
A. Well, l\fr. Parker had not handled any exten:sive liti-
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gation for 1\fr. Hayes. It was just a matter of asking advice 
and putting through the deed to the house. 
Q. But he had had, as you testified-
A. Oh, we were both favorably impressed with Mr. Parker 
at that time and I,. againt the strong recommendations of 
other men, went to Mr. Parker. 
Q. Now, what other men were theyt Who strongly recom-
mended you not to employ Mr. Parked 
page 542 ~ A. Not to not employ Mr. Parker, but strongly 
recommended other men, I said-not to not go 
to Mr. Parker, but strongly recommended other men. There 
is a difference there. 
Q. I assume that what happened was that you asked ac-
quaintances as to what lawyers they knew, and they told you 
what lawyers they knew and recommended the lawyers whom 
they had found sa tis factory¥ 
A. I daresay. 
Q. That usually happens, doesn't it¥ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when you consulted anybody as to a professional 
man, they recommended a professional man who had served 
them satisfactorily? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Had you ever been engaged in any extensive litigation 
before this litigation here f 
A. I never had anything to do with litigation-nev~r in-
side of a courtroom. 
Q. This was the first time, then, that you had engag·ed i:t1 
any litigation T 
.A.. Yes. 
Q. You did not know, of course, exactly what faced you, 
except that you were anticipating trouble from Mrs. Guil-
foil, and from what you knew of Mrs. Guilfo.il 
page 543 ~ and from what your husband had told you, you 
thought she was going to give you some kind of 
trouble in the way of a contest of this will, 
A. Just right there, let me tell you that when Mr. Hayes 
went to Mr. Parker-
Q. Just a minute. I pref er you to answer the question 
first and then make your explanation. · 
( The pending question was read.) 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Now, what other explanation do you want to make? 
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A. When Mr. Hayes went to Mr. Parker to transfer the 
deed to the Newburgh house to me, he told l\fr. Parker that 
day that his nephew would make trouble for me when he died, 
and Mr. Parker, the day I went to him, recalled that to me. 
Q. Exactly. Now, as a matter of fact, neither you nor 
l\fr. Parker anticipated the extensive litigation which really 
ensued, did you? 
A. That is true, w·e did not. 
Q. And as each new attack came upon you, as your hus-
band's widow or executrix, that attack had to be met in the 
forum in which it was made, did it noU 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And you had adversaries whom you have, yourself, char-
acterized as being· bitterly antagonistic, and you had a law-
yer who ,vas indefatigable in resource, did you 
page 544 ~ not, on the other side? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And as each attack was made, it was necessary for you, 
throug·h your counsel, to resist that attack, was it not1 
A. It was. 
Q. You stated, I believe, that you had at that time re-
sources which amounted to some thirteen thousand 1 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Did you tell M:r. Parker that f 
A. Mr. Parker asked me, Mr. Maupin. 
Q. As a matter of fact, Mrs. Hayes, d.idn 't you tell Mr. 
Parker tha.t this estate represented practically all you had 
in the world and that if you lost the estate, you would ha.ve 
nothingt 
A. \Vell, that is not putting it just absolutely true. 
Q. All rig·ht, will you put it absolutely true? 
A. I told Mr. Parker-he asked me what I had of my own 
personal worth, and I told him to that amount, which is the 
truth, but I also told him that that estate was mine by tho 
wishes of my lmsband, he wanted it to be mine, and that I 
could not see why the contestants were then going into the 
Jitigation most bitterly and vindictively, and although from 
the start I was wi1ling to compromise and make a settlement 
with them, I knew I would be going against my 
page 545 ~ husband's wishes and giving· over to them what 
was justly my own in losing it, and I could have, 
if this litig·ation had been held up, taken care of myself, but 
there was never at any time any thought of our losing this 
litigation. 
Q. Do you mean to tell me that you thought in the begin-
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ning that you had what you might call a sure case and there 
was no chance of your losing it t 
A. I do .. 
Q. You thought that all the way throug·h 1 
A. I did, absolutely. 
Q. Then, I take it, you think it did not require any great 
amount of legal skill to represent you in this matter; is that 
true? · 
A. Well, I think there were a great many legal points in-
volved .and I think it was done very well, and I have been 
very grateful, as I told Mr. Parker time and time again, but 
I do know Mr. Parker had facts to work on and the opposite 
side did not have facts to work on. Now, as a lawyer, you, 
yourself, know which is the easier case to handle, the case with 
the points or the case without them. 
Q. Mrs. Hayes, sometimes a layman doesn't realize the 
points of the litigation, and it is just possible, isn't it, that 
that was -the case here? 
A. I don't think it is possible; it may be. They 
pag·e 546 ~ may try to make that appear, but it would be a 
very poor lawyer, I think, who would lose that 
case. 
Q. Mrs. Hayes, if you will answ·er my questions and then 
stop, perhaps we will get along a little faster. vVasn 't there 
a considerable amount of testimony, part of which was good 
and part of which, you knew, had, that would have made a 
contest on the grounds of mental incapacity of your hus-
band-
A. Now, Mr. Maupin, don't mention that to me. 
Q. Let me finish my question, please-an exceedingly dan-
gerous contest. from your point of view? 
A. There was never any question, real question, about Mr. 
Hayes' mental capacity. It could not be proved in court. They 
can say it, but they could not prove it. Mr. Parker said that 
to me over and over again. The publicity connected with it 
was what I dreaded. 
Q. As I understand it, you think that your case was such 
that any reasonably competent lawyer, on the fac.ts, could 
have met the situation in a contest on the sole ground of 
mental capacity or incapacity of your husband and won the 
case "lmnds down"; is that your idea Y 
, A. I do. 
Q. So, you think it was ~ntirely unnecessary for Mr. Parker 
to go throug·h the legal maneuvering which he has gone 
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through with and which has been testified to in 
page 547 ~ your presence by a number of witnesses, and that 
he could have won the case in the first instance 
by simply meeting the issue of testamentary capacityf 
A. I do. 
Q. And you were willing-
A. l\fr. Parker-
Q. Just a minute. Let me aslr my question. y OU were en-
tirely willing to have that issue presented and fight and stand 
or fall on that, even though the result might have been the 
loss of the whole estate to you; is that correct? 
A. Yes, that is correct. 
Q. Now, if a lawyer who understands the pitfalls of trials 
and the danger of adverse evidence, perhaps better than a 
layman, should be of a different opinion from you about that, 
would you still insist that you were right and the lawyer was 
wrong and that is the way the case should have been con-
ducted¥ 
A. I think, Mr. Maupin, that this repetition of that is all 
wrong. I was always ready at all times-this thing has been 
gone over, and I was always ready at all times to offer evi-
dence as to Mr. Hayes' capacity and the validity of the mar-
riag·e. Mr. Parker assured me time and time again that those 
points could not be questioned, and Mr. Heath, who, as every-
one in this room testified two weeks ago, is such a wonder-
ful lawyer, never did offer any evidence on those 
page 548 ~ points, and unless the Commissioner directs other-
wise, I don't think I should be asked to go into 
those questions. 
The Commissioner: Let me see how far it is $"oing. 
The Witness: I don't think it should be questioned. 
By ~fr. Maupin: 
Q. Don't you remember there was evidenee taken in New-
lmrgh and from certain doctors in :New York which Mr. 
Parker thought was very dangerous evidence from your point 
of view? 
A. vVell, I would like to tell you some of the comments 
made about l\fr. Parker's handling of that. 
Q. Answer my question, please. Do you remember that 
evidence, or not? 
A. I remember it, but they were never cross examined, 
and Mr. Parker, to use one expression, never cross examined 
or tried to bring out or combat those points. 
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Q. I am trying to get your attitude-
A. I still say it is immaterial. 
Q. You won't let me ask my questions. 
A. -Because. I think it is beside the point-do I owe this 
money? 
Q. If you will answer my questions and stop making sup-
positions, we will get along faster-
page 549 ~ A. My husband is not here to defend himself. 
The Commissioner': Wnat he wants to get at is the fact 
that there was other work that had to be done which he thought 
was necessary with reg-a.rd to the mentality of l\fr. Hayes, 
and your attitude is that there was nothing along that line 
that could be brought up, and he is simply trying to show-
that Mr. Parker was ju~tified in going into that question in 
order to prepare himself-is that it? 
Mr. Maupin: That is it exactly . 
. The Witness: But, 1\fr. Pilcher, he did do that in prepara-
tion; he did not do it in court. 
The Commissioner: Well, that is all right. I understand. 
The Witness : '\V ell, could he say he prepared documents 
- the size of the vV oolworth Building-
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. But what I am a~king is, he had t.o make the prepara-
tion? 
A. vVell, I refuse to answer any more questions on that 
point. 
Q. · vVell, I will ask them and yon can answer them or not, 
just as you like. l\fy question is, tliat your attitude towards 
Mr. Parker is that, along the line of testamentary capacity 
of the deceased, he did not cross examine the 
page 550 ~ witne~ses properly and did not do his duty to 
you; 1s that right¥ 
A. ]\fr. Parker assured me, on testamentary capacity, time 
and time ag·ain, ''We have them _on testamentary capacity. 
Mr. Hayes knew what he was doing. He dictated his own 
will. Re made the three points that are necessary for the 
legality of any will; he had them all. How could such a will 
be broken 1 '' 
Mr. l\faupin: Will· you read the question, Mr. Reporter, 
and see if we can get an answer to it. 
( The preceding question was read.) 
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By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Is that your attitude or not? 
A. Yes, I think each witness should be cross examined. 
Q. Now, do you set yourself up, Mrs. Hayes, to be a better 
judg·e of what is proper cross examination than an experi-
enced lawyer ·f 
A. No, I don't set myself up to be a judge, but it is only 
human and natural to look over testimony that you know is 
wrong and contradict it if you can do so. 
Q. Do you realize that sometimes, and very frequently, I 
might say, cases are lost by maladroit cross examination 1 . 
.A. Well, pe,rhaps so. I don't know. 
Q. Well, don't you think Mr. Parker was a better judge 
of what cross examination was required in the particular cir-
cumtance than you are Y 
A. Well, whether I thought he was a better 
page 551 ~ judge or not, I let Mr. Parker do everything about 
the litigation. I depended upon him solely and 
took his advice in it, naturally, though I say again I think, 
from the human standpoint, it would have been better to have 
had certain questions combated, because they could have been 
very easily. 
Q. Do you think that the human point of view is more 
important than the material point of view in this litigation¥ 
A. Well, that is just a question between you and me, Mr. 
Maupin. V.l e could discuss that for a long time. 
Q. I am just trying to get at your attitude. 
A. My attitude was to let Mr. Parker be the adviser, as 
I did let him be the adviser. That was my attitude in what 
I carried out. 
Q. I am also trying to find out, if I can, what you think 
the value of these services was and the reason for your 
opinion. Now, that is all in the world I am trying to do, 
and the questions are addressed to that thing. You said a 
moment ago that there never was any question about the 
favorable outcome of this case; what do you base that opinion 
on? 
A. I base that opinion on the way Mr. Hayes left his will, 
the way he drew it and made it; I base it on his declaring 
his intentions; secondly, he carried out his plans 
page 552 ~ in the deed; he carried out the same plan when 
he went down to the safe deposit box and asked 
for the strongest and the fullest form they have to give every-
thing· he had over to his wife. They presented him with 
one form; he said, "Haven't you anything more binding?" 
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The one he signed was that in the event of either party dying, 
all the property became of the sole ownership of the surviving 
member. He gave me a power of attorney, and he would 
tell me time and time again what he had done and that-
well, that is going into the other thing-and how to carry 
things out, but those and the building of the house at Virginia 
Beach prove his intentions. 
Q. Are those all your reasons? 
A. And my reason that I know that Mr. Hayes had a mind 
as firm and strong and solid as anyone. He had a brilliant 
mind, as his doctors said. Now,. if you want to go back and 
claim that he had been sick, yes, he had been sick, but he ·got 
better't and you can't claim that a man is down and out 
because he has been sick. 
Q. Well, for those reasons, you think it would have been im-
possible for any jury to find against the validity of the will 
on the ground of testamentary incapacity? 
A. I do, and Mr. Parker then must have been telling lies-
he must have been acting lies if he did not believe 
page 553 ~ it. 
,Q. Do you mean seriously to tell this Commis-
sioner that Mr. Parker told you that he had a case that could 
not be defeated? 
A. Yes, sir, I do. 
Q. Have you ever had any experience with lawyers, Mrs. 
Hayes? 
A. No, I have had no experience with lawyers except, prob-
ably, in a friendly way. 
Q. Ha.ve you ever known of a case where a lawyer told the 
client that he had a case he could not lose? 
A. Well, Mr. ParkQr said it in his own words-''We can't 
lose, I can't see how we can lose"-what was the meaning? 
Is that English, or is it German, or not? 
Q. I wouldn't know. I am asking you. 
A. Well, I take it for English-the statement that he could 
not lose. 
Q. And the litigation that he engaged in for you really 
was not very serious, and you don't tllink you ought to pay 
much for it; is that the idea T 
A .. No. Mr. Parker, himself, told me that I ·was most 
generous. Mr. Parker knew I was most generous, and Mr. 
Parker knew that he should not have brought this litigation 
against me. 
Q. Now, Mrs. Hayes, let us try to cou:fine ourselves to the 
an.swers· to the questions. 
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page 554 ~ A. I was willing to pay Mr. Parker-here is 
my answer-I was willing and did pay Mr. Parker 
for his work and was willing to pay him most generously. I 
thought I had been paying him well. 
Q. Now, all of that is not an answer to my question. My 
question was this: If I understand you correctly, the liti.;. 
gation that was brought against the will of your husband, 
in your opinion, was not serious litigation, was not to be' 
taken seriously-
A. Now, that is wrong, Mr. Maupin. . 
Q. The defense of it was nothing that required a great deal 
of skill, you could not lose it anyway with any competent law-
yer and, therefore, you ought not to pay much for it; is that 
right, or not f 
A. No, that is not right. 
Q. All right, what is the answer Y 
A. It was serious litigation, not because of the legal ques.:. 
tions involved, but it was serious litigation because of the way 
it was handled-the maliciousness of broadcasts in the papers; 
the slanderous attacks, that is what made it serious. · 
Q. Let us try, if we can, to confine ourselves to logical 
answers to the questions. 
A. That is a logical answer. Probably another lawyer 
could have done away with some of that. 
Q. Let me make my question clearer if I can. 
page 555 } You would, I take it, consider that the fee in a 
case should be higher if it was extremely difficult 
and hard ,to win than the fee if the case :was a very simple 
case which he was bound to win; is that righU 
A. If it were hard to win, it would be-
Q. The fee should be larger than if it were a simple case! 
A. But we were almost bound to win sooner or later, and 
if it were on a contingent basis, which my case was not-
Q. In any case, contingent or otherwise-wait a minute; 
you keep interrupting me and won't let me ask you. 
A. I am sorry. 
Q. If the case was simple and should be won without any 
trouble, whether the fee be contingent or an agreed fee in 
the beginning, I take it, you believe that that fee should be 
less than if the case were an especially difficult one t 
A. Yes, I tliink so. · . 
Q. Now, you also take the position that, in all the liti-
gation against you, you took no chance of losing if your case 
was reasonably competently handled! 
A. I did. I never thought I would lose, but may I add, if 
you will permit me, I was afraid of the slander and the news-· 
pa.per attacks. 
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page 556 ~ Q. Well, what could your lawyer do about that °l 
A. Well, some men do have influence with cer-
tain people and they seem to stop that. Now, you know 
that as well as I. I begged Mr. Parker to please stop those 
attacks. WI1ether he had any influence or had no influence, I 
don't know, but the answer would be a broadside the next 
day or two after or a week after .. 
Q. Do .I take it, then, that you want Mr. Parker's fee cut 
down bec.anse he· did not stop newspaper publicity about 
this trial! 
A. No. Yon put questions that should not be asked and 
have no relevancy in here at all. 
Q. I will let the Judge decide that. Suppose yon just an-
swer them and your lawyer will protect you by objections., 
I am sure, if I ask you irrelevant questions. Now, am I to 
understand that you think Mr. Parker's fee should be re-
duced because of the unfavorable newspaper publicity you re'-
ceived f 
Mr. Lanning: She has answered that. 
Mr. Maupin: I have not heard the answer. She told me 
my question was irrelevant. 
Mr. Lanning: Well, answer it again, please. 
( Several preceding questions and answers were read to the 
witness.) 
The Witness: My answer to that other question will do for 
that second one. 
page 557 ~ The Commissioner: I thought she said it was 
irrevelant. 
Mr. :Maupin: That was the o~ly answer I heard. 
By :Mr. Maupin: . 
Q. How did you get at the figure of $1,200 which yon said 
you understood, after January 13, 1938, was all the addi-
tional money you owed Mr. Parker? 
A. Well, on my visits to Washington time and again, I 
made a practice of going- to the Congressional Library, the 
Law Division, and I ·read quite a good deal about this-the 
questions in this litigation, and I would also read cases and 
I p:ot a very good idea of what la:wyers charged in estates 
and in litigation over them. I can cite. some if you want. 
Q. You set the fee, then, I take it from your answer--
A. I did not set it-
Q. vVait a minute. Please let me finish my questions before 
you attempt to answer them. 
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A. Well, I am ~orry. 
Q. You can't possibly answer them until I have asked 
them. I take it, then, that you set the fee-
A. I don't like the word ''set'', because I didn't set it. 
Q. I will fry again. I take it, then, that you 
page 558 } set the fee from your reading in the Congressional 
Library, and from that you conceived what Mr. 
Parker ought to have charged you and thought that, in addi-
tion to what you had already paid him, $1,200 would be a 
sufficient fee; is that correct or not f 
A. That would be ~orrect. I based it on my readings and 
on conversations with friends, particularly two who are law-
yers, who told me, as I mentioned, that I had been paying 
too much for litigathm. 
Q. Now, who are those lawyers? 
A. They are friends of mine. 
Q. ,vhat are their names? 
A. No, thank yon! 
Q. I am asking you, Mrs. Hayes, for the names of the peo-
ple who said that Mr. Parker was charging you too much. 
A. They are strangers to you, Mr. Maupin. Yon don't 
know them. 
Q. I am asking· you again for their names. 
By Mr. Lanning: 
Q. ·who were they, Mrs. Hayes t vYashing·ton lawyers Y 
A. Yes. One I know just by-well, I don't know the 
name; I just know from going· there and conversing and 
talking. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Do you mean to tell me that you are relying· 
page 559 ~ on the opinion of a man whose name you don't 
even know? 
A. Yes, a man whom I talked with visit after visit. 
Q. What were you visiting for-to find out whether you 
wore paying too much 1 
A. No, to familiarize myself with this litigation. Mr. Parker 
knew I went there. 
Q. If you went there day after day to see this lawyer, do 
you mean to tell the Commissioner seriously that you don't 
know what his name is? 
lVIr. Lanning: She didn't say she didn't know. 
A. Now, Mr. Maupin, please don't try to put any such 
statement~ in my mouth. I told you. Don't you know peo-
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pie that you talk with and converse with ~nd you probably 
don't know their names? 
By _Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Not about things like that, Mrs. Haves, no. 
A. W ~11, probably yoµ are different from what I am. 
Q. I should not douot it. 
A. I dare say you are. 
Q. Now, I am asking you again, what was the name of either 
of the men or both of the men who told you that you were 
paying too much? 
Mr. Lanning: I don't think, Mr. Commissioner, that it 
makes any difference what their names were. 
· The Commissioner: I have no power to pass on 
page 560 ~ the objection one way or the other, but I think 
it has probably gone far enough. 
Mr. Maupin: All right. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. You don't care to tell what theh: names are Y 
A. I do not. 
Q. You q.ecline to tell what their names are Y 
A. I do not care to tell. 
Q. I am asking you, do you decline to tell? 
A. If you wish it so. 
Q. In your direct examination, you urged, as one of your 
reasons why you would not pay Mr. Parker's fee, that you 
had been advised bv others that the fee was exorbitant and 
that you had already paid too much. Now, just a minute; 
let me ask my question before you answer it. 
A. All right, continue. 
Q. That is by way of preliminary statement. Now, did you 
tell these gentlemen, who advised you, exactly what Mr. Parker 
had done for you, what the litigation was, and what the ques-
tions involved were? 
A. I did. 
Q. You think that yqu have sufficient knowledge of the law 
and principles of law and the fine points of law to be able 
to tell a lawyer what was involved in all these five different 
suits 7 
pnge 561 ~ A. Mr. Maupin, I could tell them everything 
that came out in the courts, couldn't H I could 
not tell them what Mr. Parker did in preparation. As I 
stated, nobody can tell that. That is a statement that Mr. 
Parker is makiu9 to be ·accepted or declined. 
Adelaide M. Hayes, et al., v. William L. Parker. 35J 
Mrs . .A.delafrle IJf .. Hayes. 
Q. Well, you are basing_ rour information, then, that Mr. 
Parker's fee is too much in part, at least, on the advice that 
was given you by these two anonymous gentlemen whom 
you decline to name? 
A. Yes. 
Q. With whom you discussed the case and who told you 
you were being charged too much? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you going to have them testify for you t 
A. No. 
Q. Now, you have filed a statement here in which you state 
that you have paid Mr. Parker $10,020.031 
· A. That is correct. 
Q. And you testified that you have the checks here to sup-
port those payments, with the exception of one check of $18, 
.as I recall your testimony; is that righU 
A. That is that Newburgh check, yes, sir. 
Q. Now, the last one of the checks that you signed for 
Mr. Parker, as set out on this statement here, was a check 
for $100 on May 3, 1938? 
page 562} A. That is correct. 
Q. You said, I believe, that you had had some 
difficulty in having Mr. Parker present his bill to yon. When 
did he present iU · 
A. I had been asking Mr. Parker for his bill time and 
time again-
Q. Please answer my question. Wlrnn did he present it Y 
A. He presented the bill in the latter part of July-I will 
give you the date in a minute-I think it was June 30, 1938, 
to be exact. 
Q. Now, when was the litigation with Dr. Johnson finally 
settled? 
A. ·when was settlement made? I can't recall. Not very 
long before that. 
Q. A short time before that, wasn't it T 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the case ha.d been set for trial and was to be tried 
and it was settled for $1,500; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, you then went, to see Mr. Parker with regard .to 
this bill, did you not f 
A. I went to see Mr. Parker in regard to that .bill and I 
askedhim-
Q. Wait a minute. That is an answer to my 
page 563 ~ question. At that time you had, yourself, from 
your researches in the Congressional Library, 
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decided th.at $1,200 additional was a sufficient fee, and you 
had been advised by two friends who are, lawyers in this pro-
ceeding without name, that you did not owe him anything and 
had overpaid him; is that correct t 
A. Yes. 
Q. At that time, why ·did you offer to settle with him by 
paying him $10,0dO additional, Mrs. Ha.yes f 
Mr. Lanning: I°objec.t to that. 
Mr. Maupin: You can object all you want tow 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Now, answer my question, please, Mrs. Hayes. 
The Commissioner: Did not that matter come np before 
and it was shown that it was made without prejudice Y 
Mr. Maupin: Yes, sir, but she has already testified to that 
conversation and about what. 1\fr. Parker claimed at that 
conversation. 
The Witness: I did not testify about that, and Mr. Parker 
himself testified that he dicln 't have to answer that. Now~ 
/ I should have the same courtesy.· 
Mr. Lanning: It was made without prejudice and 1\fr. 
Parker said it was made without prejudice. 
Mr. Maupin: Was that offer made without 
page 564 } prejudice? 
Mr. Parker: Yes. 
The Commissioner: It ,vas my recollection that it was 
made without prejudice. 
Mr. Lanning: Will that question be stricken ouU 
Mr. Maupin: Yes, strike that out. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Did you, at that interview, Mrs. Hayes, tell Mr. Parke1-
what you considered the balance due was? · 
A. What I considered the balance would bef 
Q. Yes. 
A. I did. I said, "Mr. Parker, you know I have been trying 
to find out from you what the balance of your bill will be", 
and I wondered what it ·would be and I said, "What will be 
done with the tax matters-" 
Q. My question was: Diel you tell Mr. Parker what, in your 
opinion, however gathered, you. ought to pay him at that 
time in addition to what had already been paid him? 
A. Yes, I did; I thought .about a. thousand to twelve hun-
dred dollars more. 
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Q. A thousand to twelve hundred dollars moref 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was that all that was said! 
A. No. We had a long conversation there that day. Do 
you want me to tell it all 1 
page 565 ~ Q. I just. simply want to know whether or not 
you told him what you thought the balance of his 
bill was, and why you told him. 
A. Yes, I said to think it over and let me know, and he 
didn't do that. Weeks went by, and I went up to New York, 
and then I received a letter ·from him, attached to which was 
a letter from the Supervisor of Inheritance Taxes, saying 
he was going to sell the assets at auction to pay the inherit-
ance tax. I immediately called up ]\fr. Parker and said, 
''Well, this is a terrible state of affairs". 
He said, "Oh, I wouldn't worry about that", and I think, 
but I won't be positive, he said he would see the Super-
visor. 
Q. As a matter of fact, he wrote the Supervisor a letter 
and sent you a copy of it, didn't he, telling him why the. 
estate could not be reported for taxation until the fee had 
been settled Y 
A. Yes, sir, Mr. Parker's fee had been settled. 
Q. Exactly so, and you knew that had been Mr. Parker'~ 
attitude all the time and that the Tax Commission had agreed 
that that was correct? 
A. Well, do you think that any other man would hold up 
a client this way? 
Q. If you will stop arguing with me and answer the ques-
tion. ·· 
page 566 ~ (The preceding question was reacl. and Mr. 
:Maupin continued:) . 
Q. Now, do you or not? 
A. I don't know the Tax Commissioner had agreed; yes, 
I knew Mr. Parker was holding it up because his bill had 
not been settled. 
Q. Didn't you see a letter from the Tax Commissioner that 
the estate could not be reported for taxation until these fees 
had been settled 1 
A. If he agreed to that, whv did he keep on hounding and 
threatening to sell tlie assets for taxes? 
Mr. Maupin: Read the question, please. 
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{The foregoing question was read.) 
A. (Continuing:) Couldn't that tax bill have been settled 
on a preliminary bill Y Mr. Lanning settled it for me on short 
order. 
Mr. Maupin: Will you read the question again, please, 
and see if we can get an a;nswer to it. 
The Witness: That is the answer there. 
( The pending question was again read.) 
A. No, I don't recall such a letter. 
Q. You don't recall such a letter. 
A. Not that the estate tax could not be settled-not from 
the Supervisor, no, sir. 
Q. Mr. Parker did not send you that letter or show you 
a copy of it¥ 
page 567 ~ A. Perhaps he has it. I don't think I saw it-
I am sure I didn't see it. 
Q. You do not intend to leave the Commissioner under the 
impression that Mr. Parker had been lax about this tax mat-
_ter and had not attended to itY 
A. I do. 
Q. You do? 
A. I do .. 
Q. on· what grounds! 
A. On the ground of holding up the tax. I don't like to 
have bills lield up. I pay people what is owing. M:r. Parker 
knows it. 
Q. All right, Mrs. Hayes, will you explain to the Commis-
sioner how any ta~ could be paid to the State of Virginia on 
this decedent's estate until it was determined where his domi.;. 
cile was? 
A. The decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia finally 
settled the estate. That ,vas on January 13, 1938. 
Q: Now, there was then a question of whether or not the 
esfate· was liable for Dr. Johnson's bill, was there not? 
A. That took -very little time, because, after that-
Q. Well, you have just testified that that was settled some 
time in ·June? · 
A. Well, that was settled before June. Mr. 
pnge 568 ~ Parker's bill came in June. 
· · Q. You said Mr. Parker's bill came in June and 
Dr. Johnson's bill came some time before that Y 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Then, how are you going to :find, out, irrespective of Mr. 
Parker's bill, what the net estate is until this lithrnted mat-
ter has been settled Y " 
A. Vv ell, that is only six months. 
Q. What is only six months f 
A. From January 13, the time of the decision of the Judges 
of the Supreme Court of Virginia, to Jun~ 30. 
Q. Precisely so. 
A. When Mr. Parker sent me his bill, the tax bill had 
not been settled 
Q. Precisely so. Now, how are you going to find out 
what the net amount of the estate is which is liable for tax-
ation until the extent of the estate has been agreed upon or 
settled in some manner f 
A~ I don't know, but I should think-
The Commissioner: I think I can.straighten that out. Until 
Dr. Johnson's bill was paid and Judg·e Parker's fee was de-
termined and settled, it would be impossible for you to make 
any return in regard to the inheritance tax. 
The Witness-: ~ thank you for the explanation. 
page 569 } By Mr. Maupin: 
· Q. Now, you testified on your direct exami-
nation, Mrs. Hayes, that at that interview you had with Mr. 
Parker subsequent to the sending of his bill to you, he made a 
number of assertions which he lmows are not true. That is 
a rather serious charge and I would like for yo1t to be specific 
about it. What assertions did Mr. Parker make to you that 
he knows are not true? 
A. When did I testify to that? 
Q. Oi1 your direct examination. 
A. On what question? 
Q. Well; did you intend to make any such statement as 
that? · 
· A. I would intend to make it if it would be on the points 
that are not at issue here, yes. · 
Q. Now, Mrs. Hayes, that doesn't mean anything. I took 0 
this down as yon testified, and you said, "At that meeting 
with Mr. Parker, lie made a number of statements as to what 
he had done that he knows ate not true". Now, I want to 
know what those statements were and what the matters were 
regarding which he made statements that he knew were not 
true. 
A. No doubt it wa8 his building up in his "book'' his refer-
ences to mental capacity. Mr. Parker knew, from his relation-
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ship with me and his $tatements to me, that he 
page 570} never had any doubt of Mr. Hayes' mental 
capacity., and if he had any great amount of work, 
which he is trying to bring out here about it, I don't know 
about it, so· I would call anything in reference to that sub-
ject untrue. 
Q. Was that the only statement that yon had reference to 
when you made the assertion that Mr. Parker had made an 
untrue statemenU 
.A. That is all. 
Q. Now, Iet us go back to that. Yon knew, did you not, that 
there had been two attacks on this will on the ground of 
mental incapacity of your husband f 
A. It was never brought out in court, I believe. 
Q. Mrs. Hayes, there was one suit brought in Princess Anne 
in 1934 against this will, the principal gromid or contention 
being· the alleg·ed mental incapacity of your husbancH 
A. That was at tlle non-suit, was it not, Mr. Maupin Y 
Q. It finished in a non-suit, but I am asking you if it is 
not a fact-
A. And we were prepared to combat it and to fight it 
out and I was so sorry we did not. 
Q. Let's see if I can get an answer. 
Mr. Lanning: She has answered it, Mr. Maupin. 
The Witness: Because that just doesn 1t appeal to you-
page 571 ~ By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. No, I simply want an answer . 
.A.. Yes, I wanted that case tried that day most sincerely. 
Q. I didn't ask you tl1at. I asked you whether or not it 
was a fact that in ·1934 a contest was instituted against this 
will, the principal ground of the contest being the alleged 
incapacity of your husband; is that the fact, or not? 
.A.. I don't know whether the principal ground was that. 
Q. You do not? 
A. It was not, no. 
Q. Then, I will ask you if there was not another suit in-
stituted in Princess Anne Countv in 1937 in which an attack 
was mac1e on tlie will and again.the principal ground of the 
contest was the alleg·ed mental incapacity of your husband 1 
A. In the pleadings of the contest, yes. 
Q. Then, do you take it, or not, that it was Mr. Parker's 
duty to prepare himself to meet thatY 
A. It was, and Mr. Parker prepared himself for everything, 
I believe, and well, in the first case that was to be tried. :My 
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trouble resulted from that first case not having 
page 572 ~ gone to trial. 
Q. Well, is there any way that you know of that 
Mr. Parker could have compelled a trial? 
A. No, I think Mr. Parker had to agree to the other side 
when they asked for a non-suit-I think that. Anyone is en-
titled to a non-suit if they ask for it. 
Q. If there were two suits brought against you as executrix, 
and against the will, in which the will was attacked on the 
ground of mental incapacity, why do you say Mr. Parker was 
not telling the truth when he said he had to prepare on that 
issueY 
A. I am sorry if I ever said, and I don't think I did say, 
that Mr. Parker did not prepare for it. I said he might 
have prepared papers as hig·h as a building, but I say what 
I did say, that there was never any serious issue in this liti-
gation, which the contestants knew, themselves. Why didn't 
they prove iU They had all the chance in the world to do it. 
Mr. Parker, you don't mean to tell me, prevented them from 
doing it. 
Q. Mrs. Hayes, please, just a minute. Yon stated that Mr. 
Parker built up what he had to do with regard to the alleged 
mental incapacity of your husband to such an extent that 
what he had in his bill to you, which i~ Exhibit No. 1, was an 
untruth? 
A. ·well, is that-
Q. ,Just one minute, Mrs. Hayes. Wait until the question is 
asked before you answer it, please. 
page 573 ~ A. All right. 
~ Q. You admit that ]\fr. Parker had to meet two 
attacks on this will on the ground of mental incapacity, on 
which he prepa~·ed himself most t.11oroughly. I no,v ask you, 
if those are the ·facts, as you admit they are, what ground, 
then, have you for saying that Mr. Parker did not tell the 
truth when he said that he had to prepare to meet that issue 
and to avoid it if possible? I have finished my question. 
A. My answer it that I believe Mr. Parker prP-parr.d him-
self to meet any issue that was to be brought up in this liti-
.Q.'ation, but I want to say as firmly and as strongly as I can, 
in deference to the man whose memory I revere, that I am just 
as certain that was not a serious iARne and that Mr. Parker, 
from liis own statement time and time and time again to me. 
knew that those pleadings could not have been proved or 
.substantiated in court, and they were not substantiated in 
court by very able lawyers on the other side. 
Q. It never got to the issue, did it? 
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A. Why didn't it? Didn't Mr. Parker- . 
Q. Just a minute. 
A. Well, answer me that question. 
Mr. Maupin: Read my question, Mr. Reporter. 
( The question was read.} 
page 574 ~ A. That is the answer to the question-did Mr. 
Parker prevent iU Now, can you answer that 
oneY 
Q. I am. not going to attempt to answer any questions. I 
am not on the stand. 
A. That is the whole gist of what Mr. Parker-
Q. Mrs. Hayes, do you think you could possibly confine 
youl'self to answering the questions I ask? 
A. Yes, if you will confine your questions to this litigation 
and not to matters that were not brought out in court, and 
I think you will not take up everybody's time so long. 
Q. Well, I am going to be the judge of what kind of ques-
tions I ask. 
A. I think it is a very unkind thing to make an issue a bout 
a person who is dead and gone. 
Q. I asked you if the question of mental incapacity ever 
came to issue Y 
A. It did not. 
Q. But you say it was never proved; how could it be proved 
if it never came to issue? 
A. Well, maybe I might have asked, in just the same form, 
why didn't it come to issue Y 
Q. ·wm you answer m~. question f 
A. I don't know. I would have to go into the minds of the 
contestants to know that. 
page 575 ~ Q. Do you know whether Dr. Johnson's depo-
sition WflR fa ken on tliat isrme? 
A. Do you know that Dr. Jolmson only saw M:r. Hayes when 
11 c was sick Y 
Mr. Maupin: "'\Vill you read the question, Mr. Craig? 
(The preceding question was read.) 
A. Dr. Johnson's deposition was taken, but he had seen 
Mr. Hayes only when he was sick. 
Q. Did yon read that deposition Y 
A. I did not. 
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Q. You did not read it f 
A. No. 
Q. Then, you do not know "7hether it was dangerous, do 
you7 
A. No, I do not. Mr. Parker, himself, told me-
Q. I haven't asked you any question. 
A. Well, I will tell you, explaining-
Q. Well, you are not supposed to tell me anything. You 
.are supposed to answQr mi questions. 
A. There are different sides to all stories, you know. 
Q. I noticed when you were testifying just now that you 
testified as to given dates and you purported to give the 
exact conversations a.nd you were reading from memoranda 
in your h.and. Will you tell me how you could 
page 576 ~ be sure of the dates and of the exact conversations 
and what these memoranda represent? 
A. Yes; it was my practice at interviews with Mr. Parker 
to jot down what was said. Mr. Parker will recall my doing 
that every time I went there. 
Q. When did you start that Y 
A. In the early part of the litigation. 
Q. Why did you do iU 
A. Whv did I do it? 
Q. Yes: 
A. Just so I would know everything that was going on, I 
suppose. 
Q. And you did that in anticipation of trouble about Mr. 
Parker's fee, didn-'t you¥ 
A. No, I did not-honestly and truly, I did not. I didn't 
think-when Mr. Parker served me with this summons, I was 
the most pained .and hurt person in this world. M:r. Parker 
' was my friend, and I told him how I relied on him through-
out this. 
Q. You took notes of every conversation-
A. Not with any ulterior motive in mind. 
Q. Will you please let me :finish my question. 
A. Well, that is my answer. · · 
Q. I have not asked you anything. 
A. At that time, yes-. 
page 577 } · Q. Will you wait until I ask my question be-
fore you attempt to answer it? We can never 
get anywhere this way. -
A. Some of your questions are very trying, Mr. Maupin. · 
Q. Well, I am sorry. 
A. Exceedingly so. . 
Q. But if you would try to answer them, they would not 
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be so trying. Yon took notes, from the early part of this 
litigation, of practically every conference that you had with 
Mr. Parkerf 0 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you preserved those notes, but you had no ulterior 
purpose in mind and you did not do it in anticipation of 
using tl10s~. notes in ~ny other question that came· up a bout 
Mr. Parker's ·fee; is that correct Y 
A. I did not. 
Q. Is my statement correct f 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Now, not only did you take these notes, but yon came 
in very frequently to consult with Mr. Parker about the liti-
gation and to ask him how it was progressing and to have 
him tell you exactly how it was going on, did you notf 
A. I did. It was necessary to have conferences with :Mr~ 
Parker. 
Q. Precisely .. 
A. And to go to the safe deposit box. He was my attor-
ney. 
page 578 ~ Q. And yon 11ad very frequent conferences with 
himY 
A. Sometimes weeks or maybe months would intervene, 
and sometimes mavl)e two or three. 
Q. At times ·a week Y 
A. Some weeks none nt all. 
Q. You also told Mr. Parker, whether from your re-
searcl1es in the Congressional Library or in your talks witlJ 
your lawyer friends or what lawyers you already knew, that 
he was not conducting his case properly and yon told him 
how you thought it ought to be conducted, did you not? 
A. No, please, I never said he was not conducting it prop-
erly. 
Q. You did notf 
A. No. 
Q. Whose handwriting is this (showing the witness a 
paper)f · 
A. That is my handwriting, and it was just about-let me 
read it, please. 
Q. No, just a moment. That is your handwriting? 
A. May I explain, when I gave that-
Q. You may answer my questions, if you will be good 
enough to. I simply asked you if that was in your hand-
writing? 
A. ·wen, what ulterior ,motive did l\fr. Parker have when 
he started to answer my questions-
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page 579 ~ Q. ·wm you stop asking me questions, please, 
and answer my questions. 
A. Mr. Parker evidently kept that for an ulterior purpose. 
Q. This pa.per that you have just identified, being in your 
handwriting-
A. Just in lead pencil notes. 
Q. -is dated November 10, 1937. You attended the argu-
ment at the Court of Appeals, did you not? 
A. I did. 
Q. About that date. 
A. What was the dateY 
Q. November 10, 1937. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you brought this memorandum to Mr. Parker '8 
office afterwards and took it up with him item by item and 
told him the mistakes he had made in conducting your case? 
Mr. Lanning: Don't ask her about it until we sec what 
is in the letter. 
The Witness: I don't know what is in it. 
(The paper was handed to counsel and the witness, and the 
preceding question was read, and Mr. Maupin continued:) 
Q. Did you not? 
A. I gave him that memorandum, yes, and if I 
page 580 ~ were a man client, probably he would have gotten 
more. Don't other clients talk to their attorneys? 
Haven't I the righU I am the executrix of this estate, I am 
the client, and he is the attorney, and ·r think Mr. Parker, in 
many ways by this litigation, has divulged most sacred mat-
ters between attorney and client. He took his bill around, 
with all my private affairs and my husband's affairs and let 
every Tom, Dick and Harry read it. If that is not against 
the ethics of his profession, I don't know what it is. 
Q. Have you completed your answer? 
A. I have. I recall handing that paper to-1\fr. Parker, but 
he did not discuss it with me and he said he would answer it. 
He kept it in his file until now, and he brings it up with what 
purpose? 
Q. :My question was, whet.her you did not go to Mr. Parker's 
office and take this up with him item by item-
A. I didn't take it up with him-
Q. Vv ait a minute, Mrs. Hayes, and let me finish my ques-
tion, please. Did you not take this memorandum to Mr. 
Parker's office and go over it and explain to him-
364 Supreme Court of Appeal&! C\f Virginia 
llirs. Adelaide lJf. H aJJes. 
A. You have asked three questions there. 
Q. Will you wait until I ask my question-
A. Ask one. question at a time. You have four there. 
Q. Did you take this memorandum to Mr. Parker's office-
A. Yes. 
page 581 ~ Q. -and take it up with him item by item? 
A. No. 
Q. The fifth time: Did you take this paper to Mr. Parker's 
office, going over it item by item, and explain to him where 
he had not represented you properly in his argument at the 
Court of Appeals Y 
A. My answer is, I took that paper to 1\fr. Parker, but he 
did not go over it with me item by item. He gave me no ex-
planation about it at all. He said he would write to me, and 
did not do so. 
Q. Did you not tell Mr. Parker that he did not plead the 
case properly, that he simply took his brief and told the court 
what was in his brief, and that the lawyers in other cases 
that you had heard really pleaded their cases Y r 
A. Oh, I didn't say it in a combative way. 
Q. Well, didn't you say that¥ 
A. I may have. I said l\'Ir. Heath gave such a long argu-
ment, why didn't Mr. Parker give a long argument Y He 
argued in a conversational tone. I had a right to do that. 
Q. Did you not tell him that the human side of the case 
was not brought out as it should have been T 
A. I did. 
Q. Did you not tell him that he did not tell the court what 
type of man your husband was? 
page 582 ~ A. I did. 
Q. That he had a dominant character and it was 
impossible for him to retain his pastorate Y 
A. I don't lrnow that that ever came up. 
Q. Well, it is down here, anyhow. 
A. Well, it is so. It would have been possible, yes. 
Q. Did you not tell him that he should have told the court 
about the mental capacity of the deceased T 
A. Yes. I was willing to face that with anybody. 
Q. Although that was not in issue, you told him he made a 
tremendous mistake in not bringing that up¥ 
Mr. Lanning: Are yol;l reading from this document? 
Mr. Maupin: I didn't say I was, did H I am asking; 
l1er questions. . 
The Commissioner : He has a right to examine her from 
that. If the paper does not substantiate it afterwards-
I 
I 
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The Witness: I don't know what he is reading. I think 
he is reading a whole lot that is not there. 
Mr. Maupin: I am asking her whether she did or not._ 
Mr. Lanning: Did whaU 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Didn't you tell him that he made a tremendous mis-
take in not bringing up ~he type of man that your 
page 583} husband was and the question of his mental 
capacity Jo make a will? 
A. Will you let me see that paper, please? 
Q. No, I will not. 
A. Then, I will not answer questions. 
l3y Mr. Lanning: 
Q. Is that your recollection of what you told him? 
A. Well, he has read from this and he will have to sub--
stantiate it. 
Q. vVell, do you recall making that statement V 
A. I don't think I said but about half of the note.. 
By Mr. Maupin! 
Q. Didn't you tell him that he had made a mistake? 
A. Yes, but if it had come out, I would have been only too 
glad for it-wanted it. 
Q. Didn't you tell him that he had made a mistake in not 
stressing to the court the objects of the visits to Newburgh, 
namely, to wind up the affairs and close the house Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that there was no home to return to? 
A. Yes. , 
Q. Did you not tell him that he made a mistake in not 
stressing to the court that your sister and you were both in 
Newburgh, the last time, closing the house, and that you were 
there in conversation with Monroe Hannan and that vou 
"could have refuted his lies"? .. 
page 584 ~ A. Yes. • 
Q. Didn't you tell him that he made a mistake 
·about taking the depositions in Newburgh because they were 
uot given by friends of Mr. Hayes?· . 
A. Yes, but is the word ''mistake" repeated there every 
time? 
Q. No. but I am asking you, please. 
A. I said, "Mr. Parker, don't you think you ought to have 
brought this ouU" 
Q. Did you not tell him that lie made a mistake in not 
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stopping Mr. Heath in what yon called ~'his scandalous and 
unbearable talk'' t 
A .. I did. 
Q. And that he ought to have attacked Mr. Heath per-
sonally1 · 
A. I told him he should speak to Mr. Heath personally, 
yes. I to Id him that those attacks were uncalled for and un-
warranted and unjust-I did, not once but several times. 
Q. Did yon not complain to Mr. Parker that he should 
have stopped Mr. Heath's argument on what you considered 
Mr. Heath's raising of a religions issue! 
A. Yes. 
Q. Didn't you tell him he made a mistake in not proving 
certain hospital records? 
A. ''Mistake' '-you have got it five thousand times-
. Q. Well, didn't yon tell him he made a mistake 
page 585 ~ in not proving the hospital records f 
A. Most certainly, I did. 
Q. Didn't you criticize him for not going to the hospital 
from N ewburgl1 f 
A. I don't recall that. Yon are certainly reading out of 
your mind, t110ngh, I think. 
Q. vVell, you are entitled to your opinion. Didn't you criti-
cize him for not bringing out the fact that your husband's own 
statement to Mr. Parker was that he wished to give the house 
to you because he knew his relatives would try to take that 
from him, and that that should have been brought out? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Didn't yon criticize him for not bringing before the 
court the matter of your social life and informing the court 
vou would not have entered it even if vou had lived here 
fifty years f - ., 
· A. Well, yes, probably yes. 
Q. Didn't you criticize him about the matter of taxes and 
not bringing out the fact that yon had not paid the taxes 
down here? 
A. I think that was said. 
Q. Did you not criticize him for not stopping Mr. Heatll 
from what vou chose to consider "deliberate lies" 
page 586 ~ of Mr. Heath, as yon lmve got it down here on 
this paperf 
A. You have asked that before· many times-yes. 
Q. Now, who won your case, Mr. Parker or l\fr. Heath T 
A. Well, l\fr. Parker won it, because he had those facts. 
Please concede something. He lrns conceded it time and time 
again. Just because yon W{lnt-
Adelaide M. Hayes, et al., ~- .. William L. Parker. 367. 
Mrs . .Adelaid~ lJI. Hayes. 
Q. You sat in Mr. Parker's office, discussing this paper, 
for two or three hours, didn't you 1 
A. I beg your pardon. Mr. Parker did not discuss it at all. 
He looked at it and said, "I will answer that", and my sister 
was there, and he put it in his files and brings it out here; 
if that is not quite unmanly, I will say something. It was 
not discussed, Mr. ··.Maupin, please take my word for it. Mr. 
Parker glanced at it. · 
Q. And, as a matter of fact, you went there about every 
hearing and you had an argument with him, didn't you f 
A. I did, with Mr. Parker's full approval. 
Q. And after he asked you to come, you spent several 
hours in Mr. Parker's office, telling him what he had done 
wrong and how the case should have been conducted f 
A. I did not every time. 
Q. Each time; didn't you do that 1 
A. Well, I don't think I criticized him but one time. 
Q. This is the only time you criticized him? 
A. I believe so, yes. 
page 587 ~ 1\fr. Maupin: I offer that paper in evidence. 
(The l)HpP.I· referred to. identified by the witness, was 
marked ''Exhibit No. 44. ") 
A. (Continuing:) I gave !Ir. Parker many thanks and 
spoke to l1im many times. My relationship with Mr. Parker 
all through this, irrespootive of what picture and light he 
wantR to show of it now, was always pleasant, but when a 
man goes out and sues you and sends down tJ1ree policemen 
with revolvers at their_ belts because be doesn't g·ct a hill of 
tJ1irty-two thousand and some-odd dollars, if he .. had a man 
for a client, just what kind of treatment he would get for it, 
I think you can answer that ve1:y nicely. 
Mr. Maupin: l\ir. Lanning, is there anything you can do 
to get your client to answer the questions? I hate to keep 
ohjeetinµ:, but this is g-etting intolerable. 
rrhc \Vitness: I thought I had some rights. 
l\fr. Lnnning:: Go ahead. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Now, Mrs. Hayes, you have testified nbout these stocks 
that :Mr. Parker Rold and. if I understood you correctly, you 
stated that they were sold at your bitter protest; is that 
rig·ht·r 
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. A ... I didn't say '' bitter protest "-you mean the original 
holdings? 
page 588 ~ Q. Yes. 
A. I agreed to have them sold. but I also 
thought it would be wise to buy every one of them back, with 
the exception, probably, of those Trust shares. I wanted 
most urgently to buy Yell ow Truck back. 
Q. You wanted most urgently to buy Yellow Truck back t 
- A. Yes, instead of taking a $9,000 loss on it. 
Q. You were advh1ed about Yellow Truck not only by Mr. 
Parker. but by Mr. "\i\Tithers, were you noU 
A. No. I don't recall anv conversation with Mr. Withers 
about any of the stock. He· was just told to sell that. 
Q. Didn't he tell you it was a speculative stock and ought 
not to be held! 
A. Everyone knows it is speculative, but it is also a good 
company, and Mr. Hayes had an intimate friend in that com-
pany and that is why he bought it and had hopes it would 
come back. 
Q. He boug·ht it on a tip, then, from the insid~, did he T 
A. He got information. I would say. 
Q. ,vhat dividend has it paid 1 
A. None. 
Q. You know the range of that stock in 1928 was from 
four dollars a Rl1are to twentv dollars a share? 
A. Yes. " 
page 589 ~ By Mr~ Lanning: . 
Q. Do you think it went to a low of four dol-
lars in 1928? 
A. I don't think that was the low of 1928, no . 
. By Mr. Maupin: · 
Q."Perhaps I am wrong about that. Maybe it was six and 
twenty? 
A. No, I don't think it went that low. 
Q. But you know it is a fluctuating stock that pays no 
dividendf 
A. It is -a fluctuating stock. 
Q. You would want to hold that¥ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And l\fr. Parker overruled you on that? 
A. I don't think Mr. Parker gave any instruction about 
it. The instruction to Mr. ·withers was to sell all these 
stocks. 
Q. And you knew the purpose for which he sold the stocks, 
did you notY 
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A. I did. 
Q. And you approved· of that f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And your objection was not that the stocks were sold, 
but that the same stocks were not bought back; is that the 
hloo? · 
page 590 ~ A. Yes, that tJiree or four of them were not 
bought back. 
Q . .And particularly Yellow Cab? 
A. And American Can and Endicott-.} ohnson. 
Q. But particularly you objected to Yellow Truck! 
A. To Yellow Truck, because of the high loss at that time .. 
Q. You have acquainted yourself with what the law is about 
the responsibility of a :fiduciary in ·holding· a violently specu-
lative security, as not income-producing? 
· .A. Well, I can't say that I have familiarized myself with 
the law concerning it, no. 
Q. Now, as to the Virginia Beach house, if I understood 
you correctly on your direct examination, you stated that 
you had to pay the $225 that was charged by Conrad. Did 
you make that as a statement, 01· is it just your recolle~tion 7 
A. That is my recollection; he sent in this bill, Mr. Par-
ker objected to it, and he was g·oing to litig~te, but I didn't 
want any litigation. I said, •' Settle it, ratlier tban pay hlm." 
Now, the exact amount that was paid at that time, I can't 
recall. · 
Q. As a matter of fact, do you deny the assertion that no 
part of that $225 was paid to Conradi 
A. No part of it? _ 
))age 591 } · Q. Y e-s. 
A. Wbo got it, then! 
Q. Nobody. 
A. It was paid, then. 
Q. You are sure it was paid? 
A. It seems to me most certainly it was paid. 
Q. What is your answer-that you don't know, that you 
are not sure, or that it was? 
A. Well, I am under the impression it was paid, yes. 
Q. You stated Mr. PRrker did not go down to your house 
but once when it was being built? 
The Commissioner: That she knew of. 
A. But once. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Well, you were sick a good part of the time that house 
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was being built and you were away from there, weren't 
you? . 
A. I was not there, but I was told he was there but once .. 
Q. You don't know how many times he was t.hete, do you °l 
A. I don't want to mention other names, but nobody else 
saw him there. 
Q. You just don't know of your own lmowledge how many 
times you saw him there 1 
A. I do not lmow. 
page 592 } Q . .As a matter of fact, wI1cn you told the Com-
missioner something about an oil burner,. it was 
not any concern of yours and it didn't mean any money to 
you one way or the other whether Conrad got that commis-
sion on the oil burner or not, did itf 
A. Yes, it did mean a lot to me ,because 1\fr. Hayes wanted 
to give Conrad that corumissio])., aml Mr. Hayes wanted a 
General Electric put in, and now I ha.Ye a Delco. 
Q. "\Vhat financial difference does it make to you whether 
Conrad got part of that commission for the oil burner or not!' 
A. Simply because I like to carry out Mr. Hayes' wishes,, 
is all. 
Q. Has it got any financial bea1ing· on it f 
A. No, from a monetary standpoint, I don't suppose it 
has. 
Q. Well, my question to you was, what fimmcia] difference 
does it make to you f 
A. None. 
Q. Now, as to tlle Straus bonds, you very strongly ad-
vised Mr. Parker to claim fraud in all those cases-that the 
bonds were solcl to vour hm;band and it was fraudulent-
and you wanted to make claim against tlle issuing house and 
others to collect the money for you, didn't you Y 
A. ~Just what do vou mean there f 
page 593 ~ Q. J1ist exactly what I said. 
A. I can't get any clear, definite idea. 
Q. Straus & Company issued these bonds f 
A. Yes. 
Q. Straus & Company did not gua1·antee payment of the 
bonds, did it? 
A. Straus & Company did not guamntee payment of the 
bonds? 
Q. Yes. 
A. No. I guess it would be the different issues. 
Q. All right. The only way that Stram:; & Company could 
. be held liable for the terrific depression of these bonds and 
the falling off in values of thes(? properties was a claim of 
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fraud. I am asking you if you di.cl not ask Mr. Parker, not 
once· but many· times, to claim that the sale of these bonds 
by Straus to your husband was fraudulent and to put in a 
claim against Straus & Company on that ground¥ 
A. I never did-not once, at any time, any place, or any-
where. 
Q. As a matter of fact, you have stated in your direct ex-
amination that everything that was done about the Stra.us 
bonds was done either by you or at your direct instance; isn't. 
that true? 
.A. That is true; I think I can safely say that is 
page 594 ~ true. 
Q. And Mr. Parker did not do anything about 
the Straus bonds except wl1at he was specifica.JJy directed by 
you to do; is that correct? 
A. Yes. Mr. Parker did not help me very much with the 
Straus bonds. 
Q. You also stated, I believe, that l\f r. Parker, in each 
case, said, "Well, there is nothing to do except to go a.long 
with the majority and deposit the bonds with the Commit-
tee''; is that right t 
A. He told me that time a.nd time ag·ain, which seemed ·to 
be a very limp way of handling the ma.ttc,r. 
Q. Well, what did you want to do different from thaU 
A. Well, other bondholders, I read in the papers, were 
making protest. 
Q. Protest to whom? 
A. There were commissions Ret up to investig·ate those 
bonds and those claims. I have never used the word ''fraud" 
in connection with my conversation with Mr. Parker about. 
that, not once, hut frauds evidently, it has now been revealed, 
were perpetrated in the sale of these Straus bonrls. 
Q. In any of these particular issues? 
A. I can't recall any particular one, but in quite a num-
ber of them. The Straus bonds were Rold under the slogau. 
"Not a dividend passed in sixty years." There 
page 595 ~ are thonsandR and thousands of people-school 
teachers and people all throng-bout the country-
,vho would think Straus bonds are gilt eclge securities. 
Q. "\,Ve know all about the Straus bonds. Let's stick to 
the point. 
A. But what I asked J\fr. Parker-
Q. You have not answerrd my question, but you have cer-
tainly gone far enough along that line. Let me ask you, 
please, to stop. Did you want Mr. Parker to make the claim 
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that the committee was not properly authorized, was not prop· 
erly constituted, that there was fraud in the committee? 
A. No. · 
Q. Well, what did you want him to do? 
A. I wanted ~fr. Parker, not to make any fraudulent claim 
against them, or sue them, or do anything like that, but to 
investigate these claims more--these l'eorganizations. Why 
accept everything·? For instance, when your principal is cut 
down, wouldn't you make an inquiryi 
Q. What sort of inquiry t 
A. To write up to them and ask them if that is the best 
that could be offered. What do people do in caRes of that 
kind? 
Q. Didn't he do that.? 
A. I don't think he did. Once or twice he made an ef-
fort. 
page 596 ~ Q. You are sure of thaU 
A. I am quite sure I have asked him, '' Have you 
written about this issue¥'~ 
"No, I didn't do it. " 
Q. Now, as to the Book Building bonds, as a matter of fact, 
did not Mr. Parker decline to deposit those bonds with the 
first committee, until another committee was appointed, and 
deposit them with the second committee? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. Can you point out to the Commissioner how the estate 
lost anything through :Mr. Parker's activities about the Straus 
Company bonds, or how the estate would be better off to-
day if he had taken any diffel'ent action from what he did 
take? 
A. No, I can't say that it would have been affeeted either 
way. 
Q. Then, what did you mean by all your original testimony 
to the effect that ].\fr. Parker had not handled the Straus 
Company bonds to your satisfaction V 
A. That there was a privilege, by not sending thom in, 
merely holding them, not l~tting them go forward to these 
di:ffe1·ent bondholders' committees who were buyin~ them in 
for nothing; that, probably, to hold them would have been 
better. · 
Q. In other words, you think yon knew how to 
page 597 ~ handle it better tha.n he did; is that the idea? 
A .. WeU. I <lidn 't put it that wav. but it seemed 
to me more sensible to hold them, rather tlian let them go 
for nothing. 
Q. Now, you testified about an insuranc~. policy, too, that 
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you got on your husband's life. How much was that fort 
A. $2,000. · 
Q. That was a $2,000 policy made payable to Mrs. Guilfoil, . 
that she got f 
A. Yes. The other was ten thousand. 
Q. You mentioned that in your direct examination. Do 
I understand that you are accusing Mr. Parker of any neglect 
in connection with that? · 
A. No, I am not accusing him any neglect of duty in that 
at all. 
Q. You got a $10,000 policy, about which you testified iu 
your direct examination; is that righU 
A. Yes. 
Q. You testified you had to go to New York about that 
policy. As a matter of fact, the policy was in a trunk .in 
New York, in your sister~s hornet 
.A. No, it was not. 
Q. "Where was it! 
A. It was in a drawer where Mr. Hayes had placed it. I 
. had to go up to New York to get the policy: 
page 598 } Q. As a matt~r of fact, the check _was sent down 
here to Mr. Parker; you were in New York at the 
time; he sent it up to tbe Hanover Bank with instructions to 
get hold of you; you endorsed the check and it was put to 
your credit; is that righU 
A. Mr. Parker knows I went directly to the Equitable 
Building and then they issued a check and sent it down here, 
but I had to go there, and these people apologized to me most 
sincerely for the delay in holding up the payment. 
Q. You were in N cw York to get the policy a.t the time Y . 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you make another trip to New York just to get that 
policyf 
A. Yes. 
Q. You did? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the check came clown here f 
A. I don't know whetl1er I got the check, or the check cam(\ 
down here. I don't recall that. 
Q. You just don't recall 1 
A. But I went there. I lmd to go there-
Q. What was it Mr. ParkC'r did about which you considered 
lie was remiss in his duty? 
A. I didn't me.a.n it in connection with any lack of duty 
• 
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on Mr. Parke1·'s part. You misunderstand. 
pa.ge 599 ~ Q. I am afraid I do. I don't see the point of 
mentioning it at all. \Vhy did you mention iU 
A'. I don't know. It was broug·ht out here. 
Q. Now, you stated tl1at the Johnson claim was for $2,000 
and you settled it for $1,500¥ 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Did not Mr .. Parker beg you to settle that claim long 
before you did settle it¥ Did be not advise compromise oiJ. 
it from the. very beginningi -
A. Mr. Parker said,. when that bill came in, "He can jump 
in the lake for it." 
Q. Mr. Parker said, ''He can jump in the lake for it"? 
A. Yes, that was exactly Mr. Parker's words. 
Q. And he did not advise any compromise of it? 
A. He did not. I wanted to compromise, for I didn't want 
any litigation. 
Q. You did not tell :Mr. Parker that you would never com-
promise with tT ohnson because he had testified your husband 
was not of sound mind and that you wonld not pav him any-
thing! · 
A. I did say that at first. 
Q. You did say that at firstf 
A. I did. 
Q. And that was iu response to Mr. Parker's suggestion 
· that you ought to try to comprom1se that claim,. 
pag·e 600 ~ wasn't it f 
A. Mr. Parker said t11e bill wa.s exorbitant~ 
'' He can jump in the Jake for it,'' was his word for word 
answer to it. I said, "We had better compromise." Later 
on, they took $500 from tho preYious bill Dr. Johnson had 
sent in. I knew it was an excessive bill. 
Q. That was the reason Mr. Parker knew it was an excessive 
bill-from what vou had t.o]d him-didn't he T 
A. He did. . 
Q. You were in New York at the time the operation was 
performed, were yon not f 
A. Yes. 
Q. You knew what the operation was? · 
A. I knew the operation was a very slight operation. 
Q. I say, you knew wha! it was 7 
A. I knew it was exceedmg-ly slight, yes. 
Q. So !fr. Parker's only knowledg·e of the operation anc.1 
what its character w~s, waR what you told him, wa8 it not Y 
A. No. 
• 
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Q. In the beginning 1 
A. In the beginning, yes. 
Q. And you stated that you wanted to :fight the claim, didn't 
youY 
A. Not because I wanted to fight it-be~ause 
page 601 ~ Dr. ,Johnson gave wrong testimony. 
Q. You wanted to fig·ht it because Dr. ,Johnson 
had testified as to your husband's mental capacity, and be-
cause you thoug·ht the bill was excessive; that is right, isn't 
it? 
A. Both ways. 
Q. And testimony was taken 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. And :finally, Mr. Parker did prevail on you to com-
promise the case, didn't he? 
A. He didn't have to prevail, because I didn't want to 
litigate it. He knowR how I hate litigation. 
Q. vVell, I thought you had just testified, Mrs. Hayes, that 
you declined to pay it, but were willing to undertake litiga-
tion for two reasons: First, because the bill was excessive 
and. second. because vou did not like Dr. Johnson's testi- · 
mony? · "' 
A. I would never have gone to trial with it. I would rather 
lmve settled it. . 
Q. Don't yon tl1ink. t.hen, that if Mr. Parker followed your 
wh,hes and prP.pnrP.d the case for trial and went to New 
York and ::ittended the taking of depositions and g·ot the wit-
nesses ready for the trial, and then you consented to com-
promise the case, that he ought to be compensated for what 
he dicl in t.hat connection? 
A. Oh, yes, I think he should. 
page 602 } Q. I think so. Do I understand your present 
position to be that the amounts of monev ",hich 
have been advanced hv vou to :M:r. Parker from time .. to time 
in the course of this litip:ation are all that you owe Mr. Par-
ker and that todav vou do not owe him one cent.1 
A. Well, I am afraid I wil1 have to answer yes to that. 
Thereupon, the hearing was Rdjourned until March 23, 
l 939, at 10 o'clock A. l\L 
--------~-- -
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page 603 ~ OFFICES OF GEORGE PILCHER, ESQ., 
COMMISSIONER. 
Norfolk, Virginia, March 31, 1939. 
The hearing was resumed before the Commissioner at 2 :00 
o'clock P. M., pursuant to adjournment from March l, 1939, 
and continuance from l\f.arch 23, 1939, made at request of 
counsel ~or the parties. 
Present: Mr. Maupin, for the complainant. 
Mr. Lanning, for the defendant. 
AUGUSTUS W. BENNETT, 
a witness on behalf of the defendant., having been duly sworn, 
testified as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Lanning: 
Q. Please state your fuU name, ag·e, residence, and occupa-
tion. 
A. My name is Augustus vV. Bennett; 41 years old; reside 
at N ewbutg·h, New York, and am attorney. · 
Q. Mr. Bennett, what degrees do you hold from any col-
lege? 
A. Bachelor of Arts, Amherst College, Amherst, Massa-
chusetts, LL. B., Columbia University. 
Q. Where are you admitterl to practice! 
A. New York City and hefore the United States Supreme 
Court and District and Circuit Courts of Appeal 
pag·e 604 ~ of the Sonthern District of New York. 
Q. Where are you practicing now, Mr. Bennett? 
A. Newburgh, New York. 
Q~ \Vhat is the nature of your practice? 
A. General practice. 
Q. Are you a referee in bankruptcy? 
A. I am. 
0. For what territor:y? 
A. Orange and Sullivan Counties, New York. 
Q. How long have you been practicing! 
A. A little over 17 vears. 
Q. \Vere you emplo1;ed to perform, and did you perform, 
· certain services for 1\[ rs. Hayes personally and as executrix 
of tlrn estate of the late William R. Haves? 
A. I was employed nnd I did perform· some services. 
Q. By whom were yon employed? 
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A. Mr. Parker. 
Q. What services did you perform? 
A. In the first instance, I was employed in connection with 
the probate of the will of Mr. Hayes in Virginia. I had 
drawn the will, and Mr. Parker c.ommunicated with me with 
ref ere nee to the will and asked me if I could arrange to come 
down here and testify, and I finally did come here on July 
19, 1934, and was prepared to testify. However, at the 
trial, contestants took a non-suit and I did not 
page 605 ~ actually testify. · 
Then, in addition to that, an action· was insti-
tuted in New York State to set asi~e a deed to some real es-
tate in the City of Newburgh, the deed having been from 1 
:Mr. Hayes to Mrs. Hayes, and in that case I was retaineq. 
by Mr. Parker to represent the interests of Mrs. Hayes-and 
the estate in that litigation in which she was a defendant. I 
was also engaged in various details in reg·ard to the manage~ 
ment of that real estate, such as the drawing of leases and 
interviewing tenants, getting appraisals, talking to the real 
estate agent who was in charge, and so on. 
Q. How long were you associated with Mr. Parker in con-
nection with this litigation T 
A. From about May or t.T une, 1934, to about January, 1938, 
as I recall it. 
Q. Have you read the testimony of Mr. Parker in this case; 
and have you also rottcl the account that he has presented 
to Mrs. Hayes as executrix and in her own right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And also the other testimony that has been offered on 
behalf of Mr. Parker! 
A. I have not read all of the testimony that has been of-
fered on behalf of Mr. Parker. I have read substantially all 
of it &-nd I have read all of Mr. Parker's testimony. 
Q. Have you especially read over the account 
page 606 } that l1e has offered in evidence? 
A. Yes-well, I rlon't know that I have read 
over the account that he bas offered in evidence; I have not 
seen that. 
Q. Have you read over a copy of it? 
A. I have read over what I believe to be a copy of it. 
Q. Do you think, Mr. Bennett, you have prepared, yourself, 
to express an opinion as to the value of the services which Mr. 
Parker rendered in this matter? 
A. I think so. 
Q. Will you please look at the statement and say what, 
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in your opinion, would he a fair charge for the various serv-
ices rendered, ·as stated in that account 1 
A. Do you .mean the total, or in detail for each charge 1 
Q. ·wen, in either way. If you have any way of ascer-
t.aining the value as a whole or separately, I would like to 
have you deal with it in the way you l1ave dealt with it. 
A. I am assuming- a valuation for the estate of 75 to 80 
thousand dollars. On the basis of that assumption, I havf.~ 
arrived at an opinion and will give it to you in detail. 
Q. ·when you do so, will you please give your 
pag·e 607 ~ reasons as you go along? 
A. I will try to. I have felt that the items in 
the account numbered 1, 2·, 4, 5, 6, .7, 14, 15, and 16 could sub-
stantially all be lumped together under the head of general 
activity in the administration of the estate. On the basis 
of a $75,000 estate, I have felt that $4,000 would be a fair 
charg·e for that. 
Q. For what? . 
A. For those services-a lump sum for those different 
items all lumped together, and I would like to explain how 
I arrive at that figure. 
In mY, practice, I would say that I have to do that g·eneral 
type of work. ·with t.11e possible exception of No. 1, in most 
of the cases that come along I treat it as a part of the routine 
administration of the estate. I understand that in Virginia 
an executor's commission is approximately :five per cent of 
the gross value of the estate. The practice in New York is 
general1y, at least in my district, for the executor's attorney 
to. cha.rge for his services the same amount allowed an execu-
tor or administrator .for the dnties of administering tlie es-
tate. On that basis and assuming the rate to be what I un-
derstand it to be in Virginia, five per cent of $80,000 would 
be $4,000, and for· those services enumerated in those par-
ticular branches of the account I would feel that $4,000 I 
would be well satisfied with. In our own statP. 
page 608 ~ the ·fee woulcl be sufo,t.antially less. You only 
get about two and a half per cent up there, but 
I am making my $4,000 np:ure on what I understand to be 
the Virginia figures, whfoh are considerably higher. 
Item No. 3, controversy with the surety on the bond: I 
l1ave read tl1e testimony with regard to that, including tlrn 
testimony of the representative of the surety company who 
test.ifiecl here before the Commissioner, and after having had 
regard to t.he degree of rrsponsibility which Mr. Parker a.p-
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pea.rs to have assumed, the exact nature of which I can't tell 
from the testimony, I have allowed $500 for that particular 
service. ·· 
The next item on w11ich I have made a separate allowance 
is Item No. 8, which is the first will contest. I am fairly 
familiar with that. That is .the case in which I appeared 
down here to testify. In connection wit.h that, I know that 
Mr. Parker made considerable preparation and was prepared 
and able to go on with the trial, although no trial actually took 
place. For that service I have allowed $1,000. 
The suit in the State of New York. in connection with which 
I was retained to represent the defendant, my own charge 
for mv services in that suit amounted to between six hun-
dred a'nd seven hundred dollars. Then, there was associate 
counsel r(ltained that had an additional charge 
page 609 ~ of about $750, so that the two of us together 
charged about $1,200. I have tentatively put 
down here $1,000 for Mr. Parker, which is only slightly less 
tha.n the two of us togctl1er charged, and I think that is fa.ir 
having· in mind wliat services we rendered and what services 
Mr. Parker rendered. 
No. 10, the application for letters of administration in 
Orange County, New York, of course, involved merely mak-
ing the decision by 1\fr. Parker, after co~sulting· authorities 
as to what to do about put.ting in an appearance. For ex-
amination of the law that he made in that case, and decision, 
I have allowed $500. 
The ~mit in the Eastern Distriet Court of Virginia to re-
cover assets-that was t.he first ~uit, if I understand it, in-
stituted in the District Court--is the one in which Mr. Par-
ker's motion to clef()tit t]1P jurisdiction of the ~ourt was de-
nied, and contestants could have proceeded, but it was never 
reached on the merits. For t]mt l have allowed $500. 
The SP.cond will contPst. the one that went to the United 
States Supreme Court on the petition for a writ of certiorari, 
I have put down tentatively $1,500.00. 
The third will contest. which was the one in Princess Anne> 
County·, I have allowed $1,000. 
I t]Jink those items ~hould total $10,000. Tl1e other items 
· that follow a re included by me in my $4,000 lump 
pag·c 610 ~ sum charge. 
Q. i\f r. BC\nnett, what is the law in New York 
State with respect to descent and distribution f 
A. In a case of thh; nature, where the decedent is sur-
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vived by a widow and a brother or sister, the widow receives 
one-half of the estate plus $10,000 in case of intestacy. I 
presume that is what yon have in mind. ·n is $10,000 and 
one-half. of the balance, I should have said. · That is a little 
backward. 
Q. What is the law with respect to real estate? 
A. The same; there is no distinction between real and 
personal property in .New York State. It descends in the 
same manner. 
Q. Have you the statutes with you Y 
A. Yes, I have. It is Section 83 of the Decedent Estate 
. Law of the State of New York, sub-division 4. 
Q. Will you please read it into the record¥ . 
A. (Reading:) '' If the deceased leaves a surviving spouse 
and no des9endant, parent, brother or sister,'nephew or niece, 
the surviving spouse shall be entitled to the whole thereof, 
but if there be a ln·other or sister, nephew or niece, and 
no. descendant or parent, the surviving spouse shall take $10~-
000 and one-half of the residue and the balance shall de·-
scend and be distributed to the brothers and sisters and their 
representatives.'' · 
page 611 ~ Q. Does that statute apply to real estate, as 
well as personal prope_rty? 
A. It does. 
Q. Now, Mr. Bennett, in arriving at your calculations 
as to a proper charge for legal services, ,vhat did you con~ 
sider to be the amount at stake? 
A. About $36,000. 
Q. How did you arrive at that 1 
A. vVell, I :figured that the worst that- could happen to 
Mrs. Hayes, assuming the validity of the marriage, which 
I am assuming was established here, was that if domicile was 
eventually found to be in the State of New York, that she 
would lose the difference between the value of the estate and 
the amount p:iven her by our decedent estate law. Now, un-
der our decedent estate law, she would get, assuming a $80,000 
estate, a.bout 45 to 50 thousand dollars; that would leave 
around 35 to 40 thousand dollars at stake. 
Q. In arriving a.t your other calculations as to the value 
of the administrative work, did you consider how much was 
at stake, or how rnnc11 was involved in the estate~ or what 
did YOU do? A: I think I said I w·as assuming· an estate of 75 to 80 
thousand dollars. 
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Q. In arriving at those :figures? 
A. Yes. 
page 612} Q. But, in arriving at the value of the litigated 
work, you considered that there was only about 
$36,000 at stake 7 
A. That is true. . 
Q. Why did you do tl1aU "Why did you assume, Mr. Ben-
nett, that there was no question as to the validity of the mar-
riage! 
A. Well, in conversation with Mr. Parker, I understood 
from him that he felt satisfied that he could establish the 
validity of the marriage, and I wrote lJim at one time during 
the progress of the administration of the estate, saying tha.t 
people in New York had been in to see me and told me that 
there was some question about the marriage. I wrote and 
told him about those rumors, and he wrote and told me he 
had ,a certified copy of the marriage decree, and he did not 
seem to be disturbed about that prospect at all. 
Q. ·when was thaU Early in the 1itig·ation Y 
A. Yes, that wa.s, I- think, in 1934. 
Q. Now, have you looked into the North Carolina law at 
alU 
A. I have. 
Q. And what conclusions have you arrived at? 
A. I have read some cases wl1ic.h, it appeared to me,. in-
dicate that after Mr. Hayes' death that marriage could not. 
be collaterally attac.ked. I might say, further, 
page 613 } that I read, in one of the briefs or somewhere 
· else in one of the court records here, a statement 
l)y l\fr. Parker at t.he outset of the case to the effect that either 
there was a stipulation entered or that in some manner the 
issue of the marriage had been withdrawn from considera-
tion, at least as far as that particular litigation was con-
cerned. 
Q. You did reach the conclusion, clicl you not~ Mr. Bennett, 
that the marriage could not be attacked? · 
A. I did. 
Q. Mr. Parker, in his evidence or in J1is account, has sug-
gested that you made some objection to the removal of the 
suit brought in Newburgh to the District Court. of the United 
States for the Southern District of New York. Will vou 
please state what occurred with respect to that? .. 
A. I did write l\fr. Parker a letter stating that, in my 
opinion, the suit I understood he had reference to could not , 
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be removed to. the District Court. I said that Orange County 
would have jurisdiction under the type of suit I understood 
it would be. He then wrote back to me and told me Ii mis-
understood the nature of the action he had in mind. He said 
the suit he had in mind was an action hy :Mrs. Guilfoil against 
Mrs. Hayes. I then wrote him back that there was no ques-
tion about the right of removal of the case to the D.istrict 
Court~ · 
Q. Have you a c.opy of that letter 1 
page 614 ~ A. Yes. 
Q. V,7ill yon produce it, please' 
A. I here produce the letter. 
Mr. Lanning·: I offer in evidence this copy of a letter 
dated August 3, 1934, from Mr. Bennett to Mr. Parker, as 
Exhibit No. 45. 
Q. Mr. Bennett, was there any difference between you and 
Mr. Parker as to wlwther the application of Mrs. Guilfoil 
for letters of administration in Orange County should be 
contested 1 
A. Not that I recaI1. :rv[r. Parker, from tl1e outset, took 
the position that. it should not be contested, and I don't be-
lieve that I can recall or lrn.ve any record of disagreeing 
about it. I did write him a letter about it at one time, stat-
ing· it would be possible to institute ancillary proceedings 
up there and in this same Jetter I said I did not see any point 
in doing so, that we could do it at any time he saw fit if he 
ever discovered anv other assets. 
Q. Well, what ":as your posit.ion, Mr. Bennett, with re-
spect to opposing the taking out of letters of administration 
by Mrs. Guilfoil? · 
A. My recollection is I thought }[ r. Parker was right on 
that. I did not think it was necessary. I did not tllink any 
tremendous harm would have resulted from doing so. 
Q. Why do you say that? 
page 615 ~ A. ·wen! I think tha.t we could have appeared 
specially in that proceeding and entered a plea 
to the jurisdiction of the. court and, if it was overruled, we 
would do nothing else but subject ourselves to the jurisdic-
tion of thP. court. If we bad' 2:one ahead, the only thing that 
would have resulted wonld have been the appointment of 
Mrs. Guilfoil ;:is administratrix. As a matter of fact. that 
is what did result, anyhow, and had she been appointed after 
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our special plea, she would have had no assets to administer 
and would have had to come down here to Virginia and 
get the Virginia courts to administer whatever rights she· 
had. 
Q. Assuming there had been a general appearance up there, 
do you think that Mrs. Ha.yes would have been affected ad-
versely by tha.t general a.ppearance? 
A. Well, a general appearance would have been, really, 
more advantag·eous t.o the position than a special plea, but 
even so, if there had been a genoral appearance and Mrs. 
Guilfoil had come down here m;ldng the Virginia courts to 
enforce her rights, it seems to me that it could very well be 
answered that the Virginia court, at least the court in Prin-
cess Anne County, had already assumed jurisdiction, and 
that the non-suit left l\frs. Hayes, the executrix, in posses-
sion of the assets, and I doubt very much, although that is 
something you would be better qualified than I to state, 
whether they could have gotten any relief dowri 
page 616 ~ here in Virginia under the circumstances. 
Q. I am wondering particularly what you think 
might have happened adverse to the interests of Mrs. Hayes 
up in Orange County. 
A. I don't think anything· would have happened up in 
Orange County. There was nothing- there to administer ex-
cept a claim against St. Mary's Catholic Church for back 
salary of a. few hundred dollars. 
Q. How about the real estate? 
A. The rea~ estate was not in ]fr. Hayes' name; it was in 
the name of Mrs. Hayes, and it was already in litigation. 
They had a perfect right to institute that litigation. Noth-
inp; in the surrogate's court could have affected that, in my 
opinion. 
Q. Had the assets at that time been removed from New 
York State to Virginia t 
A. I believe so. l\fr. Parker took care of the removal of 
the assets. ·My impression iR, from the correspondence, that 
he did that very promptly after .July 19th. I am quite sure. 
they were all out. of the way long before this proceeding came 
on. 
Q. Do you remembc1: any conversation that you had with 
Mr. Parker with respect t.o getting the assets out of New 
York State? 
A. Yes, I rPmember that when I was down 
page 617 ~ here on July 19, my r<'collection is that I sug-
gested to l\fr. Parker that it might. be well to re-
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move those assets out of the New York jurisdiction at the 
earliest possible date in order to prevent any possible attach-
ment by the contestants in New York. 
Q. Now, how much did you allow for the first will contest, 
Mr. Bennett T 
A. $1,000. 
Q. You came down here, as I understand, when that case 
was supposed to have been tried! · 
A. That is right. 
Q. And the non-suit was taken. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was any evidence taken in the ca.se? 
A. Not to mv recollection. A motion was made by Mr. 
Heath, as I recall it, before even a jury was drawn. .. 
Q. Had any depositions been taken¥ 
.A.. Yes, depositions, I think, had been taken prior to that 
t1='ial-I am sure some depositions were taken. 
Q. Who took those depositions? 
A. Now let's see; I may be off on that. I may have that 
confused with one of the other suits. There were depositions 
taken in Newburgh a.nd Mr. Pa.rkei· attended at th(1 time of 
the taking· of the depositions by the contestants, and I would 
have to look at the dates. Mr. Parker was in 
page 618 ~ Newburgh before this suit came on in the Prin-
cess AnnP. Circuit Court, lmt I don't recall when 
those depositions were. 
Q. Mr. Bennett, in the third will contest a deposition of 
Mae L. Goodman was offered in evidence, which was taken 
on the 27th of July, 1936. Did you take that deposition Y 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Did Mr. Parker attend on the taking· of that deposi-
tion! 
.A.. No, he did not. 
Q. It appears from the record in the third will contest 
tha.t certain depositions we·re taken at the office of Peter 
Cantline, in the City of N ewburg·l1, on the 30th day of June, 
1934. 
A. Then, those were taken prior to the first will contest 
and Mr. Parker was there present. 
Q. As I understand, certain depositions were taken to be 
used in connection with the appeal from the order of pro-
bate and it was stipulated that those depositions might bP 
used in later litigation? 
A. That. is my recollection. 
Q. At that time Reverend William J. Guinan, Miss Sarah 
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Bradley, John J. Coyle, Monroe Hannan, William J. Welch, 
Alice Sessoms. and Thomas V. Burke were taken. Do you 
recall those depositions f 
page 619 } .A. Yes. 
Q. They were evidently taken before the first 
will contest! 
A. That is right. 
Q. Did you attend on those depositions? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Do you remember what factual issues were in that first 
caseY 
A. As r recall, they were the mental competency of the 
testator, domicile, and the validity of the marriage. I am 
wrong· about that; validity of the marriage does not seem to 
have been raised there. The question of undue influence was 
raised, in addition to the other two that I mentioned. 
Q. Were the factual issues that were· raised in that case 
the same factual issues that were raised or could be raised 
in any other case? 
A. ·Yes, in my opinion, they were .. 
Q. Now, item 11 of Mr. Parker's account, the suit of Mary 
Ha.yes Guilfoil, Administratrix, in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, to recover 
assets in the l1ands of Adelaide . M. Grady Hayes : Do you 
recall now, from your reading· of tl1e record, wl1at happened 
in that case, generally? 
A. It was a proceeding brought by J.\tf rs. Guil-
page 620 } foil, as I recall it, to recover assets which she 
claimed Mrs. Hayes was illegally withholding, as 
I recall the nature of the case, and l\fr. Parker, I believe, 
made a plea to the jurisdiction of t.he court on the ground 
that 1\frs. Guilfoil had no rig·ht to maintain the suit down 
here in Virg-inia. That motion was argued and Mr. Parker's 
plea to the jurisdiction was overruled, but, as far as I know 
from the records here~ nothing further was done with that 
case until .J a.nuary, 1938~ when it was dismissed on Mr. Par, 
ker's· motion and with Mr. Heath's consent. 
Q. In arriving· at your figure, you considered what was 
done in that. case, did you? 
A. I did. 
Q. There was no evjclence taken in the case, was theref 
A. Not according to the record. . 
Q. In the next case in the District Court of the United 
States for the Eastern District of Virginia, what was tht~ 
nature of that suit. and t11e issue there? Do you recall Y 
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A. Well, that was an ac-.tion, as I recall it, brought by 
Mrs. Guilfoil in her capacity as administratrix from the 
Orange County Court. Mr. Parker made two objections to 
that, one on the ground that it was a probate proceeding of 
which the Federal Court had no jurisdiction, and 
page 621 ~ the other on the ground that-I think that was 
the only ground on which he made that, that it 
was a probate proceeding and the federal court had no juris-
diction. 
Q. Was any evidence taken in that ease 1 
A. No evidence was taken in tlrnt case, so far as the record 
shows. That case went by various stages to the United States 
Supreme Court and· the certiorari was denied. For that I 
allowed $1,500. 
Q. Was there any evidence taken in that case! 
A. Not according to the record. 
Q. So that the only issue was the jurisdiction of the court T 
A. As I read the record, I don't see any other issue in there. 
Q. Now, the third will contest in Princess Anne County~ 
What was the issue there? 
A. Well, the proceedings were to set aside the probate, 
and Mr. Parker put in two pleas, one that the statnt.e of 
limitations had run against the cause, my recollection being 
that tbe statute had been extended from one year to two 
years about that time. Then, the second g·round that he made 
was that she had no interest to maintain the proceedings, 
on the gTotmd that this decedent was domiciled in Virginia. 
and that all of the estate's personal property belonged to 
the widow under the Virginia law. r:rhe plea of 
page 622 ~ the statute of limitations was overruled and evi-
dence was taken on the other plea of whether 
or not Mr. Hayes was domiciled in Virginia and Mr. Parker 
was successful in establishin~ to the satisfaction of the court 
that }fr. Hayes ,vas domiciled in Virginia. 
Q. And how much did yon allow for that litigation? 
A. $1,000. I should have Raid tllere was an appeal from 
that decision and Mr. PnrkP.r was sustained on the appeal. 
Q. Did you urge !\fr. Parker to probate the will in New-
burgh? Did t'he question evPr come up f 
A. I Am quite Rnre tlrnt I did not. I have no record to 
show that nnd tl,ere iA no reason why I should Irnve done it. 
The only thing· I have is the letter to which I referred ahoui 
the ancillary proceedings. I don't recall anytl1ing about pro-
bating the will. 
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Q. Mr. Parker has m1-1de a cha.rg·e of $350 for services per-
formed in connection with the Newburgh property. What 
have you to say about that t 
A. Vv ell, I put that under the $4,000 charge for the ad-
ministration of the estate. Mr. Parker did perform servj.ce 
in connection with the Newburgh real estate in the various 
questions that came up with regard to, oh, the oil burner 
and the different tenants there and making certain repairs, 
and all that. While they were handled by IDP, 
page 623 ~ they were referred to Mr. Parker. If something 
came up there that I did not feel I had carte 
bla,nche to go ahead with it, I would refer it to Mr. Parker, 
and in due course l\fr .. Parker would send me back what I 
presume was Mrs. Hayes' view of what should be done. How-
ever, as far a.s drawing leases and interviewing the tenants 
and taking care of the items themselves that you have to do 
around a place, the real estate agent and myself did all of 
that work. I want to say, as I have said, that I referred every 
question that was neces~ary for decision to Mr. Parker. 
Q. Now, coming back to Mr. Parker's charge for services 
in respect to the litigation in New York, will you please state 
generally wl1at services Mr. Parker performed in connection 
with that litigation t 
A. After the litigation had heen instituted, Mr. Parker 
wrote me and asked me whether it was not my judgment that 
the case should be removed to the District Court, and after 
the correspondence about which I have already testified, it 
was decided to remove the case to the District Court. There-
after, in order to g·ain time, l\fr. Parker prepared the peti-
tion for removal and the removal bond and sent them up to 
me. The petition for removal was substantially in correct 
form; I only had to make some change in it to confonn to 
our practice. The bond I had sent down here, for various 
reasons, as I recall it, but he did prepare those 
page 624 ~ papers, and I then:went ahead ,:vith the argument 
of the motion. The: validity of t]1e petition was 
attacked by opposing counsel; they, claiming that it did not 
show jurisdictional facts, but' I :wa's· successful in upholding 
the petition as drawn by l\fr. Parker. Thereafter, I prepared 
the answer and the answer was submitted to Mr. Parker for 
his approval and with, I think, one minor ch~nge was· ap-
proved. We, about that time, associated the firm of Hunt, 
Hill & Betts with us for two reasons : In the :first plac.e, I felt 
that they were in New York City and l was some sixty miles 
up the river. They were dealing daily in federal court liti-
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gation, and I thought they would be better equipped to fol-
low the calendar and keep track of the progress of the litiga-
tion on the calendar than I would be. And in the second 
place, I would have to be a witness on the trial, and I felt 
that under those circumstances some proper man from some 
New York firm should conduct the case, rather than for me 
to conduct it and examine myself. They were retained, and 
from then on there was a. sort of round-about between Mr. 
Parker and Hunt, Hill & Betts and myself. We sent papers 
back and forth for approval a11,d conunent. Mr. Parker passed 
on, as far as I know, about every paper that was submitted 
in the case. 
Q. About the stipulation that was finally entered into: Do 
you know about that personally, or does Mr. 
page 625 ~ Meagher know? 
A. Mr. Meagher might better testify. I know 
about it second.band. I do know that the stipulation was 
originally prepared by Mr. Meagher, and Mr. Parker insisted 
on some changes in it, which changes were incorporated be-
fore the stipulation was signed. 
Q. I believe you have already testified as to the charge 
you made in connection with that litig·ation, haven't you t 
A. Yes. 
Q. As I understand, the total charge that was made by 
you and Mr. Meagher, of the office of Hunt, IIill & Betts, was 
about $1,250? 
A. Well, to get that figure, my total charge for all the 
services to :Mrs. Hayes was about a thousand dollars, but a 
part of that was .for coming down here to testify in the Prin-
cess Anne County suit and another part was for lay work, 
you might call it, in connection with the Newburgh real es-
tate, and the other part was for work in connection with the 
federal court litigation. My estimate is that that part of 
the litig·ation would be about five or six hundred dollars. It 
is not divided that way in my bill at all. 
Q. Did you make a charge for investigations at Newburgh 
and the depositions which were determined upon? 
. A. I made a charge of $150 for coming down 
pag·e 626 ~ here to Princess Anne County to testify and for 
the little preliminary work that I had to do in 
connection with that trip. That is the only specific charge 
that was made by me throughout the case. That is the only 
definite item I could pick out and say was definitely, distinctly 
for that purpose. 
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Q. Well, you did make an investigation in .Newburgh after 
]\fr. Hayes died, did you noU 
A.. Yes, I did. 
Q. What sort of investigation was that? · 
A. I talked to two or three potential witnesses and ob-
tained statements from some of them. I talked to the other 
witness to the will, Miss Ryan, who li~ed next door to Father 
Hayes, and made some examination of the law which seemed 
to me necessary. 
Q. But you did not make any specific charge for that work 7 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. You also attended on taking depositions, did you not?. 
A. Yes, I attended on the taking of depositions the day 
Mr. Parker was there and attended the taking of the depo-
sition of Miss Goodman another day when. Mr. Parker _was 
not there. 
Q. In a statement whieh has been marked in evidence,. 
which shows total disbursements of $12,965.71; 
page 627 } there appear several items that were paid to you, 
one for $52.65, another for $300, an'd still another 
for $9·60.88. Those items, as I understand, covered disburse-
ments, as well as fees f · 
A. Thev did. 
Q. Are~ you able to say, roughly, Mr. 'Bennett, about how 
many letters you received from Mr. Parker with respect to 
the Newburgh real estate? 
A. With respect to the Newburgh· real estate? 
Q. Yes. 
A. No. 
Q. Mr. Bennett, why did you group items 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 
14, 15, and 161 
A. Well, because-
1\Ir. Parker: He has answered that once, I think. 
The Commissioner: He went into it very fully, I think. 
By l\f r. Lanning! 
·Q. On page 5 under Item 13 of Mr. Parker's account, this 
statement appears: ''Counsel attended the taking of these 
depositions and spent several days in N ewburg·h in further 
investigation and consultation.'' ·what have you to say about 
that statement, Mr. Bennett? 
A. What date was that? 
Q. It is in his aecount. 
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A. The records show that Mr. Parker was ·in 
page 628 ~ Newburgh on April 16, 1936, and on the next day 
he was in New York, and that on the 18th, the· 
following day, he was in Norfolk. At least, I received a let-
ter dated at Norfolk on the 18th. 
Q~ Then; according to your records, he was not in New-
burgh for several days on that occasion t 
A. No, sir. 
Q. In the second parag,:aph of the same page it is stated 
that he ,vent to Newburgh in July, 1936, to take the depo-
sition of :Mae L. Goodman. Did he take that deposition, or 
did yon take it¥ 
A. I took it. 
Q. Now, Mr. Bennett, have yon ever handled an estate in 
which there was litigation comparable to the litigation in 
this case? 
A. I have handled an estate in which there was litigation,. 
nothing like this litigation, but I will say in regard to the 
importance of the issues involved and the risk run by the 
clients, it was certainly comparable to it. 
Q. Will you state what estate that was, if you don't mind,. 
and what litigation was involved there and how much money? 
A. I might say that that case covered my views abou.t what 
the fee ought to be in this case, naturally, because it covered 
the same period of time when this estate was in process. 
T1iat was the estate of the late Marian L. Borden,. 
page 629 ~ one of tl1e Borden Milk Company people, and the 
estate was appraised at $2,000,000. Due to the 
fact that one of the executors was Miss Borden's brother and 
owner of a large bloc.k of the Borden stock, he felt very sure 
that the stock was an excellent security to hold, and althoug·h 
it was worth $74 a share at the time of her death, he and the 
other executor held onto it while it went down to seventeen 
or eighteen dollars a share, and in doing so they lost $900,000 
to the estate. My uncle and Mr. Borden w·ere sued for $900,-
000 as the result of this loss and I was compelled to clef end 
that suit and was opposed by about a dozen New York City 
firms representing various leg·atees who received various 
amounts under the will, which apparently they were not go-
ing to g·et. That litigation was heard on four different oc-
casions in the Surrogate Court of Ulster County, an ad-
joining county. I don't know what the outcome would 
eventually have been, although the Surrogate intimated he 
would have ruled in our favor. Due to good fortune, they 
still had the stock when the NRA agitation came on, and 
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the stock shot up to $38 a share and the executors sold enough 
to pay the general legatees in full, so all of the contestants 
withdrew. We had obtained the consent of the residuary 
legatees, early in the ·case, to hold this stock, so we defeated 
them on their contention by producing this con-
page 630 ~ sent and that 'was the end of that particular liti-
gation. 
Then, we had an action in that same case to throw out the 
entire residuary estate on the ground that it was an invalid 
trust, and I was faced in that by Ernest Angell, who has since 
been chief counsel for the Security ~Jxchange in New York. 
And there was litig·ation concerning the boundaries of the 
property. One of the devises made there was simply de-
scribed as ''all the land on the west side of the lake'', which 
left room for a lot of imagination as to where it was. ·when 
it was all throug·h, about a million dollars in assets were dis-
tributed, and I received a fee of $30,000 in that case, which 
represented approximately the amount of executors' com-
missions. There was opposition to the payment of the ex-
eeutors' commissions because of this large loss, but the court 
finally allowed them about $25,000, and I was allowed $30,000 
for my services in that case. 
Q. As I understand, you were employed by the executors, 
were you not¥ 
A. i was employed by the executors. 
Q. \Vere there any other attorneys? 
A. I had no associate counsel of any sort-excuse me, I 
want to correct that: I did have associated with me in the 
litigation regarding the validity of the trust, the 
page 631 ~ attorneys for the residuary legatees. They. were 
associated in that partfoular litigation with me, 
not the other. 
Q. How long a period of time did that litigation cover? 
A. Well, :Miss Borden died in September, 1930, and the final 
deci·ee was entered in 1934. However, the litigation of the 
suit for $900,000 was not instituted until 1932, and was ter-
minated in 1934. 
CROSS EXAl\HNATlON. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. 1\Ir. Bennett, in estimating the value of a lawyer's serv-
ices, what criteria are you guided by? 
A. Well, I use several criteria: The value of the estate 
or fund in dispute, the amount of time consumed, the difficulty 
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of the legal questions presented, and the number of litigations, 
and so on. 
Q. And the professional standing and competence of the 
attorney involved? 
A. That is true. 
Q. All of those enter into what would be a reasonable fee 
in a given matter? 
A. That is true. 
Q. You have grouped a number of these items as pre-
sented by Mr. Parker into one, namely, Items 1, 
page 632 ~ 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 14, 15, and 16, and you have said that 
you considered that all of those could properly 
be considered as routine estate services for which a fee ap-
proximating the fee allowed by law to the executor would be 
proper to be paid to the attorney; is that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Do you think the probate of the will, then, goes along 
with the duties of the personal representative after the pro-
bate and ought to. be included as assimilated to the fee that 
is due to the executor t 
A. Well, in the particular case, there is no separate charge, 
in my own experience, for the probating of the will; that is 
all part of the ordinary administration. In this particular 
case, there were some items involved in the probate of this 
will which do not ordinarily appear. I think I have allowed 
for those in my allowance for the first will contest of a thou-
sand dollars. In other words, that covered preparation, de-
ciding where to probate the will, and so on. 
Q. Well, let us take it from this standpoint: Let us as-
sume that we have an estate of $100,000 all of which is rep-
resented by deposits in bank; a personal representative col-
lects that $100,000 and distributes it in accordance with the 
provisions of the testamentary instrument; under the . Vfr.. 
ginia practice, he would get five per cent of the 
page 633 ~ amount. :Now, do you think that in that case an 
attorney representing· the personal representa-
tive ought to get $5,000¥ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. On the other hand, we may haye a case in which there 
are any number of troublesome questions on which a per-
sonal representative, unless he be himself a lawyer, is bound 
to consult counsel. Those questions or problems that are pre-
sented to the personal representative necessitate study and 
preparation on the part of counsel and, perhaps, some ap-
pearances in comt on the part of counsel. Do you think that 
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counsel in that case ought to be held down, no matter what 
the difficulties, to the same amount counsel would g·et in the 
case of the estate with $100,000 in cash? . 
A. Well, you h~ve to elaborate that a little. If there is 
.additional litigation, there should be additional compensation, 
and I have allowed for that. 
Q. Let us leave out the litigation. Let us say there are a 
number of problems-problems as to the retention of securi-
ties, whether it is legal to retain the securities or not; there 
are problems connooted with the bond of the personal repre-
sentative and whether or not the surety on that bond is en-
titled to be relieved; there are also problems with regard to 
certain real estate and what the duty of the per-
page 634} sonal representative is with regard to continuing 
payments on real estate under the given circum-
-stances; there are investments included in the estate assets 
of a very troublesome character that have to be looked into 
and nursed and investigated, and decisions have to be made 
as to what is to be done about them; there are tax matters 
to be decided; and there are a number of miscellaneous serv-
ices, all of which take up a great deal of that lawyer's time 
and involve responsibility in reaching decisions; do you still 
think that lawyer ought to get the same thing as the lawyer 
who had the $100,000 estate in cash? 
A. That is a long question, but my answer would be this: 
In an estate of fairly good size where the executor's com-
mission is a substantial amount, my practice, at least, is that 
I take the bitter with the sweet. In other words, if it is a. 
case where I have to do a larg·e amount of work, I get the 
same fee. That is a "rule of thumb'' method that works 
out to your disadvantage in some cases and to your ad-
vantag·e in others, and I follow it, myself, rather religiously. 
Q. Then, it is more or less a gamble, when you are repre-
senting a testamentary fiduciary in New York State, whether 
you have to do anything or whether you have considerable 
services to render, and you charg·e the same thing in either 
ev·ent? 
page 635 ~ A. If it is a bank account, under your hypothe-
sis, and the commissions are $5,000, I would 
charge a fee of $5,000 even if I didn't have to do anything 
but go through the motions, as you might say, of settling up 
the estate. If there were the details you mentioned, I would 
still think that $5,000, in these days, anyway, is a good fee 
and I would figure I ought to do that work for that fee. Now, 
if you come down to a very small estate, where the _commis-
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sions are very small, say an estate of $10,000 where, under 
our practice, the commissions would be only $250 or $300, and 
I had all those problems you have mentioned., I would not 
charge just the executor's commissions; I would charge more,. 
but as you go up the scale1 I would adopt a different method. Q. Now, assuming an est.ate of considerable size, we will 
take $100,000 in round figures: You are representing the 
personal representative, executrix or administrator, and it 
is necessary to 1i~igate a disputed claim and to gather evi-
dence and to look into the law applicable to it; do you think 
that any additional charge should be made in that casei 
A. In a $100,000 estate t 
Q. Yes. 
A. I do not. 
Q. You would undertake the litigation, then, for 
pag·e 636 ~ the same $5,000? 
A. For the $5,000 I would be very glad to 
handle the disputed claim in the estate. 
Q. You sort of average them up, then, don't you¥ As you 
say, you take the bitter with the sweet¥ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And one man gets off light ancl the other man gets off 
pretty heavy, considering the amount of fee to be charged f 
A. That is true. 
Q. So, your criteria, the amount of work done, the amount 
of time involved, the amount of responsibility involved, do 
not appear to apply to your practice in probate matters, do 
they? 
A. In probate matters my fee is pretty generally covered 
by the amount of the estate, whether it is a large amount 
of work or a small amount of work. 
Q. I say, those criteria you mentioned just now are not ap-
plied in probate matters f 
A. Not in the particular probate matters, no. 
Q. Now, you allowed, as I recall it, $500.00 as a fair and 
reasonable fee to Mr. Parker for his services in connection 
with the effort of the National Surety Company to be re-
lieved as surety on Mrs. Hayes' bond Y 
A. That is right. 
page 637 ~ Q. Do you know what the law is in Virginia 
about the right of a surety to apply to the court 
to be relieved from further responsibility on the bond? 
A. Not except what I got from the record here-the arg11-
ments of counsel, and so on, before the Commissioner here 
before. 
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Q. What do you understand it to be? 
A. I understand that counsel took different positions. One 
of them was that the surety could not get off, the other was 
that it could. I don't know which is correct. 
Q. Let us proceed on the assumption that the surety had 
a right to be relieved, not as to matters before the order 
granting the relief, but as to all future transactions. You 
know that when this application was made by this surety, 
or rather, to be more accurate about it, that the surety in-
timated that it was going to make application to be relieved, 
it was very shortly after the qualification, wasn't itf 
A.. ·So I understand from what I read here. 
~- You have read Mr. Taylor Johnson's testimony, have 
you nott 
A.. That is the man who knew about the Straus bonds, and 
so forth? 
Q. No, he was the man representing the National Surety 
Company. 
page 638 ~ A . .Oh, yes, I did. 
Q. He testified that if the Surety Company had 
been successful in being relieved as surety on Mrs. Hayes' 
bond that, in his judgment,. it would have been absolutely im-
possible for Mrs. Hayes to have obtained other surety. 
A. I did read that. 
Q. Now, assuming that that testimony is correct, what do 
you think would have happened with regard to the estate 
after the court had relieved the National Surety Company 
as surety on this bond? 
A. The only thing I know, as Mr. Parker testified him-
self, as I understand it, the securities would have been, pre-
sumably, deposited in court, or a certain amount of securities 
would have been deposited in court. 
Q. In other words, a receiver or a curator of the estate 
would have been appointed and 1\frs. Hayes would have been 
discharged as executrix, so far as any further duties were 
concerned, and she would not have had any control ,vhatever 
over the estate nor would she have been entitled to any in-
come from the estate until this litig·ation was concluded? 
A. I can't go all that way with you. I don't know all of 
that. 
Q. Yv ell, oblige me, if you will, by assuming that would 
have happened, it would have been a very serious 
page 639 } situation to her, would it not f 
A. It would depend on whether she had any 
other assets on which she could depend. 
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Q. At any rate, it would have resulted in tying up the 
estate until the end of this protracted and extensive litiga-
tion·¥ 
A. That is my understanding of that. I know nothing ex-
cept what Mr. Parker testified here. 
Q. As it was, Mrs. Hayes was enabled to use the assets of 
the estate for her living expenses, for the expenses of this 
litigation, and for the completion of the house at Virginia 
Beach, according to the records. Is that in accordance with 
your recollection of it? 
A. Yes, that is. 
Q. Now, if she had-been unable to use the assets for those 
purposes, she would have been considerably embarrassed, 
would she not? 
A. I think she would. 
Q. In addition to that, the record appears to show that 
Mr. Parker made himself liable personally to the surety 
company for any diversion of funds for unlawful purposes. 
Assuming that that is correct, if this litigation had been 
terminated unsuccessfully from Mrs. Hayes' standpoint, not 
only she but Mr. Parker would have been personally liable 
to replace any of the money that had been used 
pag·e 640 ~ for her purposes, would they not? 
A. Well, if you say that is so-that he made 
himself personally liable-it would have to follow that if 
there was a diversion, he would be legally liable. I don't know 
they a re the facts. 
Q. Assuming those facts are correct and that conclusion is, 
correct, that personal liability, under the circumstances, was 
a rather serious liability to undertake, was it not 7 
A. On that assumption it would seem so. 
Q. Now, gTanting· that liability was assumed and that Mrs. 
Hayes ,·vas relieved from the tying up of this estate in 
the hands of a curator or receiver over a period of about 
four years and was enabled to use the funds of the estate 
for her living expenses, for the completion of her house, 
and for the expenses of this litigation, do you still think that 
$500 was a reasonable fee to Mr. Parker for llis· services that 
he performed in that connection? 
A. I think so, and I will tell you why if you want to know. 
Q. J would be glad to know. 
A. I am accustomed to doing the same thing, myself, in 
that respect. I am frequently appointed a~ent of the surety 
company to conntersig"n cl1ecks as the representative of the 
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surety company and I am responsible to the 
pag·e 641 } surety company if I permit checks to be drawn 
and signed by the executrix or administratrix for 
her own account or some other improper purpose. That hap-
pens very frequently and I never think of making an extra 
eharge for it. 
Q. I agree with you thoroughly when you say you coun-
tersign checks and know exac.tly what the checks are being 
used for, in a case in which the estate is not at issue or the 
will is not being disputed, that an attorney really takes very 
little risk if he is ,careful and if he knows what he is doing, 
but don't you agree with me that the circumstances here 
were a little different? 
A. Yes, I think they were. 
Q. There was litigation pending and nobody ·could fore-
see with any degree of certainty what the ultimate outcome 
of that litigation would be. Now, under those cireumstances, 
every payment that was made to or on behalf of Mrs. Hayes 
was a payment of which there was a very real possibility that 
they might be called upon to make good, was it not? 
A. I understand it was, from the statement you have made 
here. · 
Q . .And you still think, given those circumstances, that $500 
was reasonable for the servic.es? . 
A. I think it is a substantial sum of money, myself. 
Q. Well, unquestionably it is, and so is five dollars for 
eertain services, but what we are trying to get 
}Jagoe 642 ~ at is, not whether a sum of money is substantial, 
but whether it is adequate for ,certain services. 
A. I cau 't get away from the fact that there .are other 
charg·es to be taken into consideration, and when you get all 
through, the sum total bears some relation to the value of 
the estate and the value of the services rendered. 
Q. I unquestionably agree with you that far. 
Let us get to the first will contest in the Cireuit Court of 
Princess Anne County. You have allowed Mr. Parker a 
thousand dollars for his services in that regard and, if I 
recollect your testimony correctly, you said that in allowing 
that fee you had taken into consideration the value of the 
estate at risk, which you put at about $40,000 did you not? 
A. About thirty...;five to forty thonsa:pd dollars. 
Q. That is eorrect, isn't it? 
A. Yes, that is correct. 
Q . .As I recollect your testimony, you arrived at the value 
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of the estate by putting the total yalue of the estate at some 
eighty-odd thousand dollars 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then, upon the assumption that the domicile of the tes-
tator was in New York, the wife, in any event, you say, would 
have received one-half of the estate plus ten thousand dol-
lars 1 
page 643 ~ A. VVould have received ten thousand dollars 
plus one-half of the remainder. 
Q. That is right. And that the residue was what was at 
issue? 
A. Yes, that is right. 
Q. Now, do you know what the law of descent and distri-
bution is in Virginia. t 
A. Only what I am told by these Virginia lawyers. I un-
derstand it to be that the widow would get the whole estate. 
Q. The widow of an intestate, no children by the marriage 
being· alive, would get the entfre estate. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Well, in that case, there would not be anything at is-
sue, would there, according to your calculations Y 
A. No, if Mr. Hayes' domicile was established, I would 
say it would not make any difference whether the will was 
probated or not. 
Q. As a matter of fact, I understood you to say there was 
very little question about the validity of the marriage? 
A. I said I had formed the opinion that the marriage could 
not be attacked, and I understood Mr. Parker had very little 
doubt about the validity of the marriage. 
Q. Upon the assumption that you have made, that the mar-
riage could not be successfully attacked, if the 
page 644 ~ domicile of this decedent was in Virginia, there 
was nothing at stake,. and Mr. Parker was per-
forming· a perfectly futile g·esture in contesting the will, 
wasn't heY 
A. If you want to go that far, but I am allowing him a 
thousand dollars because he prepared for all this work and 
got ready .for it. I assume that if there was a contest it was 
his duty to defend it. 
Q. That is true so far as it goes, but if a Ia,vyer undertakes 
a lot of preparation and spends a lot of time on services that 
don't benefit his client in the sligl1test degree, would you give 
him a thousand dollars for doing it, or wouldn't you, ratlier, 
say, as a lawyer, '' No, it doesn't make any difference and I 
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am not going to charg·e you a big fee for performing- services 
that don't result in a penny "s worth of benefit to you''? 
A. Well, I think the value of the services, whether they 
result in benefit to the client, is an element to be taken into 
consideration, but I think in this case it was probably right 
and p_roper for Mr. Parker to do what he did do here-to pre-
pare for this and to oppose it. 
Q. ·well, certainly, then, you did not take into considera- · 
tion when you set this fee of a thousand dollars that the 
amount in controversy was approximately thirty-fiye to forty 
thousand dollars, assuming that the domicile of the testator 
was in Virginia t . . 
page 645 ~ A. No, I don't think that the admission of the 
will to probate, or the failure to admit the will 
to pro bate, would make any great cli:frerence to Mrs. Hayes 
if she could establish marriage and establish domicile here .. 
Q. But domicile was not established until the very last part 
of these proceedings, was it f 
A. It was established, as I understand it, in the third will 
contest in Princess Anne County. 
Q. It was at the winding up of all the litigation of the es-
tate, wasn't iU 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. So that you did not apply the criterion of the amount 
at stake, necessarily, in putting this thousand dollar fee down, 
because the amount at stake in Virginia certainly was notb-
ing? 
A. I felt that if Mr. Parker did succeed in this will contest 
and got a final adjudication from the Circuit ·Court of Prin-
cess Anne County, which I understand is the court having 
jurisdiction of the probate of the will of a resident of Vir-
g-inia. Beach, that the contest would have been all over, and 
that was a g·ood job and that he should have a thousand dol-
lars for it. I don't think I did have $36,000 in mind par-
ticular Iv when I mentioned that amount. 
Q. -wi.1at you fixed that amount for was the amount of la-
bor exerted and t.he intelligence and skill that Mr. 
page 646 }- Parker bad to display in preparing for a trial 
which never actually took place? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Irrespective of what. was involved there? 
A. That is true. 
Q. Let us get to the suit in the State of New York to set 
aside the deed conveyh)g the Newburgh real estate. You 
I1ave allowed Mr. Parker a fee of a thousand dollars, I think, 
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for that. ,vhat do you understand the value of the New-
burgh real estate to be, Mr. Bennett Y 
A. Well, I believe it was officially appraised in this pro-
ceeding at $8,500, which L consider a very low appraisal. I 
think, myself, it is worth about $15,000, possibly a little 
more. 
Q. That was an appraisal for tax purposes, I imagine7 
A. I assume that was the idea, yes. 
Q. It is a small apartment house, isn ''t iU 
A. Yes. 
Q. How many apartments are there in it 7 
-A. I think there are three apartments in it. 
Q. Now, that was a proceeding instituted by Mrs. Guilfoil 
to set asiqe a deed which Father Hayes, in his lifetime, had 
given to Mrs. Hayes for this property, on the ground that 
. he was mentally incompetent to execute the deed and that it 
was procured by undue influence; is that right? 
page 647 ~ A. That is. right. 
Q. So, there was $15,000 at stake there, accord-
ing to your appraisal of the fair value of the property? 
A. No, I would not· say there was. I would say there was 
only about six or seven thousand dollars there. 
Q. I understand what you mean-taking the inheritance 
law into consideration 1 · 
A. That is right. 
Q. But the value of the property was $15,000? 
A. That is right. 
Q. Now, your fee there was :finally six or seven hundred 
dollars, as you can ,best estimate it, and the fee of Hunt, HiH 
& Betts was about six hundred dollars 1 
A. $750. 
Q. The leading counsel in that litigation was Mr. Parker, 
who associated you with him, and you and he in turn associ-
ated with yourselves Hunt, Hill & Betts; that is correct, isn't 
it? 
A. That is right. 
Q. It was Mr. Parker's suggestion in the first place that 
an attempt be made to remove this suit from Orange County 
to the District Court of the United States for the Southern 
District of N cw York, was it not f 
A. Yes, it was. 
page 648 ~ Q. In your judgment, was that a wise move? 
A. I think it was. 
Q. He was hoping· to get a much less prejudiced forum in 
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New York City in a district court than he would in the state 
court in Orange County, was he not f 
A. No, I don't know about that, but I think the atmosphere 
of the trial in ~ ew York City would have been better than it 
was up there. 
Q. Well, I think that is another way of stating it. 
A. No, I don't think we would have had a prejudiced .jury. 
Q. Perhaps I was unfortunate in the choice of expression; 
J)erhaps you expressed my thought better than I did. .As a 
matter of fact, after that suit was removed, nothing was done· 
more than the filing of pleadings, and it remained on the 
calendar subject to this stipulation until the conclusion of 
the Ii tigation in Virginia f 
A.. No, there was something done. I think Mr. Meagher 
can testify more about that than I can, but he was prepared 
f.or trial. 
Q. But, I mean, as to court proceedings 1 
A. That is true. 
Q. You understand counsel have to familiarize themselves· 
with the law involved in the matted 
A.. And examine witnesses, too. 
})ag·e 649 } Q. If you are cons-cientious about it, it requires 
good, solid work! 
A. Most of the preparation of the case for trial, as far as 
I know, was done by Mr. Meagher. I didn't do much of 
that. 
Q. 1N ow, whose idea was the stipulation f 
A. It was not mine; I don't know whether it was Mr. 
Parker's or )Ir. Meagher's; I think it was Mr. Parker's, but 
I think Mr. :VIeagher can testify better about that. 
Q. Assuming it was Mr. Parker's idea, the stipulation was 
a stroke that was extremely favorable to Mrs. Hayes, was 
it not? 
A. The stipulation as it was finally drawn was very fa-
vorable to Mrs. Hayes. 
Q. The effect of it was that, if the effect of the termination 
of the Virginia litigation was favorable to Mrs. Hayes, the 
suit should be dismissed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If it was unfavorable to Mrs. Hayes, there was no preju-
dice to her proceeding to defend that suit in New York-that 
was about the size of that stipulation? 
A. That is true. . 
Q. So that the outcome of the New York suit was deter-
mined by the outcoll!.e of the litigation in Virginia T 
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A. Yes, that is right. 
page 650 ~ Q. It was Mr. Parker's idea, you say, to trans-
fer the case, in the first place, as well as you recol-
lect, subject to Mr. Meagher's correction, and it was his idea 
to have the stipulation enteredf 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it was his efforts in the conduct of the case in Vir-
ginia that decided the outcome of this suit in New Yorkf 
A. At least, the stipulation was so drawn that the stipu-
lation had to decid~ that if it was favorable to Mrs. Haves·. 
Q. Now, you, as -a practicing lawyer, realize that very of ten 
the outcome of litigation is determined by the initial decision 
of counsel to pursue a certain line of conduct. Let me am-
plify that a little: You have a case presented to you and there 
are several Jines of procedure which suggest themselves to 
you; yon I1ave to make the decision. as to which of those lines 
of procedure you may pursue. If you pursue one, that leads 
to success; if yon pursue another, it may in the beginning 
look quite or almost as favorable as the first, but you may 
find obstacles looming up in your way, and a great deal de-
pends upon the wisdom of counsel in the very beginning and 
in having the courage to select between several possible 
courses of procedure, and selecting the right one; that is a 
fact, is it not'f 
page 651 } A. That is right, surely. 
Q. And that is a responsibility which can best 
be exercised by one who, before lie decides wI1at he is going 
to do, makes necessary research into the law and acts, not 
by guess, but with his eyes open as to the possible conse-
quences of these various possibilities; that is true, isn't it 6l 
A. Certainly. 
Q. You think that should be compensated, do you noU 
A. Surely. 
Q. Now, you think that for Mr. Parker's responsibility,. 
his services, his decision to transfer the case from the state 
eourt to the federal court, and his services ·with regard tq 
the stipulation and the property upon ,vhich this attack was 
being made, are worth only. a thousand doUars? 
A. Yes. 
·Q. All rig·ht; we come back to the application of Mary 
Hayes Guilfoil for letters of administration in Orange 
County, New York. Now, if I correctly understood your tes-
timon1r in chief, it was tlrnt Mr. Parker was of the opinion 
that it was unwise to contest those proceedings on the part 
of Mrs. Hayes, or for her to appear in the proceedings in 
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the New York state court, and that you were in accord with 
that, although you were of the opinion that a spe-
pag;e 652 ~ cial appearance would not have done any particu-
. lar harm; that is about the ·size of iU 
A. I am of the opinion that special appearance would not 
have any particular harm, but I don't think I ever said that 
to Mr. Parker, or wrote it to him. ·That is my view of the 
µiatter now, but I am quite sure I was in accord with him 
throughout, and that his original decision not to appear was 
right. 
Q. I also remember your saying, I think, that you did· not 
think a general appearance would haye done a:riy particular 
amount of harm f 
A. L don't believe it would. 
Q. If there bad been a general appearance, it could hardly 
have been made effective without the physical appearance 
of Mrs. Hayes, could it f 
A. No. 
Q. Well, if she had g·one to New York, there she would 
have made herself liable to the service of process in the State 
of New York, would she not? 
A. Of course. 
Q. And it is conceivable that a personal judgment might 
thereafter have been obtained against her, requiring her to 
deliver up all the assets that she had in her custody in the 
State of Virginia, is it not? 
A. It is conceivable, yes. 
page 653 ~ Q. And if she had made a general appearance, 
then, that is a conceivable result which might 
have flowed from her physical appearance in the State of 
New York, isn't iU 
A. That is, yes. 
Q. Well, do you think that, in a situation with an estate 
of this size at risk and the lawyer having to make a decision 
about that which might have had the consequences which we 
have just discussed, a fee of $500 is sufficient for him to make 
that decision and adyise his client with regard to that, too f 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Now, we come to the suit of Mary Hayes Guilfoil, Ad-
ministratrix, in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia to recover assets in the hands 
of Adelaide M. Hayes. That was a proceeding in equity, 
brought by Mrs. Guilfoil upon the theory that she had been 
duly appointed administratrix of all the goods and chattels 
of "\Villiam R. Hayes, deceased, hy the Probate Court of 
• 
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Orange County, New York, and that all the assets of the es-
tate were in the hands of one, Adelaide M. Grady Hayes, who 
was unlawfully withholding them from the duly constituted 
administratrix. ·Now, if that proceeding had been successful 
from the standpoint of the complainant, the whole of the es-
tate would have been transferred out of Mrs. Hayes' hands 
into the hands of Mrs. Guilfoil; that is correct, 
page 654 ~ is it not? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Well, that was the object of the suit, and if it had been . 
successful and that object had been accomplished, that result 
would necessarily have followed, would it not? · 
A. I would presume so, yes. 
Q. So that it involved a suit on the administration of the 
whole estate? 
A. Yes, I would say so. 
Q. Well, you will agree with me, will you not, that the fa-
vorable outcome of a lawsuit does not always depend u:pon 
the examination of witnesses and the conduct of a trial-that 
'' There are more ways of killing· a dog than choking him to 
death with melted butter,"' and more ways of winning a law-
suit than going through a trial and having a jury verdict t 
A. That is a fact. 
Q. And ve·ry often suits are won by the maneuvering and 
strategy of counsel, aren't they? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, l\fr. Parker was successful in keeping this case 
on the docket of the court and maneuvering so that it never 
came to trial until the time had expired when any contest of 
this Virginia qualific~ tion could be made-do you follow 
met · 
page 655 ~ A. Yes. 
Q. A contest, under the Virgfaia statute, can 
only be made within a limited time after the probate of the 
will. Now, Mrs. Guilfoil was faced with this: Either she had 
to rely entirely upon her suit brought in her capacity as New 
York administratrix, or she had to contest in some forum the 
probate of the will in Virginia. Now, Mr. Parker, by dilatory 
tactics, had prevented this suit of Mrs. Guilfoil in her ca-
pacity as administratrix coming to any decision or being· in a 
condition upon the docke~ of coming· to a decision until that 
period of limitation bad almost expired, thereby making it 
imperative for Mrs. Guilfoil to proceed in the Virginia ~ourts, 
state or federal or .both, to contest the probate of the will. 
Do you think that was good legal strategy? 
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A. Yes. I don't see any record in this case that that hap-
pened. If that is what happened, I think it was very good 
strategy. 
Q. I think the record shows that is what happened. Now, 
·so far as Mrs. Hayes was concerned, -she was just as much 
benefitted if that suit was terminated s.uceessfully to her be-
cause of subsequent haJ)pening which were engineered by 
Mr. Parker as she was if the case had gone through to a 
hearing and final deeree, was she not? 
page 656 } A. Yes, the eventual outcome was the. same. 
Q. So, it is simply a question of what counsel 
considers the tactical advantage, or what we might -call "le-
gal maneuvering''; the favorable outcome is what benefits the. 
olient, is it not T 
A. Yes, of course. 
Q. Assuming that Mr. Parker had done that-that he had 
made a very exhaustive search of the law of the case, not 
only on the dilatory plea which he put in, but of the sub-
stantive law on the merits of the c.ase, which, as you very 
properly stated just now, has to be done anyhow, and' had 
accomplished the favorable outcome of the case, do you think 
that, with the whole estate and the administration of the whole 
estate involved, five thousand dollars is a reasonable fee for 
those services f _ 
A. No; if the suit had the outcome. which you say, of which 
I have no evidence in anything- I have seen here, I would say 
that the suit was worth more than a thousand dollars. 
Q. How much more? 
A. ·well, I would say it wa.s worth another thousand dol-
lars. 
Q. Now, we come to the second will contest in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, 
for whioh you have allowed Mr. Parker $1,500. 
pag·e 657 } That was a pure contest of probate that was in-
stituted in the federal forum, rather thari in the 
state forum. Now, I assume that you, in the course of your 
experience, as most of us have, have had cases in which you 
felt that on certain phases of the case your factual situation 
was weak? In other words, that there might be a pretty 
dang·erous attack made upon the will on certain phases of 
the case, upon the facts? 
A. Yes. · 
Q. In such case, a competent lawyer will try . to avoid an 
.issue upon that factual issue on which he feels himself to be 
weak, will he not? 
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· A. I think so. 
Q. Mr. Parker has te.stified, and it is in evidence here, that 
he considered the weakest point in his case was the testimony 
which could be brought to bear .by the contestants upon the 
mental capacity of ~,ather Hayes at the time this will was 
made; that there was evidence of which he knew, part of 
which had been reduced to depositions and part of which 
had not, which made him feel that if that issue was ever 
squarely presented, he had a dangerous case. Assuming that 
Mr. Parker is a capable lawyer, which, I think, may be con-
ceded, and that he did feel that that was the situation, you 
will a{?;ree with me, won't you, in saying that he would be 
well advised to so conduct his case, if possible, as 
page 658 ~ to avoid meeting that issue t 
A. Obviously. 
Q. A good deal of testimony has· been broug·ht to bear in 
this case previously upon the fact that this so-called '' second 
will.contest" in the United States Court never got to the point 
where any evidence was introduced. Now, if a lawyer is able 
so to conduct his case as to avoid a contest on the evidence 
on whicl:i he feefa that he is weak, and get a successful out-
come of his case without g·oi.ng into a dangerous evidentiary 
situation, he has perf 011ued a distinct service to his client, 
has he not? 
A. Unquestionably so. 
Q. The record shows that in this case Mr. Parker did suc-
-cessfully avoid coming· to· issue upon the point upon which 
he felt his case was weak. He conducted the case right 
straight through on the question of jurisdiction. Now, are 
you familiar with the legal aspect of the situation ,vith re-
gard to whether or not this was actually a case inter partes 1 
or whether it was a continuation of a probate proceeding? 
A. I read some cases that Mr. Parker, sometime ago, sent 
up to me, and the question was an open-and-shut problem; it 
was a pretty clear question. 
Q. It was a pretty clear question that it was not free from 
difficulty 1 
A. It was not free from difficulty, or it would 
page 659 ~ not have gotten as far as it did go. 
Q. That question was litigated through the Dis-
trict Court of the United States for the Eastern District of 
Virginia, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit, and a petition for certiorari was filed by Mrs. Guilfoil 's 
counsel, which was denied by the Supreme Court of the 
United States; that was three courts in which that litigation 
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was fought. Ta.king into consideration the fact that Mr.· 
Parker at first devised a method of fighting that case which 
would avoid coming to gTips on a factual issue upon which 
he thought he was weak; that ·lie successfully convinced three 
courts that this was not a federal question, and that the fed-
eral courts lacked jurisdiction, under the peculiar statutes 
of Virginia affecting· probate; and that he accomplished ex-
actly the same result for his client as if he had gone through 
a trial on the merits and had gotten a verdict of the jury 
in his favor, supported by a judgment, three courts being 
involved, don't you think that $1,500 is a little light as a fee 
for those services? 
A. I would say it would be if this were the only litigation 
here; if you did nothing else in the estate, and you were re-
tained to handle the litigation of this sort, and you carried 
it through to a successful conclusion, I would say that $1,500 
was not enough, but I would say, where it was 
page 660 ~ one of several litigations you had been handling 
for the same parties, presenting for the most part 
not any different questions, although this was a different 
question, that you should take that into consideration in fix-
ing the fee. I based that $1,500 partly ~n that consideration. 
Q. I think I appreciate what you mean there, but don't 
you think that the situation here was one that, in one sense, 
l\fr. Parker could not control? He was faced with a lawver 
who, I think this record shows, was about as fertile in ·re-
source as any of whom I ever knew and who continuously 
made fresh forays and attacks upon him from every angle, 
so that, as far a.s he was concerned, he simply had to repel 
those attacks when they were made, as best he could, did he 
not? 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. In other words, the point that I am trying to make, upon 
which I would like to get your expression of opinion, is this: 
tlia.t this was not simply a question of a ''knock-down-and-· 
drag-out'' fight on a will contest, but it was a continuation 
and series of attacks in different fora and from different 
angles 1 
A. Yes, I appreciate that. 
Q. And that was a matter, of course, which :Mr. Parker 
could not control? 
page 661 ~ A. That is true. · They were all suits instituted 
by other parties. 
Q. And in defense of his client's interests, as each attack 
was made, he had to combat that and to make research into . 
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the faw and make such decision as he was advised to make Y 
A. But I think where vou are retained in four or five dif-
ferent lawsuits for the saine party, your fe·e in each one might 
very well be a little less than it would be if that were the 
only lawsuit you handled for him. · 
Q. I see. Now, we will come to the third will contest in 
the Circuit Court of Princel?s Anne County .. That, again, 
was a Virginia contest of the probate of the will, and it took 
up where the first will contest left off. In other words, the 
first will contest was terminated by a voluntary non-suit on 
the part of the contestants, who thereupon, after an unsuc-
cessful attempt to contest the will in the federal court, made a 
second contest in the state court. ;Now, Mr. Parker, accord-
ing to his testimony, was still faced with the same thing on 
his facts, because the same question of testamentary capacity 
was involved in this attack. "\Ve have just discussed a suc-
c-essful avoidance of that issue in the federal court by an at-
tack on the jurisdiction. That same defense would not avail 
him in the state court, would it f 
page 662 ~ A. No. . 
Q. So that some other defense had to be de-
vised, if possible, which, if successful, would result in a fa-
vorable outcome for :Mrs. Hayes, but which would still avoid 
the dangerous question of mental capacity, as he considered 
it from his standpoint; that is right, isn't it! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. All right; then, Mr. Parker successfully raised the ques-
tion of domicile, as applicable in this case in the light of the 
Virginia statutes. The Virginia ·statute regarding the contest 
of probate provides that any interested party may bring pro-
ceedings to contest the probate of a will. ·Now, under the 
Virginia law, a widow of a husband who has died, no issue 
·being alive of the marriage, takes the whole estate; so tha.t 
if the domicile of Father Haves at the time of his death was 
in Virginia, his widow, even ~if he were intestate, would take 
the whole of his estate, there being no real estate, and Mrs. 
Guilfoil, the contestant, would not be an interested party. Now, 
that was a clef cnse which, if successful, would dispose of the 
matter ·without going· into the question of testamentary ca-
pacity, would it not f 
A. Yes. . 
Q. Now, you realize also, however, that there were cer-
tain inherent dangers and difficulties in the posi-
pag·e 663 ~ tion that he took. That matter he carried success-
fully to a termination .before the Circuit Court 
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of Prince~s Anne County, and on appeal was successful in 
the ,Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. That also in-
volved a good deal of research and a good deal of investiga-
tion of the law on a point which had never been taken up; 
isn't that a fact? 
A. I don't know except from what-
Q. Well, as far as the record shows¥ 
A. I understand that Mr. Parker says it is a novel pro-
ceeding in Virginia. That is the extent of my kno":ledge of 
it. 
Q. Well, it is certain that the question of domicile and the 
Virginia statute regarding the probate of wills had not been 
involved as a defense in the previous litigation, had it? 
A. No, not that I recall. 
Q. So that the questions at issue, through Mr. Parker's 
ability to maneuver the ease according to his ideas, in this 
last will contest, were different from the questions which were 
at issue and argued in those other cas-es? 
A. The question of domicile was at issue in one of those 
other cases, it seems to me. 
Q. Which one 7 
A. I think it was involved in No. 11, the suit of 
pag·e 664 } :Mary Hayes Guilfoil in the Eastern District of 
Virginia. 
Q. No; that was a question of residence. Domicile does 
not come into the question of adverse -citizenship; it was a 
question of residence there. 
A .. Qf course, the question of domicile was involved in 
the-
Q. And it was also a question as to whether the qualifica-
tion in the State of New York had an extraterritorial effect, 
too, but that was not, strictly speaking, a question of the 
domicile of the testator at the time of his death f 
A. The question of domicile, I take it, was necessarily in-
volved in the first will contest, on which I appeared to tes-
tify as a witness. 
Q. Lt would have been involved if the contest had ever -come 
up, but that was ended by a non-suit. 
A. Yes, but it bad been prepared for-I assume it had been 
prepared for. 
Q. Now, you will agree, will vou not, that if Mr. Parker 
was able to get a successful ternrlnation of that case and, at 
the same time, avoid a phase of the case which he corn;;idered 
dangerous, he had performed a very distinct service for his 
client? 
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A. Yes; on that assumption I could not do anything· else .. 
Q. Do you think that a fee of a thousand dol-
page 665 ~ lars for conducting that litigation successfully in 
two courts is an adequate fee for Mr. Parker t 
A. I think it.-~.vas a very nice fee, in consideration of the 
fact that he had prepared already on the question of domicile 
when the first c~se came up, which should not have required 
a good deal of. additional preparation in the second case. 
Q. Let us change that assumption and say that when the 
first case came .up Mr. Parker had not realized the strength of 
the evidence against him on testamentary capacity, and 
afterwards discovered that was a very dangerous ground, 
. to be avoided, if possible, and when the third will contest 
was instituted, worked out to his own satisfaction the ques-
tion of domicile and the lack of interest on the part of the 
contestant, and on that assumption, that is to say, a change 
of tactics because of information afterwards acquired, he 
would be required to investigate the domiciliary aspect of 
the case at the time of the third contest, would he not t 
A. Of course, he would have. 
Q. Assuming those facts to be true, do you· still think a 
thousand dollars was sufficient Y 
A. Yes, I think so, bearing in mind the other allowances 
made. 
page 666 ~ Q. Now, you haye based your views, to some 
extent, at least, I think, on an estate of about $80,-
000, of which you say only thirty-five to forty thousand by 
possibility could be at risk. Now, let us depart a moment 
from what we have been talking about and consider the ques-
tion as to what would have happened if the yalidity of this 
marriage had been successfully attacked. You were aware of 
the fact that such an attack was in contemplation, were you 
noU 
A. I don't know whether it was in contemplation; I know 
that they investigated the validity of the marriage. 
Q. Exactly. You know .that in the application for letters 
of probate in New York, there was a claim on the part of 
·Mrs. Guilfoil that Father Hayes was unmarried when he 
died, do you not f 
A. Yes. She would have to do that or she could not have 
been appointed administrator. 
Q. And that was an indication that at least the contest-
ants believed that he was not married. Assuming Mrs. Guil-
foil 's claim, you have to do that, do you not 1 
A.. Yes. 
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Q. Now, do you know what the evidence was regarding the 
circumstances of the marriage, on just how strong an attack 
could be made upon the marriage? 
A. Only what Mr. Parker has told me. It is all hearsay, 
as far as I am ,concerned. 
page 667 ~ Q. Are you aware of the fact tha.t, under the 
North Carolina law, if a marriage is performed, 
one of the persons being· of unsound mind at the time, that 
marriage is not only voidable but void? 
A. I know the statute says it is void, but the decisions I 
have read indicate a different result. 
Q. Do you know that the law is by no means ·settled in 
North Carolina, and that proceedings may be instituted to 
set aside a marriage, if void, even after the death of one of 
the spouses f 
A. I only know the extent of my researc.h, which has not 
been extensive. I have read four or five cases which I have 
had called to my attention. -
Q. Now, assuming that an attack was made upon the va-
lidity of the marriage in Virginia on that ground (that it 'Yas 
not voidable but void, under the North Carolina statute), 
what law would apply, the law of North Carolina or the law 
of Virg-inia f 
A. vVell, in my opinion, the law of ,North Carolina would 
apply. 
Q. Are you entirely assured of that, or is that also de-
batable? 
A. It is just my opinion. 
Q. 'Then, there is a possibility, at least, that that marriage 
could have been successfully attacked, is there 
page 668 ~ not? 
A. I assume there is, yes. 
Q. And there is also a strong indication, from the fact 
that Mrs. Guilfoil solemnly declared in the probate proceed-
ings in New York that Father Hayes died unmarried, that 
she did not reg·ard the marriage as valid and that she was 
going to attack iU 
A. I don't think there is any chance that she did not re-
gard the marriage as valid; I believe she did regard it as 
valid. I do believe, never~heless, that she would have attacked 
it. 
Q. ·well, if she had successfully attacked it, the whole · es-
tate would have been at risk, would it not f 
A. If she had succ.essfully attacked the marriage and also 
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succeeded in attacking· the will, then it would have been at 
stake, and she would have had to do both. 
Q. Yes. In these various will contests, if the marriage had 
been held to be a void marriage, then the whole estate would 
have been at risk in each one of those will contests? 
A. Yes, it would. . 
Q. Under the New York law, if a man makes a will and 
subsequently marries, as I understand it, that will is not 
nullified by the fact of his subsequent marriage, is it? 
A. That is right-it is not. 
. Q. You are aware of the fac.t that in Virginia 
page 669 }- the reverse is true-the will is voided in toto by 
the subsequent marriage of the testator? 
A. So I am informed, yes. 
Q. So that was a problem that had to be looked into, so 
far as the question of Virginia domicile was concerned, was 
it noU 
A. I should think so. 
Q. Because it depends upon which law governs. .There was 
a danger, and a very real danger, that the will, assuming 
that the marriage was a valid marriage, even if the will were 
valid when made, might have been set aside by the subse-
quent marriage of the testator? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That also was a question that was by no means free 
-from difficulty, was it? 
A. It was not. 
Q. Now, all throug·h, Mr. Bennett, from what you have 
read and from your association and conduct with Mr. Parker, 
what quality of leg·al services did he perform for Mrs. Hayes Y 
A. A very high quality of services. 
RE-DIRECT ELt\.MINATION. 
By Mr. Lanning: 
Q. Mr. Bennett, how large a place is Newburgh? 
A. 32,000. 
page 670 ~ Q. It is in Orange County, is it not T 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you think that if the litigation had been m New-
burgh Mrs. Hayes would have gotten a fair trial? 
- A. Yes. 
Q. Why do you say that 7 
A. The only reason to s~ppose she would not have gotten 
a fair trial would have been a question of the religious is-
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sue involved, and practically without exception, all the court 
officials are Protestants up there, and any jury that would 
have been drawn, I assume, would have had automatically ex-
cluded from it any members of St. Mary's parish, of which 
he was the priest, and I think they would have been success- · 
ful in excluding any members of the Roman Catholic Church 
from the jury, on account of the issues involved. I don't 
think there would have been any trouble getting a fair trial 
before a fair jury. I do believe, as I told Mr. Maupin be-
fore, that the atmosphere in New York City would have been 
better. It would ha.ve been removed from evervone who-
knew Mr. Hayes in his lifetime, but I do believe .. she-could 
have had a fair trial in- Orange County. . 
Q. What is the percentage of ·Catholics in Orange County? 
A. About fifteen or twenty per cent, perhaps~ 
Q. 1\fr. Bennett, you have said that, under cer-
page 671 r tain circumstances, you thoqght that the charge. 
which you had :fixed for services . performed in 
connection with Item 11 might he increased a thousand dol-
lars? · 
.A.. Yes .. 
Q. vVill you please state what those circumstances are? 
A. Mr. Maupin mentioned some considerations of which I 
had no previous knowledge and which I only know from what · 
he said, and that is that Mr. Parker's tactics in that particu-
lar suit, in delaying the proceedings, resulted in forcing Mrs. 
Guilfoil and her attorneys into taking steps which otherwise 
they might not have taken, namely, the institution of the con-
test proceedings. in Princess Anne County, and those con-
. test proceedings, of course, were the ones which eventually 
resulted in termination of the action in Mrs. Hayes' favor. 
If Mr. Parker's handling of those proceedings in the federal 
court did have that result, they are worth more than the value 
I put on them. 
Q. vVhat tactics do you have in mind? 
A. Just what' Mr. Maupin said-that he succeeded in de-
laying bringing the case on for hearing until they had to make 
some decision. I don't know why Mr. Heath did not go ahead. 
He seemed to have a perfect chance to go ahead. He pro-
ceeded with the case, as far as I ~an tell from a reading of 
· the record. 
page 672 ~ Q. From your reading· of the record, · did you 
firid any tactics resorted to in there by Mr. Parker 
that got the result claimed Y 
.A.. No, nothing in the record. 
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Q. Mr. Bennett, as I understood from Mr. l\faupin's ques-
tions, he asked you whether, if the marriage had been de-
clared invalid, the whole estate would have been at stake, 
and what was your answer to that? 
A. I said .if it had been declared invalid, I thought it would 
have been a_t stake. It would have been necessary then for 
Mrs .. Hayes to establish the validity of the will. 
Q. And, ·of course, if the will, then, had been declared valid, 
the whole estate would not have been a.t stake? 
A. If the will had been declared valid, Mrs. Hayes would 
have gotten everything·. The will gave her everything, and 
it would have been necessary to have it established as valid 
for her to get that result. 
The Commissioner: That is, provided the will was not de-
clared invalid on account of the subsequent marriage of Mr. 
Hayes. 
Mr. Maupin: Yes. 
page 673 ~ WILLIAM R.. MEAGHER, 
a witness on behalf of the defendant, having been 
duly sworn, testified as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Lanning: 
Q. l\fr. Meagher, will you please state your full name, age, 
residence, and occupation 1 
A. ,vmiam R. :Meagher, 801 ,vest End Avenue, New York 
City, thirty-six years of ag·e, lawyer. 
Q. Where are you admitted to practice, Mr. Meagher? 
A. In the State of New York. 
Q. When were you admitted f 
A. I was admitted in the month of Janua.ry, 1928. 
Q. And you have been practicing since that time, have you 
not, Mr. Meagher? 
A. Yes; since October, 1927, I have been associated with 
the firm of Hunt, Hill & Betts, that is to say, until December, 
1938, when I eng·aged in the general practice of the law, with 
particular emphasis on litigation, and since ·December, 1938, 
I have been and am now a member of the staff of John Har-
lan Amen, who is investigating· various criminal activities in 
the Boroug·h of Brooklyn, New York. I might add that since 
October of 1928 I have been lecturing in law at the Fordham 
University Law School, and am still lecturing in it. 
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Q. What has beei1 the nature of your practice, 
page 674 ~ J\fr. Meagher1 
A. It has been the general practice-handling 
estates that have been in litigation, handling various types of 
litigated matters, admiralty suits for seamen to recover dam-
ages under the ,Jones Act, litigated tax matters, and I have 
some criminal experience. 
Q. And you handled some estates when with the firm of 
Hunt, Hill & Betts 1 
A. I did. 
Q. ·were you associated in the litigation involving the es-
tate of the late William R. Hayes a.nd some real estate which 
he had formerly owned in the State of New York? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. State just what your connection with that litigation 
was . 
.A. My connection witl1 that litigation was solely with re-
spect to a suit which had been instituted by a Jfrs. Guilfoil 
against l\frs. Ha.yes in the Orange County Supreme Court. 
The suit was in .the nature of a. suit to remove a cloud on 
title of certain real estate which had been deeded by the de-
cedent, William R. Hayes, to Mrs. Hayes. The case came 
into the office throug·h Mr. James E. Bennett, who is a cousin 
of Mr. Augustus Bennett, and I believe the case had been re-
ferred to Mr. Aug·ustus Bennett by Mr. Parker. vVe became 
first interested in the matter when it had been decided be-
tween Mr. Bennett and Mr. Parker to remove the 
page 675 r case from the Orange County Supreme Court to 
the United 1States District Court for the Southern 
District of N cw York, on the ground of diversity of citizen-
ship. 
,vhen the case first came into the office, the petition for 
removal had been prepared, a bond for removal had been 
prepared, and we filed the papers with the Clerk of the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York. 
I was then asked by :Mr. Bennett, of our office, to g·o over 
tbe pleadings in the case, which I did, and I concluded that 
the complaint set forth a cause of action in equity to remove 
a cloud on title. I also concluded, at the same time, that since 
Mrs. Hayes was in possession of the premises, that is, con-
structively, at least, through her agent and her tenants, n 
suit would not lie in equity to remove her claim to the prop-
erty as a cloud on title, for the simple reason that, in my 
opinion, the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy at law 
by way of a suit in ejectment by which the title would be 
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tried, and as soon as I had reached that conclusion and looked 
at some federal authorities to verify my opinion, I so advised 
Mr. Parker by letter which, I believe, I sent him around Oc-
tober 20, 1934. I am not quite sure of the date. I think I 
also suggested to 1\fr. Parker in tha.t letter that it might be a 
g·ood idea not to raise the question as to ·the jurisdiction of 
the ~quity court at the very beginning of the pro-
page 676 ~ ceedmgs, but to a.llow the case to remain on the 
equity calendar, take its ordinary course until it 
was reached for trial, and even perhaps proceed through tho 
trial, and in the event that we saw the litigation was going 
against us on the merits, we could always avail ourselves of 
the question as to whether or not the equity court had juris-
diction in the premises, and I believe Mr. Parker became of 
the same mind in that regard. 
After the papers had been filed, as I have said, and the 
opinion rendered to Mr. Parker, we were requested to look 
into the personnel of the judg·es in the Southern District of 
New York, having in mind that in the background of this. liti-
gation there was a relig·ious issue, perhaps, and we did that; 
we investigated their .background and particularly their re-
ligious inclinations thoroughly and advised Mr. Parker as to 
our findings. · 
The next step was the preparation of a motion and an af-
fidavit in support of it for a bill of particulars. We consid-
ered that rather important, not only from the standpoint of 
the New York litig·ation, but also from the standpoint of the 
litigation down here in Virginia, because the basis of Mrs. 
Guilfoil 's claim that the deed should be set aside was that 
the grantor, Mr. Hayes, at the time he executed the deed, 
did not have the mental capacity to do so and, 
page 677 ~ secondly, that the deed had been executed as a re-
sult of duress on the part of :Mrs. Hayes. I be-
lieve, also, there was a claim of fraud in the procurement of 
the deed. We felt that if we could pin the plaintiff down in 
our suit to a definite, specific statement of each and every act 
which she claimed constituted the undue influence and each 
and every respect in whi~h she claimed the decedent grantor 
had lacked mental capacity to execute the deed, we would 
have gone a long way in helping the litigation down here, 
because we would then have admissions on the record as to 
the plaintiff's position in the matter. That motion was made 
and there were numerous adjournments of it, I believe at 
the request of Mr. Cantline, who was the attorney represent-
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ing Mrs. Guilfoil up in Newburgh, and finally the motion was 
granted and the bill of particulars was served. 
The next activity in the matter occurred when Mr. Parker 
came up to New York on April 17., 1~36, and on that day Mr. 
Augustus Bennett was also in the office. There was a con-
ference the1·e which, to the best of my recollection, lasted 
about two hours, in which the bill of particulars was examined 
by 1\fr. Parker, and a conference was had with respect to the 
method of procedure as far as the New York suit was con-
cerned, and at that time Mr. Parker was very anxious to put 
off any hearing in the New York proceedings, and we dis-
cussed ways and means of keeping the New York 
page 678 ~ proceedings from coming to an issue and being 
tried while the proceedings were pending in the 
State of Virginia. Accordingly, we took up the matter with 
Mr. Augustus Bennett, through Mr. Cantline, and finally Mr. 
Cantline entered into a stipulation, taking the case off the 
calendar of the Southern District of New York altogether, 
subject to restoration at any time by consent of counsel and 
by order of the court. That was in April of 1936. We felt, 
of course, that if there were an adverse decision in .New 
York, it would be very damaging to the proceedings down 
here. At the same time, we felt that if there was a favorable 
decision down here, it would be very helpful in New York. 
It was just a question of "jockeying" one case against the 
other. 
The next activity occurred in F·ebruary of 1937, and in 
that month the case became really active in our office. Mr. 
Parker, in the latter part of January, inquired as to the 
status on the calendar, and I think it was then that the case 
was restored to the calendar in the Southern District and 
was expected to he reached within a month. Mr. Parker then 
proceeded to take depositions down in Virginia for use in the 
New York suit, and we prepared the notice of taking depo-
sitions for that purpose. After the depositions had been 
taken, they were sent up to us and I spent some time examin-
ing them. At the same time, Mr. Augustus Ben-
page 679 ~ nett, of Newburgh, sent down the depositions that 
he had taken up there, and I spent some time in 
examinin~ those. · . 
Followmg that, in February of 19137, ]\fr. Parker sent up 
the depositions of Mr. ,Grant, Mr. Coleman, Mr. Hayes, and 
l\!r. Deary, which he had taken down here for use in the New 
York suit. 
I, in the meantime, from the bill of particulars, had been 
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advised that the plaintiff was arguing the incapacity of Mr .. 
Hayes to make a valid deed on the theory that he was so 
afflicted with numerous diseases, physical and mental, that 
his mentality had been seriously impaired. I then under-
took to get the hospital records in the case, and fo1~ that pur-
pose I sent down to Mr. Parker an authorization to be exe-
cuted by Mrs. Hayes which we could present to the hospital 
in order to get those records. I did get them. An investi-
gator connected with my office interviewed several of the 
nurses and doctors connected with the hospital, bearing on 
the question of Mr. Hayes' mental capacity, and I may say 
in summary, 1 think, outside of the depositions that had been 
taken, the only other witness on our side who was to be called 
was Mr. Parker, himself,. who had prepared the deed. Our 
preparation consisted chiefly and in the main in the pre-
paring of his cross examination of the plaintiff's witnesses. 
It was at that time, when the case was about 
page 680 ~ No. 2 on the calendar and in a. position to be at 
any time sent out for trial, that Mr. Parker, I be-
lieve, called me up on the long-distance telephone, on March 
4, 1937, and told me that he had been advised that the other 
side was going to seek an adjoumment of the trial and he told 
me to oppose the adjournment. He also told me, I believe, 
to oppose the adjournment unless the other side would stipu-
late that if the adjournment was granted they would be 
bound by the result of any litigation down here in Virginia. 
Now, I am not clear as to this. The stipulation which was 
ultimately drawn and signed also provided that Mrs. Hayes 
was not to be bound in the New York suit by the outcome of 
any litigation down here in Virginia, so y01:ir Honor can see 
it was rather a one-sided agreement, and to be perfectly frank 
with you I did not expect they would accept it. However, I 
am not clear as to whether the latter part of our stipulation-
that we were not to be bound---came from me or Mr. Parker 
after I communicated with him around March 4; that letter 
might refresh my recollection one way or the other on that 
point. 
I went up to court and we appeared before Judge Knox, 
the c.alendar judge, and a Mr. Van Orman, representing the 
other side, was there, and I, in the meantime, had 
page 681 ~ put this proposition up to him, and he said he 
could not accept it because, he said, he would 
have to confer with Mrs. -Guilfoil and also with Mr. Guilfoil. 
It struck me that they were very anxious to avoid the trial 
in that court. The reason I say that is because ordinarily 
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these applications are really made in New York courts whe1i 
there is nothing to them. But l\ir. Van Orman approached 
the bench and insisted on a whispering conference at the bench 
and explained certain of the details to Judge Knox. He 
stated he thought the stipulation would be agreeable to the~ 
but he was not in position to say so definitely without au-
thorization from his client. Judge Knox then reserved de.:. 
cision on the application. · 
In the meantime, Van Orman said, "Draw up a stipulation 
and send it over to me with definite proposals in it and I 
will take the stipulation up ·with the Guilfoils and see if they 
will agree to it,'' which I did, and I believe I sent a draft of 
that agreement to Mr. Parker. . ·· 
_ "\\Te were in constant conference with Van Orman from 
March 4 until March 17, when the agreement was signed by 
the Guilfoils and was also signed by Mrs. Hayes down here, 
and ori the 19th the agreement was submitted and filed with 
the court. I mig·ht say that I had the agreement typed up 
in Van Orman 's office; althoug·h I prepared it, I had him 
. type it up. And I also had Judge Knox approve 
page 682 ~ t.he agreement before it was filed, in order to 
forestall any possible claim in the future that it 
had been ente1:ed into under mistake or under duress or by 
misrepresentation. . . 
Then, in January of 1938, we ";.ere advised. by Mr. Angus~ 
tus Bennett that the proceedings down here iri Virgini~ had 
been successfully . concluded. "\Ve got an exemplified copy of 
the mandate of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
in the case, and on that exemplified copy, together with the 
stipulation that had ,been filed, we entered a judgment on 
the merits, dismissing the case in the United States District 
·court. 
Q. Mr .. Meagher, I think, in a general way, your resume 
of what happened in that case covers what l\fr. Parker did 
jn connection with that litigation, but. I am not sure of that. 
Could you just generally state what .he did? 
A. M:r. Parker conferred per.sonally at our office on two 
_occa~ions. He ";as in touch with us by correspondence on 
more. .. . . . 
. Q. Were you corresponding- with him directly, or through 
Mr .. BennetU . . . . 
. A ... Whenever Mr. P.arker. corresponded with us directly, 
\ve did likewise, but J don't think the correspondence be-
twee1i us was very extensive~ 
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Q. What did he have to do with .the stipulation other than 
suggest itf 
page 683 ~ A. When I had completed the draft, I sent it 
down to him here, and my rooollection is that he 
made a change in the name of the court in which the pro-
ceedings were pending down here, which I did not have ac~ 
curately set forth in my draft. 
Q. Who dictated the stipu]ation 7 
.A. I did. 
Q. Mr. Meagher, have you read Mr. Parker's account 
against Mrs. Hayes, as executrix and against her individu-
ally? 
A. I have. 
Q. Have you also read the evidence that has been offered 
in this case on his behalf-his evidence and the evidence of 
other witnesses f 
A. I have. 
Q. Have you read it all! 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you examined the account, attached to his bill, 
in which he is making a total charge of $29,850 for his serv-
ices? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you think you have fully prepared, yourself, to pass 
on the value of the services which Mr. Parker performed f 
A. I do, yes. 
page 684 ~ Q. vVill you please take the account and state 
what vou think would be a fair and reasonable 
compensation to ~Ir. Parker for the services that he per-
formed for :Mrs. Hayes individually and for her as executrix 
of the estate of William R. Hayes, and give your reasons for 
it? You might state whether you have dealt with it as a 
whole or gTouped some of the items. 
A. I have dealt with it in both ways-as a whole and also 
taking each item separately. 
I would like to say this at the outset, that I have ap-
proached the estimate of the services here on the assumption, 
which is borne out by the record, of Mr. Parker's standing be-
fore the Bar of Virginia, and also on the basis of the result 
which was ultimately reached, which I have no hesitancy in 
saying was a one hundred per cent victory for Mrs. Hayes. 
I have divided the account into what I might term two 
parts. The way in which I approached estimating the fee 
was this: I asked myself, first, What would be a reasonable 
fee in the case if there had not been any litigation of any 
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kind f In other words, if there had been a probate of the 
will and handling of the incidental matters connected with 
the estate, a winding up of the estate ·by an accounting, and 
.completion of the tax matters and tax proceedings, what 
would be a fair estimate of the bill? Now, your 
page 685 ~ Honor, of course, I am not familiar with the Vir-
ginia procedure in that regard, but I know that 
in New York an exooutor, although he may do nothing-and 
I might say in 95 per cent of the cases he does nothing as 
far as· an effort is concerned in the management of an es- -
tate-is entitled to two and a half per cent of the value of 
the estate. His attorney, in the absence of any litigation, 
in the ordinary probate proceeding is entitled to a similar 
percentage for his fee. Now, I understand, and it seems to 
be borne out in the record, that the practice down here is 
to permit an attorney in handling an estate an allowance up 
to five per.cent of the value of the estate, leaving outside of 
the question for the time being any kind of litigated matters. 
Now, assuming that .five per cent basis, I have assumed that 
the value of the estate is $72,000 and :fiye per cent of that 
would be $3,600. It was called to my attention, however, 
that the estate has not been actually concluded at the pres-
ent time. There are tax proceedings still- in abeyance, and 
one of the most important parts of the management of the 
estate, namely, the final accounting of the executrix and the 
releasing· of the· bond of the surety company, has not been 
done. Presumably, that work will have to· be done by some..: 
body, and in view of the fact tbat the estate has not been 
wound up, I feel justified in deducting from $3,600 the sum 
of $600 to cover the remainder of the work left 
_pag·e 686 ~ undone in the ordinary routine matters of the es-
tate. So, we start off, then, with a figure of 
$3,000. Then I took up what· I considered to be the litigated 
matters, and those are as follows: I include under the term 
''Probate of the will", or "First will contest", Items Nos. 
1 and 8 of Mr. Parker's account. Now, L am allowing him, 
or suggest that he be allowed, for the first probate of the 
will, so-called (that includes Item No. 1), the sum of $3,000. 
I reach that conclusion in this way: It appears from Mr. 
· ·Parker's account that practically every litigated question of 
fact or of law upon which the merits of· the case depended 
had been prepared completely by him at the time the first 
will contest was ready to go to trial, and as I understand 
the facts, the case was ready to proceed to trial, a body of 
veniremen were available for jury duty, l\f r. Parker was 
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ready to select his jury and proceed with the trial before 
the jury on the merits; when suddenly the attorneys on the 
other side asked leave to take a: non-suit 011 the theorv that 
the decedent was domiciled in the State of New Yo1:k, ac-
cording to them. 
. Now, those issues were, the validity of the marriage, the 
validity of the will;-. the testamentary capacity of the testa.:. 
tor, the question of duress; and also, according to Mr. Parker; 
the jurisdictio~'iOf.the court, which, of course depended upon 
the decedent"s.:domicile at the time of his death. Since all 
. of those questions were prepared and ready f 01; 
pag·e 687 ~ presentation through witnesses and through 
briefs, I felt that a fee of $3,000 was fair and rea..: 
sonable under the circumstances. Now, I would be very frank 
to say to your Honor that I would consider a fee of niore 
than $3,000 reasonable if that first will contest had decided 
anything on the merits~ but. when the othe1~ side was per·..: 
mitted to take a non-suit, that lef~ the merits completely un..: 
decided. Now, I realize that it was not Mr. Parker's fault 
that the court saw fit to permit a non-suit .. At the same time, 
it was not Mrs. Hayes' fault either, but the fact remains 
that a tremendous amount of work uricloubtedly had been 
done in the preparation of that proceeding for trial. It nev.er 
did get to trial, and bearing in mind that the .results of liti..: 
gation are to be taken into consideration in setting a fee; we 
find here that the merits. were not even touehed in the first 
pr~ceeding and, as a matte1~ of.fact, the proceeding was prac-
tically ordered sta.ded de nova. However, conipensation for 
the service rendered to date certainly was earned arid should 
Bi ~rtid; · . 1 ; 1r !!~ 
The next item of litigation is No. 9, the New York suit tq 
set a~iq.e the deed to the real estate, which I have described 
at some length. I sug·g·est that Mr. Parker in that suit be; 
awarded the sum of $400, and I base that opinion on this: }Ve 
charged as a fee the sum of $750. I understood from Mr.. Ben-
nett-I don't know whether he has so testified-~ 
page 688 ~ that he had allocated. $500 of his fee to the work 
that lie did in the New York case, which would 
make his and our fee approximately $1,200. I considered Mr. 
Parker the forwarding 1:1ttorney in that suit and, under .th,~-
generally accepted percent~ge, to be entitled to one-third of 
the .fee, and I therefore suggest $400 as reasonable in that 
case. . . . . . . 
. Now, No. 10 Js. not really a litig·ated. matter, .but I have 
classified it as such, and that is the application of Mrs. Guil..: 
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foil for letters of administration in Orange County. Mr. 
Parker bases his fee in that matter, as I understand it, on 
the making of a decision; in other words, the making of a 
decision to take no steps whatever in the Orange County pro-
ceedings-not to appea.r specially, not to appear generally-
to ignore them altogether. I appreciate the fact that that 
was an important decision; there was responsibility attached 
to jt. I, therefore, recommend that he be awarded the sum 
of $500 in that case. 
No. 11 is the suit in the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Virginia, brought by Mrs. Guilfoil 
as administratrix to recover certain assets she claimed to 
have been converted bv nfrs. Haves. Mr. Parker there made 
a motion, I believe, addressed to .. the jurisdiction of the court, 
and his motion was denied. The case, as far as I have been 
able to determine, was never reached for trial, · 
page 689 ~ and there again the merits were not touched in 
that proceeding. I really think that my sugges-
tion as to a fee in that matter is generous. There was no ap-
peal, as far as I have been able to determine; it was just a 
motion with memoranda to support it, but I considered the 
sum of $500 reasonable there. 
Coming to No. 12 : The second will contest was disposed 
of on a motion made by 1\fr. Parker, himself, addressed to 
the jurisdiction of the United States District Court, I believe 
on the ground that the proceeding·, in substance, was a pro-
bate proceeding aud that the United States District Courts 
had no jurisdiction over probate matters. Mr. Parker was 
successful in getting a dismissal of the case, and there was 
an appeal there to the Circuit Court of Appeals, which was 
argOed and briefed, resulting in affirmance. I point out to 
your Honor that in that case again the merits of the con-
troversy had not been determined, and I consider the fee in 
that matter, for the argument on the motion and the appeal, 
to be reasonable at the sum of $1,000. 
We come next to the third will contest, which finally did 
touch the merits, as subsequent events proved. As I under-
stand it, that will eontest was decided on the question of 
the domicile of the deceased at the time of his death. Evi-
dence was taken there, but I want to point out to your Honor 
that I consider the same factual issues to have 
page 690 ~ been involved in the third will contest as were 
involved in the first will contest, except that there 
were not as many factual issues involved. In other words, all 
you had was the narrow issue as to whether or not the de-
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cedent was domiciled in the State of Virginia at the time of 
his death. Now, I have read the evidence that was presented 
in that case and it seems to me that the evidence was simply 
overwhelming that Mr. Hayes was domiciled in the State of 
Virginia at the time of his death. l feel that Mr. Parker, in 
takino· care of the third will -contest, availed himself of the 
fact findings and the legal findings which had resulted from 
his investigation in the fir~t will contest, and the ref ore I feel 
that an additional payment of $1,500 in the third will contest 
would be reasonable. Now, I am mindful of the faet that in 
the third will contest a petition for certiorari, I believe, was 
filed in the Supreme Court of the United States. 
Mr. Maupin: No; that was in the second will contest. 
A. (Continuing:) That was in the second? ,ven, going 
back .to the second, the petition was filed, and, of course, it 
had to be opposed by printed briefs, I presume. But the fact 
that the court denied certiora·ri there indicates to me that it 
did not consider the question involved to be sufficiently novel 
or important to require its consideration. Of 
page 691 ~ course, L _realize that we do not always agree with 
• the court's opinion when they deny certiorari. 
Ninety-nine per cent of them, I would say, are denied. 
The only other litigated matter that I would classify as 
such was the Dr. Johnson suit for $2,000 which, I understand, 
was settled for $1,500 without any trial, and I think a figure 
of about $150 for that would be reasonable under the circum-
stances. 
That would give a total of litigated matters of $7,500, ·and 
adding· the $3,000 for the management of the estate, a total 
fee of $10,500. 
I would like to end with this statement: that it is not quite 
fair to charge in a matter of this kind by splitting up each 
and every subdivision of the work done, .because we all know 
as lawyers that there are in any litigation prelimina.ry skir-
mishes which sometimes are vitally important and have a di-
rect bearing upon the ultimate result of the litigation, but 
which are, nevertheless, preliminary litigation which do not 
touch the merits, and it was not until you got to the t4ird 
,vill contest in these proceedings that anything like a termina-
tion on the merits, or final judgment, which was considered 
binding on all the parties was- obtained. I might also say 
that I do base my charges with respect to the litigated mat-
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ters on the size of the estate and the amount in-· 
JJag-e 692 ~ volved, and after going over the testimony here, 
. it would seem that, assuming the marriage· to 
liave been valid, if the probate took place in Vir-
ginia, Mrs. Hayes would have reeeived all of the personal es-
tate; if the probate took place in 'New York, she would have 
received at least half. Even assuming that the will was not 
valid in New. York, she would have received at least fifty per 
cent and, in addition, $10,000. Now, that would leave, :really, 
in litigation an amount involved of about $33,750, because I 
am including in that figure, of course, the real estate, which, 
I believe, is valued at about $15,000, and that is an element 
in my accounting. I think that we have all got to decide in 
every case whether or not the work that is going to be in-
volved in the litigation, insofar as we can foresee it, is ·going 
to justify a charge which the amount of the estate will rea-
sonably stand under the circumstances. · · 
By Mr. Lanning~ 
Q. As I understand it, Mr. l\fe8:.gher, all of the items, six· 
teen in number, that you have not dealt with especially are 
c.overed in the allowance of $3,000 which you have made t 
A. Yes, sir. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
·Q. I think tl1at you testified, Mr. Meagher, that 
page 693 } in estimating the compensation to which Mr. 
·Parker was entitled, the duties of which were 
what ,ve mig·ht call the routine duties of an attorney for a 
personal representative, you understood that the practice in 
Virginia was to allow the attorney for the personal repre-
sentative five per cent of the value of the estate 1 
A. An allowance up to five per cent in the ordinary case. 
Q. Now, if your information on that point is incorrect, of 
cou~se, it would change your result, would it not? 
A. Absolutelv. 
Q. Suppose, ·instead of that being the case, it is really the 
ease that the compem,ation of the attorney for a personal rep-
resentative is directly dependent upon what that attorney 
does; for instance, citing a case of which I have very recent 
lmowledg·e, in an estate of $30,000 where the attorney had 
nothing· to do except prepare the inventory, attend to the 
distribution in accordance with the terms of the will, every-
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thing being immediately available for distribution, file the 
tax return,. and file a final accounting, a fee of $2,000 would 
be -reasonable; whereas, if the1~e had .been a number of other 
troublesome matters, it would have been yery mueh larger; 
that would change your idea about the fee, would it not? 
A. Well, in looking· over what I term routine 
page 694 ~ matters in this estate, there doesn't seem to me 
to be anything that was particularly troublesome,. 
with the possible exception of the argument with the surety 
company about the bond. 
Q. Well, the result, if the surety had been relieved on the 
bond, according to the testimony of an expert on surety bonds,. 
would have been that Mrs. Hayes would have been unable-
to secure another surety¥ 
.A.. I think the testimony on that was that it would be dif-
ficult to g·et another surety because-
• Q. Practically impossible, I think is what he said. 
A. The analogy was drawn between turning down a man 
for a life insurance policy and having him apply in another 
company. 
· Q. Now, the situation was at that time, of course, that a 
vigorous attack was being made on the validity of this will; 
the sole beneficiary under the will was also the executrix 
named in the will and who would have full access to all the 
assets of the estate. Now, under those circumstances, if the 
National Surety Company had sueceeded in being· relieved 
and Mrs. Hayes had been unable to seeure another surety, 
the result to her would have been to lose all chance of con-
tinuing as executrix of this estate, would it not f 
A. Well, may I answer that by asking you a question? 
Q. Surely. 
page 695 ~ A. Is there any procedure down here whereby 
she could have made a deposit of the assets in a 
depository of the court and had access to them from time to 
time? 
Q. I never heard of it. The routine procedure down here 
fo such ca8e would ha:ve been to appoint a receiver or a cura-
tor for the estate; and in t]mt case the necessary result would 
have been, would it not, tliat Mrs. Hayes would have been 
depdved of all ace~ss to the assets of the estate? 
A. vVell, I am not qualified to answer that. If you mean 
by a curator someone who is equivalent to a temporary ad-
ministrator appointed by the court up in New York, that re-
sult would not follow. A temporary administrator wonlcl ad-
minister the estate, but upon proper application to thP- sur-
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rogate, showing· necessity for funds, l\frs. Hayes could, from 
time to time, have applied to the court for certain money 
for litigation expenses and, with the approval of the cou'rt. 
met those expenses, thereby covering· the surety companv on 
the bond or covering herself as the .. executrix. " 
Q. ·wen, let us assume that the estate in toto would have 
been kept intact, with its accretion, until the termination of 
this litigation; in that case her position would have been very 
different from what it was in fact f • 
A. Yes, and so would Mr. Parker's. 
page 696 ~ Q. Precisely, but Mr. Parker would st.ill have 
had to attend to all the litigated matters? 
A. The litigated matters, yes, and he would also have been 
unable to have drawn anything on account of his fees out of 
the estate funds. 
Q. Well, that may or nuiy not be. 
A. ,vell, that is my conclusion, if you say that putting 
the funds in the hands of a curator would freeze them. 
Q. It would freeze them as far as the distribution was 
concerned, but not necessarily so, so far as the preservation 
of the estate was concerned, in an attack on the will. 
A. I understood you to say that the appointment of a 
curator would have frozen the assets so that no expenditure 
could have been made until the termina.tion of the litigation. 
Q. No expenses except the necessary expenses of litiga-
tion which were designed to preserve the estate. 
A. vVould those expenses have been defrayed from time 
·to time by court order approving the expenses f 
Q. Yes. 
A. ,v en, my original answer stands. 
Q. In other w01·ds, J\frs. Hayes would have been unable to 
complete out of estate funds the house at Virginia 
page 697 ~ Beach which had been started just before Father 
Hayes' death, would sl1e not? 
A. If you as~nme that the court on proper application 
would not permit the curator to release funds for that pur-
pose. I don't know the answer to that. 
Q. But on that assumption, that is so? 
A. Ori that assumption. 
Q. Now, another plrnse of the situation about the contro-
versy with the surety: 1\fr. Parker, according to the record, 
made himself personally Hable for any unauthorized ex-
penditure of the funds of the estate. Now, as to who w·as en-
titled to the assets of this estate was a matter tl1at was liti-
gated for several years and the outcome of which was, of 
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course, uncertain. He had to approve certain expenditures 
to Mrs. Hayes for living· expenses and for the completion 
or the house and other matters, and you realize that if the 
outcome of the litigation had been unfavorable to l\frs. Hayes, 
he would have been personally responsible for those expendi-
tures? · 
A. Yes, and also unfavorable to Mr. Parker. 
Q. Now, speaking about the litigated matters here, you 
· say that Mr. Parker, you considered, was simply the for-
warding attorney in the suit that was brought by Mrs. C+uil-
f oil in the State of New York to set aside the deed to the 
Newburgh real estate? 
page 698 ~ A. Yes, I do. 
Q. And that he was entitled to $400? 
A. That is right. 
Q. Did you take into consideration the fact that it was at 
Mr. Parker's suggestion that the ca~e was transferred from 
the state court in Orange County, New York, to the District 
Court for the Southern District of New York t 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And did you take into consideration that it was he who 
first suggested the stipulation? 
A. ·Yes, I did. 
Q. And you still think that $400 to himself and an aggre-
gate of $1,250 to yourself and Mr. Bennett is fair and rea-
sonable compensation Y 
A. I do. yes, sir. 
Q. As for the application of Mary Hayes Guilfoil for let-
ters of administration in Orange County, New York, you 
have said, as I recall it, that you realized that that. was an 
important decision, but that you thought $500 was ample for 
that decision 7 
A. I Raid I thought it was generous, as I recall. 
Q. Certainly adequate. Now. assume that be had advised 
Mrs. Ila.yes . to contest. that: 1\frR. Hayes' physical appear-
ancP. in New York for the purpose of such a contest would 
have been essential, would it noU 
page 699} A. Why? To contest the appointment of Mrs. 
Guilfoil as administratrix? 
Q. Yes. 
A. On the merits, you mean? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes, a personal appearance would have to be entered 
for her anyway. 
Q. Yon realize the fact that the application .of Mrs. Guil-
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foil stated that Father Hayes died unmarried, so the validity 
of the marriage was brought into question in those proceed-
ings? 
A. I assume that. 
Q. And that could hardly be tried out on the merits with-
out Mrs. Hayes' being personally present, could it 7 
A. I think the case could have been proved on her behalf 
without any personal appearance before the court. 
Q. Assume that she did make a personal appearance, she 
would.have laid herself liable to process in the State of New 
York, would she noU ' . 
A. She would not. She would then be in the state prosecut-
ing judicial proceedings and immune from personal proceed~ 
ing·s, under our statute. 
Q. Suppose she had contested the case and had lost the 
case, there would have been no reason in the world why then 
Mrs. Guilfoil could not have used that judgment 
page 700 } to come down to Virginia ancl attack Mrs. Hayes' 
custody of the assets of the estate down here, 
would there Y 
.A. You mean, if the N ewburg·h court, or the Orange Co1.Jnty 
Court, had determined on tl1e merits that Mrs. Hayes was 
not the widow of the deceased 7 
Q. Precisely. 
A. Yes, I agree with you. 
Q. Now, the suit of Mrs. Guilfoil a.s administratrix, in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia, to recover assets in the bands of Adelaide M. Hayes : 
You. testified, and it is a fact, that no~hing was ever done 
in that case which went to the merits of the case. You will 
agree with me, however, will . you not, that in certain in-
stances the result can be accomplished by what we might call 
"strategic maneuvering" of lawyers-
A. I think I so testified. 
Q. And assuming that Mr. Parker in this case was attempt-
ing· to delay a decision on the merits, so as to force the con-
testants of this will within the statutory period to institute 
a contest in Virginia, and that th,~re was a congestion of the 
dockets, and that by raising this dilatory plea he had avoided 
a contest on the merits until the time bad almost elapsed and 
until the contestants had to make up their minds to file their 
contest if they were ~oing to do it; he had accomplished his 
purpose, had l1e not 1 
page 701 ~ · A: He had accomplished something, yes. 
Q. So that, at that stage of the proceedings, 
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that suit, in the nature of things, would have to lie dormant 
until the other que~tion had been disposed of, because the 
very question of the ·me~·its of this suit was at issue in that 
litigation¥ ~ 
A. I ~uppose so. 
Q. So, that was a matter of some importance, ,,rnsn't iU 
A. It was. 
Q. Now, the second will contest which was started in the 
United States District Court for .the E·astern District of 
Virginia and which was decided in favor of Mrs. Hayes in 
that court, and on appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit, and in which certiorari was denied 
by the Supreme Court of the United States, I understood 
your testimony to be that that matter was never really de-
cided upon the merits, but was decided entirely on a juris-
dictional point 1 
A. I so understand. 
Q. Now, let us take it as an assumption, and I think it is 
borne out by the record, that ~fr. Parker, in the conr8c of 
these proceedings, had come to the conclusion that it would 
be wise from the standpoint of his client to avoid coming 
to grips on the issne of testamcmtary capacity, 
page 702 ~ that there was evidence on that point which was 
_ danger and that lie would be well advised to avoid 
it if he could; now, will you agree that it was the part of 
wisdom for him to so conduct his litigation, if possible, as 
to avoid coming to is$Ue on that point and have that par-
ticular piece of litigation disposed of, if possible f 
A. There is no doubt about that. 
Q. And if he was successful in having that suit finally 
disposed of without coming to an issue on a debatable point, 
possibly a dangerous point, he had performed a very distinct 
service for bis client, had he not? 
A. Yes, that is, assuming he could dispose of it without 
raising equally dangerous points or more dangerous points. 
Q. W11ich he did, of course, because, if he lost on the. juris-
dictional point, he would be no wori:;c off¥ 
A. That is correct. 
Q: So, in that case he did succeed in getting a final de-
termination of the contest of the will without entering upon 
dangerous ground and was sncces~ful in avoiding· a ground 
which he considered dangerous? 
.A. That is right. 
Q. That is the part of a good trial lawyer? 
.A.. A g·ood attorney, yes. 
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Q. And that, assuming that the facts I have 
page 703 ~ stated are correct, was first class legal work, was 
it noU 
A. It was excellent strategy. 
Q. That wa.s a contest in which the estate was involved 
to the extent of the interest that J\frs. Hayes had in it? 
A. That is right. 
Q. Whether she be wife or whether it be decided after-
wards that she were not wife. 
Now, in the third will contest in the Circuit Court of Prin-
cess Anne County and which was the last of these various 
litigated matters that seem to have followed one another 
pretty regularly, there again the record shows that Mr. Par-
ker was . anxious, if possib1 e, to avoid coming to issue on the 
question of testamentary capacity. Now, let us assume for 
the purpose of my question that a very larg·e part of Mr .. 
Parker's doubts as to the strength of his ground on the issue 
of testamentary capacity had arisen by reason of facts which 
had come to his attention since the non-suit was taken in the 
original will contest, and that he was at this time very de-
sirous of avoiding coming· to an issue on that point, it wou]d 
be very necessary for a lawyer in that position to exercise his 
ing·enuity and to probe his wits to dispose of the case finally 
and avoid that dangerous issue? 
A. That is true, but I don't think it was so difficult in thiH 
case to do tliat. 
pag·e 704 .~ O. Perhaps, but it was good legal strategy to 
do that? 
A. Excellent. 
Q. In that case the isi;:uc of domicile was hit upon by him 
as being one whfoh, taken in connection with the wording 
of the Virginia statute as to the contest of wilh::, if decided 
in his favor would be a' final disposition of the controversy? 
A. Yes, but let me answer that this way: I don't think 
that the issue of domicile hit upon Mr. Parker, as you ex-
press it, as late as the third will contest. "Why, from the 
outset, the issue of domicile was basic; it was basic as to the 
question of jurisdiction and it was basic on the merits as 
to tl1e ultimate result that would be reached in the distribu-
tion of the estate. Let me explain that if I may. The vnlidity 
of the marriage would he determined by virtue of North 
Carolina law, no matter where the estate was offered for pro-
bate, because if the marriage was ·valid there, it would be 
valid everyWhere unlesR it would run counter to public policy 
in some other state, and there wasn't anything in the case to 
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indicate that, and if it was invalid there, it would be invalid 
everywhere else because that is where it was celebrated. Now, 
if the marriage was valid, as I understand the Virginia law, 
it would automatically revoke the will. At the 
page 705 ~ same time, if it was valid, it would automatically 
clothe Mrs. Hayes with all the personal property 
of the deceased. Now, therefore, it became vitally important 
at the very outset of this litig·ation to determine the forum 
and, if possible, to make the forum Virginia and not depend 
upon the question of domicile, because it is only the court of 
that state in which the decedent is domiciled that has juris-
diction to administer his estate. 
Q. You are in error on that. There are Virginia decisions 
holding that even in the case of a decedent who is domiciled 
in another state but _has assets in the State of Virginia, that 
Virginia courts have authority to appoint a personal repre-
sentative to administer those assets, irrespective of qualifica-
tion anywhere else. 
A. I realize there may be such decisions, but, at the same 
time, I say at the vc-ry outset the question of domicile was 
vitally important.. You may have some decisions holding 
to that effect, but-
Q. The point of my question .was this : It was possible, 
as Mr. Parker viewed it, to probate this will in Virginia be-
cause the assets of this decedent were in Virginia, whether 
or not he was domiciled in Virginia. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So that the question of domicile did not. necessarily 
arise at the time of the original probate of the will. 
A. Let me aRk you this, if I may: Why was 
page 706 ~ the question of domicile litigated here at all if 
the jurisdiction of the cpurt depended upon the 
presence of assets in tl1e State of Virginia? 
Q. For this reason, as the record shows: The Virginia 
statute provides that such a contest may be instituted by 
any interested party. Now, if the domicile of the deceased 
was in Virginia at the 'time of his death, under the laws of 
descent and distribution in Virginia, the wife was tbe sole 
distributee of his property if he had no real estate and, there-
fore, the contestant was not an interested party, under the 
statute, and was not entitled to institute a contest of the will. 
A. Yes. Then, I say that question should have been vitally 
important in the very first instance, rather than the la.st. 
Q. Assuming tha.t question had never been litiµ:ated be-
fore, it was necessary to prepare that question, to gather 
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evidence on that question, and to thrash that out thoroughly 
in this last and third will contest, was it not? 
A. Yes, and the evidence on the question of domicile, to 
my mind, as I said before, was overwhelming to establish 
domicile here, rather than in New York. 
Q. Well, it was complicated, at least, was it noU 
A. Very slightly so. . 
page 707 ~ Q. There was testimony given by certain resi-
dents of New York as to declarations of the testa-
tor; as to where he had paid taxes; that within a very short 
time before his death, he had taken out an automobile license 
in the State of New York;. that he described himself in the 
deed as being a resident of Newburgh, New York; and other 
evidence to that effect, was there not? 
.A.. Yes, but there was also evidence of conduct which was 
inconsistent with those mere statements. I mean, you ·had 
the fact that the decedent had been for many years a priest 
of the Roman Catholic Church; he certainly could not return 
to N ewburg·h after marriage· and assume to live there under 
the same circumstances that he 1iYed before, either in hap-
piness or in peace; and you also had the fact that he had 
1tis property down here, that he had undertaken to move 
out of temporary quarters here and into permanent quarters, 
and gone to the CAl)ense of not merely renting a house, which 
lw did, I understand, at first, but went to the expense of buy-
ing property down here and building· a house according to 
his own personal specifications. · I fail to see where you 
could have a much stronger case or have any question at all 
nbout it. 
Q. All of those facts were brought out by Mr. Parker, 
weren't theyf 
A. They were there for Mr. Parker to use them, 
pag·e 708 } and lie used them and he did a good job, yes. 
Q. It was a case of hearing the evidence on 
both sides and ·sceing·which side was the stronger? 
A. Tbat iR correct. · 
Q. So that that was a question of which you think, and I 
think, that Mr. Parker had the best side, but that was not a 
·question that was free from all doubt, was it 7 
A. Oh, no, there was some doubt, but, I say, the evidence 
was overwhelmingly in favor of domicile. 
Q. There is a presumption, of course, in favor of the domi-
cile and the burden is on the person who asserts a change. 
A. I appreciate that. 
Q. Throughout this litigation, from what you have seen 
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of the record, what c}:iaracter of service do you think was 
rendered by Mr. Parker! 
A. I think Mr. Parker has rendered excellent service. 
· - ·:RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Lanning·: 
Q. Mr. Meagher, I understood you to say that it. was your 
understanding that an attorney down here who acted for a 
pe1·sonal representative could make a charge of five per cent. 
Is it your understanding that the personal representative 
could make a .. charge of five per cent, or that the 
page 709 ~ attorney could make a charge of five per cent t 
A. I may be wrong on this, but I thought that 
the attorney could make that charge. I don't know whet.he1· 
I am correct on that assumption or not. 
Q. What is the practice up in New York f 
A. In New York the executrix would make a charge of two 
to two and a half per cent for ordinary routine handling of 
the estate, and the attorney's fee would be measured by the 
same standard-he would be entitled to charge two to two and 
a half per cent likewise. 
Q. If it turns out that there is no rule as to the amount 
that an attorney can charge, would that affect your ideas as 
to the amount an attorney can charge in Virginia, as to the 
compensation of $3,000 which you have allowed for the mis-
cellaneous items f 
A. I consider that the figure of $3,000 represents the fair 
and reasonable value of the services which I have not in-
cluded under litigated matters. 
Q. Now, did you, in coming to your conclusions, consider 
that Mr. Parker is entitled to compensation on a conting·ent 
hasisY 
A. No, I did not. I considered that there was a reasonable 
value basis. 
Q. "\Vha.t we calI a straight fee basis? 
A. A straig·ht fee basis, with out any definite 
page 710 ~ fee fixed. I can speak for myself in the matter: 
There was never anv definite fee fixed as far as 
Hunt, Hill & Betts were concei·ned, but, regardless of the 
outcome of the proceeding·s, we expected to be paid a reason-
able amount. 
Q. Did Mr. Parker ever tcH you that he was handling this 
case on a cont.ing-ent basis? 
A. No. sir. be did not say so to me. 
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Q. And that you would not be paid if the litigation was 
not successful? 
A. No, I had no such conversation as that. 
HE-CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Mr. Meagher, you would revise your estimate upward 
. if you assumed that.the services were undertaken on a con-
tingent basis, woul~ou not? 
A. Oh, yes, it would increase it to some extent. 
Q. Wouldn't it increase it considerably? 
A. Well, I think I would consider this: I think that a one-
third contingent fee is a fair contingent fee. Now, when I 
say one-third, I mean one-third of the actual amount that is 
involved in the litigation. 
Q. And that is the amount of the property that is involved? 
A. No ; I would consider the amount actually 
page 711 ~ involved as what Mrs. Hayes would lose if tbe 
will had not been admitted to probate. 
Q. It is what was at risk, isn't it? 
A. Yes, but I am talking a bout the amount. I don't con-
sider that she would have lost $72,000. 
Q. You think it is what she would have lost, and a one-
third basis of that, you think, would be reasonable? 
A. If there was a contingent retainer. May I say this: 
I have never heard-I may be ignorant of what is g·oing on 
around town-but I have n~ver heard of a case being taken 
on a contingent basis and, at the same time, having the at-
torney have fees paid as he goes along. I mean, the whole 
reason for the large percentage of the ultimate recovery, 
namely, one-third, being· allowed an attorney in the case is 
that it is a gamble with the result and, with the exeeption 
of disbursements, he has to carry on that litiga.tion from be-
ginnin~ t.o end in a real contingent retainer case without 
any hope of advancements or compensation from his client, 
except necessary court disbursements, and that is why he is 
entitled to a larger percentap:e in the long· run, because of 
the g·amble and the risk involved. So, if l\Ir. Parker had 
lost on a straig·ht contingency basis, Mr. Parker would get 
nothing and he would have to return to Mrs. Hayes whatever 
be had gotten on account of his fer.s. Of course. I don't know 
what arra.ngPment these people had. 
page 712 ~ Q. Suppose it had been decided that l\frs. Haves 
was not entitled to any part of this estate, what 
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would have been his liabilitv for what he had taken out of 
the estateY · w 
· A. Well, if he had taken it on a contingency basis, it would 
seem he would have to pay or i'eturn the $10,000 he had been 
paid. · · · · 
· Q. If it had been decided Mrs. Hayes was not entitled to 
any of this money, he would have to return it' fo whomever 
was appointed as her successor 1 
A. That is what I mean-he would have had to replace it 
from his own pocket, yes. I don't know-they mav have 
started off on a contingency basis and then there may have 
been a modification of the original contract, that the pro-
ceedings be carried along· from time to time by various ad-
vances, in which event I certainly would not increase the 
amount of the fee I have suggested in this case. · 
Q. There is not much difference in pure contingency and 
getting money· which you are under obligation to return if 
the litigation is not wont 
A. Oh, yes, there is. There is certainly a very strong 
evidentiary fact that there was not a contingent retainer 
in this case. I don ''t think anyone l1as ever heard of a con-
tingent retainer where the client makes advances on the fee. 
It is like taking a. case on a conting·enc.y and billing your 
client every two or thi·ee months as you go along. 
page 7~3 ~ Q. ,v ell, that is a question of viewpoint. · 
AUGUSTUS W. BENNETT, . 
~ecalled by the defendant, further testified as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Lanning: _ 
Q. In your various conversations that you had with Mr. 
Parker and in the correspondence that was exchanged b_e-
tween you and Mr. Parker, did he ever express to you any 
fear of meeting the question of testamentary capacity of Mr. 
Ha.ye§, or of undue influence? 
A. None that I recall. I don't recall any. 
Q. You have already testified, as I underst3:nd it, what he. 
told you on the subject, haven't you 1 
A. No. . 
Q. vVell, what did he say on the subject t 
A. I don't recall anv conversation with him about undue 
influence, or his opinion what he would do with it one way 
or the other. 
Q. How about the testament3:ry capacity of Mr. Hayes 'l 
Did you ever have any conversation about thaU 
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A. I recall no conversation nor any correspondence as to 
his opinion a.s to what he could do in meeting 
page 714 } those issues. · · · 
Q. You did testify about some conversation 
you had with him about the validity of the marriage? · · · 
A. .Yes, I did, I think. · 
Q. In arriving at your figures, did you consider that Mr .. 
Parker handled this on a contingent basis Y 
A: No, I thought he did not handle it on a contingent basis. 
Q. Did he ever tell you that. he had the case on a contingent 
basis? · 
A. ·He never told ~e anyt~ng about the financial arrange-
ments. · · · · .. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Suppose a case of this sort were handled on a contingent 
basis and that the attorney had to look to the estate which 
was at · risk for his compensation, what percentage of the 
amount whicl1 was at risk would you say would be a reason-
able fee, considering the number of suits and the amount" of 
work that had to be done in these litigated matters here? 
A. From 25 to 33-1/3 per cent · 
By Mr. Lanning: 
Q. That is, assuming he had it on a contingent basis? 
A. Yes. -That is wha.t the· question was-as-
page 715 } suming he -had it. on a contingent basis. 
Thereupon, the further hearing of this cause was adjourned 
tq a date to be agreed upon by counsel. 
page 716 } OFFICES OF GEORGE PILCHER, ESQ., 
COMMISSIONER, 
Norfolk, Virginia, April 14, 1939. 
The hearing was resumed before the Commissioner at 11 
o'clock A. l\L, pursuant to adjournment from March 31, 1939~ 
Present: l\fr. Maupin, for the complainant. 
~{r. Lanning, for tbe def e:°dant. 
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was called as a witness on behalf of the· defendant, and made 
the following statement: 
Mr. Hughes: I desire the privilege of making a brief 
voluntary statement before I testify in this matter. I have 
consented to testify with much reluctance, and only because 
I feel ·that a defendant in a suit for legal fees would be in 
an impossible situation if all lawyers refused to testify 
.against a brother lawye1·. I like Mr. Parker and have a high 
regard for his character and ability. I think he handled 
this matter in which his fees arc in litigation with skill and 
good judgment, and was signally successful in the results, 
thus earning· substantial fees. My principal reason for my 
opinion that he is entitled to receive less than he claims is 
that the amount involved does not justify such 
page 717 ~ a total as he has charged. 
I feel that I should say also that I have had 
practically no experience in handling estates. Our firm has 
handled very few since I have been a practitioner, and none 
of any substantial size. The ref ore, I do not pretend to any 
special qualification to pass upon the administrative phases 
of Mr. Parker's account, as distinguished from the litigations 
involved. 
(The witness was thereupon duly sworn and testified as 
follows:) 
Examined by :Mr. Lanning·: 
Q. :M:r. Hughes, will you state your full name, residence, 
and occupation f 
A. Robert M. Hug·hes, Jr.; ag·e fifty-eight; residence, Nor-
folk; occupation, lawyer. 
Q. What college or colleges did you attend and what de-
gree or degrees do you hold? . . 
A. My academic education was at Wilham & Mary Col-
lege, at which I earned the degrees of A. B. and B. Lit. My 
legal education was at the University of Virginia, wJ1ere I 
earned the law degree. 
Q. When did you get your law degree, Mr. Hughes! 
.a.. 1902. · 
Q. And when were you admitted to practice in the Stat"' 
of Virginia? . 
page 718 t A. 1902. 
Q. Did you begin practicing immediately! 
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A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Have you been practicing constantly in the State of 
Virginia since you were admitted to the bar 1 
A. I have. 
Q. Have you practiced before the higher courts in Vir-
gfoia? 
A. I have. 
Q. State generally what has been the nature and character 
of your practice f 
A. The firm of which I am a member, Hughes, Little & Sea-
well, has a general practice. ,v e take everything· that comes 
to us except criminal law and titles, but our principal prac-
tice is litigated practice in admiralty, transportation law, and 
the defense of negligence ca.ses. 
Q. Mr. Hughes, have you had experience in the trial of 
cases Y 
A. That has been my principal experience. 
Q. Your firm representR the Norfolk & vVestern Railroad 
Company; is that correct Y 
.A. That is correct, and I personally handle the N orfo]k 
& Western work. 
Q. Have you read Mr. Park~r's account in this matter, 
and his testimonv and also the testimonv offered 
page 719 } in his behalf, as well as on behalf of Mrs. Hayes, 
and otherwise familiarized yourself with tlie rec-
ord in this ca use ? 
A. I .have read ~fr. Parker's account and his testimony 
and most of the testimony on both sides, but not all of it. 
Q. Do you feel that you are in position to place a. va.lue 
upon Mr. Parker's services? 
A. Yes; I feel that. I am in the same position that any law-
yer would be to give his idea as to wlrnt fees have been earned. 
Of course, the assessment of feeA is always attended with 
some difficultv in arriving· at the amount. 
Q. "'What, in your opinion, would be fair and reasonable 
compensation to Mr. Parker for the services rendered by 
him to Mrs. Hayes personally and as executrix of the estate 
of William R. Hayes f In answering·, please give the reasons 
for your conclusions and state how they were arrived at, 
what sums in question you considered at issue, and what 
were the possible results to Mrs. Hayes in her official and per-
sonal capacities. 
A. From the study that I have mentioned, I have arrived 
at. total fees of $12,800. I divide those as follows: For the 
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litigations, $9,125; for the administrative services, $3,000; 
for services in connection with the Virginia Beach house, to. 
Mrs. Hayes personally, $300; for services in connection with 
the Newburgh house, $:WO; as a fee in the Johnson suit 
$175. 
page 720 ~ In my study of this situation, I do not regard 
this as a contingent fee. Nevertheless, I do think 
that the amounts at issue are a very important considera-
tion, particularly in the litigations. For the purpose of the 
litigations, I figure that the amount at stake was $36,500. 
Mrs. Hayes has already paid about $13,000 in fees and dis-
bursements, and Mr. Parker's account, less the credit of $10,-
000 received, is about $22,000. The sum of this $13,000 al-
ready paid and $22,000 more would be $35,000, so that if 
that amount had to be paid, Mrs. Hayes would get practically 
nothing from the litigation except mental anguish and un-
happy publicity. . . 
In arriving at the administrative fee, I have practically 
taken Mr. Parker's figure of $3,750 and deducted $750 by° 
reason of the fact that the job is not finished. ,vhilc I have 
had little experience in work of this sort, it seems to me 
that it is about a fifth unfinished and that, therefore, the 
amount that I ha.ve suggested should probably be deducted. 
I think that reasonable figures for the other three items, the 
Virginia Beach house, the Newburgh house, and the Johnson 
suit, or the fig11res that I have named, $300, $200, and $175, 
· respectively, outside of these three items and the litig·ations 
for which I have allowed a little more than $9,000, it is my 
idea that the balance of the work should be included in the 
fee for the administration. 
page 721 ~ As. to the litigations, I realize that they b~ve 
been numerous and that thev were not of Mr. 
Parker's bringing, that his very vigorous and astute adver-
sary plagued him with many litigations and kept him pretty 
busy defending them. At the same time, I feel that the ques-
tions involved in all of the litigations-and in these litiga-
tions I incln.de the three will contests, as they have been 
called, the probate proceedings in New York, and the real 
estatP. litigation in New York-while th,1J1 were many other 
incidental questions, that. in all of these litigations the prin-
cipal questions involved were domicile and mental capacity. 
It is true, also, that in the suit which went through the fed-
eral courts, all the way up, there was another question, only 
related remotely to these others, that was the question of 
probate in the federal court, and that might be considered 
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another leg·al question, but it seems to me that the prepara- · 
tion for the probate of the will and the preparation of all 
the other .cases involved the same facts and law, particularly 
facts. The real issue was fought out in the la.st case in 
· Princess Aune County, but I think that the questions in-
. volved there had been prepared for in several of the earlier 
:litigations. I therefore feel that these litigations must neces-
sarily be grouped in order to arrive at a charge that is in 
any way commensurate with the amount at stake .. 
page 722 } In arriving at the amount at stake, I include the 
New York real estate at $15,000, the personalty 
at $72,000, making· a total of $87,000, less debts. of $4,000, 
making $83,000 net.. If the New York law were applied, we 
would deduct from this $83,000, $10,000 which apparently 
is a fixed amount under the New York law that goes to the 
widow~ leaving $73,000. Of this $73,000, one-half or $36,500 
would be at stak-e, this being the difference between what 
Mrs. Hayes would have gotten under the New York la.w and 
under the Virginia law where she got it all. Under all the 
'Circumstances, I have felt that it would not be reasonable 
for these litigations to charge more than 25 per cent of this 
"$36,500, in view of the considerations which I have already 
mentioned, and it is on tliat basis that I have arrived at a 
figure of $9,125 for the litig·atious. 
CROSS EXA1vIINATI0~. 
By Mr. Maupin-: 
Q. In estimating a reasonable and proper compensation 
for legal services, Mr. Hug·hes, I take it that you are guided 
by the considerations which have been set forth by our court 
of appeals and other tribunals as to the elements which en-
. ter.into the ascertainment of wha.t such a compen-
pnge 723 } sation should be, that is to say, the importance of 
t11e litigation~ the amount involved, the time which 
is taken, the nature and character of the services, and the pro-
fessional standing and competence of the attorney involved? 
A. Yes, I am. 
Q. I think you have said that, so far as the character of 
the services is concerned and the standing and competence 
of the attorney involved, you have no criticism? 
A. None whatever; in fact, I wish t.o ·compliment him on 
Jiis strategy· in hanclling these litigations. 
Q .. Now_, the character of the litigation itself: Do yon 
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. know of any other case than what is called in this Exhibit 
1 '' The Second ·wm Contest'' in the· Federal Court in which 
a question has been raised as to the peculiar character of 
the Virginia statutes regarding the methods of contest of 
the probate of a will, as to whether or not either one or both 
of the methods which are prescribe~ by statute in Virginia 
are continuations of the probate proceedings, or a new pro-
ceeding brought fo1· the purpose of setting aside a.n act that 
has already been done and completed t 
A. I do not, Mr. Maupin, but I have made no real study 
of that question and, as I say, it is entirely out of my usual 
line. I do not know of another case. 
Q. Have you read the exhibits relating to that 
page 724 ~ piece of litigation which were filed in the record 
beret· 
A. What were they, generally speaking! 
Q. Well, the briefs and some of the pleadings and the rec-
ord. 
A. I have read only parts; I read parts of the briefs, part 
of the record, and I don't. recall whether I read the plendings 
or not. I think I got my idea from the opinion of the court 
as to just what the pleadings and issues were, rather than 
from the pleading·s themselves. 
Q. You are familiar with the fact, are yon not, that in 
Virginia there are two methods prescribed for tbe contest 
of a will, one where the will has been admitted to probate 
by the clerk, by an appeal from the clerk's probate, and 
the other, where the will has been admitted by the clerk or 
by the court, by the institution of a chancery suit for the 
purpose of contesting the will? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You are also aware of tl1e fact that the clerks of the.) 
city courts, under a constitutional provision, in Virginia 
have no authority to admit a will to :record or to probate it? 
.A. The city circuit court has that authority. 
Q. I am speaking of the city courts, as disting"Uished from 
the circuits courts. 
A. Yes. 
page 725 ~ Q. So that the only method in·which a will whic11 
has been admitted to probate by a corporation 
or hustings court can be c-0ntested is by the bringing of a 
chancery suit? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You recognize the distinction, do you not, between ap-
pealing from an act which has been performed or a decisioi:i 
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which has been made by a lower tribunal to a higher tribunal, 
on the one hand, and a new suit to set aside something that 
has been done by another tribunal, on the other? 
A. Yes. 
Q. By way of illustration, I might make my question pe1· .. 
haps a little plainer: In the one case, assume that you are 
a litig·ant in the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk and 
there is a decision against you, you can appeal that decision 
to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, which is simply 
a continuation of the litig·ation which was started in the Cir-
cuit Court. is it noU 
A. Yes. 
Q. On the other hand~ let us assume that in this particular 
case there had· been no valid service of process on you, ana. 
you did not appeal the case, but in other litigation pending· 
in the Court of Law and Chancery, in the City of Norfolk, 
· sometime afterwards, you attacked the judgment against 
vou which had been obtained in the Circuit Court 
page 726 ~ collaterally and had it set aside as being a void 
judgment; that would not be a continuation of 
the original suit, but would be an attack upon the judgment 
which had already been obtained, would it noU 
A. Yes. 
Q. vVell. would you say that was the decisive point that 
was in the second will contest, that is, the case which was 
instituted on behalf of Mrs. Guilfoil in the District Court 
of the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia T 
A. As I understand it, that was a probate proceeding, a 
continuation of the probate proceeding, and not a separate 
attack or separate suit, and therefore the Federal Court had 
no jurisdiction. 
Q. What was the character of the complainant's plead-
ingf 
A. It was a bill in chancerv in the Federal Court. 
Q. It then became important to inquire. whether or not 
the Legislature of Virg'inia, in nuthoriziilg· two separate 
forms of proceeding·, one of which was unquestionably ap-
pellate and a continuation of probate proceedings, and the 
other of which was a new suit, intended t.he proceeding by 
chancery suit. to be a continuation of probate proceeding-, or a 
proceeding inter va:rf es to set aside something wbieh had 
been improperly performed by the clerk of the · 
page 727 ~ court which had admitted the will to probate; 
that is true, is it not? 
~---
,_ 
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A. That is true, and that was the point in that case, as I 
understand it. · 
Q. And, as far as you know, that was a case of first impres~ 
sion f 
A. As far as I know, yes. 
Q. Well, that required an acute legal mind and an ability 
to dra:w analogies and differentiations between statutes in 
other states which were more or less $imilar and which had 
been considered by the Supreme Court of the United States 
and other tribunals, did it not? . 
A. I think not only that, but most of these litigations were 
proceedings with acute questions requiring an acute legal 
mind. · · 
Q. And those questions which I have just detailed were 
not involved in any other piece of -litigation that Mr. Parker 
was eng·aged in? 
A. No. I have mentioned that1 was a different phase. 
Q. You might say stti generisf 
.A. Yes. I so mentioned in mv answer. 
:Q. Of eourse, you will agree" with me, will you not, that 
Mr. Parker had no way in the world of directing the extent 
or multiplicity of this litigation; all that he could do-
. A. Yes, I do. All of it was started by the other 
page 728 ~ side. 
Q. A.nd it was defended as and when it was 
brought? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, he had, first, a contest by way of an appeal from 
the Clerk, in the Circuit Court of Princess Anne County, which 
was dismissed on the morning of the trial and which, of 
course, counsel for proponents had no way of knowing would 
be diRmisRed a.nd had to prepare as thoroughly as possible f 
A. That is right. 
Q. And th::it was instituted very shortly after the employ-
ment of Mr. Parker by Mrs. Ha.yest 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you rP.ca.11 wh1it thEl gTounds of contest were there? 
A. No, I do not. not specifically. 
Q. Did you know that one of them was that the testator 
wai:; men.ta.Hy incapable of making a wilU 
A. Yes ; that wa.s in the pleadings. 
Q. And the other one wns that he bad· been subjected to 
undue influence? 
. A. Yes. 
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Q. And, among others, tha.t the alleged marriage between 
the executrix and beneficiary and the testator was invalid Y 
A. That was an issue, as I understand it, but, 
page 729 ~ as far as I know, while the validity of the mar-
riag·e was questioned in pleadings in various 
cases, there was no serious e:ff ort b'y tiie other side to main-
tain that point, as far as I know. 
Q. vVell, we will come back to that a little farther on, I 
think, but at this time I just want to bring out the fact that 
that was broug·ht up at the very beginning of these various 
pieces of litigation, the design of all of· which was to set 
this will aside and to deprive Mrs.. Hayes of the property 
which was left to her by the testator. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, a lawyer with the interests of his client at heart 
. would prepare as thoroughly as he could to meet the issues 
which were disclosed by the grounds of contest, would he 
noU 
A. Yes. 
Q. And, except for the actual trial of the case, he would 
liave the work to do that he would have had to do if the case 
had actually gone to trial at that time f 
A. Yes. 
Q. You a.re familiar, I am sure, with the fact that by stat-
ute in Virginia it is provided that subsequent. marriage by 
a testator revokes the will? 
A. Yes, I am. 
Q. And yon iue further familiar with the fact 
lJage 730.} that this will was made about two months before 
the marriaA·e of Father Hayes a.nd Mrs. Hayes T 
A. That was ·my unde1·standing. 
Q. Now, if the will was revoked by the marriage, why, in 
your opinion, was it necessary to conduct the probate pro-
ceedings at all? 
A. You are talkin2: about the first suit in Princess Anne? 
Q. Any suit, the design of which was to set this will aside. 
A. Because the i8sue of fact as to mental capacity and 
duress was an issue in almost all of the cases. 
Q. Well, suppose it was; suppose that the will had been 
procured by undue influence; suppose it was a fact that the 
testator was mentally incapable of making a valid will; what 
of it? Suppose the will had been set aside by the marriage; 
suppose it were held tl1at Father Hayes died intestate; bow 
would Mrs. Hayes have been any worse off? 
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A. I thiuk it made no difference in the Virginia litigation 
because Mrs.· Hayes would get all of the property whether 
he was testate or intestate. 
Q. Thell:, if that is the case, there was nothing at all at 
stake,. was· there t 
A. Well, it was very important to establish the domicile 
in Virginia so as to apply the Virg-inia law. 
Q. Is it your understanding: that there was no 
page 731 ~ authority for probate proceedings in Virginia un-
less :b,ather Hayes was domiciled in Virginia, 
when all of his property was in Virginia 1 
A. I think there might be ancillary probate-
Q. Lam not speaking of ancillary probate; I am speaking 
of original probate. 
A. Well, in any event the domicile would determine the 
law applicable. 
Q. Let us assume that the will had not been found and 
Mrs. Hayes, a resident of Virginia, had applied for letters 
of administration to administer an estate which was wholly 
in Virginia: Do I understand you to say that she would have 
had no right to qualify as original administratrix in the 
courts of Virginia T 
A. No~ I do not;. I think she could have qualified in Vir-
ginia. Q. Then, what difference does it make whether there was 
a will or not 1 
A. I don't think it makes any di:ff erence under the Vir-
ginia law. I think she would have gotten it either way. 
Q. So, the logical corollary is that these will contests were 
futile- gestures, is it not 1 
A. No, because, if the administration had been in New 
York and his domicile at the time of death had 
page 732 ~ been in New York, then the New York law would 
have applied. 
Q. Yes, hut you are making your own ground rules here. 
That is not the question I am asking you. We are not at-
tacking the New York administration in the question we are 
considering· here. We are considering what was the use of 
attacking a will which had been admitted to probate in Vir-
ginia and which made the wife the sole legatee, when the 
same wife would have taken the whole estate even if the will 
had been declared to be invalid . 
.A. I think it made no difference so long as the Virginia 
law were applied. 
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. . 
Q~ Theri, as I say, the logical corollary of that is that the 
defenses of the contests of the probate of the will in Virginia 
were just simply futile-they didn't do Mrs~ Hayes any good 
at all, did they t 
A. Well, any case has to be defended~ 
Q. ·why? .. 
A. In order to bring out the facts which would establish 
her rights. 
Q. I.f you have a client, Mr. Hughes, who is being sued, 
and it would be very expensive to defend that client, and 
you are convinced that, even if the litigation is decided ad-
versely to her, it will not make one particle of difference to 
her, she will be no worse off with an adverse decision than 
she would be if the litigation had never been 
page 733 ~ started, would you go to work and defend that 
litigation through three nisi tprius courts and 
three appellate courts and charge her for doing something 
that was of no value to her? 
A. I think it would not be safe not to watch it and see 
that some unanticipated question did not arise that might 
affect it. 
Q. Some unanticipated question 1 
A. Yes . 
. Q. Now, we are getting down to g·rips. Let us suppose 
that the will had been set aside ( and there were three efforts 
so to do) on the ground of the incompetency of the testator 
to make a will by reason of mental disability; now, that will 
was made, the . record shows, about two months before the 
testator's marriage; that is a fact, isn't iU 
. A. I understand so; July and September, I believe, were 
the months. 
Q. The deed to the Newburgh property was made about a 
year after the will was. made. 
A. The deed was October, 1933. . 
Q. October,. 1933, and the will was made sometime-
A. July, 1932. . 
Q. Well, say, fourteen months or fifteen months. Now, the· 
sequence is that the testator has made a will, then contracted 
a marriage, and, third, deeded the Newburgh 
page 734 ~ property to his wife; all in tlie space of fifteen 
months. A.. Yes. . . . 
. Q. Oi:ie of the gi·ounds of contest, and, I think the record 
shows, the inost serious orie, of the will was mental incapacity 
of the testator to make it. The most serious ground of the 
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suit brought in Newburgh to set aside the deed was the 
g-round that the grantor was mentally incompetent to make 
the deed. If, under those circumstances, the will had been 
set aside, there would have been a judicial finding that Father 
Hayes was mentally incompetent to make a will in July of 
1932 and that he was mentally incompetent to make a deed in 
October, 1933, would there not? 
A. Presumably. 
Q. Notwithstanding which, all of the personal property, 
by the law of descent and distribution, would have gone to 
his wife? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If she was his wife? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, :Mr. Heath is an astute lawyer, is he noU 
A. I think so. . 
Q. He is a very thorough man, is he not? 
A. That is my experience with him. 
Q. You hardly think that he was instituting litigation here 
just to be litigating, unless he expected to derive· 
page 735 ~ some benefit for his client by reason of that liti-
. g·ation? 
A. He evidently had reasons satisfactory to him to mul-
tiply the suits. 
Q. But if the matter had stopped at the point we have just 
reached- . 
A. -I understand Mr. Heath did not control the policy of 
the other side until these events had partly occurred; isn't 
that true? 
Q. He did from the time before the taking of the non-
suit in the first will contest. 
Now, going- back to my question, if matters had reached 
the state that we have just considered, that is to say, if the 
will had been set aside on the ground of mental incapacity, 
and Mrs. Hayes still took all of the personal property, he 
would not really have accomplished anything· except, pos-
sibly, the professional satisfaction of having set aside the 
will, would he?· 
A. That is all. 
Q. vVell, can you conceive that he intended to stop there? 
A. Not if he could help it. 
Q. It is quite obvious, isn't it, that the setting aside of 
the will was only preliminary to an attempt to set aside the 
marriage, because unless the marriage had been set aside 
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his client would have taken no benefit by the set-
page 736 } ting aside of the will, would she f 
A. I can't conclude from what I know of the 
situation that Mr. Heath had any reasonable hope of setting 
.aside the marriage, because, otherwise, 1 think he would have 
been more vigorous in attacking on that front.. 
Q. Well, it would not do him any good to set aside the 
marriage if the will were held yalid, would it? Father Hayes 
had a perfect right to leave what he chose to this lady, whether 
she was Miss Grady or Mrs. Hayes, did he not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So that the setting aside of the will was the neeessary 
preliminary to- the setting a.side of the marriage, was it notf 
A. Well, either one might have been preliminary to the 
other, I should think. 
Q. In order . to effect a recovery for the benefit of Mrs. 
Guilfoil, both had t.o be accomplished, did they not Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. You are familiar with the North Carolina statute re-
garding what marriages 3:re declared to be void under North 
Carolina lawf 
A. Fairly familiar with it. I have read it and studied it 
to a certain extent for this question. 
Q. That statute is Consolidated Statutes No. 2495, and I 
will intr<>duce a copy of it in the record as Ex-
}Jage 737 } hibit .No. 46. Under that statute, a marriage con-
tracted between persons either of whom is at the 
time incapable of contracting, for want of will or understand-
- ing, are just as void as incestuous marriages or miscegenous 
marriages or bigamous marriages, aren't they? 
A. I think not. 
Q. Well, where is there any distinction made between them f 
Here is what the statute says! 
'' All marriages between a white person and a Negro or 
Indian, or between a white person and person of Negro or 
Indian descent to the third generation, inclusive, or between 
a Cherokee Indian of Robeson County and a Negro, or be-
tween a Cherokee Indian of Robeson County and a person 
of Negro descent to the third generation, inclusive"-
That is miscegenation, isn't iU 
A. Yes. 
Q. '' or between any two persons nearer of k1n than first 
cousins''-
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That is incest, isn't it! 
A. Yes. 
Q; '' or between a male person under sixteen years of age 
and any female; or between a female person under fourteen 
years of age and any male', __ 
That is ,vant of agef · 
A. Yes. 
Q. '' or bet~een persons either of whom has a husband or 
wife living··at the time of such marriage"-
page 738} 
That is bigamy? 
A. Yes.: 
Q; "or between persons either of whom 1s at the time 
physically impotent',_ 
That is iinpoterice. 
- "or is .incapable of contracting from want of will or un.:: 
derstanding, shall be void.'' 
Now, what is the distinction that is made between them? 
A. Well, the highest appellate court of North Carolina has 
held that that word ''void" there really means ''voidable"; 
except with respect to marriages between whites and Ne-
groes or bigamous marriages. 
Q. You are ref erring, are yon not, to the ~ase of Waters 
v. Waters, which is reported in 84 Southeastern V 
A. Yes. . . 
Q. Are you. also familiar wi,th the case of Gathings. v. Wil-
lia1ns, in 27 North. ,Carolina 487, reported in 44 American De-
cisions at page 49 Y . . . 
A . .I don't remeinber that case by naine. I would like to 
see it. 
{The report of the case was handed to the witness.) 
Mr. Maupin:. .Waters v. Waters was decided i:ri 19i5 and 
Gathings v. Williams was decided in 1845~ 
A. (Continuing:) Yes, i remember seeing; this case, anci 
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my conclusion was that it was apparently at 
page 739 ~ variance with the Waters case and, the ref ore, had· 
been abrogated by the later decision. 
Q. In this case Chief Justice Ruffin uses this language : 
'' The death of one of the parties to this marriage makes 
no difference, as to the power of inquiring into its validity, 
for any and all purposes. ·There is a distinction in the law 
between void and voidable marriages, where, even, they were 
regularly solemnized.'' 
You think that is a correct statement of the law, do you,' that 
the death of one of the parties, if the marriage is void, does 
not prevent the marriage from being attacked at any time? 
A. I think that is not a correct. recitation of my conception 
of the North Carolina law. · 
Q. I will read you another statement of the law and ask 
whether you agree with it: 
'' A marriage is termed void when it is good for no legal 
purpose. Its invalidity may then be maintained in any pro-
ceeding, in any court, between any parties, whether in the 
lifetime or after the death of the supposed husband and wife, 
and whether the question arises directly or collaterally." 
Do you agree with that? . 
A. I think that is a correct statement of what a void mar-
riage is, yes. 
Q. "\Vell, you have just told me that you did not think that 
Chief Justice Ruffin 's statement as to a void 
page 740 ~ marriage was the law in North Carolina, to-wit, 
"The death of one of the parties to this marriage 
makes no difference, as to the power of inquiring into its -
validity, for any and all purposes. There is a distinction 
in the law between void and voidable marriages, where, even, 
they were regularly solemnized.'' 
A. I think it is not a correct interpretation of the North 
Carolina law, in the light of the Waters case. I might say 
this: that the statute uses the word "void", and does not 
use the word "voidable'' at all. It would, therefore, follow 
from the implications in your question that all marriages 
would be void and none would be voidable, under Carolina law. 
Q. Let me state here that the statement of the law with 
which you agree was the statement of Mr. A. 0. Freeman, the 
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editor of the American Decisions, appended to the report of 
Gathings v. Williams. 
A. That is the statement as to what is a void marriage! 
Q. No, sir; as to whether a void marriage can be attacked 
after the death of either spouse, by either pai-ty, or in any 
manner of proceeding·s, whether direct or collateral. 
A. That statement is a note? 
Q. Yes; and I understood you to say you agreed with that 
as a correct statement of the law¥ 
page 7 4.1 ~ A. .No, not if I understand your question. I 
agree with the statement that you read me as to 
what is a void marriage, but I do not ag-ree with the statement. 
that death does not affect a marriage, where mental incapacity 
is involved, if that is what your statemel).t is. 
Q. My statement had to do with a marriage that was void. 
We are not concerned at this point why it is void, but if 
it is void, it can he attacked after the death of either spom;e, 
in any court or any proceeding. 
A. If it is void, it can be attacked collaterally-yes, I agree 
with that. 
Q. As a proviso in section 2495, you will obserye that there 
is a provision reading this way: 
'' Provided further, that no marriage followed by cohabi-
tation and the birth of issue shall be declared void after the 
death of either of the parties for any of the causes stated in 
this section, except for that one of the parties was a white 
person and the other a Negro or Indian, or of 'Negro or In-
dian descent to the third generation, inclusive, and for 
bigamy." 
The effect of, that is tha.t, if there is cohabitation and the 
birth of issue, no marriage shall be declared void after the 
death of either spouse, except in the cases of miscegenation 
and bigamy; that is correct, isn't iU 
A. That is one of the effects of it. 
Q. What other effect has it? 
A. It also has the effect, as construed by TV a-
page 742 ~ ters v. Waters, as designating the only two classes 
of marriages which are void under the Notth 
Carolina law. 
Q. If a statute says that all marriages are· void, with a 
provision, however, that only two of six enumerated classes 
may be declared void after the death of either party, if there 
has been cohabitation and issue, doesn't it follow that except 
where there has been. cohabitation and issue, that all of the 
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marriages can be attacked as yoid after the death of either 
party! 
.A. I think the language is confusing and would be suscep~ 
tible of the interpretation that you suggest, except for the 
fact that Waters v. Waters has given it a different interpre-
tation, and I aooept that interpretation of the Carolina law. 
Q . .Now, what were the facts in Waters v. Waters/ Do you 
recall? 
A. I would have to look at it a minute and refresh my 
memory. 
The Commissio_ner: '' Except for that," if that was made 
as another proviso, wouldn't that be a limitation on the first 
proviso? 
Mr. Maupin: Yes. The first proviso says if there had been 
cohabitation and birth of issue, you cannot thereafter, in any 
case, attack the marria~e as· void except where there has been 
miscegenation or bigamy, in which latter cases, 
page 743 t even if there has been cohabitation and the birth 
of issue, the marriage may be declared void, as 
I interpret it. 
The -Commissioner: \\That is the meaning of the first sen-
tence, which seems to be the headlin·e {I don't know whether 
it follows the statute): "Want of capacity; void and void-
able marriages''? 
Mr. Maupin: I am unable to answer that question for 
the reason that the statute does not say anything about void-
able marriages. It says that they shall be void . 
.By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. I will ask you if it is not a fact, Mr. Hughes, that in 
fVa.ters v. Waters there was an application on the part of a 
husband to have declared void a marriage which had been 
contracted eight years before and had been followed by co-
habitation and the birth of five children, on the groun<;l that 
his wife was unable, from lack of understanding, to contract 
the marriage at the time it was contracted 1 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Then, that came squarely under the proviso, did it 
noU 
A. It seems to me it did. 
Q. Now, that was the only issue that was before the court-
whether or not it came under one of the classes 
page 7 44 ~ contemplated in the proviso in which the statute 
· stated that no attack could be made upon a mar-
riage? 
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A. Is that a question¥ 
Q. Yes; I say, isn't that the only point that was before 
the court for dec.tsion-whether or not the marriag.e wlJich 
the plaintiff there sought to have avoided, under the circum-
stances disclosed J>y the case, did not come squarely within 
the proviso of.· section 2495 i 
Ar They ,ve·re the facts of the case, but I do not understand 
that the expressions in the opinion are limited to those facts 
or expressly predicated upon those facts. 
Q. ·well, you will agree with me that if they went beyond 
the issue, they were obiter? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you familiar with the case of Pridgen v .. Pridgen,, 
which is reported in 166 Southeastern 591, a North Carolina 
~ase, in 1932 t 
A. You will have to let me look at that, too, Mr. Maupin .. 
I have not made as profound a study of this question as I 
would have if I were going to try a case involving it. 
Q. Well, you see, 1\fr. Parker did. 
A. I guess he had to know it better than I do. I have not 
read this case. I would have to read it and study it before I 
.,,,..-, could give any opinion on it. 
page 7 45 ~ Q. Let me read you an excerpt from that case, 
on which I will question you. It was decided 
seventeen years after JV aters v. Waters and is the last pro-
nouncement of the North Carolina law. The opinion, by 
Justice Adams, says : · 
'' Between void and voidable marriages the law recognizes 
a distinction which applies to the status of the parties be-
fore the marriage relation is dissolved. A voidable marriage 
is valid for all civil purposes until annulled by a competent 
tribunal in a direct proceeding, but a void marriage is a 
nullity and may be impeached at any time. (Citing cases.) 
In Gathings v. Williams, supra, the principle is stated in these 
words : '·where the marriage is between persons, one of whom 
has no capacity to contract marriage at all, as where there 
is a want of age ('want of age' being obiter, Koonce v. Wal-
lace, 52 N. C. 194), or understanding, or a prior marriage 
still subsisting, the marriag·e is void absolutely and from the 
beginning, and may be enquired of in any court. For, al-
though, .in such case there may be a proceeding in the ecclesi-
astical court, it is not to dissolve the marriage, but merely, 
for the convenf~nce of. the parties, to find the fact and de-
clare the marriage thereupon to have been void, ab in.itio.: 
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and no ·civil rights can be acquired under such a marriage. 
It is said to be no marriage, but a profanation of marriage, 
and the factum is a nullity.' " 
Now, with that pronouncement of the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina directly on the point of lack of understanding 
in contracting a marriag·e, you will agree, will you not, that 
the question as to whether or not an attack under North Caro-
lina law could have been made on this marriage after the 
death of one of the spouses, collaterally, is a question that is 
not by any means free from difficulty! 
A. I would not undertake to express any opin-
page 746 ~ ion as to the effect of that case by just hearing 
you read that passage. I would have to study the 
case before I could express an opinion on it. 
Q. Assuming an attack on the marriage, that attack could 
have been made in Virginia, could it not f 
A. I think so. You mean a collateral attack? 
Q. Yes. 
I will invite your attention to the case of TVilliam.~on v.· 
Johnson, decided by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia in ,June, 1935, and reported in 164 Va. 632, and also in 
180 S. E. 310. Have you read that case Y 
A. No, I have not-not recently; I may have read it when 
it was first reported. 
Q. That was a case in which a marriage was solemnized 
in North Carolina between two parties neither of whom were 
residents of North Carolina. and to that extent it is exactlv 
like the case here. Now, an attack was made on that ma1:-
riage in the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk on the ground 
that one of the parties, the husband, at the time of the m1lr-
riage was not of sufficient understanding to contract a valid 
marriage. 
A. The marriage was in North Carolina Y 
Q. The marriage was in North Carolina. The attack was 
a collateral attack, made by the committee of the husband, and 
the court :mnulled the marriage and declared 
page 747 ~ it void pursuant to section 2495 of the Carolina 
Code, which is specifically set out in the opinion. 
A. V{ ere both parties still alive? 
Q. Both parties were still alive. The case cites the case 
of Counts v. Counts, 161 Va. 768, and proceeds with the fol-
lowing lang-uag·e : 
"As in the case at bar, the wife contended that the annul-
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ment proceedings ha.d been instigated by the husband's rela-
tives with the ulterior motive that they, and not she, might 
inherit his estate. Justice Browning disposed of that conten-
tion by aptly saying·, 161 Va. 768, at page 774: 'In our view 
we cannot he concerned with the motives of the parties, what-
ever they were. We are confronted with the absolute terms 
of solemn statutes which we have no right to disregard or 
abrog·ate.' '' 
Now, in the light of these cases, do you think that Mr. 
Parker was faced with an open-and-shut proposition as to 
whether or not an attack might be made upon that marriage 
upon the ground of want of understanding, particularly, as 
we assumed just now, the attack on the will made two months 
before the marriage was successful and it was held there was 
lack of testamentary capacity, and/or the attack on the deed 
which was made just about a year after the marriage had 
been successful on the ground of want of mental ca pa.city to 
make a deed¥ vVould not that have raised a right serious prob-
lem? 
A. My answer to. that is that I do not know anything about 
this recent Virginia case except what you have 
page 748 ~ _read me, but that I would think that while both 
parties were alive-that was a divorce proceed-
ing, was it noU 
Q. No. 
A. What kind of proceeding was iU 
Q. It was a proceeding on the part of the committee to 
have the marriage annulled on the ground that it contravened 
a North Carolina statute. 
A. I use the word "divorce" in a _general sense. It was 
an annulment proceeding. 
Q. Precisely. 
A. An annulment proceeding during the life of the parties 
is very different from-
Q. But you have just agreed with the statement that, if 
the marriage was yoid, it could be attacked after the death 
of the parties in any kind of proceedings? 
A. Yes, but I do not think it was void, and I think, even 
if it was not void, it could be attacked in this sod of pro-
ceeding. I also am convinced that Mr. Heath, if there had 
been any hope in his mind of attacking this marriage, would 
have been very quick,, with proceedings to do so and would 
not have "miss'ed that trick" in any phase of the litigation. 
Mr. Heath apparently conceded in the case that finally went 
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through all of the courts, that the marriage could not ,be at-
tacked; Mr. Parker said so in his brief, so that he evidently 
did not think so, and he also said, in his annota-
page 7 49 ~ tions of his account, under Item 13: '' A search 
was made for all decisions of the Supreme Court 
of North Carolina interpreting this statute (referring to the 
Carolina Code), and the conclusion was reached that the 
validity of such a marriage could not be attacked after the 
death of one of the contracting parties." So that it seems 
to have been the view of very diligent counsel on both sides 
of these litigations that that was the case. I have no doubt · 
that both Mr. Heath and Mr. Parker made a much more 
thoroug·h and careful study of this question in these litiga-
tions than I have made for the purpose that I am here to-
day, and the fact-that they apparently concurred in the view 
that ~ have expressed seems to go far towards substantiating 
my views. 
Q. You have raised a good many points in your answer, 
and, I am sorry to say, it is going to be necessary to go ove1· 
several of them. Let us start first with this alleged concur-
rence of counsel that there was nothing in the point. Now, 
so far as Mr. Heath was concerned, unless the will could be 
declared invalid, it was a matter of utter indifference to him 
whether the marriage was valid or not, wasn't it 7 
A. There was no reason why he could not attack both ques-
tions at the same time, as far as I know. 
Q. Well, that was a matter of tactics to be de-
J)age 750 ~ cided by himself, I take it T · . 
A. Yes, but I can't get over the feeling that if 
there had been any real prospect of attacking this marriage, . 
he would have done so very quickly. 
Q. Let us analyze it and see if there was any necessity for 
it. You don't want to do useless work in any case, do you f 
- A. No, but I am_ by no means assured it would have been 
useless. 
Q. Now, let us analyze that. Suppose he had started out 
by attacking the marriage and had succeeded in having the 
marriage annulled: What good would that have done unless 
l1e could have also had the will declared void T 
A. Possibly not any, but it was just as important to do 
one as the other. 
Q. Precisely. 
A. And he could do them simultaneously, as far as I can 
see. 
.-
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Q. And he might have decided that it was to his advantage 
to do them seriati,m, might he not Y 
A. He might have decided that, but I don't think he did. 
Q. Well, what do you know about what he decided t 
A. Well,. I am not a mind reader. 
. Q. ,]Juctly. But you will admit that, unless he 
page 751 ~ was successful in setting the will aside, it was a 
purely moot question with him whether the mar-
riage was valid or invalid 1 
A. He had to do both. 
Q. So that when you say that Mr. Heath conceded there 
was nothing in the point as to the validity of the marriage, 
that is simply a gratuitous assumption on your part, isn't 
it? 
A. I think not. 
Q. ·why not? 
A. Because I so interpreted his expressions in his briefs. 
Q. Mr. Heath's expressions in his briefs¥ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Point them out to me. ' 
A. He says, on page 3 of his petition in the appeal from 
the Princess Anne case : 
"It appears that the only question, upon this appeal, is 
as to the sufficiency of all the evidence to show that an es-
tablished domicile had, shortly before the testator's death, 
been changed from New York to this state." 
I realize that that is not a complete concession, but I think 
it is an implied one. 
By the Commissioner: 
Q. Could he have attaeked them both in the same· proceed-
ing! 
A. I should think so. 
page 752 ~ By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. What character of proceeding would you 
suggest? 
A. I mig·ht be wrong about that. A.s I say, I have no prac-
tice along that line, but I was under the impression that both 
points could have been raised in the Princess Anne case. I 
may be wrong. 
By Mr. Lanning: 
Q. The last case Y 
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A. Yes, the last case. I may be wrong. 
By Mr. Maupin:· 
Q. As a matter of fact, in this brief from which you have 
just read, the two points at issue, and the only two points at 
issue, upon which error was assigned were as to the domi-
cile of Father Hayes and, second, as to whether the statute 
of limitations had interposed. 
A. That is true, ·but I think there would have been another 
point in there if it could have been successfully maintained. 
Q. What you read just now was simply an attempt on the 
part of counsel to state what the issues before the Court 
wereY 
A. That is true. 
Q. And there could have been no further issues than those 
assigned by the assignment of errors, could there? 
A. No. 
pag·e 753 ~ Q. Is that the only thing you have on which to 
base your opinion that Mr. Heath had abandoned 
this important factor in the case¥ 
A. No, that is not the only thing; that is just one item. 
Q. Are there any expressions in his brief that he did soY 
A. I can't point to any, but the point that I make is that 
I think his whole attitude throughout the litigations would 
have been one of attack on the marriage, as well as the will, 
if he thought there was any chance of successful attack. I 
may be wrong about that. 
Q. Can you tell me how in the world any counsel in a will 
contest can bring in the validity of a supposed marriage as 
a ground of the contest which will be at issue in that will 
contestf 
A. If it could not have been done in that, I think Mr. 
Heath would have found some other form of litigation that 
could have raised the issue. I do not know of any way of 
doing it in the will contest. 
Q. You admitted, early in your testimony, that once the 
will had been declared invalid and the marriage had been 
declared valid, the personal estate would all have gone to 
Mrs. Hayes anyhow? 
A. Yes. 
page 754- ~ Q. Now, you do not think that Mr. Heath was 
strenuously attempting in three separate suits 
to have this will set aside simply for the professional satis-
faction of having it set aside, do you? 
A. :No. 
--
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Q. Well, can you conceive of any reason why he would not 
thereafter haye attempted to have the marriag·e set aside f 
A. No reason except my feeling that he did not think he 
could do it. 
Q. Your feeling! 
A. I may 1;,e wrong. 
Q. Well, you phrase it a little differently. 
A. I just got the idea that he did not think he could do it. 
Q. I say it is a "gratuitous assumption"; you say it is a 
"feeling"; we will let it go as a difference in phraseolog-y. 
You are aware of the fact, too, from your reading of this 
record, that Mrs. Guilfoil made oath in New York that, at 
the time of his death, Father Hayes was unmarried, are you 
not? 
A. I don't know what she made oath to. That point was 
made, and I suppose it was made 1U1der oath; I don't know 
whether it was or not; I assume it was. I have 
pag·e 755 ~ not read the testimony. 
Q. New York counsel testified that she had to 
make such an oath before she could obtain letters of admin-
istration, and you knew :Mr. Heath was engaged in that liti-
g·ation and acting in an advisory capacity c.oncerning it t 
A. Yes, I knew that. 
Q. Now, let us assume that proceedings had been instituted 
to annul this marriage, and they had been successful, the 
amount at issue would have differed greatly from the amount 
you testified, of $36,000, wouldn't it Y 
A. Yes, it would. It would have been twice as much. 
Q. l,t would have been, really, $83,000, according to your 
calculation, would it not? 
A. Yes, that is right. 
Q. And if your calculations err on the side of conservatism, 
it would have been as much more as the estate was actually 
~~, . 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you have testified that you think that a fee of 25 
per cent for the litigated matters, of the real value of the 
estate at risk. w8s a rNHwnable and fair fee? 
A. On that amount. I would not say that 25 per cent would 
be an invariable fraction, regardless of the amount, because, 
as I said, I do not regard this as a oontingent fee, and I think 
that certain fractioning enters into it but there 
page 756 ~ is no fixed fraction that would hold for all 
amounts. 
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Q. Well, I don't know of any '' rule of thumb'' that you 
can decide it by, anyhow. 
A. I don't either .. 
Q. But suppose the estate at risk had been a hundr·ed thou~ 
'Sand dollars-
A. Lawyers, in assessing fees, have to use various aids of 
ihat sort. No aid is invariable or immutable, but the assess-
ment of fees, I think, is always difficult and lawyers have 
to use such aids as they can find in arriving at reasonable 
amounts. 
Q. Suppose the estate at risk had been a hundred thousand 
dollars, would you say 25 per cent would have been a rea-
sonable fee? 
A. I would not. 
Q. What would you say would have been a reasonable fee?. 
A. I have not given any thought to that phase of it. Of 
course, the fee would have been substantially increased. . 
Q. Now, you say you do not consider this fee as contingent. 
'l\fr. Parker's testimony was that l\irs. Hayes told him that 
he would have to look to the estate for his payment, that she· 
had no funds of her own with which to compensate him. As-
suming the truth of that statement, would you 
page 757 ~ consider the fee contingent or not T . 
A. No, I would not, because I understand Mr. 
Parker said it was not contingent. I may he mistaken, but 
my impression was he said it was not contingent. Didn't he 
say that? Q. No, not to my knowledge. He has been, to the con-
trary, contending it was contingent- · 
A. I didn't know that. I knew that Mr. Sydney Smith, 
perhaps others, had said so, but I did not recall Mr. Parker 
had said so. 
Q. Assume that his statement is true, to-wit, that Mrs. 
Haves informed him that she had no means of her own to 
compensate him with and he would have to look to the recov-
ery to compensate him for his fee, would you consider that 
the fee, in connection with the other facts disclosed by the 
records, was contingent? . 
A. No, I do not consider that any fee is contingent unless 
it so agreed in advance. We have to perform many services 
which, by reason of lack of funds, defeat us from collecting 
our fees. I suppose all lawyers have that experience. 
Q. vVhat form of agreement does there have to be? If a 
client says to a lawyer, "I. want yon to represent me, but you 
liave got to look to the recovery for your fee", and the law-
462 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
TV. H. Terry, Jr. 
yer proceeds to represent her, what more agree-
page 758 ~ ment than that do you want 
.. A. Is that Mr. Parker's testimony¥ I don't re-
call his saying that. 
Mr. Lanning: I don't recall that, l\fr. Maupin. 
Q. I may be mistaken about it-I don't think I am-but if 
there is not, there will be. Assume that such testimony is 
in the record, would you say that this was a contingent fee 
or notf 
A. Not unless an agreement was made as to what the fee 
should. be. 
Q. In other words, yon think there could be no contingent 
fee on a quant'ltm 1neruit? 
A. Yes. That is my ide~ of the meaning of "contingent". 
Mr. Lanning: Mr. Commissioner, I have no further re-di-
rect questions at the time. It may be possible that I will wish 
to recall Mr. Hughes after he has bad opportunity to read 
this case to which Mr. Maupin has referred, if it is neces-
sary. 
I would like to offer in evidence the case of Waters v. 
Waters·. 
The Commissioner: It has been ref erred to, 
page 759 } has it not f 
Mr. Lanning: lt has been ref erred to, but I 
would like it understood that it has been offered in evidence. 
Mr. Maupin: Let the same stipulation be made as to all 
the other cases referred to this morning. 
The Commissioner: All right. . 
Mr. Lanning: Yon offer in evidence the other cases, just 
as if they were in the record? 
Mr. Maupin: Yes. 
W. H. TERRY, JR., 
a witness on behalf of the defendant, having been duly sworn, 
testified as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Lanning: 
Q. Mr. Terry, will you please state your name, age, resi-
dence, and occupation f 
A. W. H. Terry, Jr.; age, thirty-eight; real estate broker; 
residence, Virginia Beach. 
Q. You know Mrs. Hayes, do you not, Mr. Terry Y 
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A. Yes, I am acquainted with her and have been for, .prob-
ably, since they first came to the Beach, probably five or six 
years ago. 
Q. Mr. Terry, did you have any connection with the build-
ing of a residence at the Beach by J\fr. Hayes and Mrs. 
Hayes? . · 
page 760 ~ A. Yes, sir, I did. I sold them the lot that they 
built. ,on and, drew the plans for the house, han-
·dled the contract and supervised the construction; that is, 
the contract was given to Conrad Brothers, and I was Mr. 
Hayes' representative. r 1 ·•·. .., 
Q. What did you do in connection with the actual construc-
tion of the house 1 · --
A. Well, more 1 :<>r ·less, to watch ·the · construction. I was 
on the job there every two or three days during the course 
of construction. 
Q. Did you you· g·o by their residence every two or three 
days and see what was going on i Is that what you mean? 
.A. Yes, sir. I live there and I would go by and discuss 
various matters with Mr. Conrad·.in Mliflection with it. Some 
few changes were made. 
Q. You know Mr. Parker, ·do you not1 
A. 1:es, sir. . 
Q. In this litigation of Mr. Parker ag·ainst Mrs. Hayes, he 
is claiming $500 for services'fo-connect'ion with the building 
of the Virginia Beach house and claims that he made fre-
quent inspections of the work and had conferences with the 
builder with respect to the controver~ial~issues. At comple-
tion of the work, h~ clai~s .to· have -.. r,e<lt~lfed the correction 
of certam om1ss1ons and contested the contrac-
pag·e 761 ~ tor's claims for extq1s., ~nd,so fo:rth; he also claims 
to have selected an· oil burner, for the house, in-
specting· several makes and consulting. with others in a posi-
tion to advise him; and advised her with respect· thereto. Do 
you lmow anything, Mr. Terry, about-the servfoes-1\.frf.Parker 
performed incident to the construction. of that .. house?, 
A. Mr. Lanning, not of my own knowledge, no, sir. · I do 
know that the oil burner was not included in the original con-
tract. However, Mr. Hayes wanted to supervise ,that him-
self, and my understanding was that.he had.already decided, 
before the house . was ever started, to purchase a General 
Electric burner. Now, of course, his dea.t:µin the meanwhile 
-Mr. Parker may have gone ahead and done· thaLfor Mrs. 
Hayes. ,, 
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Q. ,\.1iat do you personally know about the services per-
formed by Mr .. Parker? 
A. Nothing whatever. I think Mr. Parker will bear me 
out that I never saw him on the job during the whole time it 
. was there. 
Q. Did you ever see him down there inspectmg the work? 
A. No, sir, not personally, no. The fact is, I was very 
much surprised that he claimed to have supervised the house-
Mr. Maupin: I object to the testimony. 
page 762 ~ By :M:r. Lanning: 
Q. Well, you did not see him down there on the 
job any, did you? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. And you were down there every two or three days, Mr. 
Terry? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And how long did it take to complete the construction f 
A. I don't recall exactly. I would say approximately three 
months. It might have been a little longer. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By 1\fr. Maupin: 
Q. Who employed you, Mr. Terry, to supervise the con-
struction of that house Y 
A. Mr. Hayes. 
Q. How much did he pay you for it? 
A. Paid me $100. 
Q. A hundred dollars? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was that before the house was started, or afterY 
A. That was before it was started. 
Q. Who drew the plans¥ 
A. I did. 
page 763 ~ · Q. So, vou got a hundred dollars for drawing 
the plans· and such supervision as you made? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. ·when Mr. Hayes died, the house had just been started, 
had it not? 
A. That is correct. 
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Q. And, thereafter, you knew that Mr. Parker represented 
Mrs. Hayes? 
A. As an attorney, yes. 
Q. You do not know how many consultations he had with 
Mrs. Hayes, or with Conrad, or with any of the sub-contrac-
tors, or with the oil burner man, or anybody else, do you T 
A. No, sir, I do not. · 
Q. And all you can say is that on the occasions you were 
there he was not there 1 
A. That is correct. 
Q. But you don't know how many times he was there when 
you were not there 7 
A. Well, I was not there twenty-four hours in the day, 
naturally. 
Q. Exactly. And it might very well ha-ve happened that 
he was there as often as you, and you just missed each other Y 
A. It is possible. 
Q. Y es--quite possible, isn't it 7 
pag·e 764 ~ A. Possible, yes. 
:.Mr. Lanning: I wouJd like to have it understood that it 
will be unnecessary for either side to prove foreign law. 
The Commissioner: Yes. Cite the cases. 
Mr. Lanning: That we may cite the cases we wish and re-
f er to the statutes. 
:Mr. Maupin: That is agreed. 
Thereupon, the hearing was adjourned, to be resumed at a 
date to be agreed upon between the parties. 
page 765 } OFFICES OF GEORGE PILCHER, ESQ., 
COMMISSIONER 
Norfolk, Virginia, May 8, 1939 
The hearing wa.s resumed before the Commissioner at 11 
o'clock A. M., pursuant to adjournment from April 14, 1939. 
Present: Mr. Maupin, for the complainant. 
]\fr. Lanning, for the defendant. 
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-a witness on behalf of the defendant, was recalled and ful"-
ther testified as follows: 
Examined·.b:r. Mr. Lanning·: 
Q. Mr~ ·Hughes, at the completion of your testimony in this 
case on April 14, we 1·eserved the rig·ht to recall you if you 
so desired, after study, to express your views as to the de-
cisions about which Mr. Maupin had questioned you. Have 
you made any studY... ~f ,th.ose decisions and, if so, do you now 
desire to comment upon 'them r 
A. Yes, I have st:u4.ie~ them a.nd I have made notes, from 
which I am now testifying. I do desire to give the inter-
pretation which 1 place. upon them. 
In the first ~Pl~ce, J. wish to repeat what I have already 
said as to the confusing language of Section 2495 of the 
Nor~h .C,ar:olina Code with its double proviso. At 
page 766 ~ the 'time of my former testimony, the Commis-
sioner called attention to the fact that th~ statute 
cpntained an exception to an exception, and also that the 
title to the-'·section iuiakes reference to "void and voidable 
marriages.~' · I have looked into the meaning of the words 
''void'' and "voidable" as used in the law, and I find that 
the use of the':woi'd" "void" is surrounded by great confusion. 
In the cai:;;e of Toledo R. Co. v. Continental Trust Co., 95 Fed-
eral 497, it is said, at pag·e 525, that "nothing is better under-
stood than that th~ word 'void' is more frequently than oth~r-
wise used···m the: 1 sense of 'voidable,' both.'in contracts and 
statutes.'' · 
In 67 Corpus Juris, at page 263, it is said: '' There is no 
word in the law-books so carelessly used'' as the word '~void.'' 
"There is g·reat looseness and no little confusion in the books 
in the use of 'void' and 'voidable.' " The following expres-
sions about the m.eaning· of the word "void" are taken from 
the text in 67 Cotpus S uris, between pages 263 and 266, in-
clusive : '' 'Void' is so often used in the sense of 'voidable' 
as to have ·a1most·Iost its primary meaning; and it has been 
said that whatever may be voided, may, in good sense, to 
this purpose, be called void.'' As used in certain statutes, 
"void" has be~ ·construed as merely void until validated. 
"Void" means ''that wllich cannot be ratified or confirmed.'' 
In the 1ig·ht o_f these expressions it is easy to 
page 767 } understand the m~e in the Carolina statute of the 
word "void" as meaning· "voidable,'' padicu-
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larly in the light o,f the title to the section to which Commis-
sioner Pilcher has caHed attention at page 618 of the tesfi-
mony in this case. 
When Mr. Maupin cross-examined me about the North 
Carolina case of lV aters v. JV aters, 84 Southeastern 703, he 
tried to show that the appellate court of Carolina, in de-
claring that the word ''void'' in Section 2495 meant '' void-
able,'' was indulging in a dictum and was going beyond the 
issues involved. There was some plausibility in thi.s sug-
gestion because of the fact that in that case there had been 
'' birth of issue,'' in compliance with the terms of the pro-
viso. A further study of that case convinces me that the 
court's interpretation of the word "void" was not a mere 
dictum. In the ,vaters case the court held that because the 
complaining husband had lived with the wife for eight years 
and she had borne him five ehildren, he ratified and con-
firmed the marriag·e, even if the wife was mentally incom~ 
petent at the time thereof. If the marriage had been abso-
lutely void, there would have been nothing to confirm. Thus 
the court's decision is based on the voidable character of 
the marriage. In this connection it is pertinent to refer fo 
the last two sentences which I have quoted above from Corpus 
Juris. 
At pages 519 m1d 520, Mr. Maupin questioned 
pa~;e 768 ~ me about the North Carolina case of Prid.qen v. 
Prid_qen, 166 Southea~tern 591. He invoked this 
case aR a reaffirmation of the deciRion of the Carolina court 
in the old case of Gathings v. TYilliams (1845), 27 N. C. 487, 
as to which caRe he also questionP-d me. Section 2495 wai,, 
not enacted until the session of 1871 and 1872. The common 
law rule prevailed in North Carolina in 1845 when Gathin,qs 
v. Williams was decided. Tl1e court held thaf under common 
law there were three thing·s that made a marriag·e absolutely 
void, namel:v: bigamy, want of age, want of mind. In the 
1870 's the legislature removed the last two categories from 
the void classes and substituted for them the black-and-wllite 
category. Waters v. 1Vaters dealt ,•lith marriages under the 
Rtatute, Gathin[JS v. 1'Villiams under the common law. Under 
the common law marriages of incompetents were void; under 
the statute they were voidable. That the two cases are in 
lrnrmony iR sl10wn by the following passage from Gathin,_qs 
v. Williams, near the middle of pa.ge 495 in 27 N. C.: 
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'' This conclusion is a complete answer to the notion of 
an estoppel; for what the law pronounces void .cannot estop.'' 
As I have pointed out, the decision in Waters v. lV ate1·s is 
predicated squarely on estoppel and ratification. At any 
rate, I find nothing in Prid{lwn v. Pridgen, which was a bigamy 
case, to abrogate the interpretation placed upon Section 2495 
in Waters v. TI' aters. 
page 769 ~ The only other case about which Mr. Maupin 
, questioned me is the Virginia case of 111-illiamson 
v . .Johnson, 180 Southeastern 310, which went up from the 
Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk. At the bottom of page 
621 of the testimony in the case at bar, Mr. Maupin refers 
to this as a collateral attack upon the marriage therein chal-
lenged. I took issue with this, and said that I thought it was 
a direct attack. I still think so. I do not see how the mere 
.fact that the complainant was the committee of one of the 
spouses keeps the case from being a direct attack upon tho 
marriage between the parties thereto. I find nothing in J us-
tice Eg·gleston 's opinion from which it could be argued that 
he held that marriage with an incompetent wa.s void rather 
than voidable in North Carolina. 
A study of these authorities has confirmed me in my view 
that the North Carolina marriage of Mr. and Mrs. Hayes 
was clearly not void, but was voidable only. 
Near the bottom of page 619 of my testimony, I stated 
that I had not made as profound a study of this question 
as I would have done if I were going to try a c.ase involviug 
it; and Mr. Maupin replied that Mr. Parker did make such 
a study. In the light of that comment, I can only refer again 
to what he said in his annotated account, reminding the Com-
missioner tha.t this comment of his was made as recently as 
.Tune 24. 1938, in connection with this present 
page 770 ~ suit for fees, and not in connection with his l1an-
. dling of the litigations between Mrs. Hayes and 
the Guilfoils. On that date, and in connection with this very 
suit for fees, he said: 
"A search of the North Carolina statutes disclosed that 
a marria@:e between persons~ onP of whom was of unsound 
mind a.t the time, was expressly declared to be void. A 
search was then ma<le of nll decisions of the Supreme Court 
· of North Carolina i~terpreting this statute, and the conclu-
~ion was reached that the validity of such a marriage could 
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not be attacked after the death of one of the contracting par-
ties.'' 
It would appear, therefore, that Mr. Parker may not 
share Mr. l\.faupin 's doubts as to the now incontestable status 
.of the marriage. 
Before closing this comment, I wish to. refer once more 
to the attitude of Mr. Heath towards this question and to the 
last suit in Princess Anne County. In questioning me, Mr . 
. Maupin sought to show that the validity of the marriage 
was not involved in that attack upon the will, and that the 
question could not have been raised and adjudicated in that 
litigation. While I have confessed that this kind of prac-
tice is entirely out of my usual line, I am not sure yet that 
Mr. Maupin is right about that. By referring to 
·page 771 :} the record in the case of Guilfoil· v. Hayes, I see 
that the bill of complaint was predicated on the as-
sumption that the defendant was not married to Mr. Hayes 
and that the complainant was his sole heir and distributee; 
that in the defendant's plea that complainant was not a per-
son interested, and in defendant's answer, it was averred 
that on the 12th day of September, 1932, he and the defend-
~mt were lawfully married and continued so to be until the ----. 
date of his death. It appears from page 55 of the printed 
record that the marriage was proved by the introductio~ 
<>f the marriage certificate as Exhibit 11, as well as by the 
testimony of Mrs. Hayes. It seems to me that when the. 
plaintiff in that case allowed these averments in answer and 
plea and tl1ese proofs to go unchallenged, the marriage was 
thereby estabfa;hed. I can only conclude that Mr. Heath 
· realized in that proceeding, as he has appeared to me to 
realize· throughout this entire controversy, that the marriage 
was beyond the hope of successful challenge or attack. 
CROSS EXAl\fINATION. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Mr. ianning's first question addressed to you had the 
predicate that the right was reserved to recall you if you 
desired to make any further Rtatement with regard to the law 
as to the void or voidable character of certain 
pap:e 772 ~ marriages under the N ort;h Carolina statutes; do 
you recall thaU 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Did you resume the stand, then, at your ~wn instance. 
or at. the request of counsel for Mrs. Hayes Y 
A. I do not remember now who made the first suggestion, 
but we had a conference after I had read the testimony a.nd 
in that conference I said that I would like to continue my 
testimony because I thought that in the light of the study I 
had made I could make my position clearer. I do not remem-
ber whether I :first suggested it or they first suggested it, 
but I expressed the desire to testify further upon that point. 
Q. In testifying here before, Mr. Hughes, you were testi-
fying as an·expert witness and giving opinion evidence, werP. 
you not! 
A. That is right. 
Q. And the evidence that yon gave was addressed to the 
value of the services performed by Mr. Parker t 
A.. Yes. 
Q. Of course, the value of those services depended to some 
extent 11pon what the legal situation was with which he was 
confronted, did it noU 
A. That is right. 
Q. And I understand that you were not entirely satisfied 
with your testimony on your first appearance ancl 
page 773 ~ wanted to come back and strengthen it f 
A. My answer to tllat is that I had made no 
real study of the question at that time except in a very 
limited way, and that when you asked me about cases that I 
had not read and I afterwards read them, I desired to justify 
my answers by giving my interpretation of those cases. 
Q. ,ven, you must have realized from the very beginning 
that the validity of this marriage was an absolutely vital 
factor in this situation, did you notf 
A.. Yes. 
Q. You realized from the very beginning that, assuming 
the validity of the marriage, it made not a particle of differ-
ence from a monetary standpoint, so far as Father Hayes' 
personal estate was concerned, whether the will stood or 
whether the will was declared to be a nullity, did you notf. 
A. That is true, assuming the application of the Virginia 
law. 
Q. Well, the will was probated in Virginia, was it noU 
A. Yes, and also probated in another state, was it noU 
Q. No, sir, it was not. Application was made to the Pro-
bate Court of Orange County, New York, for letters of ad-
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ministration on ·Father Hayes'. estate, and the 
page 774 ~ statement was made that he died intestate; so 
that thP. will was probated only in the Circuit 
Court of Princess Anne County. 
· A .. That is true. I should have said there was qualification 
in another state. · · : . 
Q. 1.,V e are speaking of the will. 
A. That is true. . 
Q. And Mi·. Parker's efforts, or a- very large part of them, 
were addressed to establishing the validity of the will; that 
is true, isn't it 1 
A. That is true. 
Q. In two fora in Virginia, is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, from· the standpoint of the contestants in thos~ 
suits attacking the validity of the will in Virginia, I repeat, 
it made not one particle of difference from a pecuniary stand-
point whether the will wa·s declared good or whether it was 
declared bad, assuming tlie validity of the marriage? 
A. That is true, in Virginia. · 
Q. Well, can yo·u give any reasonable suggestion as to why 
a lawyer of Mr. Heath's experience, competence, and wisdom 
would have litig·ated a question for a period of four years 
when, if he were successful, he would be no better off than 
he would be if he 'were unsuccessful 1 · 
A. Well, one reason is that he mig·ht have hoped 
page 775 ~ to apply the New York law instead or the Vir-
ginia law. 
Q. 1.,Ve.11, Mr. Hughes~ if Mrs. Hayes was the wife of Fat.her 
Hayes, she took his whole personal estate, even if he died 
intestate; did ·she not? 
A. In Virginia, yes. 
Q. · From her standpoint, what difference did it make 
whether she took under the will as leg-atee or whether she 
took under the law of descent and distribution as his dis-
tributee T 
A·: It madP. no difference so long as the Virginia law were 
applied. · · 
· Q. And wl1at difference did it make to Mrs. Guilfoil whether 
Mrs .. Hayes took the whole personal estate as distribntee or 
as leµ:atee 1 
A. The same answer. 
Q. So that reduces hack to the fact that ]\.fr. Parker, in 
all this will litigation, really did not accomplish any pur-
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pose for Mrs. Hayes other than establishing the validity of 
the will; isn't that true f 
A. He kept the Virginia law applicable-he so managed 
the litigation as to apply the Virginia law. 
Q. Of what Virginia law are you speaking? 
A. Distribution. 
Q. The law of descent and distribution f 
A. Yes. 
page 776 }- · Q. Precisely so, but if Father Hayes was domi. 
ciled in the State of Virginia, his wife would be 
his sole distributee, would she not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The will wa.s pro bated in Virginia, was it not! 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Parker did establish the fact that Father Hayes 
was domiciled in Virginia, did he not f 
A. Yes, but that was at issue down to the very end of the 
litigation. 
Q. I .say, he established that, though, did he not f 
A. Yes. 
Q. But, assuming that he had been unsuccessful in estab-
lishing· this as a v~id will, his client would have been just 
as well off, would she not? 
A. In a Virginia forum, yes. 
Q. Well, he was in a Virginia forum, was he not Y 
A. In that case, yes. 
Q. So, I repeat again, does it not follow tha.t what he was 
doing was of no value whatever from a pecuniary standpoint 
to Mrs. Hayes on your theory of the case? 
A. Well, Mr. Heath must have had some purpose. I ha-ve 
not talked to him. I do not know what his thoug·ht was. 
Q. He unquestionably, did have some purpose in mind, but 
what I am trying to get you to do is to enlighten 
page 777 ~ the Commissioner as to why Mr. Heath should 
litigate a question for four years in the courts of 
Virginia~ that did not make one penny's worth of difference 
to his client, be he successful or unsuccessful f 
A. I think Mr. Heath could enlighten him better than I 
could. r believe it has been suggested that lfr. Heath could 
be a witness. 
Q. Well, you admit tl1at you are unable to enlighten the 
Commissioner on that point? 
A. Yes. 
Q. ,vhereas-you will admit this also, won't you-if Mr. 
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Parker had been successful, as he was, in sustaining the. will, 
l\:fr. Heath could not thereafter gain anything by attacking 
the validity of the marriage, couJd he Y 
A. I think not.. 
Q. Whereas, if Mr. Heath had been successful in avoid-
ing. the will and having it declared not the last true wiU and 
·testam~nt of William R. Hayes, if he were thereafter su,c- -
eessful in having the marriage declared void, Mrs ... Hayes 
would have t~ken nothing; isn't that a facU 
A. That is true. 
Q. So that, in order for Mr. Heath to have accomplished 
anything from a pecuniary standpoint for his client, it would 
have been necessary for him to do two things: First, to have 
the will declared not the last true will and testa-
page 778 } ment of William R. Hayes, and, second, to have 
avoided the · marriage Y 
A. It seems so to me. 
Q. And in the face of that, you still would not think there 
was any possibility of ·anybody, in any forum, in any charac-
ter of proceeding·, attacking this marriage successfully! 
A . .After the death of Mr. Hayes, tbatis my opinion. 
Q. Now. you said that you had not made a very exhaustive 
study of the authorities relating to this point before your 
previous appearance on the ·stand, but I take it that you 
bave made an exhaustive study of the authorities since that 
time? 
.A. The only thing I have studied is the cases that you 
asked me about, and the meaning of t.he word "void" in a 
general way in the encyclopedias and texts. 
Q. Diel you investigate to discover whether ithere w~re 
any other cases interpretin~ or explaining Section 2495 of 
the North Carolina Code subsequent to the case of Pridgen 
v. Pridgen? 
A. No, I did not. I made no study except of the cases that 
you asked me a.bout. 
Q. You do not know, then, whether there is any subsequent 
pronouncement of the Supreme Court of North Carolina on 
t}le point? · 
A. I do not. 
page 779 } Q. I have been unable to find any, though I 
have made a search, and I wondered if you had 
discovered any subsequent to that. 
A. No. I have not made a search. 
Q. Here is the language of the court in Pridgen v. Prid,qen-: 
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'' Where the. marriage is between persons, one of whom 
has no capacity to contra-0t marriage at all, as where there 
is a want of ag·~, or nnderstan~ing, the marriage is void abso~ 
lutely. ,and from the beginning,· and may be enquired of in 
any court.'' 
. . -
. . 
, Now, if that is the last pronouncement of the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina. it would appear ·that a marriage 
which is contracted by pa'rties, one of whom has not under-
standing sufficient to contract the marriage, "is· void abso"" 
lutely and may be enquired of in any court"; is that not 
correctf · -
· A. I did not interpret Pridgen v. Prid,qcn so to decide. 
They were passing on their own facts in that· case, and they 
were following Gathings v. TYilUams, and in following it there 
were some expressions that might have been misleading if 
you did not· bear in mind the fact that Gathings v. TVilliams 
was decided under the common law and before the statute 
was enacted. The fact that Pridgen v. Prid,<Jen did not abro-· 
gate or undertake to modify ot revoke the decision in W ate·rs 
v. Water.~;Ied me t_o the conclusion that it did not intend to 
decide that the marriage of an incompetent was void. · 
· Q. Pridgen v. Prillgen, in the Iang-uage that I 
page 780 ~ have just quoted to you~ approved the language 
· of Chief ,Justice Ruffin in Gathings v. Williams? 
did it not? 
· A. Yes, but I think it approved it-with reference to the 
facts of that case and the law in 1845. · 
·Q. You have unde·rtaken to give· the Co1trt som·e definitions 
of the meaning of the word "void." I did not hear; as you 
read them, any reference to any definition by the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina as to · the meaning of the word 
"void"'; did you have any suchf 
A. No. · . 
Q. You did not, thenJ consult the case of Bmvyer v. Slack, 
a ·North Carolina case, reported in 146 Routl1eastern ~64, · 
which gave the definition of a. void ·marriap:e Y . 
A. I did not. · I have not seen the case. · 
Q. Well,' if ·1 told you that that decision said that a void 
marriage had· no' validity whatever for any purpos·e, · and 
might b·e enquired ·of at any time, in any r·ourt, that definition, 
as given by the North Carolina court with partfoulnr refer-
ence to this statute, w'ould be more controllinA' tlum the state-
ment of a text or a decision of a court of some otlrnr state, 
would it not 1 
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A. It would depend on the facts of the case. I think that 
statement that you have just made is, in the abstract, a true 
statement of the ·effect of a void marriage. The 
page 781 ~ trouble is, when you say '' a void marriage,'' yon 
are talking about a voidable marriage, and it is 
entirely different. 
Q. When I talk about a void marriage, I talk about a void 
marriage; when I talk about a voidable marriage, I talk about 
a voidable· marriage. 
A. You are more accurate than most of the writers of the 
decisions. 
'Q. I take it that your interpretation of the ~tatute is that; 
when the statute said that a marriage which is contracted 
between persons, one of w horn is incapable from lack ·of un-
derstar..ding of. contracting a valid marriage, is void, the stat-
ute really means that it is voidable, even if there has been 
no birth of issue; is that true? 
A. I think that is true· of this North Carolina statute. I 
would not say it was true as to all statutes. 
Q. You think the North Carolina statute is sui ,ge.neris., do 
you? , · 
· .A. No. I think. that there are many statutes in which the 
· word ''void'' is used in the sense of ''voidable,'' and that 
this North Carolina statute is one of them. 
Q. You are aware of the fact, are you not, that when let.,. 
ters of administration were applied for in Orange County 
by Mrs. Guilfoil, the statement was made by her that William 
R. Hayes was unmarried when·he diedf · 
A. I think so: I think that was a fact. 
pag·e 782 } Q. Can you c-onceive that any person engaged 
in litigation of this character, represented by 
counsel who were not only astute and learned in the law but 
who also hfld thC' highest possible professional standing, would 
have made such· a statement, particularly under oath, unless 
there had been an intention to substantiate that statement in 
court? -
· A. Well, it is a sort -of general practice in pleading to 
state things as strongly as you possibly can and to prove a..q 
inuch as you can. 
Q. That was not pleading. As a prerequisite to Mrs. Guil. 
foil's right to take out letters of administration, as the sister 
of the deceased, there had to be a statement made under 
oath that the deceased did not have surviving him a spouse. 
Now, that was not ple1tding: it was a vital sworn statement 
upon which her right fo qualify depended. 
0 
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~. It was i~ the n~ture of a pleading, I sµould s~y. 
Q. Well, (;lo -you underst~nd tliat a stateµient t9 a judici~J 
tribu~al, µnder·oath, of an ~xtsting fact which t~ a prereq~istte 
to yo11r riglit to recover is a ple~dingf 
~. A gr-eat µiany pleadings ~re sworn to~ 
. Q. Yes; and what is the penalty for swearing falsely to 
a ple~dingY 
.A. Perjury~ 
Q. Po ypu think, then, that Mrs. Guilfoil committed ab~o"! 
lute, bJire'.:faced perjury when she made that statement? 
A. I do not charge her with that. 
page 7$3 } Q. Po Y0'-1 ~ake any explanation of that except 
that she in~:pd~(l tp substantiate it to the courtf 
,A. I do not k:qgw th~t l ~an explain it or that I ought ta 
tr-y tp e~piain it. 
ARTHUR E. CONRA:P, 
a witness on behalf of the ~~fendaTit, being duly sworn, tes-: 
tified as follows : 
Examined by Mr. L~nning ~ 
. Q. Mr. ,Conrad, will you state your name, age, and occupa-: 
tiooY ' 
A.. Arthur E. Conrad, will be forty-:nine in November, gen-: 
eral contractor. 
Q, ])o ·you live in Norfolk? 
A. Ye~, sir.. 
Q. Mr. Conrad, did you build a cottage fo1· Mrs. Hayes in 
the summer of 1934 Y 
A. My firm did, Conrad BrotherA, lncorporateci. 
Q. 'fha.t was in the summer of 1934 Y 
A. ~s near as I can rooolloot. It bas been quite a while 
ago. 
Q. Y,ou knew Mr. Par~er was acting for the estate of M1\ 
Hayes, did you not f 
page 184 } A. Yes, sir. 
· Q. Did you see Mr. Parker at the site of the 
cottage whilt it was being constructed Y 
A. At one time, after Mr. Hayes' death, Mr. Parker called 
me and asked rne to go with him and inspect the cottage, 
and as Ttear ns I remember, I think it was on Saturday, Sat:-
urday afternoon. I took him with me to Virginia Beach and 
he inspected the cottage. 
Q. How far along had the cottage gotten at that ti1n:eY Was 
it half constructed, or almost -finished¥ · 
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A. No, it was not finished. I think it w~ pear about re1',qy 
for plastering, as near as I recollect. ·· . · 
Q. That was on a Saturday, you say7 
A . .As near as I recQllect, it was on Saturday afternoon? 
Q. Did you see him out there at any other tjpie Y 
A. I have not seen him personally, no. Of coµrse,. I dqn 't 
know whether he has been there or not.. 
Q. Were you out at the cottage ve,y pftenf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How often? . 
A. Well, if it wasn't eve1·y day, it was every other day 
and probably twice a day when I was there. . . 
Q. And you say you saw Mr. ParkeF there onl1- on this one . 
occasion when you carried him down there; is that correctT 
A. That is correct. 
page 785 } Q. Did vou have a number of conferences with 
· Mr. Parker about additions? 
A. Not so much additions, except with reference to settle'" 
ments. 
Q. How many conferences did. you have with Mr. Parker, 
would you say, Mr. Conrad? 
A. Oh, I will say three or four all together. g. Did you have any conferences with Mr. Parker witli 
reference to the boiler or heatert 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q, How m.a,ny conferences did you have with him_ about 
that? 
· .A. I think it was only one with reference to that. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
· Q. Your firm does considerable work around here, does 
it not, Mr. Conrad? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q~ How many jobs did you have at the time Mrs. Hayes' 
house was being built? 
A. In Virginia Beach proper, or in Norfolk? 
Q. All together. 
A. Well, it is right far to remember back ex~ 
page 786 ~ actly, but at that time I think we had three in 
Virginia Reach and probably four or ftve in Nor-
folk. 
Q. You had, then, somewhere. around eight or nine jobs 
going on a.t that time f 
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A. Yes,. sir .. 
· Q. You do not do any actual manual work yourself! 
A. No. 
Q. You a.re in a general supervisorv capacity and inspect 
the work from time to time t • 
, A. Yes. 
Q. And you tell your mechanics what you want done and 
whether anything is done right or not t 
A. I keep a foreman on each job. 
Q. When you went down there on the job, you did not stay 
there long at a time, did you t 
A. No. 
Q. Yolll.·had correspondence with Mr .. Parker about various 
phases of this work, did you not Y · 
A. As near as I recollect, I had correspondence with him 
several times. 
· Q. You do not know to what extent Mr. Parker benefited 
Mrs. Hayes, or what services he performed for her in con-
nection with that house! 
. A. The only thing I know, he was appointed by Mrs. Hayes 
as her attorney to look after the work. 
page 787 ~ By Mr. Lanning: . 
Q. What do you mean, -Mr. Conrad, by "-the 
work'' Y Do you mean building the house Y 
A. No ; I mean the work on the building as the work pro-
gressed, and so on. I think he told me Mrs. Hayes did not 
know anything about building and he was supposed to look 
after the building while the work was going on. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. While the work was going on, Mrs. Hayes was away. 
was she notf 
A. Yes, sir. I think she was here once, but the work was 
almost completed then. 
Mr. Lanning: That completes our testimony, Mr. Com-
missioner. 
- Thereupon the hearing was adjourned, to be resumed for 
the hearing of rebuttal testimony at a date to be agreed upon 
by counsel. 
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page 788 ~ OFFICES OF GEORGE PILCHER, ESQ., 
- COMMISSIONER, 
Norfolk, Virginia, June 8, 1939. 
The hearing was resumed before the ._,Qommi,.ssioner at 10 
A. M., pursuant t~ adjournment front 'M_ay 8;~l9W). 
~ • ~- 1 ,. r I 
' . .• ·r 
Present: Mr .. : ilVIa1,1pjn,c£or tb.e:co.mplaina~t~ . :·:··· .. - ,,o 
Mr. Lanning, for tlie defendant. ,··:{ · . :·· · .. 
. :f)'!• 'r~~ ··~ \~-~C\ ;'if~ 
Mr. Maupin: ·I·ivould like·to·ask 'Mrs. Hayes a question. 
~ . , ' . ..... .. ~· . ·.. : . .,. . "\ ')-
•\ '. - ·· ADELAIDE M. HAYES, . 
being. r'ec4Ue9:,. .furthe~ testif\ijd_::as follows : - ·· 
• !• r \ .. ~ • .' ~ • ..-; '.T l'~ I ~ ') ; I' , I r' f ; • -:, r • 
Examined by']\fr.··Maupin:; ··. · ·r .'.·r· 
Q. I have reason "to · believe that 4he · ~ ewburgh property, 
which ha:s been subject to certab~ ·,testimQny in thi~ case,.,qas 
either been sold ·or you contracted to sell it; is that a fact-? 
A. It has not been solo. yet. r i • _,.,.. , , r .. 
Q. Have you contraeted fo, sell it'? ·.... ·r ~ 
A.Y~. · 
Q. At what price? •·rr ··· ..•. 
A. The. price stated-$1.5~QOo.- .·· .. :·1 - .... 
°l"·'f rp :: . '! o" 
Mr. Maupin: Thank you very much. 
, 'r 
;;i:,· , 
page 789} WILLIAM L. PARKER, , !i. 
being recalled in rebt\ttal, further testified as fol-
lows: ': ,' -~ . ' .. r, • 
I r 
---.~·; J ~ ,·:·:· t· •: :;·)",·:.~ 
Examined by Mr. Maupin: · ~··H,~~" 
Q. Mr. Parker, there has been certain testimo~y· in ·thii;z 
case introduced in an effort to,·minimize. the :value : of your 
services in connootion with the·,building of th'e house. at·~VIr-
ginia Beach. Mr. Terry testified that he was. ,there at l~ast 
once a week, I think. · ·;.. ...--, .. ~ , r 
,r 1 o • • I ~ : .. ,-. •• 1)1,-
Mr. Lanning: I think he said every other day. 
Mr. Maupin: All right, let's say-ev-ery day~-· ··., .. 
Mr. Lanning: He didn't say every- day;--'he ··said every 
other day:) . r, •rtu• 
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By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. He was there at least once every week, and possiblv as 
much as every day, and he didn't see you there. \Vas there 
any reason for you to go there when :M:r. Terry was tberef 
A. Not at all. I examined that property at least once 
a week in the course of its construction. I didn't spend any 
great length of time there. During the periods that I was 
there, neither Mr. Terry nor Mr. Conrad was there except 
on· one occasion when I made a complete inspection of the 
house with Mr. Conrad. 
As a matter of fact, Mr. Terry had drawn the plans for 
the house for which he has charged $75. I ques-
page 790 ~ tioned those, wl1ich I took up with Mrs. Hayes 
as to whether or not he would be employed to 
superintend the construction. We agreed that we would not 
employ him for that purpose. He was paid the $75, and an 
additional $25 for certain minor services that he rendered in 
connection with the house, the nature of which I do not now 
recall. But he was not employed or paid to superintend the 
construction. 
Q. So far as you knew, did Mr. Terry have any business 
at the house, so far as the superintendence of it was con-
cerned, or dirl you know that you were under any duty to 
consult with him or he eonsult with you Y 
A. Quite the contrary. I told Mr. Terry that we would 
not employ him for the purpose of superintending the con-
struction. 
Q. Where was Mrs. Hayes living during the time of the 
construction Y 
· A. She was in New York. 
Q. Was there any other representative of the owner pres-
e:pt on the grounds except yourself, so far aR you knew at 
the time? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you ever know anything to the contrary until the 
testimony in this case was produced Y 
A. I did not. 
Q. Mrs. Hayes testified that she paid for cer-
page 791 } tain extras on that house Y 
· A. She did not. Mr. Conrad rendered a bill for 
extras of $225 which was the subject of several conferences 
between Mr. ,Conrad and myself. The result was that I re-
fused to pay tl1em. They were not paid. Mr. Conrad was 
paid the contract price for the house. 
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In that connection, I might state t.his: The contract pro-
vided that the owner should select the oil burner. Mr. Con-
rad filed with me the bids of several manufacturers of oil 
burners. One of them was the Standard Oil Company, as I 
recall. I knew that it was customary for the general con. 
tractor to take a ten per cent commission on the sale of a 
burner which he got from the manufacturer. In other w-0rds, 
the manufacturer billed the retail price to the owner and 
paid the contractor ten per cent. On the advice of Mr. Brad-
ford Tazewell, with whom I consulted in connection with the 
oil burner, and who had no interest in the matter, I agreed 
to buy a Delco burner. 
Q. Mr. Tazewell, let me interject, is an architect and a 
contractor, and is well known to you over a long period of 
years? . 
A. He is a personal friend of mine. At lns suggestion I 
got in contact with Mr. Hurst who was the distributor for 
this Delco burner. I told him that we were interested in the 
purchase of an oil burner. I got bids from him 
page 792 ~ and told him that we w~uld expect the discount 
that was customarily paid to the contractor. He 
allowed this discount, which Mrs. Hayes had the benefit of. 
Subsequently, Conrad sued Hurst for the amount of this dis-
count and I was called upon to testify. 
Q. For whom7 
A. Mr. Hurst. 
Q. Did you testify! 
A. I did testify. 
Q. How many times in connection with this house did you 
communicate with Mr. Conrad. Mr. Park~rf 
A. At a rough estimate, I would say at least fifteen or 
-twenty conferences I had with Conrad. We were not making 
payments to the extent called for by the contract, and Con-
rad was freQuentlv in communication with me in an effort to 
obtain money. ~ 
Q. You were the only representative of the owner! 
A. Yes. I assured myself before paying Conrad anything 
tha.t he had expended on the construction considerably mo}.·e 
than the payment would amount t? at _the pa:ticular ti1!1e· 
I had three or four conferences with .Conrad m connection 
with the extras, and I had as many conferences with him in 
connection with the claim which he made for the ten per cent 
• commission on the oil burner. 
page 793 ~ Q. Mr. Parker, there has been some testimony 
in the ca~e also with regard to what your lia· 
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bility was when you signed a surety bond for Mrs. Hayes, 
executrix of her husband's estate. Mr. Johnson testified, 
as I recall his testimony,. fo the effe-0t that it was the ems-
. tom of his companJ,. in .an estate the size of this one, to re-
quire of the attorney .. fo;n the personal representative the 
execution of an instJmm.ent which would have the same effect 
as the execution by .you of. the instrument which you executed. 
That is to say, an impqsition of personal liability upon the 
attorney for any .. d.evastavit. of the estate by improper pay-
ment of :fiduciary. .f urids~, . He further testified, according to 
my recollection,.iha.t thisjinstrument which you executed, and 
which is in evidence, was executed at the same time this bond 
was executed. Le.t :eie, ~ you if, during· your twenty-five 
years of pr~etice, you,.ha'OO, ever represented other :fiduciaries T 
A. I have. '. 
Q. Hav~.,you ·ev.e.r signed such an instrument as this be: 
fore!, •:e;f. :Ia ;.,g·;i ., . 
· A. Never 1 befo1~ ·in my experience, although I have in th~ 
past exercised control .of. :accounts. 
Q. I take it th~t what you mean by that is, pursuant to a 
verbal agreement;with 1ihe surety company, you notified the 
bank to h'onor joint. ;0:ileclts' 
A ... That is iaOrmct.'. · . 
Q. That-.jsi .as far as that joint control goes f 
page 794 } A. That is as far as I have_ gone in connection 
with joint control a,....<>Teements to this" time. My 
recollection of that particular transaction was :thi_s: In ad-
vance of writin~ the bond. Mr .. Johnson asked me :whether 
or-not;it·.would ·be agiieeable for the company toi:exercise joint 
control with the· executrix. I told.him it would not. He then 
·asked mi whether or'not I would agree to exercise joint con~ 
trol of. the aocounts: and I told him that I would. My recol-
lection is that the agreement which I signed, and which went 
far beyotfd in the matter of responsibility, was executed at 
a later date after the question had been raised as to whether 
or not tlie company would make the move to be relieved on 
its bond, ·amd: 1that th~· reason for dating it as it was, was to 
cover all tr:insactions ·which had been incurred from the date 
of the qualification! :I state that only as my recollection. I 
may be wrong. . . ·. i. 
· Q. According-· to · your recollection, it was not until you 
conferred witJ:i: M:1~~ Bilbrey that this instrument was signed? 
A. That is my recollection. • 
Q. And prior·to that time, you had agreed to countersigp 
checks, and that is all T · 
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.A. And assume joint control of the safe deposit box. 
Q. On page 376 of the transcript, Mrs. Hayes testified that 
you got her into a terrible muddle about the in-
pa.ge 795 ~ heritance tax. Mr. Meagher and Mr. Hughes af-
. terwards testified as expert witnesses for the de 
f endant here, I presume, basing their testimony upon the tes-
timony of Mrs. Hayes, that it made a reduction in your claim 
for your duties to the executrix. Will you please state to 
the Commissioner, first, whether you got Mrs. Hayes in a 
terrible muddle, or any muddle at all about her inheritance 
taxY 
A .. There was no muddle, so far as the inheritance tax ques-
tion was concerned. From the inception of this controversy, 
I was in contact with the offiee of the Supervisor of Inheritance 
Taxation of the State of Virginia--Mr. Dillon. I explained 
to him that it would be impossible to g·ive a return until it 
had been determined whether or not William R. Hayes died 
d,,micile iu Virginia or in New York. 
Q. That was determined, I believe, in ,January, 19377 
A. That is correct. Mr. Dillon was in entire accord with 
my view. He simply requested that I should keep him ad-
vised of all developments in the case, which I did. There 
were some matters in connection with the return that I dis· 
cussed with Mr. Dillon and had an understanding with him 
with respect to them. I was· prepared, as soon as the ques-
tion of mv fee had been determined. to file a return. At the 
most, it would have necessitated about three hours' work to 
have completed it. 
Q. The fee that he would pay you under the 
page 796 ~. Virginia inheritance tax law is deductible'? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. So it woulil be impossible to tP-11 what taxeR would be 
assessed until that fee had been determined Y 
A. That is correct. When M:rs. Haves wrote me that I no 
longer represented her, I wrote Mr: Dillon to that effect. 
What additional conferences she had with him, I am unable 
to state. -
Q. Did you have a.11 of your inheritance tax data up f 
A. I had it all in completed for.m ·with the exception of the 
fee that I should charge. 
Q. What was necessary to be done then, other than to trans;. 
fer it to the forms? 
A. Nothing except to insert the amount of my fee as a 
deduction. At the most, it would require about an hour·~ 
work on the part of the stenographer. 
484 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
William L. Pa·rker. 
Q. Do I understand you mean that the only reason it was 
not completed was that you were discharged as her attor-
ney? 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. By the l~tter which has been introduced in evidence Y 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Mr. Parker, you testified in your previous examination 
· that you advised Mrs. Hayes to sell the common 
page 797 t stock which had been held by Father Hayes dur-
ing· his lifetime and to re-invest in certain other 
common stocks. That is to say, a part of the same stocks 
were bought back and other chang·es were made. You fur-
ther testified that one reason which actuated you in this course 
was that certain of the securities were highly speculative, 
and in your judgment, the estate ought not to hold them. Mrs. 
Hayes in her direct testimony complained rather vigorously 
about the sale of the Yellow Truck & Cab stock, and said she 
wished to hold it, but you would not permit her to do so, and, 
due to your insistence, it was sold. In your judgment as a 
lawyer, had the estate any right to hold that Yellow Truck & 
Cab stock! 
A. None, whatever. It was speculative stock. I was so 
advised by the broker with whom I dealt, and my examination 
of market. fluctuations since that time have confirmed that 
view. 
Q. Do you know what range that stock was in the years 
1936, 'H7. 'HSY 
A. In 1936, it ranged in price from 231tJ. to 8%,. In 1937, 
it ranged in price from 37% to 71/2. In 1938, it ranged in 
price from 21 % to 8%. In the meantime, to my knowledge, 
it has never paid a dividend. . That also was an important 
consideration from the point of view of Mrs. Hayes. She 
wanted an income from these securities, and, except in the 
case of 17nited States Steel, she has received a 
page 798 ~ substantial income from these securities. 
Q. United States Steel was bought at what fig-
ure? Do you recall Y 
A. Approximately mt It has paid one dividend of a dollar 
a share during that period. 
Q. Did you re-invest in any securities which you considered 
in the least speculative Y 
A. I did not. 
Q. Mr. Parker, have you got a certified copy of the pro-
ceedings in the Surrogate's Court, Orange County, at the 
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time Mrs. Guilfoyle started to qualify as administratrix of 
the estate of the Rev. William R. Hayes Y 
A. I have; certified in accordance with the act of Con-
gress. 
Q. Reading from the paper which you have handed me 
.and described, I find this: "Adelaide l\L Grady, who resides 
.at the present time at Virginia Beach, Virginia claims, to be 
the widow of said deceased but such claim is not admitted, 
it being alleged by the petitioner that the marriage of said 
.Adelaide M. Grady with the deceased· is null and void. Tha.t 
said Adelaide M. Gradv has assumed and uses the name of 
Adelaide M. Hayes.'' ~That is signed by Mary H. Guilfoil, 
and is supported by her oath, reading as follows: "Mary H~ 
Guilfoil being duly sworn, deposes and sa.ys that she has heard 
read the foregoing petition by her subscribed, 
page 799} and knows the contents thereot; and that the same 
is true to the knowled~e of deponent, except as 
to the matters therein stated to be alleged on information 
and belief, and as to those matters she believes it to be true." 
You were aware of the existence of this petition when you tes-
tified before. were you not T 
A. I was. 
Mr. Maupin: I ask leave to introduce this as an exhibit. 
Note: Paper is introduced as Exhibit No. 47. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Tha.t petition was filed, apparently, about the first day 
of July, 1934. Yon knew about those proceedings and knew 
the petition had been filed? 
A. When the non-suit was taken in the first will contest 
on July 19, 1934, 1\fr. Heath announced that Mrs. Guilfoil 
would apply for tl1at administration. I requested Mr. Ben. 
nett to let me have copies of any papers filed, and he promptly 
furnished me with a copy of the petition. In addition to that, 
a citation was served bv a deputv sheriff of Princess Anne 
County on Mrs. Hayes.·· I had full knowledge of those pro-
ceedings and a copy of the petition in question. 
Q. In that connection, :Mr. Parker, it appears that in an 
obvious P.ff ort to minimize thP. seriousness of the 
-pag·e 800 } question as to the validity of the marriage, Mr. 
Bennett testified on page 488- of the transcript, 
as an expert witness for the defendant, that he wrote to you 
at one time during the progress of the administration of the 
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estate, saying that people in New York had been in to see 
him and told him there was some question about the marriage; 
that, thereupon,. he, Bennett,. wrote yo-µ. and told you about 
these rumors, and you wrote Bennett and told him you had a 
certified copy of the marriage ·decree and didn't seem to be 
disturbed about that prospect at all. What have you to say 
. as to that? · 
. A.· In that connection,. I desire to introduce the correspond-
ence between Mr. Bennett and myself. 
-. # 
· Note: Paper is introduced in evidence as Exhibit No. 48 .. 
By Mr. Maupin: . 
Q. I note that Mr. Bennett in a letter dated December 22, 
1934, which has been introduced as an exhibit, wrote you that 
he had been. approached by a reporter for the local pap~r 
·, who had stated to Bennett that he had just learned that it 
had been proved that no marriage certificate was ever ob-
tained by Mr .. and Mrs. Hayes, and that the marriage was 
therefore going to be held to be illegal. Mr. Bennett passed 
this information on to you, stating that he had refused to 
confirm the story. Is there anything in that letter that shows 
any quest.ion about the validity of the marriage-
page 801 } except as to the actual existence of a marriage 
. certificate evidencing that marriage Y 
A. Nothing, whatsoever. 
Q. In your reply to Mr. Bennet, which is a part of the same 
exhibit, did you refer to anything exeept the proof of the 
existence of a marriage? 
A. On January 4, 1935, I replied to this letter of Mr. Ben-
net, acknowledging receipt_ of letter, and said this: 
"I have had in my possession since prior to the date set 
in July for the proceedings then pending at Princess Anne, 
a duly certified copy of the marriage· certificate of Mr. and 
Mrs. Hayes, which is recorded in the office of the Register 
of Deeds of Pasquotank County, N. C. (at Elizabeth City). 
I might say in passing that at the outset of this thing a simi-
lar certified copy · was in possession of Mrs. Guilfoil 's local 
representatives.'' · 
Q. Was there any occasion for you going into any other 
phase as to the validity of the marriage except the one that 
had been directed to your attention hy that letter of Mr. 
Bennett · · 
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A. Nothing, whatsoever. I didn't require the assistanc~ 
of Mr. Bennet, or his advice with respect to tl1e marriage, 
nor was he in my confidence in that respect. 
Q. There was some testimony by Mr. Bennet, which ap-
pears on page 489 of the transcript of the iesti-
page 802 r mony, as to whether or nof .i\[r. Bennet advised 
you that it was impracticable and not in accord-
ance with law to remove the suit from the state court to the 
federal court. Have you any correspondence bearing on tha.t 
question? 
A. In that connection, I desire to introduce a copy of a let-
ter which I wrote Mr. Bennet, dated July 25, 19'34, and his 
reply to that letter, dated July 27, 1934. 
Note : Paper is introduced in evidence as Exhibit No. 49. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. In this exhibit which has just been introduced, I note 
that on July 25, 1934, yom· letter to Mr. Bennet contains the 
following: "I would like to have you consider- the advisa-
bility, in event suit is instituted to set aside the deed in New 
. York, of removing the suit to the federal court for the ap-
propriate district of New York. In my opinion, jurisdiction 
for such removal would exist in view of the fact that Mrs. 
Hayes is a resident of Virginia and the contestants are resi-
dents of Connecticut and New Jersey. I am making this sug-
gestion at this time for the reason that we will have to act 
promptly if and when suit is brought if we decide to take such 
a step." I take it you were taking time by the forelock and 
laying your campaign to be followed in the event that cer-
tain contemplated litigation was taken by your adversaries; 
is that correcU 
page 803 r A. That is correct. Mr. Bennet was in Norfolk 
on July 19th. At that time, I handed him the 
deed to the Newburgh property, which had not properly been 
admitted to record. I requested him to admit it to record, 
and anticipated, as soon as this was done, a suit would be in-
stituted for the purpose of setting aside the deed on the same 
broad grounds of attack as when the will was made. Know-
ing that steps had to be taken promptly in case it was de-
sired to remove the suit to the federal court, I wrote Mr. Ben-
net as vou have stated. 
Q. What you wrote seems to be perfectly plain. Let me 
quote from Mr. Bennet's reply of July 27, 1934: 
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'' With regard to the question of r·emoving the suit to the 
federal court, I am of the offhand opinion that if it is eventu-
ally determined: that Mr. Hayes was a resident of' Orange 
County, the ·case is properly here· as that is the controlling 
factor and not the residence of the various interested par~ 
ties, but I will, of course, give this more careful consideration 
and let you have a report at a later date." 
.Apparently, he g·ave· that ·further consideration before he 
sent the letter to you, for in a postscript his letter contains 
this : '' Since dictating the foregoing I am confirmed in· my 
report that the case cannot be transferred to the federal 
court by the following cases:'' Then he cites 
page 804 ~ five cases which I ·wm ·not cite at length. Did 
those cases· have anything to do with ·diversity of 
citizenship? 
A. I examined those cases as soon as I received· the letter 
and found in each case, on the question of whether or not the 
suit was removable, that the federal court would not take 
jurisdiction of probate matters, which I knew. I telephoned 
Mr. Bennett and told him my view-discussed it· at' some 
length with him-and he then concurred in my view that the 
case was 1~einova ble. , 
·· Q. From what you state, then, Mr. Bennett failed to dis-
ting·uish the difference between a probate matter and· a pro-
ceeding to set aside a deed, which was inter vivas.· 
A. I think that is apparent on the face of the correspond:-r 
ence. 
Q. After that, who· prepared the papers for the removal t 
A. I prepared every pa.per in connection with the removal.. 
T prep.ared the form of bond, petition, and the order, and sent 
them to Mr. Bennett. He made certain minor ·changes in 
them ,vhich did not go to thP. substance. and used those 
papers for the purpose of obtaining· the removal. There was. 
a contest on the question of removal before the original 
c.ounty court, and the Judge there ordered the ease removed. 
Q. While · we are still on the question of Mr.· Bennett;. it 
appears from pages 503 and 504 of the transcript that Mr. 
· Bennett was attemptin~ to contradict your state-
page 805 }- ment that you attended the taking of certain depo-
sitions and spent several days in Newburgh in 
furtller investigation and consultation. Mr. Bennett, fu an 
effort to contradict that, testified that ''ihe records show that 
Mr. Parker was in Newburg·h on April 16, 1936, and on the 
next day he was in New York, and·that on the 18th, the~~\-:-
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lowing day, he was in':No'rfolk -At lerist, I received a letter 
dated at Norfolk on the 18th.'' How many days were you in 
New York state on the business of ·Mrs. Hayes in April, 1936? 
A. At least three days. · 'I spent one day in New York, 
That night I went to 'Newburgh and attended the taking of 
the deposition of Dr. Howell. The following day I spent in· 
New York city in conference with a representative ~f the 
iirm of Hunt, Hill & Betts.. · 
Q. Did your trip to New· York have any other object or 
purpose, or was ·any other business transacted during that 
trip, except the business pertaining to Mrs. Hayes' litiga-
tion and the matters for which you were employed by her? 
A. None, whatsoever. One· of t11e days I spent in· consul-
tation with a close personal friend of mine, -Mr. Harold G. 
Hathaway, who had just resumed·the practice of law in·:New 
Yorlr-city, and, having a great deal of' confidence in his ability, 
I went over the situation with him so far as the New York 
proceedings· ·were · concerned; · · · : · 
The: second day I spent in New York and was 
page 806 }· in conference with Mr. Meag·her and 1\fr. James 
Bennett of Hunt, Hill & Betts. · · · · · 
The third day I was in Newburgh in eorinection' with the 
deposition ref erred to., 
Q. In that ge11eral connection, Mr. Bennett testified on 
page 504 · that he took the deposition of Mae L. Good.maµ in 
July, 1936. 'Was it' the deposition of 1\Iae Goodman that·you 
.attended and took, or was it some other deposition T · · 
A. it was the deposition· of Dr. John· T. Howe-11, which was 
take:il'in the same year, but on ·April 16th. In .my statement 
I confused the names. ·1\'Iy records were not complete in all 
respects in these matters, and I had overlo·olrnd the· fact it 
was Dr.· Howell's· deposition and not· Mrs. Goodman's that ,I 
:attended. I have here a copy of the· deposition in which it is 
recited that I was present a·s attorney for Adelaide M. Hay~s 
with August.us vV. Bennett, Esq. · ' · ! 
·Q. Do you want to introduce those? · 
· A. I ,vould li1re to introduce those. 
Mr. Lanning: "\Vhat ·is the pur.pose of introducing this 
deposition? 
Mr. Maupin: J µst to show he was present 
l\fr. Lanning: Is that the only purpose? 
lfr. Maupin: Yes. You can· use it for any purpose you 
like. If you will c.onced.~ tbat 4e was present1 we will not in• 
iroduce itf 
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page 807 ~ Mr. Lanning: I will concede he was present. 
He inade a mistake in his form.er testimony. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Mr. Parker, M:r. Bennett, in a further effort to minimize 
the value of your services, apparently, testified on page 548, 
that. from his re.~ding of the record he did not nnd that you 
had adopteq ~riy ·tactics of delay in the suit in chancery which 
was brought oy~- Mrs. Guilfoil in the District Court of the 
United States for the Eastern District of Virg.inia against 
Mrs. Hayes in an effort, I might say, to replevy, broadly 
speaking, all of the assets of the estate; that he didn't find 
that you. adopted any such tactics, whatever,. from the rec-
ord. That was pursuant to a former cross examination in 
which he was asked if such tactics had been considered, if it 
was the strategy and workmanlike conduct on the part of· a 
lawyer to do as suggested. Now, will you please state to the 
Commissioner whether or not you did adopt dilatory tactics,, 
and explain to him how they we-re adopted, and the result! 
A. It appears from the record that I filed a motion to dis-
miss. At that time, Judge Way was the only federal judge· 
for the Eastern District of Virginia. His docket was con-
gested, and after the filing of that motion some months 
elapsed before he was able to hear it. It was all duly argued 
before him. He overruled the motion, and then the case went 
on the docket for ti·ial on its merits. 
page 808 ~ Q. At that time, how many federal judges were 
there for the Eastern District of Virginia? 
A .. Only one-Judge Way. 
Q. Approximately how ·long did it take to get a hearing on 
the merits at that time? · · 
A. At least several months before you could be reached 
on Judge Way's docket. ,: 
Q. The dockets are only called how often¥ 
A. At that time, as I recollect, it was only called twice a 
year. 
Q. Before it was reached on the merits, what had hap-
pened with regard to the suit in the state court to set aside 
the will¥ 
A. It became necessary, in order to come within the period 
limited by the Virginia statute, for :Mr. Heath to file his con-
test in the state court, which he did. 
Q. Was that just a fortuitous circumstance or was that a 
form of proceedingf 
A. I adopted that deliberately ·because I knew that :M:r. 
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Heath would be forced to move within the limited space· of 
time, and I knew Judge Way could not reach this case on the 
merits, first, until he had disposed of the motion to dismiss. 
It could not be reached until some considerable period of 
time. The result was that Mr. Heath was forced into the state 
court trial, and we had a disposition of the case 
page 809 ~ before the federal case could be reached at all. 
Q. Mr. Meagher, testifying as an ·expert witness 
and a member of the New York firm for the defendant in this 
case, on page 551 of the transcript, testifying in connection 
with the suit which was brought i:first in the state court of 
New York and removed to the federal court for the purpose 
of attacking the validity of the deed of the Newburgh prop-
erty which had been executed and delivered by Father Hayes 
to his wife during his lifetime, said, ''I also concluded at the 
same time, that since Mrs. Hayes was in possession of the 
premises, that is, constructively, at least, through her agent 
and her tenants, a suit would not lie in equity to remove her 
claim to the property as a cloud on title, for the simple reason 
that, in my opinion, the . plaintiff would have an adequate 
remedy at la.w by way of a suit in ejectment by which the 
title wo.uld be tried, and as soon as I had reached that con-
clusion and looked at some federal authorities to verify my 
opinion, I so advised Mr. Parker by letter-'' Mr. Parker, 
in civil practice in New York, is the sort of proceeding which 
would !be an equity cause tried by a jury? 
A. It is. . 
Q. Were you anxious to have this particular case tried by 
jury? 
A. Quite the contrary. One of the controlling· motives in 
my desire to remove this to the federal court was 
page 810 ~ that I realized it was essentially an equity pro-
ceeding for the purpose of cancelling the deed. 
I realized that when it g·ot to the federal court it would be 
determined py the judge without the intervention of a jury. 
I do not recall that I replied to Mr. Meagher's letter, but, in 
the first place, it struck me as being unsound on the face of 
it. 
Q. It was a simple question of cancelling a written instru-
ment which was alleged to have been procured by fraud Y 
A. Exactly. I didn't feel it necessary to reply to the let-
ter at all. I may have discussed it with Mr. Meagher person-
ally over the phone, but since he didn't ~on template any im-
mediate removal, I did nothing ahout it. ' 
Q. Apparently what Mr. Meagher was endeavoring to do 
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was to nullify the benefits which you had obtained ·by the re-
moval of the case t 
A. Exactly. 
Q. And I take it you did not fall in with this plan in that 
reg·ard? 
A. Not at all. 
Q. In :Mr. Meagher 's testimony, beginning on page 557 of 
the transcript, as I read it, you had little or nothing to do 
with the drawing of the stipulation, as a result of which the 
litigation which we have just ~een discussing was finally 
terminated and the firm of Hunt, Hill & Betts, was the actuat-
ing cause of that instrument, and, thereby, the 
pag·e 811 ~ actuating cause of the dismissal. "What have you 
to say about that? 
A. I desire to introduce that correspondence which I had 
with the firm of Hunt, Hill & Betts, in that connection, as a 
preliminary to what I have to say. If Mr. Lanning desires 
to examine it-
Mr. Lanning: We have no objection to these letters going 
·in, but there does appear to be some missing letters from 
II unt, Hill & Betts, and I think they also should be intro-
duced. 
The ·witness: I will introduce those letters. I have not 
got them with me at this time. 
Note: Paper is introduced in evidence as Exhibit No. 50. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Mr. Parker, who, if anyone, was desirous of delay. in 
the proceeding in the Federal Court of the Southern District 
of New York? 
A. Mrs. Guilfoil. I mig·ht state at the oµ_tset that when 
this suit was first instituted in 1934, I was in entire accord 
with the desire on the part of Mrs. Guilfoil to defer that ques-
tion until the Virginia litigation could be gotten to a point 
where it would not be prejudiced by what might transpire in 
New York. For that reason I at one time ,vent to the office 
of Hunt, Hill & Betts, and in colla:boration with 
page 812 ~ them prepared an extensive affidavit for the pur-
pose of obtaining a continuance, in the event they 
were not agreeable to it. As a matter of fact, when they 
were approached on the subject, they readily agreed to the 
continuance. At a certain stage in the Virginia litigation, I 
then desired to push the New York litig·at.ion to a conclusion, 
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.and in accordance with that purpose w1·ote the first letter-
what is the datef 
Q. September 4, 1936. 
A. That is addressed; as I recollect, to 1\fr. James E. Ben-
net who was connected with the firm of Hunt, Hill & Betts. 
He is a cousin of Mr . .A. W. Bennet. 
Q. It appears from this correspondence that this case on 
the docket of the Fedet·al Court for the Southern District of 
New York was ready for trial in March, 1937 7 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And it further appears from that correspondence that 
this stipulation was pre.pared in March, 1937, and was :finally 
signed and entered. According to this correspondence; on 
March 4, Hunt, Hill & Betts sent you a di·aft of stipulation 
and agreement concerning tvhich th.at :firm had sp9ken to 
you over the telephone that day. ·was the draft, as drawn 
by them, agreeable to youi 
A. It was riot. As I recall the transaction in iliat connec-
tion, they were as follows: ~ I stated, Mrs. 
page 813 } Guilfoil was not at all anxious to· try the New 
York case. They first proposed a stipulation to 
continue the case. Then they proposed to stipulate that. the 
outcome of the Virginia litigation should determine the N ~,\; 
York litigation. I refused to do that, and insisted that the 
only basis· upon which I would agree to a continuance wa~ a 
stipulation to tl1e effect that if ,ve were successful in the 
Virginia litigation, the court would enter a decree adjudging 
that the deed was valid. In other words, it would decide 
the case on the basis of the outcome of the Virginia litiga-
tion, but, if I lost the Virginia litigation, it would ihe _without 
prejudice to our rights to def end the "New York litigation. 
That was sent down to Mr. Heath who did not approve of it. 
He, I might state, had very little to do with what went on 
up there. But, in all events, they finally agreed to the stipu-
lation. 
Now the form in which the stipulation was drawn,-it was 
drawn by the · fhm of Hunt, Hill & Betts. They read it to 
me over the telephone. I sugg·ested certain changes. It was 
necessary for them to go back to ~ounsel for the other side. 
The result-for several days Mr. Meag·her and myself held 
numerous consultations over the telephone in connection with 
what the stipulation should be. Referring to the bill of Hunt, 
Hill & Betts in this case, I find that on March 4th they say 
this: "Mr. Meagher engaged with 1\fr. William L. Parket 
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in reference to plaintiff's application for an ad-
page 814 } journment and in preparation of a statement in 
opposition to same and appearance before Fed-
eral Judge Knox to reverse decision; Mr. Meagher also en-
s·aged preparing stipulation for adjom·nment and sent draft 
to Mr. William L. Parker." 
Ag.ain on March 6th this statement appears: "Mr. Meagher 
discussed on long distance telephone the agreement with Mr .. 
William L .. Parker and l\ir. Van Orman-" 1\!r. Van Orman 
was a partner of Mr. Guilfoil and one of the counsel engagecl 
in the New Y1ork matter. ''-also conferred· with Judge 
Knox's secretary in reference to application for adjourn-
ment."' 
On March 9th: "Mr. Meagher conferred with Mr. William 
L. Parker in reference to the settlement.'' 
On March 11th: "Mr .. Meagher again conferred with Mr .. 
William L. Parker and sent him a final form of agreement.'" 
On March 17th: "Mr. Meagher advised 1\fr. William L .. 
Pa1·ker by telephone that the agreement had :been signed by 
the other side and sent original to hiiµ for Mrs. Hayes' sig-
nature.'' 
During that period of time, as I say, I was not in New 
York at all, but I held daily consultations with Mr. Meagher 
over long di stance telephone .. 
Q. llow do you reconcile those estimates of Mr. Meagher. 
with the statement on the stand that you were simply for-
warding counsel f 
page 815 } A. I do not recall any instance at which Mr. 
Meagher did anything except at my direction. 
Certainly, I had no idea in the world of conceding to Jiim the 
man&gement of this case, especially in view of his letter in 
which he very unsoundly took the view that there was no 
equity jurisdiction, and attempted to negative what I had 
accomplished by the removal. 
Q. In connection witll the final decree, wliat was the form 
of the decree that Mr. Meag·her prepared? 
A. When the Virginia litigation had been disposed of, I 
obtained a copy of the mandate of the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia and a copy of the order of the Supreme 
Court of the United States refusing to grant the certiorari, 
and forwarded them to the office of Hunt, Hill & Betts, and 
requested that they prepare an order disposfng of this case. 
In the stipulation I had been careful to state that the out-
come of the Virginia litigation would deeide the New York 
case on the merits, if favorable to me. The order, prepared 
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by Hunt, Hill & Betts and sent to me simply stated that the 
case was dismissed on the motion of the plaintiff. 
Q. Did not that absolutely destroy all of_ the advantages 
you had painfully acquired by your preparation of the stipu-
lation as finally drawn Y 
A. Exactly. The plaintiff could have instituted 
page 816 ~ a second suit because the order, as drawn by them, 
did not dispose of the matter at all. I re-drew 
the order and provided in the order that the deed from Wil-
liam R. Hayes to Adelaide M. Hayes was good and valid and 
conveyed whatever interest he had in that property to Mrs. 
Hayes, which was in accordance with the stipulation. 
Q. vYas the order drawn by Hunt, Hill & Betts in accord-
ance with the stipulation? 
A. It was not. 
Thereupon an adjournment was taken at 11 :15. 
pag·e 817 ~ AFTERANOON SESSION 2 P. M. 
Same parties as heretofore noted. 
W. L. PARKER, 
being r_ecalled, further testified as follows: 
Examined ·by Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Mr. Parker, Mrs. Hayes testified regarding these Straus 
bonds on page 402 and aga~n on page 469, on direct and cross 
examination respectively, and she was particularly asked the 
question on cross examination if she did not demand of 
you, not once but- many times, to claim that the sale of these 
bonds by Straus to Reverend Hayes -was fraudulent and to 
put in a claim against Straus & Company on that ground. 
Her answer was, "I never did-not once, at any time, any 
place, or anywhere.'' According to your recollection and 
records, is that answer in accordance with the facts, or not 1 
A. It is not. · 
Q. Would you amplify that? 
A. Mrs. Hayes produced before me an article from the New 
York Times which listed a large number of claimants who 
proved claims before a referee in Straus & Company receiver-
ship proceeding. She advised me that the· securities which 
· her husband had bought were misrepresented to 
pag·e 818 ~ him, but stated to me that she had no personal 
knowledge of the matter; that the sale was be-
' 
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tween a salesman who could not then be located and the de-
cedent. 
Now, Straus & Company had no obligation so far as these 
securities were concerned at all, It was not a party to this 
security as guarantor or 'otherwise. The basis of these vari-
. ous claims which were proved before the Referee were mis-
representations as to the various securities which had been 
sold. I took the Referee's name, and his name was Gordon, 
and communicated with him and received a reply that it would 
be necessary for Mrs. Hayes to appear in person before 
him. 
In the first place, I was unwilling to have Mrs. Hayes go 
t<;> New York. In the· second place, she had no proof, what-
soever, that any misrepresentation had been made as to the 
sale of these securities, her only information in that respect 
having· been statements which were made to her by her hus-
band during his lifetime. 
On the date of March 5, 1936, I wrote Mrs. Hayes. I now 
propose to iiitroduce that letter in evidence. 
Note: Paper is introduced in evidence as Exhibit No. 5:t. 
By l\Ir. Maupin: 
Q. Have you completed your answer ·y 
A. I call attention to this paragraph in the let-
pag·e 819 ~ ter which dealt with other matters as well: 
'' After a great deal of delay I received a letter from 
the Referee· in the Straus matter, which is enclosed for 
your infonnation. You will observe that it will be neces-
sary for you to appear in person at the office of Mr. Gor-
don in New York to testify. As I have previously ex-
plained to you, I think it would be extremely unwise for you 
to g·o to New York. In the second place, your informa-
tion is based, as I understand it, on what Mr. Hayes told 
you. This is known as 'hearsay' and is not admissible evi-
dence. It is my opinion that you would incur unnecessary 
risk and put yourself to trouble and expense without any 
possibility of return." Mrs. Hayes has that letter. I did not 
receive it back. 
Q. Was that information given to Mrs. Hayes pursuant 
to any request on her part that some sort of proceeding be 
instituted against Straus on the ground that there had been 
fraudulent misrepresentation in selling the ·bonds to her t 
A. Mrs. Hayes wanted to file a claim before the Referee. 
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The Referee was Mr. Gordon. I wrote him in connection 
with it,. received his reply, and forwarded hfa letter to Mrs. 
Hayes with the letter that I just introduced. It was subject 
to a previous discussion with Mrs. Hayes. We understood 
that no further steps would be taken in the mat-
page 820 } ter. 
Q. In general regard to those Straus bonds, 
Mrs. Hayes testified in effect that there was very little that 
you did-page 402. Her testimony was to the effect that on 
numerous occasions she asked you to go to Straus & Com-
pany and ascertain information of yarious sorts about the 
b_onds, and th~t you were always too busy to comply with her 
request, and that the only time you interested yourself was 
when she had se.en something in the newspaper, cut it out, 
.and brought it to your attention! 
A. That is not true. During Mr. Hayes' lifetime, he took 
up with me the situation regarding the Chanin Bldg. of 
New York. At that time a very close friend of mine, Mr. 
Hathaway, was a partner in the brokerage and investment 
concern of Edward B. Smith & Company of New York and 
Philadelphia.. The initial information that I received was 
from the head of their statistical department to whom he in-
troduced me. I discussed these matters a number of times 
with a representative of Smith & Company. In each instance 
I had :Mr. Hathaway telephone and make the engagement. 
At that time he was in the praotic.e of law and surrendered his 
partnership in this concern, so that frequently I ohtained in-
formation from them. 
In addition, I have here, and I am now prepared to intro-
duce, such records as financial plans and correspondence in 
connection with these issues. My files are not 
page 821 ~ complete. I don't know what became of certain 
of these plans which I had, but there are a num-
ber of them which are here. They are marked with the name 
0,f eac.h issue. 
Q. The issues which you have testified about and whioh 
'you have lm;nded me are marked respectively: "(a) Court 
and Remson Streets ; (b) Broadway and 41st Streets''; '' ( c) 
},ifth Avenue and 43rd Street"--
A. " ( d) '' was left out of there. 
Q. " ( e) Chanin Building''; "(h} Book Building and addi-
tion'' ; '' ( i) 59th Street and Madison A venue''; and '' (k) 
Majestic Apartments.'' · 
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Note : These papers were introduced in evidence marked 
Exhibit No. 52. 
By Mr. !YHtupin: _ ·_ · 
Q. In regard tQ ~e issues which are not repres~mted in that 
file which has just been inh-oduced as an exhibit, did you 
have correspondence, and did you do everything in your judg-
ment, to saf eg11ard the interest of your client Y 
A. Absolutely.. In most of the. issues the securities bad 
been deposited with bondholding committees, I think in my 
name in some instances and in some instances Mrs. Haves,. 
name. I received circulars of proposed proceedings before 
the court, and financial plans, and so f-orth. 
Q. In addition to the correspondence, did yon discuss the 
effect of whatever the situation was with vour 
page 822 ~ client as this information was received by you! 
· A. Frequently. I always told her what was 
going on in the various matters. 
Q. Is there any free and open market for those trust bonds·, 
so far as you know? 
A. .A!bsolutely none. The sales are always distress sales·. 
Someone has to realize cash on the securities, and they take 
what they can ·get for them. 
Q. I take it, then, that in :protecting these various securi-
ties you were protecting a distressed asset of the estate f 
A. Absolutely. 
Q·. As illustrative of Mrs. Hayes' testimony, I cite page 
380 of the record. She testified that you assured her from 
beginning to end that the opposition had no case, and that 
there was no chance of your losing any of these various liti-
gations under which she found herself unfortunately in-
volved; that for that reason she thought that the amount of 
skill that had to be exercised by her attorney was not as 
gTeat as it would have been in a more difffo.ult case. Will 
you please make such comment or explanation of that testi-
mony as you care to! 
A. From time to time l\frs. Hayes would ask my opinion 
of the outcome of these various litigations. I invariably told 
her that I expected to win them-I felt I would 
page 823 ~ win them-but that I realized in order to win 
them, it was necessary that a great deal of work 
should be done, and it was necessary that the case he defended 
in the best possible way. I realized that I had an intelligent 
opponent in !fr. Heath, and the same was true of the New 
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York lawyers who were handling other phases of the litiga-
tion. 
In addition to that, Mrs. Hayes very naturally was worried 
and in an extremely nervous condition, which became inten-
sified as the matter progressed and dragged out. I did 
everything possible to contribute, as best I could, to her peace 
of mind. I did riot express ·any pessimism at any time as to 
the outcome of the litigation. What I told her were my 
views, .and that the court might, or mig·ht not, follow them, 
but no lawyer can predict the outcome of a litigation with 
any assurance. · 
Q. With regard to the insurance policies on the life of 
Father Hayes, Mrs. Hayes testified on pages 407 and 408 o.r 
the transcript that she had to go up to New York to get that 
insurance paid. I will quote exactly: '' I had to go up to 
New York to get that insurance paid-had to take the trip 
from here to New York." Mr. Parker, what have you to say 
as to that statement? 
A. That is not correct. On the death of the decedent. the 
policies could not he located. They were not in the safe de-
posit box. Mrs. Hayes was under the impression 
page 824 ~ that they were somewhere in. New York among 
his personal effects. At that time she was living 
in New York at 2685 University A.venue. She came here only 
when her presence was necessary. 
I now desire to introduce a telegram which I addressed 
to Mrs.· Hayes in the name of Adelaide ::M:. Grady on the date 
of June 12, 1934, and a letter w_hich I received from her which 
is not dated, and a letter which I wrote her, dated June 27, 
1934. 
Note: This telegram was- introduced in evidence marked 
Exhibit No. 53. . 
A. (Continuing:) Before going into the question of the 
correspondence, I will state this: The proof of claim which 
was made up by the local office of the Equitable Life Insur-
ance Company was prepared by Mr. Parkins, representing 
that company liere, who told me it would be necessary to pro-
duce the policies, which, of course, I knew. As I stated, the 
policies could not be found at that time, nor did Mrs. Hayes 
know where they were. I obtained a certified copy of the 
death certificate of William R. Hayes and filed it with the 
company, and urged Mrs. Hayes to make every effort to lo-
cate the policies in question. 
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On the date of June 12, 1934, I addressed a telegram to 
her under the name of l\Iiss Adelaide M. Grady, 2685 Univer-
sity Avenue, New York, New York, which reads as follows: 
'' Make every effort to locate insurance policy.'' 
page 825 ~ Subsequent to the sending of that wire, I re-
ceived a letter from her, which is not dated, in 
which she enclosed a $2,000 policy of the Travelers Insurance 
Company of Hartford, and the two policies of $5,000 each of 
the Equitable Life Assurance Society. 
I delivered these policies to Mr. Parkins. The check came 
down here payable to :Mrs. Hayes as executrix. At that par-
ticular time I had an engagement either in Newburgh or New 
York City. In any event, I was going to New York. I turned 
the check over to Mr. Dey of the National Bank of Commerce 
for the purpose of crediting it fo Mrs. Hayes' account as ex-
ecutrix. He told me that he would send it to their New York 
correspondent, which was the Central Hanover Bank & Trust 
Company, which he did; that if Mrs. Hayes would call there 
and endorse the check-the Central Hanover would credit it 
to the account of the National Bank of Commerce, and on ad-
vice from the Central Hanover, the National Bank of Com-
merce would credit the amount to Mrs. Hayes as executrix. 
On the date of June 27th, I wrote Mrs. Hayes that I had 
the check, told J1er I was leaving that night for New York and 
had arranged to deliver the check to Mr. W. ,C. Bean, who was 
one of the vice-presidents of the Central Hanover Bank & 
Trust Company. I told her in the letter I would telephone 
her sometime during the following day in New 
page 826 ~ York City, which I did. She went down and en-
dorsed the check, and the amounts were duly 
credited to her account. 
Q. Where was she living at that time? 
·A. 2685 University Avenue, New York City. 
Q. How long· did she stay there? 
A. She was there for some period of time. I don't recall 
exactly how long. . 
Q. Can you measure it in weeks, or months, or how t 
A. She .was down here in advance of the trial of the fin;;t 
will contest at Princess Anne, which was set for July 19th. 
How much in advance she came, I do not recall, hut the house 
had not been completed-or the house was completed, I be-
lieve, it seems to me sometime in the latter part of June. She 
came down at that time. 
Q. And her presence in New York was not, I take it, due to 
the fact she had to go up there? 
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.A. Not at all. 
Q. Mrs. Hayes testified that she told you in the early stage 
of the litigation that she had stocks that cost her over $30,000, 
and they were then worth $10,000·. Is that a fact 1 
.A. That is not correct. Mrs. Hayes told me she had in-
vested a substantial amount of money--didn 't tell me the 
amount-in stocks prior to the crash of 1929 that the invest-
ments were in very bad shape. In other words, I 
page 827 ~ gathered the general impression that they had 
practically no value. L know this: That in order 
to obtain funds for the purpose of probating the will and pay-
ing the expenses of the trip to ;Newburgh, at which time I 
asked her for $250, as I recall it, she stated to me she had no 
available money, and it was necessary for me to negotiate a 
loan with the National Bank of Commerce, which I did. Until 
the will had ;been probated and she had qualified as execm-
trix, it was impossible for her to obtain the funds which were 
on deposit to the credit of the decedent at the Virginia Beach 
Branch of the National Bank of Commerce. 
Q. What, if anything, did she tell you regarding- her ability 
to raise any money outside of what would come to her through 
her husband f 
A. Sl1e told me she could not do it. That was the reason 
for my attitude towards the surety company, and my refusal 
to permit them to exercise joint control. 
Q. As a result of what she told you, did you understand 
there was any money available to pay you for your service 
other than what wa8 intencfod for her? 
A.. It was my very clear understanding that that was the 
only source to which I could look for payment. She told me it 
was necessary for her to have monev to live on. That was 
the reason for my attitude towards .. the surety company. 
Mr. Lanning·: Mr. Commissioner, I think the 
pag·e 828 ~ witness ought to testify to what Mrs. Hayes told 
llim; not what his understanding was. 
A. I don't recall the exact statements she made to me, but 
I do recall the general effect of them. That was some five 
years ago. 
By Mr. Maupin: 
Q. Until you a1.'ranged a loan for her from the bank, was 
she able to raise the money sufficient to pay for the probate 
proceedings? 
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A. She told me she didn't have it. 
:Nifr. Lanning: Did not have the cash. 
~y Mr. Maupin: 
Q. What did she tell you with regard to the value of the 
securities or other property, if anythingt 
A. She told me at that time that they were. practically value-
less. I had personal knowledge of one block of stock, because 
she requested me to make claim on it, and that was the Hol-
lins Brewing Company, which was some northern brewing con-
cern. That was absolutely worthless. 
Q. Did you have any list showing you what she. had person-
ally! Except for what she told you, did you know anything 
about her individual worth! 
A. Not a thing. 
Q. And you say she told you that what she had was prac-
tically worthless¥ 
page 829 ~ A. Yes,. sir. 
Q. In order to make this perfectly clear, Mr. 
Parker, let me ask you if there was any detail discussion ·be-
tween you of what Mrs. Hayes owned individually and what 
it was worth l 
A. None, w~atsoever. 
Q. Was the amount of $10,000 ever mentioned by either one 
of you as representing the value of what she had individually! 
A. It was not. 
Q. Did you eyer hear of any such conversation as she tes-
tified to, and until she testified to iU 
A. I did not .. 
Mr. Maupin: That is all. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Lanning: 
Q. Mr. Parker, you said you had several discussions with 
Mr. Hathaway of .Smith & Company with respect to the Straus 
bonds. How many discussions did you have with him, or some-
one in the office of Smith & ,Company, after the death of Mr. 
Hayes? 
A. I don't recall that I saw him but one time. It was after 
the death of Mr. Hayes. I mean, I discussed it with him. I 
saw him a number of times-one or two times; I 
page 830 ~ don't recall exactly. Mr. Hathaway died in 1936. 
Q. You said you had additional correspondence 
with respect to other issues, as I understood you? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Will you produce that other correspondence you had? 
A. Everything· I have that is available has been introduced 
in evidence. It is in those envelopes. 
Q. You have no further correspondence 7 
A. Yes, I haye some additional correspondence. I will turn 
over the complete files if you want them. 
· Q. I g·ather, either from Mr. Maupin's question or your an-
swer, that there was some corre&pondence with respect to 
other issues which you have not offered in evidence? 
A. I received circulars and copies of financial plans by rea-
son of the fact I was listed, or Mrs. Hayes held certificates 
of participation from bondholding committees which I do not-
have now. Those that I have, I have introduced. I don't know 
what became of them. After the new securities were received, 
they were of no particular importance. 
Q. Have you introduced in evidence all the correspondence? 
A. No, I have not introduced all of the correspondence. I 
have some additional correspondence. 
Q. In connection with these same issues¥ 
page 831 r A. Yes. If you want it, I will introduce it. 
Q. I wish you would produce it, Mr. Parker. 
Now, Mr. Parker, in your account you have listed the securi-
ties which were sold, and you state the value of these securi-
ties at the time of death-and the amount realized. That state-
ment shows an amount of $37,356.17 realized. Doesn't that . 
total include commissions f Rather, were not commissions 
taken out of the sale price so the net result to Mrs. Hayes was 
considerably less than that figure of $37,356.17? 
A. I don't recall, Mr. Lanning. I would not like to say un 4 
less I checked back. 
Q. I said something· to you about that sometime ago, and 
asked you to get the information for me. From an exhibit 
which has been offered in evidence here, Exhibit 39, it appears 
that the net proceeds were $36,919.021 
· A. That is a difference of about $400. 
: Q. The difference is represented by the commissions, as I 
understand? 
A. Very likely. 
Mr. Maupin: You are speaking, Mr. Lanning, of course, of 
the commissions of brokers? 
Mr. Lanning: Brokers. 
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By Mr. Lanning-: 
Q. l\Ir. Parker, when you told Mrs. Hayes that you thought 
she didn't have any chance of losing her case, you 
page 832 ~ believed what you told her, didn't you 1 
A. I didn't tell her she didn't have any chance 
of losing her case. I told her I was confident I would win it. 
Q. You believed what you told her, didn't you? 
A. Certainly. I never advertised the fact that I expected to 
lose the case, Mr. Lanning. 
Q. You didn't expect to lose it, Mr. Parker! 
A. No, I didn't. I had .confidence in myself to the extent 
that I thought I would win it. I frequently have been disap-
pointed in making statements of that kind. As a matter of. 
fact, until this litigation was completed, I had no knowledge 
of what the other side was g·oing to do next. They seemed to 
try most every available method of attack. All of them were 
surprises to me, or most of them. 
Q. I have reference now to the first suit in the Federal 
Court. After ydur motion to dismiss was overruled, there 
was nothing you could do to delay a trial if plaintiff had 
wanted to go ahead with it, was there f 
A. The plaintiff could not have g·otten a trial within any 
short space of time, by reason of the congestion of J ndge 
Way's docket. 
Q. "When was that motion of yours overruled? 
A. I don't recall, Mr. Lanning. 
Q. Did you do anything? 
A. No, I did nothing. It was not necessary. 
Mr. Lanning: That is all. 
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City of Norfolk, To-wit: 
I, George Pilcher, a Commissioner in Chancery for the 
Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, Virp;inia, do hereby 
certify that, pursuant to the decree of reference entered in 
the above-entitled cause, the foreg·oinp; depositions of Wm. 
L. Parker, J. Sydney Smith, Jr., N. T. Green, Henry Bowden, 
,Julian S. Lawrence, John B. Jenkins, Jr., Howard Vv. Bent-
ley, "\V. Taylor Johnson, Adelaide l\L Hayes, A. W. Bennett, 
Wm. R. Meagher, R. l\L Hup;hes, Jr., W. H. Terry, Jr., and 
Arthur E. Conrad; w-e1·e duly taken before me in the satcl 
Citv of Norfolk, commencing on the 25th day of .January, 
1939, and being· resumed from time to time as therein shown; 
that the signing· thereof by the witnesses was waived; and 
that the foregoing· is a true and correct transcript of the tes-
timony so taken. 
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And I further certify that the docmments described i.n 
the foregoing transcript and numbered '' Exhibits 1 to 38, 
inclusive, 38-A, and 39 to 53, '' inclusive, were introduced 
as evidence with the testimony of said witnesses. 
Given ·under my hand this 21st day of September, 1939. 
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GEO. PILCHER, 
Conunissioner in Chancery. 
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page 837 ~ . The following are the Exceptions to Commis-
sioner's Report, :filed in this court by Adelaide M~ 
Hayes, Executrix, etc., on October 19, 1939: 
page 838 ~ Virginia : 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk. 
' ' 
William L. P:;trker, Complainant, 
'I). 
Adelaide M. Hayes in her own right and a.s Executrix of the 
last will and testament of William R. Hayes, deceased, et 
a1., Respondents. 
]N CHANCERY. 
CONSOLIDATED CAUSES. 
Adelaide M. Hayes, Executrix under the last will and te~ta-
ment of William R. Hayes, deceased, Complainant, 
v. 
Wil1iam L. Parker, Respondent. 
EXCEPTIONS TO .COMMISSIONER'S RE.POR,T. 
Respondent, Adelaide M. Hayes, personally and as Execu-
trix of the estate of William R. Hayes, excepts to the report 
of the Special Master, George Pilcher, ·filed herein on Sep-
tember 21, 1939, and for grounds of exception says: 
1. Respondent excepts to the f ollowi.ng question pu1: · to 
Mrs. Hayes by complainant's counsel, p. 439, to-wit: 
page· 839 ~ 
Hayes? 
"Q. At that time, why did you offer to set.tle 
with him by paying him $10,000 additional, Mrs. 
Mr. Lanning: I object to that." 
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on the ground that said question was incompetent, irrelevant 
and immaterial, was highly prejudicial and was intended by 
counsel 1:o prejudice the Commissioner and the Court against 
respondent, that said question did necessarily prejudice the 
Commissioner and may prejudice the Court, wherefore, by 
reason thereof, respondent excepts to the entire report and 
asks that the Court refuse to consider the same with such 
question of record; that it will set the same aside at complain-
ant's sole expr.nse and order said case retired de novo before a 
jury or another Commissioner. 
2. The Commissioner erred in holding that '' for all prac-
tical purposes the remuneration of Parker was contingent 
upon the successful termination of the litig·ation involved", 
and in failing to find· that his services were performed on a 
quantimi mentit basis. In so doing he erred 
(a) In concluding that the borrowing of money by the re-
spondent to pay for the probate of the ,vill' and the expenses 
of complainant's trip to New York shortly after the probate 
constituted evidence of respondent's lack of funds or assets 
with which to pay complainant ~s fee for his services. 
(b) In holding that if the litig·ation had been lost respond ... 
ent would not have been able to compensate complainant for 
his services, notwitlH;tanding the finding "it is quite pol:,sible 
that she had individual l)Ossessions of some teu 
page 840 ~ to thirteen thousand dollars which were not de-
rivP.d from her husband's estate. 
( c) In concluding that. respondent was unwilling to jeop-
ardize her own properties and possessions in litigation over 
her husband's wi11. 
( d) In concluding that respondent "evidently left Parker 
under the impression that she could not raise any monev 
outside of what would come to her through her husb~and, and 
that that would be his onlv source, of remuneration". 
(e) In concluding that "''it would seem to be unfair for 
her to set up at this time her ability to pay counsel, when 
she did not inform him at the time of his employment". 
(f) In ignoring· complainant's express refusal to accept em-
ployment on a contingent basis (I:Taye.s 370), and in failing 
to hold that such refusal was binding on complainant and 
limited the measure of bis compensation to a qu.antitm men1,it 
basis. 
(g·) In ignoring- respondent's ag·reement to pay complain-
ant for his services from time to time ·and the payments made 
and accepted by complainant amounting to $10,020.03, and 
in failing· to hold such payments constituted payment in ful1 
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up to the time of each payment and negatived any possibility 
of contingency. · 
(h) In failing to give any consideration to respondent's 
evidence that she had sufficient personal means with which 
to compensate the complainant for the reasonable value of his 
services, and that she a<lviRcd complainant of her own per-
sonal estate at or about the time he was retained. 
page 841 } (i) I11 failing to hold that respondent did have 
ample personal means with which to pay com-
-pla.inant what his services were reasonably worth. 
(j) In failing to hold the estate which respondent actually 
possessed was the criterion, not what complainant believed 
or supposed she had. 
(k) In overlooking the fact that even if the litigation over 
the estate had been decided adversely to respondent, com-
plainant would nevertheless, as the attorney for the propo-
nent of the will, have been entitled to receive an allowance 
from the estate funds and properties for a reasonable fee 
and disbursements and in failing to so bold. 
(1) In overlooking the fact that, since not more than one-
half of the estate was involved in the litigation, tl1ere would 
have been ample estate funds to pay complainant irrespec-
tive of the result o·r the litigation and in failing to so hold. 
3. The Commissioner erred in allowing the complainant a 
fee of twenty-five per cent of the entire estate, the value of 
. which he found to be approximately $90,000. In so doing he 
erred 
(a) In failing to find that respondent, as the wife of Mr. 
Hayes, was entitled to $10,000 plus one-half the remainder 
of the estate, irrespective of domicile and the validity of the 
will, and that, therefore, the whole estate was not at risk, 
but only one-lialf thereof after first deducting $10,000. 
(b) In failing to find that the- validity of re# 
pa.ge 842 } spondent 's marriage was never litig·ated, and it 
could not haw~ been declared invalid after the 
death of Mr. Hayes and in holding the question ari open one. 
( c) In failing to find that there was nothing in the record 
from which it could possibly be assumed or inferred con-
testant ever intended to contest the validity of the marriage, 
but, on the contrary, contestant's admission of the legality 
of the marriage ( or failure to contest it) in the third will 
contest showed conclusively that no contest was contemplated 
and the decision in that case became re8 adjudicata of the 
issue. 
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(d) In holding ·E>l' · assuming· the whole estate was a.t risk .. 
4. The Commissioner, in fixing the fee recommended, erred 
in failing to give any consideration to the following facts : 
(a) All factual issues tendered by the pleadings in th~ 
yarious suits instituted by contestant were the same. 
(b) Only one factual issue, that of domicile, was ever 
tried-the other factual iRsues tendered by the pleadings 
were never tried; only two legal issues were ever tried, 
namely, the rig·ht of a foreign administrator to sue in the 
local Federal Court (in the first suit in the Federal Court} 
and the jurisdiction of the Federal Court' over a probate pro-
ceeding ( in the second will contest, Federal 
page 843 ~ Court). 
(c) Preparation for trial of the first ·wm con-
test necessarily prepared complainant for trial of all other 
cases on both the law and the facts, except on the two legal 
issues mentioned in the preceding paragraph. 
. ( d) Only two suits were ever tried) namely, the second 
will contest in the Federal Court on the legal question of the 
jurisdiction of that Court to hear and determine a will con-
test and the third will contest on the factual issue of domi-
cile. -
( e) The only services perf oruied by complainant in the 
first will contest (Princess Anne County) were in preparing 
for trial of the appeal from the order probating the will and 
unsuccessfully opposing an application for a non-suit. 
(f) The only services performed by complainant in con-
nection with the application of contestant for letters of ad-
ministration in Orange County, New York, were in looking 
into the authorities relating thereto and determining not to 
oppose said application. 
(g) The only services performed by complainant in the 
first suit in the Federal Court were in receiving and examining 
the complaint in said action ; preparing, serving and filing 
an answer thereto; making a motion to dismiss said suit on 
the ground that a foreig~ administrator had no right to sue 
in the local Courts; preparinp: for arg-ument thereof and argu-
ing and losin~· Raid motion. 
page 844 ~ (h) ThP onlv sPrv'i,w.; performed bv comnlain-
ant in the second will cont.est (Federal Court) 
were in filing a.n answer to fke bill and a motion. t.o dismiss 
on the g:round that the Court was without jurisdiction; pre-
paring· for and arguing the motion which waR suRtainecl bv 
the lower Court; preparing and filing a brief in tl1e. Oircuit 
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Court of Appeals to which an appeal was taken by contestant 
and arguing the case in that Court; writing and filing a brief 
in opposition to contestant's application to the Supreme 
Court for a writ of certforari. 
(i) The only _services performed in the third will contest 
(Princess Anne County) were in preparing and filing an an-
swer and two special pleas, one a plea to the jurisdiction of 
the Court and the other alleging contestant was not a party' 
in interest; preparing for and trying the case on the sole 
question of domicile ; preparing and filing a brief in opposi-
tion to contestant's application to the Supreme Court o~ Ap-
peals for a writ of error; preparing and filing a brief in th<1 
Supreme Court of Appeals and arguing the case there on · 
appeal. 
(j) The only services performed by complainant in the 
suit in Orange County, New York, to set aside the deed to 
Mrs. Hayes of the Newburgh real estate were in preparing 
drafts of proposed papers to remove the cause to the Dis-. 
trict Court of the United States for tl1e Southern District 
of New York and ,draft of a proposed answer to the bill; tak-
ing· depositions and otherwise preparing for trial; suggest-
ing changes in a stipulation providing that if the 
pag·e 845 ~ Virgini~ litig·ation was favorable to Mrs. Hayes 
it would control the New York litigation, but if 
the Virginia. litigation was unfavorable to Mrs. Hayes she 
could then contest the New York litigation; preparing draft · 
of proposed final order dismissing- the New York litigation 
on the merits afte1r the decision in favor of respondent in-
t.he third iri.11 contest. 
(k) The payments already made to New York counsel for 
fees and disbursements amounting to $2,219.22 and an ad-
ditional sum paid or incurred by respondent for Court costs 
amounting to $1,880.40 (Exhibit 37). 
(1) The fact that complainant was acting· as counsel for 
an Executrix of an estate. In such a case the rule is that 
only reasonable charges can be made and the evidence here 
shows the fee recommended bv the Commissioner is unreason-
able. ·· 
5. The Commissioner erred in holding or assuming tha.t, 
if the contest had been successful on the domicile issue, the 
contest on the meriti:; would necessarily have taken place in 
New York State, and in failing to hold that respondent had 
the right to probate the will in Virginia, where all the assets 
of the estate were located, irrespective of domicile. 
6. The Commissioner erred in considering as factors in 
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determining the amount of fees to which complainant was 
entitled 
(a) Complainant's fears that a fair trial of the New York 
litigation could not be had in Orange County, New York. 
(b) Complainant's fears that a fair trial of 
page 846 ~ any of the issues tendered by the pleacling·s in any 
of the cases could not have been had in New York 
State. 
( c) Complainant's fears and speculations that the instiga-
tors of the litig·ation defended by complainant would litigate 
at any time the validity of respondent's marriage to :Mr. 
Hayes. 
( d) Complainant's fears and speculations that any of the 
factual issues tendered by the pleadings would ever be tried 
in New York or any other place. 
( e) Complainant's fears of trying the case before a jury 
and claims that he successfully kept it from a jury, whcrea~ 
the record shows he was ready, willing and anxious to try all 
the factual issues before a jury in the first will contest. 
7. The ·Commissioner erred in considering the testimony 
of complainant's experts based on erroneous assumptions of 
fact and law, and in failing to give weight to the opinions of 
respondent's experts based upon actual facts and the la.w. 
8. The Commissioner erred ·in finding that complainant has 
received only the sum of $8,705.73 on account of his services, 
and in failing to find that he has been paid on account thereof 
$10,020.03 less disbursements claimed by complainant amount-
ting to $1,144.27, or $8,875.76, as the evidence shows. 
9. The Commissioner erred in adding an in-
page 847 ~ cremcnt on stock investments of $7,951 to arrive 
at the figure of $89,394 which he has fixed upon 
as the net value of the estate, including the Newburgh real 
estate, and in failing to fix the net value without said incre-
ment a.t the sum of $81,443. 
10. The Commissioner erred in finding that the estate's se-
curities are in the hands of complainant, and in failing to 
hold that said securities are in a safe deposit box in the 
National Bank of Commerce in the name of respondent, as 
Executrix, but to ,vhich access can be had· only in the pres-
ence of complainant as the evidence shows, and in failing 
further to find that there are in the same safe deposit box 
in the name of respondent, as Executrix, as also appears from 
the record, one Bear :Mountain Bridge bond, par value $1,000; 
three Republic of Chile (1960) bonds, par value $3:000, mar-
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ket value $420; Strauss bonds, par value $88,500, market 
value $14,425.92; twenty-five shares of Continental Can in-
stead of twenty-five shares of Consolidated Can as found 
by the Commissioner. 
11. The Commissioner erred in finding complainant has · a 
lien upon the estate's securities for any fees due him and in 
failing to hold he has no lien for the reasons that 
(a) ·Complainant does not have possession of the estate's 
assets or assets belonging to respondent and therefore has 
no lien thereon. 
page 848 } ( b) Such control as he has was given him for 
a special purpose inconsistent with, and adverse 
to, his claim to a lien. 
( c) Since the estate is not liable for complainant's fees, 
-as the Commissioner has held, its assets ar~ not chargeable 
with a lien therefor. 
12. The Commissioner erred in failing to find that com-
plainant has illegally converted, and is continuing to illegally 
convert, dividends and interest belonging to the estate to his 
own use over the objec.tion of respondent, and in findirig that 
he has used estate's funds amounting to only $1,474.37 and 
holds checks totaling only $50:-l.7 4 payable to Mrs. Hayes, as 
Executrix, for the reason that since the last statement was 
made up (Exhibit 55) and both before and since the Cbm-
missioner 's report wa.s filed further interest and dividend 
checks lurve come in to complainant and the aforesaid state-
ment does not reflect the true situation at the present time, 
as the respondent is informed and believes. 
13. The Commissioner (\rred in his deliberations in finding· 
that 
(a) The issues in the various suits defended by complain-
ant- were numerous and involved. 
(b) If complainant had appeared for Mrs. Hayes and op-
posed the application of her deceased husband's sister for 
letters of admini~tration in New York there was 
page 849 ~ a possibility of his submitting l1is client to the 
jurisdiction of the New York Court and thP 
''funds in. Virginia would then have been removed to New 
York for administration''. 
( c) Complainant nsed dilatory tactics in the first suit in 
the UnitP.d States Court to for~e counsP.l for contestant of 
the will to institute a suit in Princess _,_t\:nne County to litigate 
the validity of ~fr. Hayes' will. 
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( d) The question as to whether the Federal Court had 
jurisdiction of the cause of action set forth in the complaint 
in the second suit in the Federal Court (second will contest) 
was a novel one in Virginia practice. 
(e) Respondent's late husband deeded to her the New-
J)urgh reEtl estate about a month after the marriage when the 
record ·sliows the transfer was made about a year and a 
month·thereafter. 
(ff If the New York litigation over the Newburgh real 
estate had continued in. the State Court the issues therein 
would have been tried before a jury .. 
(g) The question of domicile was not involved in the first 
will contest. 
(h) The State inheritance tax returns could not be filed 
until complainant's fee was determined. 
(i) Complainant took all the necessary steps and prepared-
all the necessary papers for the removal of the New York 
litigation from New York Supreme Court to the Federal 
Court .. 
page 850 ~ (j) New York counsel differed with complain-
. ant with respect to the right to remove the New 
York litigation to the Federal Comt .. 
14. Respondent further excepts to the report because of 
evidence offered based on fears, speculations, understandings, 
hearsay, etc., which was improper and prejudj.cial to her in-
terest, and other testimony w hie~ was irrelevant and imma-
terial to the issues. 
WHEREFORE respondent prays that these her exceptions 
to said report may be sustained; that the Court will set the 
report aside at complainant's sole cost and order a new ref-
erence or trial for the reasons stated or that it may not be 
confirmed but will be reformed in the particulars mentioned 
and complainant's compensation fixed at the sum heretofore 
paid him; and that the respondent may have such other and 
further relief as the justice of the cause may require. 
ADELAIDE M. HAYES 
in her own right and as Execu-
trix of the la-st will and testa-
ment of William R. Haves· de-
ceased, · 
By BAIRD, WHITE & LANNING, 
Her Attorneys. 
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page 851 ~ The following is the Additional Exception to 
Commissioner's Report, filed by Adelaide M. 
Hayes, Executrix, etc., in this court on November 16, 1939. 
page 852 } Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk. 
William L. Parker, Complainant, 
v. 
Adelaide M. Hayes in her own right and as Executrix of the 
last will and testament. of William R. Hayes, deceased, et 
al., Respondents. 
Adelaide ]\L Hayes, ]Jxecutrix under the last will and testa-
ment of William R. Hayes, deceased, Complainant, 
v. 
William L. Parker, Respondent. 
" . 
IN CHANCERY. 
CONSOLIDATED CAUSES. 
ADDITIONAL EXCEPTION -TO COMl\HSSIONER'S RE~ 
PORT. 
2. (m) In holding complainant was entitled to compensa- · 
tion on a contingent basis and in allowing him a percentage 
of the amount found to be the value of the whole estate. 
ADELAIDE M. HAYES 
in her own right and as Execu-
trix of the last will and testa-
ment of William R. Hayes de-
ceased, 
By BAIRD, WHITE & LANNING, 
Her Attorneys. 
page 853 } The following is the final decree entered in thfa 
cause on December 5, 1939: · · 
page 854 } Virg·inia : 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk. 
William L. Parker, Complainant, 
1). 
Adelaide M. Hayes in her own right and as Executrix of th~ 
last will and testament of William R. Hayes, deceased, et 
al., Respondents. 
I 
51(; Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Adelaide M. B;ayes, Executrix under the last will and testa-
. ment of "\Villiam R. Hayes, deceased, Complainant, 
- v. 
"\Villiam L. Parker, Respondent. 
IN CHANCERY. 
CQNSOLIDATED CAUSES. 
DECREE. 
These consolidated causes came on again this day to be 
heard upon the papers formerly read, the decree entered 
therein on the 23rd day of December, 1938, referring- the con-
solidated cause to George Pilcher, J!"1sq., one of the Commis-
sioners of this Court, the report filed herein by Commissioner 
Pilcher in the execution of said reference and the evi de nee 
and exhibits returned there-with, and the exceptions filed to 
said report by Adelaide M. Hayes, in her own right and as 
Executrix of the last vYill and Testament of William R. Hayes, 
deceased, and was argued by counsel. 
page 855 } Upon consideration whereof the Court is of 
opinion to and doth sustain the 9th exception t() 
the report of Commissioner Pilcher and doth amend the said 
report in so far as the same finds the net value of the estate 
o( William R. Hayes, deceased, to be $89,394.00, in this, to-
wit: that there shall be deleted from the value of the gross 
estate, set forth in said report a.t $98,021.00, the it.em therein 
set out as "increment on stock investments, $7,951.00"; and 
there shall be deleted from the deductions from the gToss es-
tate the item therein set out as '' paper loss in sales of securi-
ties originally held as compared to the amount for which they 
were appraised, plus expenses of sales and purchases, 
$3,605.00'' so that. as amended the value of the gross est.ate? 
shall be $90,070.00, the amount of the deductions therr.from 
shall ag~;reirate $5,022.00, and the not value of the estate shall 
be $85,048.00. 
And the ,Court doth overrule each and eyerY one of the 
exceptions filed to the report of the said Commiss.ioner Pilcher 
save and except Raid Exception Number 9; and, as herein-
above amended, the said report of Commissioner Pilcher is 
hereby approYed and confirmed in all respects; 
AND .THE COURT DOTH FURTHER ADJUDGE, OR-
DER AND DECREE that the said ·wmiarn L. Parker, wa.s 
entitled for the services rendered hy him to Adelaide M. 
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Hayes up to the date of his discharge as the attorney of the 
said Adelaide M. Hayes, to-wit: the 23rd day of July, 1938, 
to the sum of $21,262.00, and that the said Adelaide M. Hayes 
is entitled as credits against the said claim of William L. Par-
ker to the sum of $8,705.73, the amount which, as found by 
.Commissioner Pilcher, has been paid to the said 
page 856} ·wmiam L. Parker by the said Adelaide M. Hayes 
on account of his services, plus the sum of 
$1,474.37, being the sum found by the Commissioner to have 
been collected by William L. Parker since July 23, 1938, on 
securities standing in his name, which securities are the prop-
erty of the estate of .. William R. Hayes; and plus $622.50, 
being the sum which the said William L. Parker testified in 
open Court he had collected on such securities since the Com-
missioner's report was filed: an aggTegate credit to the said 
Adelaide M. Hayes of $10,802.60. 
AND THE COURT DOTH FURTHER ADJUDGE, 
ORDER AND DECREE that the said William L. Parker do 
recover from the said Adelaide M. Hayes the sum of $10,-
459.40, being the gross amount due him as aforesaid less the 
credits aforesaid, with interest thereon at the rate of six 
per cent.um per annum from the date of this decree until paid, 
and the costs of tl1is suit, to be taxed by the Clerk of this 
Court. And- in taxing the costs of this suit the Clerk shall 
include as a part thereof a fee to Georg·e Pilcher, Commis-
sioner, of $1,250.00, and a payment to Phlegar & Tilghman, 
Court Reporters, of $426.00. 
And upon payment in full of the said judgment and costs 
hereinabove decreed in favor of the said William L. Parker 
he shall deliver to the said Adelaide M. Hayes, Executrix of 
the last Will and Testament of ·wmiam R. Hayes, deceased, 
all of the property belonging to the estate of the said Wil-
liam R. Hayes, deceased, in the hands of the said ·wmiam 
L. Parker, and lodged in the safe deposit box in the National 
Bank of Commerce of Norfolk, which box is rented 
page 857 } in the joint names of said William L. Parker and 
said Adelaide M. Hayei.;;, ~Jxecutrix. And it ap-
pearing to the Court. that the securities in the hands of said 
,Villiam L. Parker, as re11orted by Commissioner Pilcher, are 
the following: · 
. 100 American Telephone & TelegTapl1 Company 
100 General Electric 
50 United States Steel 
25 Norfolk & Western 
S1S. Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
25 ,Consolidated Can (correct name ·continental Can) 
25 American Tobacco Company 
50 National Dairy Products; 
and that there is or may be other property belonging to the 
estate of the said ·wmiam R. Hayes in said safe deposit box,. 
the said William L. Parker is hereby directed to deliver the 
securities listed by Commissioner Pilcher as aforesaid and 
any and all other property of the estate of the said vVilliam 
R.. Hayes in said safe deposit box; and the said ·wmiam L. 
Parker is further directed, upon delivery of said property 
as aforesaid, to make such endorsements £or transfer and 
do such other acts as may be necessary to transfer title thereto 
in the name of said Adelaide :M:. Hayes, Executrix of Wil-
liam R. Hayes, deceased; and simultaneously with the de-
livery of said property hereinabove mentioned said Parker 
shall in addition_ deliver to the said Atlelaide :M. Hayes all 
personal papers belonging to her as an individual. or as 
· Executrix of William R. Hayes whic.h may have been en-
trusted by her to said ·wmiam L. Parker in his capacity as 
attorney. 
And the said ·wmiam L. Parker is further directed, upon 
payment of the judgment and costs hereinabove provided 
for, to deliver to the said Adelaide l\.L Hayes, Executrix of 
William R. Hayes, deceased, the checks amounting to $503. 7 4 
reported by Commissioner Pilcher, plus checks 
page 858 ~ received by him since said date amounting to 
$264.37, which are held by the said William L. 
Parker, and the said Parker shall make such endorsement 
or do such other act with respect thereto as may be necessary 
to enable the said Adelaide M. Hayes, Executrix as afore-
said, to cash the same. And the said ·wmiam L. Parker shall, 
upon the payment· in full of the judgment and costs herein-
above provided for, countersign a good and sufficient check 
in favor of Adelaide M. Hayes, Executrix of William R. 
Hayes, drawn upon the. K ational Bank of Commerce of Nor-
folk in the sum of $656~67, the balance found by Commissioner 
Pile.her in his report as on deposit in Raid Bank to the credit 
of said Adelaide M. Hayes, Executrix. 
4nd leave is hereby granted to the said ,vmiam L. Parker, 
in the event that said judgment shall not be paid witllin the 
period of sixty clays from tlle entry of this decree, to make 
application to the Court for such further relief as he may 
be entitled to receive in and about the enforcement· of his lien 
as attorney and the collection of the judgment awarded him 
by this decree. 
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To which action of the Court, except its ruling as to the 
item set out in the Commissioner's report as ''increment on 
stock investments $7,951", the respondents Adelaide M. 
Hayes, in her own right and as Executrix of the last will and 
testament of William R. Hayes, deceased, duly excepted, and 
the said respondents having expressed an intention to present 
to the Supreme Court of Appeals a: petition for appea'l ,rom 
this decree it is 
ADJUDGED; ORDERED and DE.CHEED that execution 
of t.he judgment herein provided for be, and it is hereby, sus-
pended for a period of ninety days from the date hereof a~d 
thereafter until said petition is acted upon by the 
page 859 ~ Supreme Court of Appeals if said petition is filed 
within the required time, upon the filing of a. sus-
pending bond in the penalty of $100.00. · 
And this cause is continued. 
Norfolk, Virginia, December 5, 1939. 
page 860 ~ Norfolk, Virginia, December 1.2, 1939. 
Cecil M. Robertson, Esq. 
Clerk, Circuit Court, 
Norfolk, Virginia. 
Dear Sir: 
Parker v. Hayes, et al. 
Ha.yes v. Parker. 
Please make up a transcript of the record in the above en-. 
titled c.onsolidated cause for the purposes of a petition for 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals by Adelaide :M. 
Hayes, in her own rig·ht and as Executrix of the last will and 
testament of Williarn R. Hayes. deceased, from the decree en-
tered on December 5. You ·will find enclosed a stipulation 
covering what the record shall contain. ' 
GML/B 
Very truly yours, 
G'EORGE M. LANNING. 
Attorney for Adelaide M. Hayes, in her 
own rin-ht and · as Executrix of the 
fast will and testament of William R. 
Ha.yes, deceased. 
520 Supreme Court . of Appealsi of Virginia 
Copy of the foregoing is acknowledged this 12th day of 
December, 1939. 
WM. G. MAUPIN, 
Attorney for 'William L. Parker. 
pag·c! 861 ~ Virginia : 
In the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of the City of 
Norfolk, on the 6th day of January, in the year, 1940. 
I, Cecil M. Robertson, Clerk of the aforesaid Court, hereby 
c·ertify that the foregoing transcript includes the papers filed, 
and the proceedings had thereon in the Chancery Cause ( con-
solidated causes) of 'William I,. Parker, complainant, 1,er.m.~ 
Adelaide M. Hayes, in her own right and as Executrix of th~ 
last will and testament of ·wmiam R. Hayes, deceased, et al., 
defendants; and Adelaide M. Hay~s, Executrix under the last 
will and testament of. ·wmiarn R. Hayes, dee.eased, complain-
ant, versus William L. Parker~ defendant, lately pending in 
our said court. 
I further certify that the same was not made up and com-
pleted and delivP-red until the complainant had received due 
notice thereof and of the intention of the said Adela'ide M. 
Hayes, etc., to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia from the decree of said Court entered on the 5th 
day of December, 1939. 
Teste: 
CECIL M. ROBERTSON, Clerk. 
By SUE B. GOFORTH, D. C. 
Fee for transcript 
Fee for Binding· 
Record 
$100.00 
9.00 
$109.00 
A Copy--Teste: 
M:. B. 'WATTS, C . . C. 
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